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Blood-Soaked Secrets Why Iran’S 1988 Prison Massacres Are Ongoing Crimes Against Humanity

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BLOOD-SOAKED SECRETS WHY IRAN’S 1988 PRISON MASSACRES ARE ONGOING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 7 million people who campaign for a world where human rights are enjoyed by all. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations. © Amnesty International 2017 Cover photo: Collage of some of the victims of the mass prisoner killings of 1988 in Iran. Except where otherwise noted, content in this document is licensed under a Creative Commons © Amnesty International (attribution, non-commercial, no derivatives, international 4.0) licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode For more information please visit the permissions page on our website: www.amnesty.org Where material is attributed to a copyright owner other than Amnesty International this material is not subject to the Creative Commons licence. First published in 2017 by Amnesty International Ltd Peter Benenson House, 1 Easton Street London WC1X 0DW, UK Index: MDE 13/9421/2018 Original language: English amnesty.org CONTENTS GLOSSARY 7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 METHODOLOGY 18 2.1 FRAMEWORK AND SCOPE 18 2.2 RESEARCH METHODS 18 2.2.1 TESTIMONIES 20 2.2.2 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 22 2.2.3 AUDIOVISUAL EVIDENCE 23 2.2.4 COMMUNICATION WITH IRANIAN AUTHORITIES 24 2.3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 25 BACKGROUND 26 3.1 PRE-REVOLUTION REPRESSION 26 3.2 POST-REVOLUTION REPRESSION 27 3.3 IRAN-IRAQ WAR 33 3.4 POLITICAL OPPOSITION GROUPS 33 3.4.1 PEOPLE’S MOJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN 33 3.4.2 FADAIYAN 34 3.4.3 TUDEH PARTY 35 3.4.4 KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF IRAN 35 3.4.5 KOMALA 35 3.4.6 OTHER GROUPS 36 4. CONCEALING THE FATE OF VICTIMS 37 4.1 PRISONERS GO MISSING 37 4.2 FAMILIES KEPT IN THE DARK 40 4.3 CRUEL NOTIFICATION OF DEATH 42 4.4 MISLEADING INFORMATION 45 4.5 DEATH CERTIFICATES: DENIED OR FALSIFIED 46 3 BLOOD-SOAKED SECRETS WHY IRAN’S 1988 PRISON MASSACRES ARE ONGOING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY Amnesty International 5. HIDING THE BODIES 53 5.1 SECRET BURIALS 53 5.2 FAKE GRAVES? 56 5.3 OPENED GRAVES 60 5.4 MISSING FROM BURIAL RECORDS 62 6. DENYING THE MASS KILLINGS 64 6.1 DENIAL TO INTERNATIONAL BODIES 64 6.1.1 IRAN’S RESPONSE TO AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 65 6.1.2 IRAN’S RESPONSE TO UN HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISMS 70 6.2 DENIAL AND DISTORTION IN IRAN 81 7. THE KILLINGS: WHAT REALLY HAPPENED 84 7.1 SURVIVORS’ ACCOUNTS 84 7.1.1 ‘DEATH COMMISSIONS’ 84 7.1.2 VICTIMS 86 7.2 A PRE-PLANNED MASSACRE? 92 7.3 LEAKED OFFICIAL RECORDS 95 7.3.1 MONTAZERI’S LETTERS 95 7.3.2 THE FATWA 97 7.3.3 RECORDS OF MEETINGS 100 7.3.4 THE AUDIO RECORDING 101 7.3.5 REPRISAL FOR REVEALING ‘STATE SECRETS’ 105 FAMILIES’ ONGOING TORMENT 107 8.1 SUSPENDED LIVES 107 8.2 MOURNING RITUALS AND COMMEMORATIONS FORBIDDEN 109 8.3 ILL-TREATMENT OF FAMILIES ATTENDING COMMEMORATIONS 111 CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 115 9.1 EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS 115 9.2 ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE 116 9.3 TORTURE 117 9.4 CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 118 9.4.1 PERSECUTION 118 9.4.2 MURDER 118 9.4.3 EXTERMINATION 118 9.4.4 ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE 119 9.4.5 TORTURE 119 9.4.6 OTHER INHUMANE ACTS 119 4 BLOOD-SOAKED SECRETS WHY IRAN’S 1988 PRISON MASSACRES ARE ONGOING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY Amnesty International CRISIS OF IMPUNITY 120 10.1 IRAN'S OBLIGATIONS TO ADDRESS IMPUNITY 120 10.2 CELEBRATING MASS KILLINGS 121 10.3 INACTION AND REPISALS IN RESPONSE TO FAMILIES COMPLAINTS 124 10.4 SUSPECTS IN POSITION OF POWER 127 11. VICTIMS’ RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE REMEDIES 129 11.1 THE RIGHT TO TRUTH 129 11.2 THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE 130 11.3 THE RIGHT TO REPARATION 132 11.3.1 RESTITUTION 132 11.3.2 COMPENSATION 132 11.3.3 REHABILITATION 132 11.3.4 SATISFACTION 132 11.3.5 GUARANTEES OF NON-REPETITION 133 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 134 12.1 CONCLUSION 134 12.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 136 12.2.1 TO THE AUTHORITIES IN IRAN 136 12.2.2 TO UN POLITICAL BODIES 138 12.2.3 TO INDIVIDUAL UN MEMBER STATES 139 ANNEX 1 – ACCOUNTS OF KILLINGS FROM PROVINCES 140 1. AHVAZ 141 2. DEZFUL 142 3. ESFAHAN 144 4. HAMEDAN 145 5. KHORRAMABAD 147 6. LAHIJAN 148 7. MASHHAD 149 8. RASHT 153 9. SANANDAJ 155 10. SARI 157 11. SEMNAN 159 12. SHIRAZ 160 13. TABRIZ AND URUMIEH 162 14. ZAHEDAN 164 15. ZANJAN 165 5 BLOOD-SOAKED SECRETS WHY IRAN’S 1988 PRISON MASSACRES ARE ONGOING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY Amnesty International ANNEX 2 – REPORTED VICTIMS DECLARED ‘NON-EXISTENT’ BY IRAN 167 ANNEX 3 – CONCEALMENT OF VICTIMS’ FATE IN REPLIES TO UN 176 ANNEX 4 – MISSING FROM BURIAL REGISTERS 180 6 BLOOD-SOAKED SECRETS WHY IRAN’S 1988 PRISON MASSACRES ARE ONGOING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY Amnesty International GLOSSARY BASIC PRINCIPLES Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law BAQI Taking up arms against the state FATWA Religious ruling or decree issued by an Islamic jurist FADAIYAN KHALQ A leftist organization which split into multiple factions including Ashraf ORGANIZATION Dehghani, Majority (Aksariat) and Minority (Aqaliat) in 1979 and 1980 HAKEM-E SHAR’ Shari’a judges appointed by Supreme Leader Rouhollah Khomeini after the 1979 revolution ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights KDPI Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran MOHAREBEH Waging war against God, a charge carrying the death penalty under Iranian criminal law MOHAREB An individual accused of “waging war against God” MOLHED Atheist, heretic MONAFEQIN Pejorative epithet for members and supporters of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) NEFAQ Hypocrisy, pejorative reference to the PMOI NLA National Liberation Army of the PMOI PMOI People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran SAVAK National Intelligence and Security Organization (pre-1979) SHENASNAMEH National identity booklet UN United Nations UN SPECIAL UN Special Representative on the situation of human rights in Iran REPRESENTATIVE UPDATED SET OF Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights PRINCIPLES TO through Action to Combat Impunity COMBAT IMPUNITY 7 BLOOD-SOAKED SECRETS WHY IRAN’S 1988 PRISON MASSACRES ARE ONGOING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY Amnesty International EXECUTIVE SUMMARY “More than a quarter of a century has passed since we began the quest for… truth regarding the fate of our loved ones.” Mothers and Families of Khavaran, speaking in 2014. In late July 1988, thousands of political dissidents held in prisons across Iran were forcibly disappeared suddenly. They were mostly young men and women, some just teenagers, unjustly imprisoned because of their political opinions and non-violent political activities. Prisons were put on lockdown across the country and the authorities suspended family visits without giving any reasons. For months, nothing was heard. Gradually, terrifying rumours began to circulate about mass secret executions and the dumping of bodies in unmarked mass graves. Families’ worst fears were confirmed from late October 1988 onwards when prison visits resumed and authorities informed many families that their loved ones had been executed. However, over the last 30 years, the authorities have cruelly denied them not only a body to mourn over, but also the truth about when, how and why their loved ones were killed, what happened to them in their last moments and where their remains are hidden. The authorities have treated the killings as state secrets. Three times in the past three decades, the wall of secrecy has been cracked and each time the authorities have responded with reprisals and accused those who have leaked records related to the preparation, planning and co-ordinated implementation of the mass killings of “disclosing state secrets” and “threatening national security”. In 1989, letters raising concerns about the executions that were addressed to Supreme Leader Rouhollah Khomeini from his deputy, Hossein Ali Montazeri, were leaked. In 2000, a copy of the secret fatwa by which, in July 1988, Rouhollah Khomeini ordered the mass killings was published. In 2016, an audio recording of a high-level official meeting that took place in August 1988 between Hossein Ali Montazeri and the officials responsible for the mass killings in Tehran was posted online. Building on the sustained campaigning and documentation efforts by survivors, family members of victims and human rights defenders over the last 30 years, Amnesty International has set out to prise open these cracks even further and reveal more of the blood-soaked secrets the authorities have tried to keep with a view to seizing the opportunity of the current renewed debate about these crimes and advance the struggle for truth, justice and reparation. Amnesty International’s focus on one of the most heinous chapters of state violence in Iran’s recent history is further prompted by the ongoing official campaign to repress the commemorative efforts of survivors, families and human rights defenders, demonize the victims and distort the facts about the extrajudicial execution of political dissidents in the 1980s. It is all the more relevant as many of those alleged to have been involved in the 1988 enforced disappearances and extrajudicial executions hold or have held positions of power in Iran. They benefit from a continuing atmosphere of secrecy and impunity in the country.
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