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Basic Principles of Homing Guidance Basic Principles of Homing Guidance Neil F. Palumbo, Ross A. Blauwkamp, and Justin M. Lloyd his article provides a conceptual foundation with respect to homing guid- ance upon which the next several articles are anchored. To this end, a basic geometric and notational framework is first established. Then, the well- known and often-used proportional navigation guidance concept is developed. The mechanization of proportional navigation in guided missiles depends on several factors, including the types of inertial and target sensors available on board the missile. Within this context, the line-of-sight reconstruction process (the collection and orchestration of the inertial and target sensor measurements necessary to support homing guidance) is discussed. Also, guided missiles typically have no direct control over longitudinal accel- eration, and they maneuver in the direction specified by the guidance law by producing acceleration normal to the missile body. Therefore, we discuss a guidance command preservation technique that addresses this lack of control. The key challenges associ- ated with designing effective homing guidance systems are discussed, followed by a cursory discussion of midcourse guidance for completeness’ sake. INTRODUCTION The key objective of this article is to provide a broad The next section, Engagement Kinematics, establishes conceptual foundation with respect to homing guidance a geometric foundation for analysis that is used in the but with sufficient depth to adequately support the arti- subsequent sections of this and the other guidance- cles that follow. During guidance analysis, it is typical to related articles in this issue. In particular, a line-of- assume that the missile is on a near-collision course with sight (LOS) coordinate frame is introduced upon which the target. The implications of this and other assump- the kinematic equations of motion are developed; this tions are discussed in the first section,Handover Analysis. coordinate frame supports the subsequent derivation of JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 29, NUMBER 1 (2010) 25 N. F. PALUMBO, R. A. BLAUWKAMP, AND J. M. LLOYD _ _ _ _ proportional navigation (PN) guidance. Over the past 1 = r/r is the unit vector along the LOS; v and _rLOS T 50 years, PN has proven both reliable and robust, thereby vM are the velocity_ _ vectors_ of the target and missile, contributing to its continued use. The Development of respectively;_ vR = vT – vM is the relative velocity vector; PN Guidance Law section presents the derivation of and and e is the displacement error between predicted and discusses this popular and much-used technique. The true target position. subsequent section, Mechanization of PN, discusses how As discussed, ideally, the relative velocity vector is PN may be implemented in a homing missile. Key driv- along the LOS to the true future target position (at the ers here are the type of sensor that is used to detect and time of intercept). However, Fig. 1 depicts a more real- track the target, how the sensor is mounted to the mis- istic condition where the relative velocity is along the sile, and how the LOS (rate) measurement is developed. LOS to the estimated future target position in space. For The next section, Radome/Irdome Design Requirements, this case, the interceptor will miss the target unless it briefly discusses the functional requirements imposed applies corrective maneuvers. _ on modern missile radomes. This is followed by an Figure 1 illustrates that the displacement error, e, can_ be decomposed into two components: one along (e ) expanded section on Guidance System Design Challenges. _ Here, the contributors to the degradation of guidance and one perpendicular (e⊥) to the predicted target system performance (radome error and others) are dis- LOS. This decomposition is expressed in Eq. 1: cussed. Then, Guidance Command Preservation presents ee= (): 11rr a technique for commanding acceleration commands LOSLOS (1) perpendicular to the missile body that will effectively ee= = 11rr##(). maneuver the missile in the desired guidance direction. LOSLOS _ _ Although this article is mainly concerned with termi- • In this equation, x y represents_ the_ dot _(scalar)_ product nal homing concepts, the Midcourse Guidance section between the two vectors x and y, and x 3 y represents briefly discusses issues and requirements associated with the cross (vector) product between the two_ vectors. Note the midcourse phase of flight. that, because the relative velocity vector, v, is along the _ LOS to the predicted target location, the error e will Handover Analysis alter the time of intercept but does not contribute to the final miss distance. Consequently, the miss distance that When terminal guidance concepts are being devel- must be removed by the interceptor after transition to oped or related systems analysis is being performed, it _ terminal homing is contained in e⊥ (i.e., target uncer- typically is assumed that the missile interceptor is on a tainty normal to the LOS). collision course (or nearly so) with the target. In reality, Homing missile guidance strategies (guidance laws) this is not usually the case. For example, there can be dictate the manner in which the missile will guide to significant uncertainty in target localization, particu- intercept, or rendezvous with, the target. The feedback larly early in the engagement process, that precludes sat- nature of homing guidance allows the guided mis- isfaction of a collision course condition prior to terminal sile (or, more generally, “the pursuer”) to tolerate some homing. Moreover, the unpredictable nature of future target maneuvers (e.g., target booster staging events, energy management steering, coning of a ballistic mis- Actual target e sile reentry vehicle, or the weaving or spiraling maneu- position Ќ e Predicted vers of an anti-ship cruise missile) can complicate the target development of targeting, launch, and/or (midcourse) position e 1 guidance solutions that guarantee collision course con- ʈ y ditions before initiation of terminal homing. In addition, Line of sight cumulative errors are associated with missile navigation r 1x and the effects of unmodeled missile dynamics that all vR –1z add together to complicate satisfaction of a collision vM Target vT course condition. For simplicity, all of these errors can be velocity Missile velocity Missile 1 collectively regarded as uncertainties in the location of Fixed target y the target with respect to the missile interceptor. Thus, frame if the interceptor is launched (and subsequently guided 1x during midcourse) on the basis of estimated (predicted) –1z future target position, then, at the time of acquisition by the onboard seeker, the actual target position will be Figure 1. To assist in simplifying the analysis of handover to ter- displaced from its predicted position. Figure 1 notion- minal homing, all of the contributing navigation and engagement _ ally illustrates this condition, where r is the LOS vector modeling errors are collectively regarded as uncertainties to the between the missile and the predicted target location; location of the target with respect to the missile at handover. 26 JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 29, NUMBER 1 (2010) BASIC PRINCIPLES OF HOMING GUIDANCE level of (sensor) measurement uncertainties, errors in ␦r 1 = ␦t the assumptions used to model the engagement (e.g., n ␦r unanticipated target maneuver), and errors in modeling ␦t missile capability (e.g., deviation of actual missile speed LOS coordinate r 1r = of response to guidance commands from the design frame r assumptions). Nevertheless, the selection of a guidance Missile r LOS strategy and its subsequent mechanization are cru- 1␻ = 1r ϫ 1n cial design factors that can have substantial impact on rM Target guided missile performance. Key drivers to guidance law rT design include the type of targeting sensor to be used Fixed coordinate frame (passive IR, active or semi-active RF, etc.), accuracy of 1y the targeting and inertial measurement unit (IMU) sen- sors, missile maneuverability, and, finally yet important, 1x the types of targets to be engaged and their associated maneuverability levels. We will begin by developing a –1z basic model of the engagement kinematics. This will Figure 2. In the LOS coordinate frame, the LOS rate is perpen- lay the foundation upon which PN, one of the oldest dicular to the LOS direction and rotation of the LOS takes place – and most common homing missile guidance strategies, about the 1 . is introduced. _ Engagement Kinematics: The Line-of-Sight We define this change in direction by the vector n as given in Eq. 4: Coordinate System The development presented here follows the one n / 1 . (4) given in Ref. 1. In the sequel, the following notation is t r used: X = n 3 m (read n-by-m) matrix of scalar elements _ _ Consequently, a second unit vector, 1 , is defined to x , i = 1 … n, j = 1 … m; x = n 3 1 vector of scalar ele- _ n i,j _ be in the direction of n as shown: ments x , i = 1 … n; x = n x2 = Euclidean vector i _ _ _ _ /i = 1 i _ norm of x; 1 = x/x = n 3 1 unit vector (e.g., 1 = 1) x _ x 1r/ t n in the direction of x; /t = time derivative with respect 1 ==. (5) n 1 / t n to a fixed (inertial) coordinate system; and d/dt = time r derivative with respect to a rotating coordinate system. Finally, to complete the definition of the (right-_ Consider the engagement geometry shown in Fig. 2, _ _ handed) LOS coordinate system, a third unit vector, 1, where rM and rT are the position vectors of the missile is defined as the cross product of the first two: interceptor and target with respect to a fixed coordinate _ _ _ _ _ _ frame of reference (represented by the triad {1x, 1y, 1z}).
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