Missile Defence and the Abm Treaty a Status Report

Stockholm International FACT SHEET Peace Research Institute June 2001

MISSILE DEFENCE AND THE ABM TREATY A STATUS REPORT

Introduction stabilizing logic of mutual assured gramme, which is set to undergo destruction codified in the treaty. a comprehensive overhaul. he subject of missile defence At the present stage it is a Second, it is to highlight the Thas again emerged as the debate about a virtual missile growing importance of the inter- focus of an international contro- defence system. This has national political dimension of the versy. The current debate is become an increasingly important missile defence controversy and generated by the USA s efforts to international issue, since its to describe recent developments modify a central pillar of the outcome is seen as affecting the related to Washington s missile nuclear arms control framework security interests of many states. defence plans. inherited from the cold war the A key question is whether a This fact sheet was prepared by 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of cooperative, multilateral approach Shannon Kile, SIPRI Researcher, Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems to missile defences can be forged in June 2001. It was edited by (ABM Treaty) in order to permit that will address US threat per- Connie Wall, Head of the SIPRI it to develop and deploy a limited ceptions and at the same time Editorial and Publications or thin national missile defence allay the security concerns of Department. (NMD) system. Russia, China and other states in Adam Daniel Rotfeld Underlying the missile defence Europe and Asia. Director of SIPRI controversy is a doctrinal dispute As evidenced by the dis- about the relationship between cussions held during the Nobel deterrence and defence in the Symposium on A Future Arms Contents post-cold war world and the rele- Control Agenda organized by ¥˚The NMD consensus in vance of the ABM Treaty as the SIPRI in the autumn of 1999, the the USA cornerstone of strategic stability . arms control process stands at a ¥˚Missile defence funding In the USA there is an emergent crossroads. The specific choices consensus in favour of building a to be made with respect to missile ¥ NMD system nationwide missile defence sys- defence and the future of the ¥˚Programme problems tem the prohibition of which is ABM Treaty will for some time to ¥˚Alternative NMD systems the basic purpose of the ABM come shape the possibilities for ¥˚Theatre missile defence Treaty in order to meet per- elaborating a nuclear order programmes ceived new proliferation threats. marked by stability, restraint and The debate over the new continuing deep reductions. ¥˚Challenges to the missile defence concept is not It is against this background that ABM Treaty confined solely to the USA. In SIPRI has assembled the infor- ¥˚Russian alternatives to Russia there is strong opposition mation and data contained in this strategic missile defence to amending the ABM Treaty to fact sheet. The purpose is two- ¥˚International concerns permit even a limited national fold. First, it is to describe recent missile defence system, since this developments in the USA s ¥˚Nuclear arms control at a crossroads is viewed as undermining the national missile defence pro-

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE 2 SIPRI FACT SHEET

The NMD consensus in The US National Missile Defense Act of 1999 the USA Main provisions: In the USA there has been renewed interest in building a ¥˚ It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is tech- national missile defence system, nologically possible an effective National Missile defense system especially among Republican capable of defending the territory of the United States against leaders in Congress, in the light limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized or of perceived new proliferation deliberate). threats. In the late 1990s this led ¥˚ It is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated to a partisan debate in Washing- reductions in Russian nuclear forces. ton over NMD and the future of the ABM Treaty. This debate In signing the legislation into law in July 1999, US President Bill involved disputes over three Clinton stated that an NMD deployment decision would be based related issues: upon the following considerations: ¥˚the nature of the threat posed (a)˚a determination that a new long-range ballistic missile threat to by the proliferation of nuclear, the USA is emerging; biological and chemical weapons and the means to deliver them; (b)˚an assessment of the technological feasibility and operational ¥˚the technical feasibility of NMD effectiveness of a proposed NMD system; and its likely effectiveness in (c)˚overall system cost; and meeting these threats; and (d)˚the progress made in achieving US arms control objectives, ¥˚the relationship between including any amendments to the ABM Treaty that may be deterrence and defence in the required . post-cold war world and the rele- vance of the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability . might not be deterred from National Missile Defense Act These disputes took place attacking US territory or interests against the background of a wider by the threat of devastating Domestic political support for debate about the adequacy of the retaliation, such a system is seen NMD was galvanized by North existing framework of arms con- as usefully augmenting nuclear Korea s launch in August 1998 of trol treaties and multilateral sup- deterrence. Some supporters of a three-stage Taepo Dong˚I mis- plier arrangements designed to missile defence argue that a more sile that passed over Japan. The prevent the spread of weapons of realistic danger is that these launch was widely seen in the mass destruction and the means states will start a regional armed USA as lending credence to the to deliver them. It was fuelled by conflict in the mistaken belief that findings of an influential report growing scepticism among many the USA will be deterred by their (the Rumsfeld Commission US conservatives about the effi- ballistic missile capabilities from Report), published earlier in 1998, cacy of the non-proliferation intervening in such a conflict. The which had concluded that the regime and about the value of deployment of an NMD system emerging ballistic missile threat is arms control agreements in gen- would force these states to broader, more mature and eral. reassess the risks they would evolving more rapidly than previ- face in confronting the USA and ously thought. Rationale for a limited NMD enhance the United States In May 1999 the US Congress system freedom of action. passed the National Missile There is an emergent consensus A limited NMD system is also Defense Act. Its enactment was in the USA that a limited NMD intended to provide protection part of the broader shift in the US system is needed to protect US against an accidental or unau- missile defence debate: the main territory against an attack by a thorized missile launch. In this point of contention was no longer small number of long-range mis- regard, it has a mission similar to whether a limited NMD system siles possibly armed with that of the Global Protection would be deployed but when. nuclear, chemical or biological Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) However, there remains strong weapons launched by rogue system, which was proposed in partisan disagreement on Capitol states such as North Korea, Iraq 1990 as a scaled-down version of Hill in Washington over the scale and Iran. Since these states the Star Wars programme. and scope of an eventual missile MISSILE DEFENCE AND THE ABM TREATY 3

tories (i.e., after they have Funding of US ballistic missile defence programmes, separated from their booster FY˚1998—2001 rockets) outside the earth s Figures are for budget authority, in US $m., at current prices. atmosphere. ______Radars. The interceptors 1998 1999 2000 2001 would be supported by high- ———————————————————————————————— frequency X-band tracking and NMD 936 1 687 961 2 034 guidance radars as well as by Theatre air & upgraded early-warning radars missile defence 2 442 1 838 2268 2 000 (UEWR) located in the USA, Support technologies & 422 648 630 729 Thule, Greenland, and Fyling- operations dales, UK. In order to upgrade Total 3 800 4 173 3 859 4 763 ______and incorporate the latter two radars into the NMD system, the Source: US Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. USA must obtain the consent of the British and Danish govern- defence system deployment as For the five-year period ments. well as over the degree to which it FY 2001—2005, the Clinton Satellites. The BMDO s plans should be concerned by the ABM Adminstration s budget allocated envision the deployment of two Treaty. Related to these dis- $10.5 billion for NMD, including constellations of space-based agreements are concerns about funds for construction and infrared system (SBIRS) satellites the affordability of missile procurement. The defences in the light of other Bush Administration budget priorities. reportedly plans to request a substantial Missile defence funding increase in spending on national missile Since President Ronald Reagan defence in a revised announced his Strategic Defense FY 2002 defence Initiative (SDI) in 1983, the USA budget request. has spent over $70 billion through the year 2000 on various systems NMD system designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles. Current BMDO plans Within the US Department of call for building a Defense, the Ballistic Missile land-based NMD Defense Organization (BMDO) is system of systems responsible for the overall man- consisting of several agement and direction of missile elements: defence programmes. These pro- Interceptors. The grammes focus on three areas: initial system would NMD; theatre missile defence use 100 ground- (TMD); and advanced ballistic based interceptor missile defence technologies. (GBI) missiles, The BMDO budget for FY 2001 deployed at a single was $4.8 billion (including sup- site in central plemental funding added by Con- Alaska. These gress in October 2000). The missiles would carry budget earmarked $4.05 billion the exo-atmospheric for missile defence research, kill vehicle (EKV) development, testing and evalua- designed to collide Architecture and operational concept of proposed land-based limited NMD system tion (RDT&E), of which $1.85 with incoming missile billion was authorized for NMD- warheads during the Source: The Economist, vol. 355, no. 8173 (1 June 2000), p.˚19. related programmes. mid-course phase of Spending on NMD is set to rise. their flight trajec- 4 SIPRI FACT SHEET

US national missile defence architecture and deployment optionsa –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Expanded Capability 1 Capability 2 Capability 3 ———————————————————————————————————————————————————

Mission Intercept few tens of warheads Intercept a few warheads Intercept a few tens of warheads accompanied by simple counter- accompanied by complex accompanied by complex countermeasures and decoys countermeasures and decoys measures and decoys

Deployment 2007 (initial capability in 2005) 2010 2011 date

Interceptors ¥˚100 interceptor missiles ¥˚100 interceptor missiles ¥˚250 interceptor missiles (1 site in Alaska) (1 site in Alaska) (1 site in Alaska, 1 in North Dakota)

Sensors ¥˚1 X-band tracking radar ¥˚4 X-band tracking radars ¥˚9 X-band tracking radars (Alaska) (2 in USA, I in UK, I in Greenland) (6 in USA, I in UK, I in Greenland, 1 in South Korea) ¥˚5 upgraded early warning radars ¥˚5 upgraded early warning radars ¥˚6 upgraded early warning radars (3 in USA, I in UK, I in Greenland) (3 in USA, I in UK, I in Greenland) (4 in USA, I in UK, I in Greenland) ¥˚4 early-warning satellites ¥˚5 early-warning satellites ¥˚5 early-warning satellites (SBIRS—High) (SBIRS—High) (SBIRS—High) ¥˚warhead-tracking satellites ¥˚24 warhead-tracking satellites ¥˚24 warhead-tracking satellites (SBIRS—Low engineering prototype) (SBIRS—Low) (SBIRS—Low)

Cost of $29.5 billion $6.1 billion $13.3 billion each phaseb ———————————————————————————————————————————————————————— a Based on revised NMD programme guidance announced by US Secretary of Defense William Cohen in 2000. b These estimates include one-time procurement costs as well as operations costs through FY 2015. They cover different periods of times based on when each level of capability will be initially operational. The estimate for operations for Expanded Capability 1 covers FY 2005—2015; Capability 2, FY 2010—2015; and Capability 3, 2011—2015. These estimates do not include the $10.6 billion cost of the SBIRS-Low satellite system. Source: US Congressional Budget Office, Budgetary and Technical Implications of the Administration s Plan for National Missile Defense, April 2000. in high- and low-earth orbits. cess data received from ground- Clinton Administration. According These satellites will detect missile based radars and space-based to the CBO, the Expanded C1 launches and provide guidance sensors. It would then use a net- phase of the system, consisting of information to the interceptors. work of communications facilities 100 missile interceptors, The SBIRS—Low satellite pro- to transmit target assignments launchers and associated radars, gramme, which is managed by and guidance information (called would cost $29.5 billion through the US Air Force, has experi- cueing data) to interceptor the year 2015: $20.9˚billion for enced significant engineering missiles. This can be done after one-time procurement costs and development problems. those missiles have been $8.5 billion for operations costs Command and control. The launched using the in-flight inter- for the years 2000—2015. The brains of the NMD system is a ceptor communications system CBO estimated that the cost of battle management command, (IFICS). the full ground-based NMD sys- control and communications tem would be $48.5 billion. This (BM/C3) system. This system is to System costs does not include the cost of be built at the North American The US Congressional Budget deploying 24 SBIRS—Low Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Office (CBO) has published an satellites, which the CBO esti- headquarters at Cheyenne estimate of the cost of the mated to be $10.6˚billion. This Mountain, Colorado. In the event ground-based NMD system would bring the total cost of the of a missile attack, it would pro- architecture outlined by the system to $59.1˚billion. MISSILE DEFENCE AND THE ABM TREATY 5

Programme problems complained that the test was and scope of the limited NMD manipulated to enhance the system proposed by the Clinton The ambitious schedule for chances of a successful outcome. Administration had been sharply deploying an initial NMD system The subsequent interception tests criticized by Republican leaders was criticized as a rush to failure failed, which has led to a signifi- in Congress, who argued that cur- in a 1998 report (the Welch cant delay in the testing pro- rent plans were driven more by Report) prepared by an inde- gramme. concerns with preserving intact pendent team of experts In addition to engineering the ABM Treaty than by consid- appointed by the Pentagon. development problems, there are erations of operational effective- Despite a restructuring of the doubts about whether the ness. NMD programme, the US Gen- planned NMD system can over- eral Accounting Office (GAO) come the decoys and other warned in May 2000 that a series countermeasures (i.e., systems There are serious questions technical challenges, particularly designed to evade or overwhelm about the effectiveness and in building the ground-based missile defence interceptors). The interceptor missile, continue to BMDO has been criticized in reliability of key missile pose significant performance and reports produced by the both defence technologies. schedule risks . Pentagon agencies and inde- Concerns about the readiness pendent experts for not testing and reliability of the NMD system the components of the planned US President George W. Bush technology have been under- system against the types of and Secretary of Defense Donald scored by the failures suffered in countermeasures that are Rumsfeld have supported the the BMDO s Integrated Flight expected to be available to a idea of building a more robust, Test Programme. Five flight tests state with a long-range ballistic multi-layer NMD system. They have been conducted to date. missile programme. have advocated pursuing tech- Three of these (in Oct. 1999, Jan. Following the conclusion of a nology development pro- 2000 and July 2001) have been deployment readiness review by grammes that eventually could interception tests using a proto- the Pentagon, US President Bill lead to the deployment of air-, type kill vehicle. A simulated Clinton announced in September sea- and space-based missile target warhead was destroyed in 2000 that he had decided to defence systems. the first test, although critics postpone authorizing the deploy- Experimentation on these ment of a limited NMD system. options is prohibited by the ABM According to Clinton, the NMD Treaty. According to Rumsfeld, programme was sufficiently the administration has consulted promising to justify continued with key allies and will later seek development and testing; how- agreement from Russia and ever, there was not enough China to lift the treaty s restric- information about the technical tions on development and testing. and operational effectiveness of In the meantime, the USA is pre- the entire NMD system to justify pared to proceed with an initial moving ahead with actual near-term NMD capability based deployment. The USA would on current plans, even though the instead continue an R&D pro- technologies remain unproven. gramme that would permit the next president to decide whether Boost-phase intercept system to authorize deployment of There has been particular interest national missile defences. in the idea of developing a sea- based system to intercept Alternative NMD systems missiles during the boost phase Launch of Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) on prototype (i.e., during the powered ascent missile interceptor as part of US Doubts about the reliability and phase) of their trajectories. Such NMD Integrated Flight Test likely effectiveness of the planned a system could be positioned programme, July 2000 NMD system have fuelled grow- relatively close to the shores of a Photo: United States Ballistic Missile ing interest in alternative missile state such as North Korea. Since Defense Organization. defence architectures. The size it would intercept missiles before 6 SIPRI FACT SHEET

Summary of US theatre missile defence (TMD) programmes

Programme Basing mode System Status

Endo-atmospheric a Navy Area Defense Sea-based Aegis cruisers and Low-rate initial production of (NAD)b destroyers equipped with Block IVA missile in FY 2001; reconfigured AN/SPY-1 radar projected FUE in FY 2003 and upgraded Standard Missile SM-2 (Block˚IVA) Patriot Advanced Land-based Mobile launcher, equipped Procurement of PAC-3 Capability-3 (PAC-3)b with high-speed hit-to-kill missiles to begin in FY 2001; interceptor missile, and associ- projected FUE in FY 2001 ated X-band radar and engagement control station

Exo-atmosphericc Navy Theater Wide Sea-based Aegis cruisers and destroyers Projected FUE for in FY 2010 (NTW)d equipped with new Standard for Block˚IC system, with con- Missile SM-3, carrying Light- tingency capability beginning weight Exo-Atmospheric Pro- in FY˚2006; Block˚II system jectile (LEAP) kinetic hit-to-kill planned as evolutionary warhead, upgraded radar option Theater High Altitude Land-based Truck-mounted launchers Entered into engineering and Area Defense (THAAD) d equipped with high-speed manufacturing development hit-to-kill interceptor missiles, (EMD) phase in 1999; pro- mobile X-band Ground-Based jected FUE for initial C1 Radar (GBR) and command capability in FY 2007; FUE and control system for C2 capability in 2011

Boost-phasee Airborne Laser Air-based Modified Boeing 747-400 air- Demonstration of laser craft carrying multiple laser lethality against an in-flight modules to create megawatt- ballistic missile scheduled class chemical laser for FY 2005

FUE = first unit equipped a˚Interception of target missile occurs inside earth s atmosphere, in the terminal phase of its flight trajectory b˚The Patriot PAC-3 and NAD systems are designed to defend limited areas from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft. c˚Interception of target missile occurs above earth s atmosphere, in the mid-course phase of its flight trajectory. THAAD is also able to engage missiles within the earth s atmosphere. d˚The sea-based NTW and the land-based THAAD systems are designed to defend large areas from medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. e˚Interception of target missile occurs during the powered ascent phase of its flight. they could deploy warheads and Some analysts have suggested that no decision has been taken decoys, it would not face the that a multi-layer missile defence on a new system architecture. target discrimination problem system would cost at least $100 inherent in the mid-course inter- billion, and perhaps considerably Theatre missile defence cept approach. In addition, its more. Experience from the past programmes limited range would minimize the two decades shows that missile threat posed by the system to the defence programmes have The BMDO has developed a intercontinental ballistic missile encountered abnormal cost family of systems concept (ICBM) forces of China and growth, much higher than the involving a combination of inter- Russia. However, Pentagon offi- ordinary 20—30˚per cent rate of operable low- and high-altitude cials caution that there are signifi- increase in the costs of strategic TMD systems (see table). They cant technical obstacles to build- missile and space programmes. are designed to protect important ing a ship-based boost-phase Concerned about the potential overseas facilities and forward- interceptor. This means that a impact of a price shock on deployed units of the US armed system is unlikey to be ready for congressional support for NMD, forces, as well as allied countries, deployment until after 2010. administration officials emphasize in conflicts with adversaries which MISSILE DEFENCE AND THE ABM TREATY 7

might be armed with short- to Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic intermediate-range (i.e., non- Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) strategic) ballistic missiles. Signed by the USA and the USSR at Moscow on 26 May 1972; There is growing interest among entered into force on 3˚October 1972 missile defence proponents in incorporating TMD technolo- The basic purpose of the ABM Treaty is to prevent the parties from deploying gies the upper-tier versions of a nation-wide anti-ballistic missile system for defending the territory of their which are judged to have con- countries. It limits permitted missile defence systems in order to prevent cir- siderable inherent capability to cumvention of this basic purpose and to prevent the parties from being able intercept strategic missiles into to rapidly break out from the treaty regime. a multi-layer NMD system. Under the original terms of the treaty, each party was permitted two ABM There are several TMD devel- deployment areas, one to protect the national capital and the other to protect opment programmes under way an ICBM launch site. A protocol signed in 1974 limits the parties to a single involving international coopera- deployment area.*˚ tion between the USA and key Main provisions of the ABM Treaty allies. The most mature of the collaborative programmes is the ¥˚limits each party to a single ABM deployment area containing no more than US—Israeli Arrow Weapon Sys- 100 ABM launchers and 100 single-warhead missile interceptors; tem (AWS), which uses a mobile ¥˚limits the location, number and technical characteristics of permitted ABM two-stage interceptor missile radars; carrying a blast-fragmentation ¥˚prohibits radars designed to give early warning of strategic ballistic missile warhead. The first Arrow-2 attack from performing the function of ABM radars; battery entered service with the ¥˚prohibits the parties from transferring or deploying of ABM systems, or their Israeli Air Force in March 2000. components, outside their respective territories; ¥˚bans the development, testing or deployment of sea-, air-, space- or mobile Convergence of missile defence land-based ABM systems or components; concepts ¥˚does not limit air defence missiles and radars, provided that they adhere to In Europe, there is considerable two basic restrictions: (a)˚they may not be tested against strategic ballistic missiles in flight trajectory; and (b)˚they may not be given the technical capa- interest in TMD systems. These bility to counter such missiles and their constituent elements. systems are relatively uncontro- versial, since their development The treaty has an unlimited duration, although parties have the right to with- and deployment would not draw from it for reasons of supreme national interests with six months notifi- cation. require amending the ABM Treaty and thereby upsetting the The 1997 memorandum of succession and demarcation agreement existing framework of strategic stability. The main rationale of In September 1997 a Memorandum of Understanding on Succession European TMD is to protect (MOUS) was signed in New York by the foreign ministers of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and the USA, pursuant to which the four former peacekeeping troops in areas of Soviet republics collectively assumed the rights and obligations of the USSR conflict. However, from a techni- under the ABM Treaty. The MOUS has not been brought before the US cal standpoint, a European TMD Senate for a ratification vote. Some leading Republicans claim that the ABM system could perform many of Treaty has lapsed and is of no force and effect. the tasks for which the United At the 1997 meeting in New York, a set of Agreed Statements was signed States is designing an NMD setting out technical parameters to clarify the demarcation line between stra- system. tegic missile defences, which are covered by the prohibitions of the ABM In the light of European reser- Treaty, and non-strategic (or theatre) missile defences, which are not. vations about NMD, the Bush Administration has worked to *˚The Soviet Union chose to deploy (and Russia continues to maintain) an ABM system erase the line between a strictly around Moscow. The USA deployed an ABM system known as Safeguard at an ICBM launch silo complex at Grand Forks, North Dakota; it achieved an initial operating national system designed to pro- capability (IOC) in 1975 but was deactivated the following year. tect the US homeland and a wider international, multi-tiered missile defence. Secretary of was no meaningful distinction national and what is theater Defense Rumsfeld stated in between national and theatre depends on where you live . March 2001 that in his view there missile defences, since what is Earlier, a senior administration 8 SIPRI FACT SHEET

official had proposed dropping the Treaty, the Bush Administration are viewed as an attempt by the term national missile defence in reportedly is preparing to offer a USA to unilaterally achieve favour of allied missile defence package of sweeteners . These security for itself at the expense to better reflect the actual scope are likely to include an offer to of other countries. of US plans. purchase Russian-made S-300 Senior Russian officials have surface-to-air missiles (also rejected President Bush s pro- Challenges to the known as the SA-10) that could posal to move towards a new ABM Treaty be incorporated into a European strategic framework featuring a missile defence system. Other mixture of defence and deter- The recent change of administra- proposals involve holding joint rence. They emphasize that the tion in Washington has resulted in anti-missile exercises and pro- ABM Treaty remains the corner- a shift in the US position towards viding money to repair Russia s stone of the entire Russian—US the future of the ABM Treaty. deteriorating early-warning radar nuclear arms control regime and During the Clinton Administra- system. warn that a US withdrawal from tion, the USA sought unsuccess- the treaty would lead to the fully to obtain Russia s agreement Russian perspectives on missile collapse of that regime. The result defence on amendments to the ABM would be a reversal of the arms Treaty that would permit the Russia has consistently ruled out control achievements of the past deployment of a limited NMD the idea of amending or replacing two decades, with the Russian system but would not interfere the ABM Treaty in order to and US strategic nuclear force with the basic purpose of the address perceived new threats. postures becoming less transpar- treaty. US officials insisted that In Russia, missile defence con- ent and more difficult to predict. only modest changes were tinues to be viewed primarily from There also have been repeated needed to accommodate an NMD the perspective of the warnings that Russia would system consisting of a single site US—Russian strategic nuclear respond to any unilateral US with 100 missile interceptors balance. Washington s claims decision to deploy an NMD sys- based in Alaska. This primarily about the emerging ballistic tem with a variety of technical would have involved amending missile threat posed by states countermeasures. Some of these the treaty to permit the USA to such as Iran, Iraq and North were originally developed in the change the location of its desig- Korea have been dismissed as 1980s as a response to SDI. nated ABM site. It would also largely exaggerated. On the Russia s severe financial prob- involve amending the treaty s whole, US missile defence plans lems probably preclude it from restrictions on early-warning and ABM engagement radars and its prohibition on the use of space- USSR/Russia based sensors. USA By contrast, President Bush has 14000 indicated that his administration is 11966 seeking to scrap the ABM Treaty 12000 10880 rather than amend it. In a May 10022 10000 2001 address on missile defence, 8043 he described the ABM Treaty as 8000 7206 an anachronism that enshrined 5636 6000 the grim premise of mutual 4632 assured destruction. He called for 4000 negotiating a new framework 2153 2000 with Russia that would move beyond the treaty s cold war-era 0 constraints and allow the USA to 1971 1981 1991 2001 build missile defences to counter the different threats of today s USSR/Russian and US strategic nuclear forces: world. deployed warheads, 1971—2001 In order to gain Russian Source: SIPRI Yearbook (various editions) cooperation in replacing the ABM MISSILE DEFENCE AND THE ABM TREATY 9

undertaking a large-scale build-up address this threat. In general, pan-European mobile missile of its strategic nuclear forces, Russian officials emphasize that defence units that can be moved including making good on threats the problem of missile to areas that might be faced with to deploy multiple warheads proliferation must be considered a missile threat. However, they (which are banned under the within the framework of point out that the proposal calls terms of the 1993 START˚II international legal and political for first holding expert consulta- Treaty) on its new single-warhead non-proliferation arrangements. tions to assess whether a missile Topol-M (SS-27) ICBM. However, threat to Europe actually exists. Global Control System For their part, US officials have said that the proposed pan-Euro- One Russian response may In January 2000 Russia proposed pean system is not a substitute the establishment of a multilateral be to re-emphasize its for NMD since it cannot defend Global Control System (GCS) to reliance on a launch-on- US territory. warning strategic nuclear prevent the spread of ballistic missiles and missile technologies. force posture. The GCS would be open to all International concerns interested states on a voluntary some analysts have expressed The missile defence debate con- basis to work out rules of con- concern that one likely Russian tinues to raise concern in China, duct in the missile field and to response will be to re-emphasize which sees the deterrence credi- reduce the dangers of using its reliance on a launch-on- bility of its small strategic nuclear missiles in peacetime. Although warning strategic nuclear force force as being jeopardized by the the US response to the GCS pro- posture. This means that large deployment of US missile posal was lukewarm, the two numbers of nuclear warheads defences. This force currently countries agreed to discuss ways would continue to be maintained consists of about 20 DF-5 ICBMs. to integrate it with a US proposal on hair-trigger alert and deployed There is speculation that the for a missile code of conduct on Soviet-era launchers coming USA s missile defence plans have within the framework of the to the end of their useful services given an impetus to China s long- Missile Technology Control lives, against the background of term strategic nuclear force Regime (MTCR). the deterioration of Russia s modernization programme. strategic early-warning radar and In addition, China appears to be Non-strategic pan-European satellite networks. concerned about the political missile defence system implications of cooperation Russian alternatives to In June 2000 President Putin put between the USA and Taiwan on strategic missile defences forward a proposal for a non- theatre missile defences. It strategic, pan-European ballistic worries that a missile defence There has been a high-level dia- missile defence system. The pro- shield will reduce its leverage logue between Russia and the posal envisions wide-ranging over the island and might encour- USA regarding the threats posed cooperation between Russia and age greater assertiveness among by the proliferation of ballistic the European member states of pro-independence Taiwanese missiles and missile technologies. NATO as well as other countries political factions. In˚June˚2000 Clinton and in Europe. The European dimension Russian President Vladimir Putin To date the Russian proposal issued a Joint Statement on the contains few details. It reportedly In Europe, US allies and other Principles of Strategic Stability. involves a mobile, land-based states have expressed serious One point of convergence was system that would use interceptor concerns about the potential that Clinton and Putin agreed that missiles to destroy incoming war- negative consequences of the the international community heads. This could be based on USA s missile defence plans for faces a dangerous and growing the Russian S-300 missile system international security. They have threat of proliferation of weapons or its successors; since it involves expressed particular concern that of mass destruction and their non-strategic missile defences, the abandonment of the ABM means of delivery, including the system would not violate the Treaty by the USA would compli- ballistic missiles . ABM Treaty. According to cate relations with Russia and However, the two countries Russian Defence Ministry might spark a new nuclear arms remain at odds over how best to officials, the main idea is to create race. The NATO allies also have 10 SIPRI FACT SHEET

worried that a US NMD shield to nuclear arms control that an attempt to overcome concern would contribute over the long emerged during the cold war. In in the capitals of US friends and term to decoupling transatlantic signing the treaty, the USA and foes alike that the administration s security by creating a situation in the Soviet Union came to accept missile defence plans will reverse which Europe would be vulner- the notion that strict limitations on the post-cold war trend towards able to missile attack emanating missile defences were a precon- lower nuclear force levels. from a regional trouble spot such dition for restraining the nuclear Earlier, in November 2000, as the Middle East while the USA arms race. President Putin proposed that would not be. France and Ger- This relationship between the Russia and the USA should many have been especially vocal limitations on strategic defences reduce their strategic nuclear in their disapproval of the pro- imposed by the ABM Treaty and arsenals below the 1500-warhead posed NMD system. the prospects for reducing offen- level envisioned in a proposed The Bush Administration has sive nuclear arms is being ques- START˚III agreement. While not launched intensive consultations tioned in the USA. There is a specifying a new limit, he called with US allies to explain its political consensus that the US for radically reduced ceilings for approach to missile defence and nuclear force posture needs to be nuclear warheads that could be the ABM Treaty. It has also adjusted to bring it into line with reached either jointly or in parallel reiterated its predecessor s changed political and financial moves. Putin added, however, pledge to share missile defence circumstances. However, the that any deeper cuts in nuclear technology with the USA s Bush Administration has forces would depend on progress friends and allies . European expressed interest in making this in preserving and strengthening resistance to US missile defence adjustment outside the framework the ABM Treaty. plans appeared to be softening in of traditional arms control treaties, the spring of 2001. perhaps in the form of unilateral Nuclear arms control at a However, at a meeting of NATO measures crossroads foreign ministers in May, the Upon taking office Bush ordered alliance refused to endorse a US the Pentagon to undertake a The debate over national missile call to take urgent measures to comprehensive defence review. defence and the future of the cope with the common threat Among other tasks, this review ABM Treaty has moved to the posed by emerging long-range will examine the USA s nuclear forefront of the nuclear arms con- ballistic missile capabilities in targeting strategy and the number trol and non-proliferation agenda. potentially hostile states. Several of nuclear weapons needed for The likely outcome of that debate European countries expressed deterrence. is difficult to predict at this point. scepticism about whether NATO In his May 2001 address on However, it is clear that nuclear faced a serious risk of missile missile defence, Bush stated that arms control is approaching a attack. The disagreement high- he would consider reducing US watershed. The specific choices lighted the gap in threat percep- strategic nuclear forces possibly to be made in the near future will tions that separates the USA from in a unilateral step to the lowest for some time to come shape the much of the rest of the alliance. possible number consistent with possibilities for elaborating a [US] national security . He also global nuclear order marked by The ABM Treaty and said that he would consider low- restraint and further reductions in nuclear force reductions ering the alert rate of US ICBMS, nuclear weapons. which remain primed for rapid The ABM Treaty forms the central launch. Some analysts have pillar of the traditional approach interpreted these statements as

' SIPRI 2001 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Signalistgatan 9, SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden Telephone +46 8/655 97 00 Telefax +46 8/655 97 33 Email [email protected] Internet URL http://www.sipri.se