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Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - I IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE - I The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions FIFTH WORKING DRAFT By Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner Revised July 11, 2012 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 2 Acknowledgements This analysis was made possible by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. It draws on the work of Dr. Abdullah Toukan and a series of reports on Iran by Adam Seitz, a Senior Research Associate and Instructor, Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University. 2 Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 5 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 6 Figure III.1: Summary Chronology of US-Iranian Military Competition: 2000-2011 ............................... 8 CURRENT PATTERNS IN THE STRUCTURE OF US AND IRANIAN MILITARY COMPETITION ........................................... 13 DIFFERING NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 17 US Perceptions .................................................................................................................................... 17 Iranian Perceptions............................................................................................................................. 19 Arab and Turkish Perceptions ............................................................................................................. 25 Israeli perceptions .............................................................................................................................. 26 Perceptions of the “War of Sanctions” ............................................................................................... 26 Figure III.2: Assessing the Full Range of Iranian Competition and Threats ........................................... 27 KEY UNCERTAINTIES IN ASSESSING THE DETAILS OF US AND IRANIAN MILITARY COMPETITION ................................ 28 Uncertainties Affecting Nuclear and Missile Programs ...................................................................... 28 Uncertainties Affecting Regime Stability and Regime Change .......................................................... 29 Uncertainties Affecting the View of Different National Officials, Military Officers, and Intelligence Experts ................................................................................................................................................ 29 COMPETITION IN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES ......................................................................................... 30 The Role of the US in the Gulf Conventional Balance ......................................................................... 30 Figure III.3: The US Military Role in the Gulf in 2012 ............................................................................ 30 Trends in Military Spending and Arms Transfers ............................................................................... 35 Figure III.4: Comparative Spending on Military Forces ......................................................................... 36 Figure III.5: Comparative Spending on Arms Transfers ......................................................................... 37 Figure III.6 The Role of US Arms Transfers and Military Education as a Percentage of US Global Efforts .............................................................................................................................................................. 38 The Limits to Iran’s Air Power ............................................................................................................. 39 The Uncertainties Affecting Iran’s Air Capabilities .......................................................................................................... 39 Iran’s Problems in a Significant Air War .......................................................................................................................... 40 Iranian Claims to Air Modernization and Combat Capability ......................................................................................... 41 The US, the Southern Gulf Problem, and Iran’s Capability for Air Combat ..................................................................... 42 Figure III.7: Total Gulf Holdings of Combat Aircraft in 2011 ................................................................. 43 Figure III.8: Comparative Modern Iranian and Gulf Air Forces ............................................................. 44 Figure III.9: Gulf Reconnaissance and AWACS Aircraft in 2011 ............................................................ 45 Ground-Based Air Defenses ................................................................................................................ 46 The Limits to Iran’s Surface-Based Air Defenses ............................................................................................................. 46 The Struggle to Modernize Iran’s Surface to Air Missile Defenses.................................................................................. 47 The US, the Southern Gulf Problem and Iran’s Capability for Land-based Air Defense .................................................. 48 The Southern Gulf Problem and Surface-to-Air Missile Defense .................................................................................... 48 Figure III.10: Comparative Land Based Air and Missile Defense Forces ............................................... 49 Iran’s Largely Defensive Land Forces.................................................................................................. 51 Strengths and Weaknesses in Iran’s Army ...................................................................................................................... 51 Weaponry and Force Quality .......................................................................................................................................... 52 Iran’s Ability to Defend Its Teritory and Project Land Power .......................................................................................... 53 Figure III.11: Comparative Iranian and Gulf Land Forces ...................................................................... 54 Figure III.12: Land Force Combat Units by Country in 2012 ................................................................. 55 Iran’s Naval Forces and Their Role in Asymmetric Warfare ............................................................... 58 The Strengths and Weaknesses of Iran’s Naval Forces ................................................................................................... 58 Iranian Officers and Officials on Iran’s Naval Posture in the Gulf ................................................................................... 62 The US, the Southern Gulf, and Iran’s Capability for Naval Combat ............................................................................... 65 Figure III.13: Comparative Iranian and Gulf Major Naval Forces .......................................................... 66 Figure III.14: Iranian and Gulf Smaller Naval Ships by Category in 2011 .............................................. 67 Figure III.15: Gulf Warships with Anti-Ship Missiles in 2011 ................................................................. 68 Figure III.16: Gulf Attack, Anti-Ship and ASW Helicopters in 2011 ....................................................... 69 Measuring the Overall Balance of US and Iranian Military Competition ........................................... 70 3 Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 4 The Wild Card in the Conventional Balance: A Weak Iraq .............................................................................................. 72 Figure III.17: Shifting the Balance: Iran vs. Iraq in 2003 and 2012 ........................................................ 73 COMPETITION IN ASYMMETRIC FORCES .......................................................................................................... 74 Iran’s Growing Asymmetric Forces ..................................................................................................... 74 Conventional Weakness vs. Asymmetric Capability ........................................................................... 77 Iran’s Growing Mix of Asymmetric Warfare Forces ........................................................................... 79 Figure III.18: Key Iranian Capabilities for Asymmetric Warfare ............................................................ 79 The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) ................................................................................. 80 IRGC Land Forces ............................................................................................................................................................ 81 The IRGC Air Force .......................................................................................................................................................... 83 Figure III.19: Key Elements of the IRGC ...............................................................................................
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