WINNING THE SALVO COMPETITION REBALANCING AMERICA’S AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES MARK GUNZINGER BRYAN CLARK WINNING THE SALVO COMPETITION REBALANCING AMERICA’S AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES MARK GUNZINGER BRYAN CLARK 2016 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2016 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mark Gunzinger is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Mr. Gunzinger has served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Transformation and Resources. A retired Air Force Colonel and Command Pilot, he joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2004. Mark was appointed to the Senior Executive Service and served as Principal Director of the Department’s central staff for the 2005–2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Following the QDR, he served as Director for Defense Transformation, Force Planning and Resources on the National Security Council staff. Mr. Gunzinger holds an M.S. in National Security Strategy from the National War College, a Master of Airpower Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, a Master of Public Administration from Central Michigan University, and a B.S. in chemistry from the United States Air Force Academy. He is the recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service, the Defense Superior Service Medal, and the Legion of Merit. Bryan Clark is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Prior to joining CSBA in 2013, Mr. Clark was special assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and director of his Commander’s Action Group, where he led development of Navy strategy and implemented new initiatives in electromagnetic spectrum operations, undersea warfare, expeditionary operations, and personnel and readiness management. Mr. Clark served in the Navy headquarters staff from 2004–2011, leading studies in the Assessment Division and participating in the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews. His areas of emphasis were modeling and simulation, strategic planning, and institutional reform and governance. Prior to retiring from the Navy in 2007, Mr. Clark was an enlisted and officer submariner, serving in afloat and ashore submarine operational and training assignments, including tours as chief engineer and operations officer at the Navy’s nuclear power training unit. Mr. Clark holds an M.S. in national security studies from the National War College and a B.S. in chemistry and philosophy from the University of Idaho. He is the recipient of the Department of the Navy Superior Service Medal and the Legion of Merit. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank the CSBA staff for their assistance with this report. Special thanks go to Jacob Cohn and Sean Cate for their analysis of threats and air and missile defense invest- ments, Kamilla Gunzinger for her production assistance, and Ryan Boone for his excellent graphics. The analysis and findings presented here are solely the responsibility of the authors. Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . i Report Purpose and Scope ................................................iii Recommendation: Develop Operational Concepts to Create Advantages in Future Salvo Competitions .....................................................iii Recommendation: Invest in New Technologies and Capabilities to Defeat PGM Salvos ......v Overcoming Barriers to Rebalancing .........................................vii INTRODUCTION . 1 Emerging Precision Strike Complexes ........................................ 1 Summary ............................................................ 9 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR COUNTERING ENEMY SALVOS . 11 Reducing the Density and Effectiveness of Enemy Salvos ........................ 11 Increasing the Capacity of U.S. Air and Missile Defenses ......................... 21 ENABLING CAPABILITIES AND TECHNOLOGIES . 29 Kinetic Defenses ...................................................... 29 Mature and Maturing Technologies for Non-Kinetic Salvo Defenses .................. 38 Battle Management: A Critical Enabler ...................................... 46 CASE STUDIES . 49 Case Study 1: Alternative Defensive AAW Capabilities Mix ........................ 49 Case Study 2: Increasing the Density of Base Defenses .......................... 53 Summary ........................................................... 57 BARRIERS TO CHANGE . 59 Old Assumptions for Defending Theater Bases. 59 A Bias for Long-Range Missile Interceptors ................................... 59 A Strategic Bias Toward Ballistic Missile Defense ............................... 60 Unclear Responsibilities for Salvo Defense ................................... 61 Insufficient Resources . 63 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS . 65 APPENDIX 1 . CHINA’S CRUISE MISSILES . 69 APPENDIX 2 . CHINA’S BALLISTIC MISSILES . 71 APPENDIX 3 . IRAN’S CRUISE MISSILES . 72 APPENDIX 4 . IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILES . 73 APPENDIX 5 . GROSS WEAPON SYSTEM UNIT COSTS FOR INTERCEPTORS IN PRODUCTION FOR THE U .S . MILITARY . 75 LIST OF ACRONYMS . 78 FIGURES FIGURE 1: ILLUSTRATIVE PRECISION STRIKE “SALVO COMPETITION” ......................ii FIGURE 2: PLAAF H-6K BOMBER WITH EXTERNAL WEAPON PYLONS AND A DF-21 ON A MOBILE LAUNCHER ........................................................ 2 FIGURE 3: HYPOTHETICAL HGV ATTACK . 3 FIGURE 4: IRANIAN “SEJIL” MOBILE MRBM AND “GHADAR” CRUISE MISSILE ............... 4 FIGURE 5: NAVY AAW INTERCEPTOR PROCUREMENT FUNDING SINCE 1999 ................ 6 FIGURE 6: DOD CUMULATIVE LAND-BASED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE INTERCEPTOR PROCUREMENT FUNDING SINCE 1999 .......................................... 7 FIGURE 7: OPERATING FROM LOWER THREAT AREAS ............................... 12 FIGURE 8: DISPERSING INSIDE A2/AD AREAS . 14 FIGURE 9: OVERLAPPING SALVO DEFENSES IN A NOTIONAL BASE CLUSTER ............... 15 FIGURE 10: COMPLICATING AN ENEMY’S PRECISION TARGETING ....................... 16 FIGURE 11: INTERCEPTING THE ARCHERS. 19 FIGURE 12: NOTIONAL INTEGRATED FIRE CONTROL-COUNTER AIR NETWORK .............. 20 FIGURE 13: ILLUSTRATIVE SHORT- AND MEDIUM-RANGE DEFENSIVE AAW CAPABILITIES ...... 22 FIGURE 14: HYPERVELOCITY PROJECTILES FOR EMRG, 5-INCH GUN, AND 155MM ARTILLERY; NAVY LASER WEAPON SYSTEM ON USS PONCE .......................... 23 FIGURE 15: ILLUSTRATIVE SHORT- AND MEDIUM-RANGE BASE DEFENSES ................ 24 FIGURE 16: LAUNCH OF A DAVID’S SLING ...................................... 25 FIGURE 17: CONCEPT FOR AN INTEGRATED MEDIUM-RANGE BASE DEFENSE .............. 26 FIGURE 18: RIM-162 ESSM AND RIM-116 ROLLING AIRFRAME MISSILE .................. 31 FIGURE 19: LAND-BASED MULTI-MISSION MEDIUM RANGE RAILGUN WEAPON SYSTEM CONCEPT ........................................................ 32 FIGURE 20: LOWER-AD INTERCEPTOR AND AI3 INTERCEPTOR ............................33 FIGURE 21: ARTIST’S CONCEPT OF MAD-FIRES THREAT ENGAGEMENTS .....................34 FIGURE 22: 155MM HOWITZER ..................................................35 FIGURE 23: PROTOTYPE EMRG AND ARTIST’S CONCEPT OF AN EMRG ON THE USNS TRENTON ..............................................................36 FIGURE 24: BEAM DIRECTORS FOR THE MIRACL LASER AND LAWS DEPLOYED ON THE USS PONCE .............................................................41 FIGURE 25: ILLUSTRATIVE LASER POWER LEVELS FOR VARIOUS TARGETS ...................42 FIGURE 26: HELLADS MOCKUP AND THE MARITIME LASER DEMONSTRATOR .................43 FIGURE 27: AAW CAPACITY COMPARISON FOR A CRUISER OR DESTROYER ..................50 FIGURE 28: AAW CAPACITY COMPARISON FOR A CARRIER STRIKE GROUP ...................51 FIGURE 29: COMPARING COSTS TO DEFEAT EACH ASCM IN A SALVO ......................52 FIGURE 30: COMPARING COSTS TO DEFEAT EACH ASBM IN A SALVO .......................53 FIGURE 31: CHINA’S DF-26 IRBM AND NORTH KOREA’S KN-08 ICBM .......................54 FIGURE 32: GUAM AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT COMPARISON .................55 FIGURE 33: COMPARING COSTS TO DEFEAT EACH LACM IN A SALVO . 56 FIGURE 34: COMPARING COSTS TO DEFEAT EACH BALLISTIC MISSILE IN A SALVO . 56 FIGURE 35: BREAKOUT OF 1999–2017 TOTAL INTERCEPTOR PROCUREMENT FUNDING BY ORGANIZATION ............................................................62 FIGURE 36: ANNUAL INTERCEPTOR PROCUREMENT FUNDING SINCE 1999 ..................63 FIGURE 37: COMPARISON OF FY 2015 PROCUREMENT FUNDING FOR KINETIC INTERCEPTORS AND S&T FOR ELECTRIC WEAPON TECHNOLOGIES DEVELOPMENT ............64 TABLES TABLE 1: CURRENT SHORT-RANGE TO MEDIUM-RANGE KINETIC DEFENSES ............... 30 TABLE 2: FUTURE KINETIC DEFENSES .......................................... 38 www.csbaonline.org i Executive Summary Over the last fifteen years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has spent more than $24 billion buying a mix of capabilities to defeat guided missile threats it views as a “cost-imposing chal- lenge to U.S. and partner naval forces and land installations.”1 Despite DoD’s urgency, these investments have fallen short of creating defensive