Policy Notes the Washington Institute for Near East Policy ■ 2019 ■ Pn58

POLICY NOTES THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ 2019 ■ PN58

SAEID GOLKAR THE SUPREME LEADER AND THE GUARD Civil-Military Relations and Regime Survival in Iran

As the Islamic Republic concludes its fourth decade, the country faces three converging threats. The first involves its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who turns eighty this year and is, according to some reports, in poor health. The succession process could create a severe political struggle, possibly unsettling the entire regime. The second challenge is growing dissatisfaction among the population, evidenced by a rising incidence of strikes and protests throughout the country. These now occur daily. And the third has to do with economic hardships associated with the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, a development that could potentially exacerbate ongoing protests and further destabilize the regime.

To neutralize these threats, the Islamic Republic This study is divided into four sections. The first and the Supreme Leader are increasingly relying on examines the IRGC’s position and structure within their security and coercive mechanisms, foremost the Iran’s military. The second looks at the mechanisms Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its and strategies Ayatollah Khamenei uses to control civilian militia force, known as the Basij. Indeed, the the Guard, especially indoctrination, which is carried most important factor in the survival and transition out through entities known as ideological-political of political regimes is the loyalty of the armed forces. organizations (IPOs) across Iran’s military. This sec- Dictators cannot stay in power if they lose support tion outlines, in particular, the internal structure of the from their national military. As long as they enjoy IPO within the IRGC, and its role in subordinating military backing, a mass uprising cannot ultimately the Guard to the Supreme Leader. The third section undermine their power, no matter how pervasive.1 discusses the character of ideological-political indoc- Even in the case of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the mon- trination, and to what extent the Guard internalizes archy collapsed when regime-aligned forces submit- this process. The fourth covers debates on other poli- ted to revolutionary fighters on February 11, 1979.2 cies, such as surveillance and coercion, which Aya- Just as dictators rely on the armed forces to main- tollah Khamenei uses to maintain his control over tain power, the military can overthrow them and con- the Guard. This section analyzes the Organization fiscate that power, as illustrated by the cases of Tuni- for the Protection of Intelligence and military leader- sia, Egypt, and Syria. In Tunisia, the military stopped ship in detail to illustrate how the Supreme Leader supporting the dictator after protests started in 2011 controls the IRGC. In concluding, the text explains and became “the guarantor of the revolution.” In the importance of the clerical-IRGC relationship in a Egypt, the military, which initially helped facilitate post-Khamenei era. the collapse of the Mubarak government, staged the coup against the post-revolutionary administration IRGC Position Within Iran’s of Mohamed Morsi. In Syria, the army mainly stayed Armed Forces loyal to the Assad regime, helping him slaughter hundreds of thousands of Syrians and crushing their The government of Iran has a bifurcated structure, dreams for freedom and dignity. whereby the Supreme Leader is balanced by the What about Iran today? With rising mass discon- president, the Majlis (legislature) by the Guardian tent and protests around the country, will the IRGC Council, and the judiciary by the Special Court for stick with Ayatollah Khamenei until the end as the Clerics. The same applies for the military, which has military did for President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, or two main branches: the conventional army, known will it stage a coup against him, as in Egypt, or stop as the Artesh, and the revolutionary military forces, supporting the regime, as in Tunisia? What about or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e the post-Khamenei era? In what ways will the IRGC Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami). Whereas the Artesh evolve or reshape then? is mainly responsible for guarding the independence In seeking to answer these questions, this paper and territorial integrity of the country, the IRGC is will examine the model of civil-military relations pro- charged primarily with defending and protecting the moted by Ayatollah Khamenei, and look into ways he Islamic regime. controls Iran’s military, especially the IRGC. While a The Artesh and IRGC, as well as the police force, few publications focus on Iran’s armed forces in gen- NAJA (Nirou-ye Entezami-ye Jomhouri-ye Eslami-ye eral and the IRGC in particular, these cover mainly Iran), are subordinate to the Armed Forces General Staff developments within the IRGC, the Guard’s role in (AFGS; Setad-e Kol-e Nirouha-ye Mosallah), which is Iran’s economy, politics, and society, and its involve- responsible for coordinating their activities, establishment in foreign policy.3 In fact, a few studies do exist ing training programs, and providing logistical back- of Iran’s civil-military relations, but most are outdated ing. The AFGS itself is under the direct control of the or based on secondary sources.4 Despite growing Supreme Leader, who holds the title Commander-in- interest in this field, gaps persist in the scholarship, Chief of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic. The and this paper seeks to fill them. office furnishing Khamenei with this power is the Mili-

2 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY THE SUPREME LEADER AND THE GUARD tary Bureau in the Office of the Commander-in-Chief Religiosity also figures into this calculus. Since (Daftar-e Nezami-ye Farmandehi-ye Kol-e Qova). Lit- the new measures were implemented in 2010, the tle public information is available on the structure of Guard has shrunk its pool of recruits to those with a this office, which houses the Supreme Leader’s mili- conservative-ideological worldview. Valued attributes tary advisors. Still, the office—which offers a direct include having a parent in the IRGC, being the rela- line of communication between Khamenei and the tive of a martyr or veteran (e.g., of Iraq or Syria), being country’s military leadership—is headed by Brig. Gen. a “devotee of the Islamic Revolution,” and belonging Muhammad Shirazi, a Basij officer with close ties to to the Basij. This contrasts with past years, when the the Supreme Leader. His brother Hojatoleslam Ali Shi- Guard was more open to recruiting people from a razi is Khamenei’s representative to the IRGC’s Qods broader ideological background. Force. These two brothers have close personal ties to The Artesh has more-diverse personnel compared Khamenei that predate the Islamic Revolution, thanks to the IRGC, whose religious-ideological members to a relationship between Khamenei and their older are less representative of Iranian society. Yet even as brother, Hojatoleslam Abbas Shirazi, who headed the army has been regarded as the clerical regime’s propaganda efforts during the war with Iraq and died neglected stepchild, it is more professional and in 1984. The special rapport between the Shirazi respected among the Iranian people, despite being brothers and Khamenei helps explain why Brigadier less well-equipped. Iranians consider the Artesh General Shirazi has served in his position for more the national force in the service of the whole coun- than twenty-five years.5 try, while viewing the IRGC as the force serving the The Artesh consists of 130,000 professional and regime and clerics. noncommissioned officers and 220,000 conscripts, When the IRGC was established by Ayatollah Kho- who serve mandatory stints lasting between 18 and meini on May 5, 1979, the goal was to create a check 24 months.6 By comparison, the IRGC is the more on the Artesh and thereby coup-proof the military. ideological force with greater loyalty to the Islamic The regime’s lack of trust in the army has persisted, regime; like the Artesh, it has 130,000 professional and the leadership has sought over the years to keep officers and NCOs, along with 50,000 conscripts, the army completely apolitical and controlled. It has drawn mainly from active members of the Basij militia. done so mainly through the creation and expansion Unlike in past decades, when conscripts could com- of the Guard. Since its inception, the IRGC has been plete their required military service with the IRGC, responsible for defending the regime and neutralizing since 2010—when the Guard instituted a new system any coup attempts by the army, and it has likewise for evaluation and appointment—it has preferred to discovered and neutralized several coups attempts by draft only active members of the Basij. According to anti-revolutionary groups. An early such attempt by Col. Gholamali Kolakaj, who supervises staffing at backers of the shah was stamped out in July 1980. the IRGC provincial corps in Khuzestan, more than In 1980, when Iraq invaded Iran, the IRGC worked 70 percent of draftees in the Guard are active Basij alongside the Artesh to protect the country, although members.7 In big cities, where demand for IRGC mili- the Guard’s role was at first small relative to the con- tary services is higher than elsewhere, 100 percent ventional army—and even though defending Iran’s of draftees are active Basij members. The less for- borders is not the IRGC’s primary mission. Boosted mal, less regimented nature of the Guard relative to by clerical support, the IRGC was expanded in Sep- the Artesh facilitates this flow of personnel. For their tember 1985 into three main branches—land force, part, non-Basijis are assigned to the army for their air force, and navy—paralleling the three Artesh mandatory military service. The intent has been to branches and intensifying the rivalry between the two incorporate into the IRGC the most ideologically reli- forces. Following the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan able fighters—even though some Basij undoubtedly and Iraq, in 2001 and 2003, respectively, the Islamic join for opportunistic or materialistic reasons—as regime perceived increasing threats to its survival. opposed to youth who are drafted for their manda- In response, the IRGC adopted an asymmetric mili- tory twenty-one months only to subsequently end their tary doctrine aimed at guarding the republic, based relationship with the IRGC. on four main elements: decentralizing IRGC ground

POLICY NOTE 58 3 SAEID GOLKAR

forces, expanding diverse missile programs managed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hired IRGC commanders to by the IRGC Aerospace Force, developing an asym- serve in his administration, the relationship between metric naval strategy through the IRGC navy, and the Guard and the clerical regime has only become creating and supporting aligned paramilitary groups more enmeshed. in the region through the Qods Force (see figure 1). Some have argued that the increasing power In addition to coup-proofing the regime and of the Guard, especially under Ahmadinejad, has deterring external threats to the clerical establish- effectively transformed Iran into a military dictator- ment, the IRGC and Basij have been involved in sup- ship.9 From this perspective, Ayatollah Khamenei is pressing internal dissent, especially since 1990. Over a puppet in the hands of the IRGC’s commanders, this almost thirty-year interval, these forces put down who are the country’s true rulers. To the contrary, oth- waves of domestic protest in 1993–94, when postwar ers contend that clergy retain the upper hand and economic austerity was under fire; 1999 and 2003, Khamenei is the puppeteer, manipulating the com- when students rose up; 2009, during the ascent of the manders at will.10 The presidency of Hassan Rouhani Green Movement; and 2017–18, amid widespread might appear to support the latter contention. He has social protests. Rapid social and economic change returned technocrats to power and marginalized the in Iranian society, the loss of regime legitimacy, and IRGC, at least within his administration. state inefficiency have led to mass disappointment This paper contends that while Khamenei still and dissatisfaction among Iranians, as manifested holds the edge in controlling the IRGC, the relation- in the widening recent protests. One response has ship has become more complicated as the Guard— been a higher profile for the IRGC in ensuring regime and the republic—turns forty. In particular, the survival, a role secured by the Guard’s reputation IRGC’s upward course after 2005, and the suppres- as a trustworthy ideological protector of the Islamic sion in 2009 of the Green Movement, has empow- Republic and its core values. ered the Guard in its competition with the religious But since its inception, even preceding its efforts class. Moreover, the subtle power struggle between to suppress domestic unrest, the IRGC has gradually these two main actors can help us better understand been transformed, first, into a conventional military Iran’s future. This future, sooner or later, will cease to force and, second, into a huge, complex organization include Khamenei, at which point the IRGC relation- deeply entwined in Iran’s politics, society, and econ- ship with the clerics could change in dramatic ways. omy. This augmented IRGC has taken on an array Finally, in most countries, the police is a civilian of missions, leading some commentators to regard rather than a military force, but in Iran the police, the organization as a veritable state-within-a-state, NAJA, relies on the AFGS for programming, plan- or a “deep state.”8 Since 2005, when then president ning, and other functions. According to the NAJA

IRGC COMMAND

Comprehensive Basij Organization IRGC IRGC Organization IRGC Aerospace IRGC Qods Force IRGC Ground Imam Hussein IRGC Navy for the Oppressed Intelligence for the Protection Force (Jerusalem) Force University and Disabled Organization of Intelligence

Imam Hussein IRGC Provincial Guard Sepah-e Vijeh Officers Vali-Amr University IRGC-GF Operational (Vali-Amr Special Corps) Headquarters Sepah-e Ansar al-Mahdi Protection Corps IRGC-GF Brigades IRGC Basij Regions

Aviation Protection Corps

FIG. 1 IRGC Structure

4 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY THE SUPREME LEADER AND THE GUARD charter, drafted in 1991, the organization is part of while safeguarding military intelligence and other the armed forces, affiliated with the Ministry of Interior counterintelligence activity. Cooptation of military and formally subordinated to the Supreme Leader. In forces has been implemented through a bureaucratic practice, Ayatollah Khamenei usually designates the system in which more-loyal and subordinate persons interior minister as his proxy on NAJA affairs; the min- are promoted despite a lack of professional training. ister is also responsible for handling logistical issues, Among these three strategies, indoctrination has such as equipping and supporting the police force. been the most important and extensively used to con- Still, he serves in this position at Khamenei’s behest. trol Iran’s armed forces. This is not only because the Islamic Republic has, by its nature, an ideological The Benefits of Indoctrination regime, but because indoctrination is an especially subtle and successful means of control. Persuasion In seeking to control the military since he became through indoctrination, if achieved, can create vol- leader in 1989, Ayatollah Khamenei has relied on the untary obedience, which is more stable than forced classic strategy of establishing his legitimacy through obedience achieved through coercion. indoctrination, repression, and cooptation. Within Relatedly, Iran’s armed forces in general, and the Iran’s armed forces, three main sectors help him IRGC in particular, derive their identity more from implement these strategies: the ideological-political human capital than from technology. According to organizations (IPOs; sazeman-e aqidati va siyasi), the the commanders reporting to Ayatollah Khamenei, Organization for the Protection of Intelligence (OPI; the military should always base its decisionmaking on Sazeman Hefazat-e Ettelaat), and the military leader- personnel first and other factors second.11 In recent ship (farmandehi). According to the respective char- years, with Iran having lost access to advanced weap- ters of the IRGC and Artesh, these three entities are onry owing to international sanctions, the country’s to be represented at every level of the military, from military advantage rests on its access to a young the Joint Staff all the way down to each individual pla- population that can be inculcated with the national toon. (For the structure of Iran’s ideological-political defense doctrine. During the Iran-Iraq War, the cleri- apparatus, see figure 2.) They are autonomous but cal establishment deployed a human wave of Basijis subordinate to Ayatollah Khamenei. “in which thousands of ill-trained and ill-equipped Whereas the IPOs are mainly responsible for legit- Iranian troops crossed the border to face ‘martyr- imizing the regime and instilling the regime’s ideology dom’ at the hands of the Iraqi forces.”12 In these rela- in the hearts and minds of the military, the OPI (aka tively early days of the Islamic Republic, this was the Counterintelligence Organization) serves as the prin- foremost strategy meant to compensate for the lack cipal tool in the leader’s hands for constant scrutiny of technical prowess and manpower. The strategy of military personnel. The OPI’s mission is to identify helped in the defense of Iran’s territorial integrity, but foreign agents and corrupt individuals in the military led to deaths in the hundreds of thousands, mostly

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Leader's General Office Commander-in-Chief, Commander-in-Chief for the Protection General Ideological-Political Military Bureau of Intelligence Office

Organization for the Ideological-Political Military Personnel Protection of Intelligence, Organizations, Selection Armed Forces Armed Forces

FIG. 2 Horizontal View of Iran’s Military Structure

POLICY NOTE 58 5 SAEID GOLKAR from among these nonprofessional and volunteer personnel. But the reach of these organizations has forces.13 Although Iran has since tried to advance its expanded dramatically since the selection of Ayatol- military technologies and has succeeded in areas such lah Khamenei as Supreme Leader in 1989. as missile programs, the human element remains the When he served as president of the Islamic crux of its asymmetric warfare doctrine. Republic from 1981 to 1989, Khamenei did not have The idea that Iran’s military motivation, and the a close relationship with the IRGC, to which Hoja- IRGC’s in particular, comes from committed person- toleslam Mahmoud Mohammadi Araqi was his rep- nel is reinforced by the Quranic edict that “a pious resentative.17 But when Khamenei became Supreme man will win in a confrontation with ten unbelievers.” Leader, he sought the deepening of the religious and That is why the regime has focused mainly on political revolutionary character of the IRGC, which had fallen and ideological indoctrination to create a doctrinaire off during the war with Iraq. To replenish the ranks, (maktabi) force based on religious principles and anyone had been allowed to apply during this period, revolutionary values.14 This ideological army is at the regardless of their ideological pedigree or loyalty center of Iran’s warfare doctrine known as Alavi and to Ayatollah Khamenei. On the Supreme Leader’s Ashurai.15 The concept has roots deep in Islam and is orders, the IPO became responsible for managing all essential to the ideology of the Islamic Republic. The the culture and propaganda activities in the Guard, term Alavi refers to Ali, the first Shia imam, whose including publications and public relationships. One forces lost the Battle of Siffin (657 A.D.) against year later, Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Movahedi Ker- Muawiyah, the first caliph of the Umayyad Empire. mani was appointed as Khamenei’s representative to According to the Shia critique, Ali was defeated the IRGC, a position he would hold for more than because his army did not heed his orders, instead sixteen years. One of Kermani’s tasks was to purge pressuring him to make peace with his adversary in the IRGC of members seen as insufficiently loyal to the interest of avoiding intra-Muslim strife. For the the Supreme Leader, or those supportive of Ayatollah IRGC, the concept indicates the requirement of total Hossein Ali Montazeri, who was initially designated obedience to the Supreme Leader and his orders, or as Khomeini’s successor but removed from conten- velayat madari. The term Ashurai refers to the tenth tion after critiquing the regime’s ruthless suppres- of Muharram, the date on which Hussein, the third sion of political dissidents.18 As a result, members of Shia imam, fell during the Battle of Karbala, which in the IRGC’s first generation who either held left-wing 680 A.D. pitted his tiny band of fighters against the Islamist views or backed Montazeri were kicked out. massive army of the Umayyad caliph Yazid. Although Others have been silenced in the years since. Hussein knew the outcome was foreordained, he sac- The Guard’s second generation, entering in the rificed himself and his men for the cause of defend- 1990s, still came mainly from conservative backing “true” Islam by taking on the Umayyads. The les- grounds, but they lacked the ideological zeal of the son culled by the IRGC from this historical event is first generation. When in 1997 the moderate candi- that “oppressors” must be challenged, whatever the date, Mohammad Khatami, defeated his conservative outcome. Related is the concept of taklif garai, or opponent, Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, in the presidential the belief in acting upon a religious commandment election, some reports suggested that a substantial 16 regardless of potential outcomes. majority of IRGC members had voted for Khatami— Among the services, indoctrination holds a higher and, effectively, against the Supreme Leader and the position in the IRGC than in the Artesh or NAJA. This IPOs, which had backed Nuri. Whereas Khatami won is because the Guard is not only a military group but 69 percent of the vote overall, he took about 73 per- also a security organization responsible for protecting cent among the IRGC, according to some reports.19 the revolution and the regime. Leftist strains from the first generation, along with a failure to indoctrinate the forces, offered plausible Role of IPOs in Legitimizing, Coercing, explanations. Yet these tallies were still a shock to the and Coopting the Armed Forces IRGC, prompting the leadership to intensify its efforts Since its inception, the clerical regime has used the to make members completely submissive, ideologi- IPOs to control Iran’s army and purify it of non-Islamic cally and politically, to Khamenei.

6 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY THE SUPREME LEADER AND THE GUARD

TABLE 1. The Supreme Leader’s Representatives to the IRGC, 1989 to Present

Hojatoleslam Mahmoud Mohammadi Araqi 1989 –1990 Conservative/Pragmatist

Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Movahedi Kermani 1991 –2005 Conservative/Pragmatist

Hojatoleslam Ali Saidi 2006 –2017 Hardliner

Hojatoleslam Abdullah Haji Sadeqi 2017 – Hardliner

To further this goal in the next decade, in 2001 For more than a dozen years, Saidi had created a Hojatoleslam Ali Saidi was appointed to serve as pervasive system of ideological-political education, the deputy to the IRGC IPO (see table 1). Saidi had expanded his IPO, and subordinated IRGC mem- previously been head of IRGC counterintelligence bers to the leader. In recognition of these efforts, during the Iran-Iraq War and head of the Islamic he was promoted in 2018 to lead the Ideological- Propaganda Organization (Sazeman-e Tabliqat-e Political Office of the Commander-in-Chief (Daftar- Islami). A hardliner assiduously devoted to his task, e Aqidati va Siyasi-ye Farmandehi-ye Kol-e-Qova), he dramatically expanded ideological and political replacing Hojatoleslam Gholamreza Safai, who had training for the Guard, helping widen its involvement led the office for the past twenty-four years, since in politics. For the duration of Khatami’s tenure, until the start of Khamenei’s tenure as Supreme Leader. 2005, the IRGC, aided by the Basij, had helped In Saidi’s appointment letter, Ayatollah Khamenei Ayatollah Khamenei and his conservative allies to ordered him to actively publicize the mission of the block reforms, suppress reformists, and crush Ira- office, communicate more effectively with IPOs in nians’ hopes for peaceful change. Early during this the armed forces, and supervise the implementation period, in 1999, when student protests proliferated of related plans. Since then, Saidi has expanded in Tehran and other cities, twenty-four IRGC com- this office and empowered several deputies to bet- manders threatened Khatami’s administration with a ter coordinate the work of all Iran’s armed forces coup unless it stopped backing the students. When IPOs, including those in the Artesh, IRGC, NAJA, the conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became and Ministry of Defense. president in summer 2005, Saidi was promoted to Alongside the promotion of Saidi, his deputy in be head of the Guard’s IPO, replacing the relative the IRGC’s IPO, Hojatoleslam Abdollah Haji Sadeqi, pragmatist Kermani. was named the Supreme Leader’s new representa- In addition to increasing ideological-political train- tive in the Guard. Like his predecessor, Haji Sadeqi— ing for IRGC members, the IPO became more aggres- who headed the Imam Sadeq Institute, the IRGC’s sive in recruiting new personnel based on their ideo- Islamic research center—is from the hardliner camp, logical credentials. This shift relied on hiring from the believing in the total subordination of the IRGC to the Basij, whose members actively supported the regime. Supreme Leader. And indeed, the third generation of IRGC members, who began their service in the 2000s, demonstrated Structure of the IRGC IPO greater ideological zeal than the second generation, All Iran’s ideological-political organizations are enlisted in the 1990s. In turn, the IRGC and Basij col- directed by clerical commissars who are appointed laborated to suppress the 2009 Green Movement, by and committed to Ayatollah Khamenei. The which emerged amid that year’s disputed presiden- IRGC IPO (Sazeman-e Aqidati va Siyasi-ye Sepah-e tial election. Besides a few commanders, mainly from Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami) is the most devel- the first generation, most IRGC members supported oped and successful of them; it is alternatively known Khamenei and his favored candidate, Ahmadinejad, as the Office of the Representative of the Supreme during the 2009 vote. The newer generation, many of Leader in the IRGC (Hozeh-ye Namayandegi-ye Veli- them religious hardliners, has also been predominant ye Faqih Dar Sepah). The IRGC IPO, and every other among recent deployments to Syria and Iraq. IPO, is controlled by Ideological-Political Office of

POLICY NOTE 58 7 SAEID GOLKAR

the Commander-in-Chief, which designs and imple- Bureau of Propaganda ments all ideological-political training (IPT) for mili- and Guard Culture tary and security personnel. One example of an order issued by this office, in 2011, was the mandate Bureau of Ideological-Political Training and Education that the military refer to Khamenei as Imam, a label granted to only twelve Shia leaders along with Aya- Bureau of Public Affairs tollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s founder. The and Publications IRGC IPO controls ideological-political operations in the various IRGC branches, including the Aerospace Bureau of Propaganda Bureau of Propaganda Force, navy, ground force, Qods Force, and Basij. and Guard Culture and Guard Culture The IRGC IPO’s duties—within the overarch- ing mission of ensuring the leader’s control over the IRGC IPO Bureau of Supervision and Bureau of Propaganda military and subordination to his will—include imple- Confirmation of Ideological Competency and Guard Culture menting IPT, propaganda, enhanced religious and Bureau of Propaganda spiritual competency for personnel, and sharia-based Political Bureau and Guard Culture rules in all processes and procedures, including in mosques, staff housing complexes, and affiliated organizations. All these responsibilities can be broken IRGC Islamic Research Center down into four categories: (1) indoctrination of members of the armed forces; (2) propagation of Islamic Shahid Mahalati ideology in the military; (3) assurance of ideologi- Higher Education Complex cal competency among military personnel; and (4) supervision of sharia implementation in the military. FIG. 3 IRGC Ideological-Political Structure The IRGC IPO itself has several bureaus, including the Bureau of Public Affairs and Publications of the Supreme Leader’s claim to represent the “Hid- (Moavenat-e Ravabet-e Omoumi va Entesharat), the den Imam”—a messianic figure in Shia Islam whom Political Bureau (Moavenat-e Siyasi), the Bureau of Ide- believers think is now in occultation but will one day ological-Political Training and Education (Moavenat-e return as an eschatological redeemer and ultimate Amouzesh va Tarbiyat-e Aqidati va Siyasi), the Bureau savior of humankind. The charge of this bureau is of Propaganda and Guard Culture (Moavenat-e to strengthen the religious beliefs of Guard person- Tabliqat va Farhang-e Pasdari), and the Bureau of nel, consolidate their ideological foundations, nour- Supervision and Confirmation of Ideological Compe- ish a culture of jihad and martyrdom, and reinforce tency (Moavenat-e Nezarat va Tayid-e Salahiyat). See a spirit of practical commitment to Islamic laws figure 3 for the hierarchy. and regulations. This bureau is also responsible for the recruitment Indoctrination in Practice and deployment of IPT instructors, both clerical and As implied thus far, the main responsibility of the nonclerical; it has several sub-branches, including IRGC IPO is educating and indoctrinating Guard the bureau for IPT trainers, which supports more than personnel through program implementation. Enact- nine thousand IPT trainers working in the IRGC.21 The ment falls to the Bureau of Ideological-Political Train- planning bureau provides textbooks and is respon- ing and Education (BIPTE; Moavenat-e Amoozesh va sible for designing courses and their syllabi based Tarbiyat-e Aqidati va Siyasi), which is tasked with IPT on the different ranks and positions within the IRGC. for all IRGC members, their families, as well as those Another branch is the Center for Technology and Vir- conscripted soldiers who spend their military service tual Training, designer and manager of the Seraj-e in the IRGC and the Basij.20 The training includes pro- Andish website,22 which offers distance learning on motion of the superiority of the clergy, the central- ideology for Guard and Basij members. ity of the regime’s founding doctrine, velayat-e faqih While the Guard’s religious and ideological train- (guardianship of the jurisprudent), and the legitimacy ing is provided by BIPTE, political education falls to

8 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY THE SUPREME LEADER AND THE GUARD the Political Bureau, founded in 1980 and known to in the last decade. The department is responsible for be the most important office within the IRGC IPO. the hiring and firing of guides, as well as for deploy- This privileged status derives from the bureau’s rep- ing political propagandists. Within the Basij, the Hadi utation as the IPO’s nerve center. According to the website and Hedayat magazine serve political guides. bureau’s former head, it is charged with establish- As of 2008, according to the IRGC IPO’s Politi- ing and promoting the political vision of IRGC com- cal Bureau, the Guard had more than 8,000 political manders. Other institutional responsibilities include guides. By 2011 and 2013, the figures had risen to deepening members’ knowledge about internal and 12,000 and 14,000, respectively.25 These individuals external political transformations, training political are assigned to such specialties as political groups propagandists, surveying and evaluating the political and ideologies in Iran, “soft war,” contemporary views of Guard personnel, and censoring social and Iranian history, ethnic politics, and regional studies. political analysis that deviates from the party line.23 According to an IRGC colonel, 40 percent of IRGC As IRGC involvement in Iranian politics and the econ- guides are clergy, and the rest military personnel, but omy has grown over time, including among individual all are pulled from among the highest ranks of their members, so too has the clout of the Political Bureau respective spheres.26 In their work, the guides seek in order to justify this involvement. to justify the regime’s national, regional, and inter- The Political Bureau has four main departments: national policies and dispel any doubts expressed the Department for Political Study, the Department by Basijis. Other areas of focus include disseminat- for Information and Communications, the Depart- ing regime ideology, defending the Islamic Revolu- ment for Political Managers and Guides, and the tion, and increasing political-ideological adherence Department for Study and Analysis. Among these, (basirat-e afzayi) within the IRGC. Guides also answer the first, the political studies department, is respon- questions among the rank and file and monitor their sible for publications, including the daily Akhbar va activities. After the 2009 presidential election, each Tahlil, the weekly Sobh-e Sadegh, and the quarterly guide was assigned to monitor and support a group Motaleat-e Siyasi-e Rooz, which is circulated to IRGC of twenty to fifty IRGC members. commanders. The second department, information Reinforcing the work of the guides, the Political and communications, maintains the Guard’s politi- Bureau has actually set up a nationwide office to cal websites, the most important being Basirat, which respond to those harboring doubts. According to the disseminates political analysis for IRGC and Basij former head of this bureau, Gen. Ali Ashraf-Nouri, personnel.24 The third department, political man- “political clinics” in each city are established for this agers and guides, recruits, trains, and organizes a purpose. Before the nuclear deal, and its partial committed cadre of IRGC personnel to be political unraveling, one such question might involve why the mentors. And the fourth, study and analysis, assesses Islamic Republic did not halt its nuclear program in national, regional, and international political trends exchange for sanctions relief. The network of political toward maximizing the impact of each Guardsman. guides also prepares IPT educators to answer polit- This department also prepares textbooks that serve ical questions. as political guides. In this sense, the department is the Each year, the Political Bureau holds thousands intellectual center of the Political Bureau, providing of gatherings across its various national branches. sustenance for IRGC and Basij propagandists. On the local level, daily bulletins are issued on key social, political, and economic issues, with the goal of Propaganda providing IPT educators the most effective responses Since 1997, in line with the work of the Department to Basij members, especially in potential crisis peri- for Political Managers and Guides, discussed in the ods occasioned by elections, political unrest, and so previous section, the IRGC has established a network forth. For example, after the formation of the Green of political guides (hadyan-e siyasi) to propagate Movement in 2009, the political guides network pub- political ideas within the Guard and beyond. This lished a series of new books for IPT educators titled network was formally recognized in 2002 and dra- The Enlightenment Movement (Nehzat-e Roshangari), matically expanded with the emergence of hardliners covering topics such as “velvet coups” (a term in use

POLICY NOTE 58 9 SAEID GOLKAR by the IRGC), media diplomacy, and psychological Sharif, who heads this bureau, it is the only official warfare. These books were designed to give talking platform for disseminating IRGC declarations. The points on the Greens—described as an oligarchic bureau has three main sub-branches: information movement of the rich—to both IRGC and Basij mem- and communications, publications, and radio and bers and to the populace at large. television.29 The first of these, information and com- The propaganda mission is also carried out by Ira- munications, works closely with Islamic Republic of nian agencies outside the Political Bureau—namely, Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), such as by hosting Guard the Bureau of Propaganda and Guard Culture and officials on various programs. The bureau also pub- the Bureau of Public Affairs and Publications (see fig- lishes the official IRGC magazine Payam-e Enghelab ure 4). The former, responsible mainly for promot- and manages two official websites, Sepah-e News ing self-sacrifice among IRGC members and their and Hamash. families, has established a group of IRGC propagandists and cultural guides (hadyan-e farhangi) to help Ensuring Ideological Competency Guard personnel navigate the soft war. A particular task here is addressing children, who typically do not Indoctrination, a central plank of the IRGC’s identity, agree with their parents’ ideology.27 Another involves is the duty of the Bureau of Supervision and Con- enforcing Islamic codes and behaviors among family firmation of Ideological Competency, which seeks members. This bureau also runs programs that sup- to confirm the ideological-political qualifications of port IRGC writers, hosts Quran programs, and leads military personnel looking to be hired, appointed, religious trips for Guard members and their families.28 or promoted.30 More minutely, the bureau monitors Separately, the Bureau of Propaganda is tasked and acts to control the thoughts, words, and deeds with burnishing the image of the IRGC among the of IRGC personnel to assess their level of belief in Iranian population, especially in poor areas. The the clerical establishment and active support for the bureau publishes two main journals, Farhang-e Pas- Supreme Leader. According to its head, Brig. Gen. dari and Noursaqlain, to disseminate its opinions. In Qasem Qurayshi, the following are the main respon- its effort to Islamize society and promote Quranic cul- sibilities of this bureau: ture, the bureau has also created thousands of cen- Continuous supervision regarding implementa- ters of Quranic education. tion of religious and revolutionary principles in The Bureau of Public Affairs and Publications is the IRGC responsible for communicating with the media to boost the Guard’s popularity within society while neu- Inspection and investigation of other political, tralizing detractors. According to Brig. Gen. Ramazan moral, and organizational violations and crimes

IRGC IPO Structure

Bureau of Bureau of Propaganda Ideological-Political Political Bureau and Guard Culture Training and Education

Office of IPT Educators Cultural Guides Political Guidance

Political Guides

FIG. 4 IRGC Political Propaganda Agents

10 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY THE SUPREME LEADER AND THE GUARD

Confirmation of ideological qualifications of maraji (sources of emulation) exist in Iran and the personnel for recruiting, promoting, appointing, world Shia community, the IPOs in Iran’s armed engaging in continuing education, and going forces use only Ayatollah Khamenei’s opinions for abroad for missions answering religious questions.31 This method helps the Islamic Republic instill the Supreme Leader’s Investigation and appointment of nonclerical IPO ideas among IRGC members. Further, although managers IRGC members are not officially banned from fol- Evaluation of IRGC commanders for observance lowing other maraji, a great majority follow Khame- of Islamic rules nei as their marja. In fact, choosing another marja is Assessment of IRGC officials’ performance in viewed as a sign of deviance and lack of ideological sharia observance competency, thereby disqualifying the Guard member from promotion or appointment. Since 2010, formalizing measures first floated in the previous two years, this “ideological competency” IRGC IPO Personnel has become even more important than before for The heads of IPOs and their bureaus are usually cler- soldiers seeking advancement. Those with a dem- ics, but the staffs include many military personnel as onstrated record of attending mosque or showing well. In fact, the people employed at the IRGC IPO up at pro-regime rallies have a greater chance for usually come from two sources: the seminary and rapid promotion, even without passing through the the military. usual channels, than those who do not. Even com- The clerical members of IPOs mainly come from mand promotions can operate by this logic. This is the independent Brigade 83, Jafar Sadeq Corps, or known in official language as premature rank pro- from a clerical Basij organization.32 The Jafar Sadeq motion or command assignment without attainment Corps (aka Imam Sadeq) and clerical Basij organiza- of appropriate rank. Given the vast clerical influence tions are subordinate to the IRGC, with the mission over the armed forces, the religious establishment to monitor and exert control over potentially way- holds control over agent selection and promotion ward clerics.33 For example, Imam Sadeq was used in the armed forces. Officers cannot be promoted to suppress Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri after he without such confirmation, regardless of their profes- explicitly criticized the legitimacy of Ayatollah Khame- sional qualifications. nei and his seminarian and religious credentials. The attack went beyond mere rhetoric: in October 1997, Sharia Implementation agents infiltrated Montazeri’s home, destroyed it, and The last mission of the IPO, alongside propaganda, placed him under house arrest until 2003.34 (Montaz- indoctrination, and checks on ideological compe- eri died in 2009.) tency, is supervising and guaranteeing the imple- According to Hojatoleslam Abdol Ali Govahi, the mentation of sharia on both a personal and an IRGC head of the Jafar Sadeq Corps and Clerical Basij organizational level. Any order, regulation, or pro- organization, 150,000 clergy belong to these two gram in Iran’s armed forces must be based on Islamic organizations.35 In turn, these clerics are likely to be law. To this end, the Office of Islamic Confirmation hired by the Islamic Republic’s military and security of Regulations and Plans (Daftar-e Tayid-e Sharie apparatus to represent the Supreme Leader. Young Zavabet va Moqararat) is responsible for checking all seminary students likewise have a desire to work in IRGC regulations against sharia and answering reli- security organizations, and many will achieve this gious questions asked by IRGC personnel. goal. Their interest arises from factors such as status According to Shia Islam, every lay Shia should as well as high pay compared to other state bureaus, follow an authority in jurisprudence known as a muj- including the educational system. For this growing tahid. One who holds this status has the authority group, a kind of dual identity has emerged. While they to perform ijtehad, or interpretation of the religious have studied in seminaries, especially the Masoumeh texts, including the Quran, hadith, and aql (intellect madrasa in Qom, and wear clerical clothes, their or reasoning), and to rule in disputes. While many primary job involves security and the military. This

POLICY NOTE 58 11 SAEID GOLKAR shift toward a security identity explains why Ayatollah political deputies at various ranks and branches in the Khamenei has ordered his representative in the IRGC IRGC, and recipients of the propaganda degree join to strengthen the clerical composition of the service the Bureau of Propaganda and Guard Culture. The and remove barriers to entry.36 Higher Education Complex also publishes a journal, Within the IRGC IPO, the Office of Clerical Affairs the Quarterly of Religion and Politics, which focuses is tasked with assigning clergy to the IRGC and Basij. mainly on the research findings of university faculty. Clerical members can work either full or part time, with the latter option entailing employment at IRGC Ideological-Political Education branches and affiliated organizations to disseminate of the IRGC propaganda and execute religious missions. Members of the IPO in all branches of the Iranian In keeping with the Islamic Republic’s prioritizing of armed forces study at the Shahid Mahalati Higher indoctrination, every member of the military must go Education Complex, an IRGC academy designated through a complete course in ideological and politi- for this purpose.37 This institution was first established cal education. As the text has shown, this indoctri- in 1982 as the Shahid Mahalati University in order nation process, especially for IRGC members, is the to train a group of instructors to teach ideological- most vital responsibility of the IPOs. political courses in the IRGC. In 1993, it was expanded The first form of IPT is known as “vertical educa- to prepare a set of indoctrinated teachers and manag- tion” (amozesh haye toli), which personnel undergo ers for service in other IRGC branches. Over the next starting from the time they enter service and then decade, until 2003, the university graduated 1,284 continue through their careers. This includes IRGC IPT trainers and sent them to locales throughout Iran general education (doreh-ye omoumi pasdari), com- to do their work. Currently, the institution accepts mand and general staff courses (doreh-ye sarparasti), applications for undergraduate and graduate admis- and strategic sciences education (doreh-ye oloum). sion in several majors, including Quranic sciences According to the head of the IRGC-affiliated Imam and hadith, IPT, political science, international rela- Hussein University, more than half the instruction is tions, propaganda, media, cultural management, and allotted to religious, spiritual, and political topics.39 public affairs. This academy is responsible for training This proportion has increased consistently over the not only the ideological-political educators and pro- years. For example, in 2002–2003, IPT accounted pagandists of the IRGC, but also personnel from other for about 20 percent of IRGC and Basij education, armed forces’ branches to work in IPOs. increasing to 30 percent by 2008–2009.40 In 2008, the Shahid Meysami Center was estab- The IPT topics addressed in the Guard’s vertical lished at the Shahid Mahalati Higher Education education regimen are vast and include the following: Complex to train clerics for service in the IRGC. In Islamic ethics addition to courses on Islam, which students take in Islamic commandments (ahkam) seminaries, they are taught how to indoctrinate IRGC personnel at every level of the organization. Each foundations of Islamic thought year, according to Hojatoleslam Hojatollah Sanaei, Quranic science the head of this center, about five hundred clerics are jihad and defense in Islam trained for placement in the IRGC.38 Moreover, the Higher Education Center for Culture and Commu- familiarity with the Islamic Republic regime nications, within Shahid Mahalati, is responsible for familiarity with the Quran (ashnai ba Quran) training a group of experts to serve in the Bureau of military ethics Public Affairs and Publications. evaluation of the political and military cam- For IRGC personnel, the Shahid Mahalati Higher paigns of the Prophet Muhammad Education Complex offers several majors, including a foundations of political science bachelor’s degree in political guidance and an associ- ate’s degree in political promotion. After graduation, staffing in military organizations those holding the political guidance credential join management ethics

12 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY THE SUPREME LEADER AND THE GUARD

lives of military commanders in early Islam cultivating a spirit of prayer and practical commit- theology ment to Islamic law, and reinforcing a culture of jihad and martyrdom.42 Even in the Artesh, according to the Islamic defense system (nezam defai Islam) its navy commander, participation in these classes is military jurisprudence required for any appointment or promotion.43 Islamic thought in history In addition to IRGC, Basij, and conscript soldiers, variations on the tarbiyat va taali programs are “commanding the good and forbidding the bad” designed for the families of IRGC and high-ranking (amr be marouf va nahi az monker) Basij members. Through this effort, the Islamic history from a Quranic perspective Republic seeks to narrow differences between the Islam and international relations generally ideological IRGC personnel and their Islamic jurisprudence families, whose children in particular tend to be less inclined toward a conservative or radical worldview. introduction to Quranic interpretation (tafsir) Attendance at these trainings is highly recommended introduction to fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) for families of lower-level staff and mandatory those foundations of Islamic jurisprudence41 of higher-level members.

The second form of IPT is known as “continuing” or IPT Content “in-service” training, to be undergone by all cadres, In ideological-political courses, which focus heav- officers, employees, and conscripts. This training is a ily on Islam and Islamic teaching, a core concern is requirement for continued service as well as promo- the superiority and righteousness of velayat-e faqih, tion. Before 2009, IRGC members took this course the doctrine affirming a Shia jurist as national leader over one month every three years; since then, they and, by implication, the legitimacy of Ayatollah take an intensive ten-day course once a year. The Khamenei’s rule. content and method of teaching have also changed Religious and ideological education focuses on over the past decade. Instead of focusing on simply increasing religious knowledge, instructors seek to strengthening Islamic theology (din shenasi), on Islam ensure students truly absorb the content, doing so as a religion and an ideology, on prophecy (nabovat), through more in-class discussion instead of lecturing. and on Shia leadership (imamat), all toward help- The topics taught in general and continuing edu- ing learners enhance their religious knowledge and cation courses are very similar. But continuing edu- devotion. The religious programming starts with prov- cation, known as tarbiyat va taali, contains differing ing the existence of God, demonstrating the necessity content for IRGC and Basij conscripts, officers, and of prophecy, establishing Islam as the most complete commanders. The titles of these courses include: religion compared to other religions, and upholding the legitimacy of the Shia imams as successors to the The Seekers of What Is Right and Truthful Prophet Muhammad. The discussion of mahdaviyat Individual, Family, and Organizational Honesty (belief in the existence and righteousness of the Hid- den Imam) is likewise an important part of ideologi- Family Consultation cal training. Talk of the Hidden Imam requires only a Political and Ideological Question and Answers short jump to get to velayat-e faqih. For impression- Visiting with Religious Ulama (scholars) able students in particular, the training can offer a Proficiency in Reading Quran credible case that the Shia ulama represents the Hid- den Imam in both worldly and otherworldly affairs. The Islamic Iranian Lifestyle Many Shia already accept this proposition for the As the previous lists show, the Islamic Republic offers religious-spiritual realm. ample courses in Quranic learning for its armed After accepting velayat-e faqih, the second ele- forces. The goals include developing faith and spiritu- ment of IPT involves approving the legitimacy of Aya- ality, consolidating foundations of belief and deepen- tollah Khamenei as the righteous jurist and highlight- ing religious knowledge, promoting Quranic culture, ing the obligation of military forces to obey his orders

POLICY NOTE 58 13 SAEID GOLKAR and follow in his path. In fact, the entire educational domination (nezam-e solteh-e jahani) is inherently curriculum can be summed up as creating a maktabi unstable, requiring the exploiters to engage in war force that is “religion-centered, armed with political and exploitation. While many countries have contrib- vision and velayat madari”(a term introduced ear- uted to this unequal power relationship, some are try- lier that implies heartfelt acceptance of the political- ing to overthrow the system. Iran is one of these coun- spiritual authority of the Supreme Leader and active tries. In fact, it is the leader of the “resistance axis,” loyalty to him), according to Hojatoleslam Saidi, the in the view of several IRGC commanders. The IRGC current head of the Ideological-Political Office of projects the United States and Iran as occupying two the Commander-in-Chief. Velayat madari is a critical opposite poles: good (jebeh-e haq) and evil (jebeh concept and the ultimate goal of IPT for Iran’s armed batel). It depicts their confrontation as strategic, not forces. According to an IRGC study on the Guard’s tactical. On the international level, the IRGC is posi- command and general staff courses, political topics tive about supporting Islamic movements and nega- are more often discussed than ethical and religious tive about collaborating with the non-Islamic world. ones, and among all political issues, the basirat, or The IRGC’s perception of the West and the United political vision, and velayat madari are the two most- States is in harmony with that of Ayatollah Khame- often emphasized.44 The intent through this emphasis nei and the hardliners, who stand against a policy is to change the model of subordination within the of engagement.47 armed forces, especially the IRGC, from a dynamic The IPT focus on Islamic education highlights a based on legality to one based on love and faith, corresponding stark absence: that of any social or indeed blind faith.45 civic education. Even traditionally nationalist or patri- This is why, in political lessons, all issues—from otic themes are left out, given the view by Ayatollah domestic to international—align with the Supreme Khamenei and fellow IRGC spiritual leader Ayatol- Leader’s ideas. Specific material covered includes lah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi that patriotism political history, the Islamic Republic’s constitution, counts only as a human and not a religious value.48 elections, and the structure of political power in Iran’s While certain Guard members may harbor compara- Islamic movements, along with “knowing the enemy” tively more patriotic sentiments, the IRGC IPO and (doshman shenasi),46 political groups and ideolo- other entities keep their focus on Islam. gies in Iran (jaryanhay-e siyasi dar jameh), and the When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for example, tried achievements of the Islamic Revolution (shenakht-e to expand his social base by promoting an Iranian dastavardehay-e Enghelab-e Islami). In all related Islam, Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, whose ideas are materials, members of the clergy are depicted as the taught in IRGC IPT classes and who is especially saviors of Iran and heroes of the country’s indepen- influential among Guard clerics, attacked this notion dence. Unsurprisingly, the teaching approach gives by saying, “Certain people who are shamelessly no weight to critical thinking. Rather, like all ideo- promoting the Iranian school in place of the Islamic logical inculcation, clerics simplify reality to fit their school are outsiders, not insiders.” He has consis- worldview. This approach is epitomized by the earlier- tently attacked patriotism as an animalistic desire, mentioned concept of taklif garai: performing a duty since “even the crows and wolves defend their territo- without regard for the result. ries.” 49 He views shahadat (martyrdom), by contrast, The United States figures prominently in the Man- as a holy concept to be promoted. Ayatollah Abdul- ichaean worldview propagated by IRGC teaching lah Javadi Amoli, whose book on ethics and morality materials. They contend that the world is divided is widely taught at the IRGC IPO, said in a speech, into two main axes: one of domination and one of “While Iran is our country and we will defend it, this resistance. The domination axis consists of so-called country was saved by Karbala and Imam Hussein, not colonializing states that have been exploiting other by ‘the glorious frontier’ [marz-e por gohar],” referring countries for centuries. Within this framework, West- to a popular patriotic song.50 “Ey Iran” (O Iran), con- ern countries, especially the United States, have sidered the country’s unofficial national anthem, was been successful in implementing their hegemony for composed in 1944 by Ruhollah Khaleqi. Moreover, decades. The IRGC holds that the system of world Hojatoleslam Saidi, the head of the Commander-in-

14 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY THE SUPREME LEADER AND THE GUARD

Chief’s Ideological-Political Office, defined the politi- books and materials for IPT programs for all branches cal groups in modern Iran as either leftist-Marxist, of military and security forces, including the IRGC, liberal, nationalist, or Islamist, and explained that the Artesh, and police. Islamic Republic is based on a religious-jurisprudence Based in Qom, the Imam Sadeq Institute also discourse and clearly distinguished from other dis- oversees the contents of any IRGC-published materi- courses, including nationalism.51 Islamic discourse is als to ensure they accord with Islam and the regime’s indeed the main discourse of Iran’s armed forces. political ideology. The institute has three main “sci- Rear Adm. Ali Fadavi, who has served since Sep- entific” groups: on theology and Islamic knowledge, tember 2018 as the IRGC’s deputy commander for defense and security, and sociocultural and politi- coordination, noted that neither the Guard’s full cal issues. And it has a publishing house, Zamzam- name nor the Islamic Revolution even mentions the e Hedayat, which has produced about a thou- name Iran. The guarding of the revolution, in his sand books for IRGC IPT courses.55 Textbooks on explanation, is different from the guarding of a coun- ideological-political issues, written almost exclusively try or region. Another example of this sentiment was by clerics within the IRGC IPO, draw from a handful expressed by Brig. Gen. Gholam Hossein Gharib of Islamic Republic ideologues, including Khomeini Parvar, the head of the Basij organization, who explic- and Khamenei, Mesbah-Yazdi, Javadi Amoli, and itly said that with martyrs from the Iran-Iraq War, the Morteza Motahhari. republic has no need for heroes such as Rustam from The institute also has three main journals: Payam, the Persian epic poem Shahnameh. The branding of for clergy providing IPT to the IRGC; Morabian, for all Gen. Qasem Soleimani does present a bit of a ques- IPT educators in the Guard; and Hasoun, designed to tion. The Qods Force general, especially following his enhance ideological knowledge for IRGC command- efforts against the Islamic State in neighboring Iraq ers. The institute maintains a website, Touba, which and Syria, has received high state-sponsored praise. provides access to its publications for the IRGC and But it is important to note that this propaganda has Basij, as well as other military branches. targeted the general Iranian population, not the 52 Guard. The common source is the IRGC’s Social Controlling the Guard Through and Cultural Bureau. It is difficult to determine to what extent this educa- Surveillance and Coercion tion program has helped the clergy achieve its goals, In maintaining control over the IRGC and Iran’s other or in what numbers Guardsmen are internalizing the armed forces, Ayatollah Khamenei relies not only on intended lessons. Anecdotal evidence suggests that indoctrination but also on surveillance and coercion. while some personnel simply go along in order to In the Artesh, IRGC, and all other Iranian secu- ensure promotion, IRGC members are generally more rity entities, a comprehensive surveillance network religious and radical compared to their counterparts serves as a first line of defense against a potential in the army and police. Some studies show that values coup.56 Three principal institutions are enlisted in this such as velayat madari have much greater adherence effort: the Organization for the Protection of Intel- 53 in the IRGC than in Iranian society at large. Finally, ligence (OPI), the Armed Forces Inspection Bureau a consensus among scholars focusing on the IRGC (Moavenat-e Bazrasi-e Nirouha-ye Mosallah), and holds that IPT indoctrination has been more success- the Commanders’ Bureau (Ashraf-e Farmandehi). ful with the Guard than with army personnel. Through the OPI, Ayatollah Khamenei, in the role of armed forces commander-in-chief, has cre- The Imam Sadeq Institute ated a pervasive apparatus aimed not only at iden- In standardizing IPT, all Iran’s armed forces use tifying foreign agents and corrupt personnel but at textbooks provided by the Imam Sadeq Institute for identifying and suppressing any voices of opposition. Islamic Sciences, which is subordinated to the IRGC Under this organization’s watch, every last member IPO.54 This institute is responsible for designing the of the IRGC and Artesh is subject to continuous scru- programs, preparing the syllabi, and writing the text- tiny. Even minor offenses can draw rebuke. In many

POLICY NOTE 58 15 SAEID GOLKAR instances, military personnel have been summoned ing at academies specific to their military organiza- to the organization for wearing short sleeves or blue tion—the Farabi Science and Technology University jeans, generally in their workplace but even in public (Daneshgahe Oloum va Fonoun Farabi) for the areas as well. Artesh, the Imam Hadi Counterintelligence Acad- emy for the IRGC. Organization for the Protection In broad terms, the OPI is designed to preserve of Intelligence and protect the armed forces and its affiliated organizations by safeguarding personnel information, doc- The wide-reaching OPI operates with a central- uments, facilities, equipment, and communications ized hierarchy under Ayatollah Khamenei’s control, security.58 According to Article 16 of the Artesh char- through the Supreme Leader’s Office for the Orga- ter, the OPI’s mission entails the following specifics: nization for the Protection of Intelligence (Daftar-e collecting news; producing, analyzing, and classifying Omoumi-ye Hefazat va Ettelaat-e Farmandehi-ye intelligence; and detecting, preventing, and neutral- Kol-e Qova). The OPI has autonomy from the military izing subversion, spying, sabotage, dissatisfaction, chain of command and IPO, but the leadership in political influence, and mission disruption. The OPI each military branch is required to provide logistical is likewise responsible for collaborating with Iran’s support for the organization. The Supreme Leader’s Ministry of Intelligence through the Council for the Office for the Organization for the Protection of Intel- Coordination of Intelligence (Shura-ye Hamahangi-ye ligence is responsible for coordinating separate OPI Ettelaat), Iran’s highest intelligence body. Item 3 of directorates within the military/security infrastructure Article 16 requires the Artesh OPI chief to promptly and for creating a unified approach among them report coup and sabotage suspicions to the attorney in implementing the Supreme Leader’s counter- general and IRGC commander.59 The OPI has also intelligence orders. been used for political missions and to arrest activists From 1989 until 2017, the intelligence protection and journalists. For example, in 1999, “the police’s office was led by three Artesh generals: Mohammad OPI incarcerated and allegedly tortured the mayor of Ali Nazaran, Abdollah Najafi, and Sayyed Hesam Tehran, Gholam-Hossein Karbaschi, alongside other Hashemi. But in 2017, the Supreme Leader broke Tehran district mayors who had supported Khatami’s this trend by appointing Hojatoleslam Gholam Hos- presidential campaign.”60 In all, the massively power- sein Ramazani, the former head of NAJA and IRGC ful OPI infrastructure has fostered a climate of fear in counterintelligence. Other public servants working in the armed forces, stifling free expression from most leadership positions for the OPI, across the Artesh, soldiers. Through these intelligence networks, the Defense Ministry, IRGC, and NAJA (police), include clerical regime can closely monitor the armed forces. both clerics and military personnel. As dictated by Another important responsibility of the OPI is law, they report to the Supreme Leader’s Office for reviewing the security qualifications and competency the Organization for the Protection of Intelligence and of military personnel at all levels and all stages of are approved and appointed directly by the Supreme their career advancement. Even for members of the Leader. Moreover, dismissal of the OPI head is the Basij militia who want to be promoted to active status, sole responsibility of the Supreme Leader. As for the the IRGC OPI must approve their security clearance. prominent role of clerics, it dates back decades. Hoja- According to some reports, tensions have emerged toleslam Saidi, the current IRGC IPO deputy, led the between the IRGC commander and the head of IRGC Guard’s OPI branch between 1983 and 1987. The OPI over failure to approve certain personnel. Back leadership for NAJA has come from IRGC ranks,57 during the Iran-Iraq War, clashes between then IRGC including both Brig. Gen. Muhammad Naqdi and chief Maj. Gen. Mohsen Rezaii and then IRGC OPI Hojatoleslam Ramazani, who successively led the unit head Hojatoleslam Ali Saidi prompted the dismissal between 1990 and 2000. of the latter in 1986 by Ayatollah Khomeini, at Gen- Other personnel within the various OPI branches eral Rezaii’s request. Again heeding Rezaii’s counsel, tend to have a military background along with ideo- Khomeini appointed Gen. Ahmad Vahidi, a top-level logical and conservative views. They receive train- intelligence official, to replace Saidi (see table 2).

16 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY THE SUPREME LEADER AND THE GUARD

One challenge for the IRGC OPI has been bers the organization is responsible for identifying ensuring ideological purity within the Guard. In and arresting. 2009, some members of the IRGC’s first genera- The OPI similarly exerts its influence over the tion supported reformist candidates Mir Hossein online activities of military personnel, having lately Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi. Since then, the regime ramped up such efforts focused on social media. has intensified its efforts to replace the Guard’s first IRGC members are thus often hesitant to use instant- and second generations, sometimes through giving messaging apps such as Telegram, although some some incentives to retire after twenty-five years. By remain active Internet users. In tightening restric- replacing these earlier generations, Khamenei has tions, the IRGC OPI has banned using smartphones enhanced Guard loyalty, though of course even on Guard bases or other sites, although reports sug- some members of the third generation are more gest these efforts haven’t entirely succeeded. And opportunistic and less ideological. In addition, the military members must clear any prospective media Basij Foundation for the Oppressed has established interviews with the organization. an organization of retired Basij in order to draw on Finally, it is important to note that the IRGC OPI is their experience. Meanwhile, the IRGC OPI has different from the IRGC Intelligence and Security Orga- nization (Sazeman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Sepha), expanded its control over IRGC retired personnel which was created formally in 2009. While the IRGC by asking them to officially register their mourn- OPI focuses mainly on surveillance of IRGC and Basij ing and religious associations (heyat-e azadari); members, IRGC Intelligence covers the broader public. those that fail to register have been closed and The distinction came about like this: the IRGC, since its their members summoned for investigation. When inception, has been involved in gathering intelligence distance opened up between Ayatollah Khamenei and surveillance of political dissidents through its intel- and President Ahmadinejad during the president’s ligence unit. However, after the creation in 1984 of the second term, the IRGC OPI arrested several Guard Ministry of Intelligence (Vezarat-e Ettelaat Jomhuri-ye members who supported Ahmadinejad against the Eslami-ye Iran), the IRGC intelligence unit narrowed its Supreme Leader. Relatedly, IRGC members serv- focus to military intelligence only. This scope lasted until ing in Ahmadinejad’s administration faced intense 1999, when Ayatollah Khamenei enlisted the IRGC to OPI scrutiny when having their positions approved block reformists, and the expanded purview, or “orga- and when reentering the Guard. According to Parviz nization” status, has lasted ever since. Since the rise of Fatah, a former Guardsman who served as Ahma- the Green Movement, the IRGC Intelligence and Secu- dinejad’s minister of energy from 2005 to 2009, the rity Organization has been controlled by the Guard OPI only approved his reentry to the Guard after leadership, whereas the IRGC OPI reports directly to years of inquiry, based on fears he answered first the Supreme Leader. A subtle rivalry exists between the to Ahmadinejad or his Deviance Group (Jaryan-e IRGC Intelligence Bureau and the Intelligence Ministry, Enherafi), so named after its members ceased to resulting in the arrest and even death of some agents follow Khamenei’s line.61 A different target of the serving one or the other.62 IRGC OPI is mystical Islam (tasavof), whose mem- Monitoring Role of the Inspection Bureau TABLE 2. Heads of the IRGC OPI Alongside the OPI, another Islamic Republic agency

Hojatoleslam Ali Saidi 1983 –1986 designed to coopt and coerce military personnel is the Armed Forces Inspection Bureau. This bureau is Hojatoleslam Ahmad Vahidi 1986 –1989 subordinate to the military commanders, answering to Hojatoleslam Ali Saidi 1989 –1993 the head of each respective military unit and—like the Gen. Morteza Rezaei 1994 –2006 other intelligence bodies discussed so far—carrying a presence in every sphere from the AFGS down to Hojatoleslam Gholam Hossein Ramazani 2006 –2009 individual platoons. Gen. Muhammad Kazemi 2010 –0000 Officially, the Inspection Bureau covers violations outside those handled by the OPI. While the OPI

POLICY NOTE 58 17 SAEID GOLKAR

deals with political, security, or organized-crime-related 1. Knowledge and Faith offenses, the Inspection Bureau targets any violations Theology outside these bounds, while identifying and arresting Prophecy (nabovat) dissidents in the armed forces.63 In such efforts, the Shia leadership Inspection Bureau works closely with both the OPI and Knowledge of resurrection the IPO to control military personnel. Without question, 2. Worship and Good Deeds much overlap exists among the missions of these three Prayer, fasting, commitment to Islamic organizations. commandments The Inspection Bureau also conducts investigations Familiarity with Quran to guard against program mismanagement and malfea- Engaging in recommended, though not man- sance. Working through judicial officers (zabet-e ghazai) datory, actions in Islam for the Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, the Observance of religious and customary inspection deputy uncovers crimes, including gather- appearance and dress codes ing and preserving evidence, as well as identifying and 3. Family Origins locating the accused military personnel. Here, relative Family religiosity and support for the regime to Western governments, in which the inspector gen- Observance of the veil and Islamic appearance eral does not hold a particularly influential position, the in one’s parents’ family 64 role in Iran’s armed forces is very powerful. Accord- Observance of the veil by spouse and children ing to the IRGC charter, which dates to August 1982, Participation in mosque, religious groups, and the inspection deputy serves the military commander in occasions associated with the Islamic Revolution determining the qualifications of members and advises 4. Belief in and Practical Commitment to the IRGC commander on the performance of various Velayat-e Faqih IRGC units and departments.65 The deputy also identi- Love and attachment to the Ahl al-Bait fies the merits of commanders for appointment and pro- (family of the Prophet Muhammad) motion, while the human resources directorate conducts Avoidance of enemies of the Ahl al-Bait and such assessments for officers and NCOs. Finally, the expressing of hostility toward them inspection deputy reports to appropriate IPO heads on Promotion of the culture of Mahdism ideological, political, and ethical deviations committed (Twelver Shiism) by staff. In this, as in other tasks, the deputy collaborates Understanding the principles of with the IPO, and once again the work of these bureaus velayat-e faqih 66 often overlaps (see figure 5). Acceptance of the rules and positions In 2010, the IRGC inaugurated an evaluation system of the Supreme Leader called the “General Merits of Guardianship” (Shayes- Enactment of the Supreme Leader’s tegi Omoumi-e Pasdari), which assesses IRGC person- recommendations and guidelines nel based on twelve broad indicators:67 Comprehensive defense of the Supreme Leader

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Deputy Coordinator

Parliamentary Social and Inspection/ Communications Education Budget and Logistics Human Operations and Legal Cultural Transcend Technology and Training Planning and Support Resources Affairs Affairs

FIG. 5 Structure of IRGC Military Leadership

18 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY THE SUPREME LEADER AND THE GUARD

5. Piety and Virtue 10. Mental and Intellectual Development Integrity in speech and deed Interest and effort to learn Chastity Balance and stability of character Commitment to work Self-confidence Self-evaluation Flexibility 6. Moral Merits 11. Social and Organizational Relations Good words (hussein-e kalam) Participation in popular gatherings Avoidance of flattery Popularity among people demonstrating Nonattachment to worldly position or money humanity, according to regime values Preservation of dignity and respect for Participation in Basij activities and operations family ethics 12. Physical, Military, and Intelligence Readiness Education and consideration of Fitness children’s affairs Martial arts and self-defense Socializing with spouse and children Counterintelligence knowledge Respect and consideration for parents For any military figure seeking appointment or pro- 7. Avoidance of Luxuries and Worldliness motion, including officers, meeting these standards is Possession of only simple devices critical. The process is managed by a directorate for and appliances appointments within the Inspection Bureau. Personnel Avoidance of congregating with the rich must be approved by this directorate before continu- 8. Intuition and Revolutionary Action ing their education at the Command and General Identifying the friends and foes of Staff College (for ranks of major and higher) or the the Islamic republic Supreme National Defense University (for ranks of Understanding the system of domination lieutenant colonel and higher). and opposition In determining ranks from private to second Knowing the Islamic Revolution and brigadier general, a process of evaluation generally protecting it involves the Inspection Bureau, OPI, and IPO, with Defending the values of the Islamic Revolu- a focus on candidate performance and ideological tion and promoting them competence. For IRGC personnel, the promotion to the high rank here, second brigadier general, takes 9. Jihadist Spirit and Ashurai three years, while for the Artesh it takes four. For this Tireless pursuit reason, a near majority of Artesh personnel retire Hardworking approach with the rank of colonel, while in the Guard, a large Recognition of religious and revolutionary number settle at second brigadier general. The rank duties in organizational and social affairs of second brigadier general is the lowest among the Practice of duties without concern for the five ranks for general within the IRGC. The other work involved, and absolute devotion to the ranks mirror the one- to four-star system used in the ideals of sacrifice and martyrdom United States. Promotion to a rank higher than sec- Avoidance of simply waiting for death, and ond brigadier general requires approval by Ayatol- acceptance of martyrdom in the name of lah Khamenei. (See table 3 for values accorded to God, oppression, and defending what is right IRGC ranks.) Defense of the oppressed, and commitment Yet since the new system was implemented in to fight against injustice and oppression 2010, the old system in which promotion happened Defense of what is right in speech and automatically after three- or four-year intervals has action, courage, and risk-taking changed somewhat. Now personal loyalty to the Refusal to be intimidated by enemy numbers Supreme Leader, joined secondarily by ideological and weaponry loyalty, has become preeminent, allowing for faster

POLICY NOTE 58 19 SAEID GOLKAR

68 † promotion than in the past. In 2010, for example, TABLE 3. Values Accorded to IRGC Ranks the loyalist Farzad Ismaili was promoted by two ranks, 20 General Ateshbod Pasdar from colonel to brigadier general, earning appointment as head of the Artesh Air Defense Force. The 19 Lieutenant General Sepahbod Pasdar same incentive holds for other armed forces members. 18 Major General Sarlashkar Pasdar

A related insurance policy for military appoin- 17 Brigadier General Sartip Pasdar tees is “religiosity,” seen by the Supreme Leader as a 16 Second Brigadier General Sartip 2 Pasdar safeguard against betrayal.69 Devotion to Shia Islam, alongside the earlier-noted ideological attributes, 15 Colonel Sarhang Pasdar not only oils appointments and promotions, it is also 14 Lieutenant Colonel Sarhang 2 Pasdar the main indicator for holding a top-level position 13 Major Sargord Pasdar for decades, versus the usual three-year term. High- 12 Captain Sarvan Pasdar ranking military officials who fit this description include Gen. Muhammad Shirazi, who heads the Supreme 11 First Lieutenant Sotvan 1 Pasdar Leader’s Military Bureau, Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi, 10 Second Lieutenant Sotvan 2 Pasdar the former head of Iran’s AFGS, and General Solei- 9 Third Lieutenant Sotvan 3 Pasdar mani, the Qods Force chief. As noted at the outset 8 Command Sergeant Major Razmdar 1 Pasdar of this paper, the Guard also has narrowed its pool of recruits to those with a conservative-ideological 7 Sergeant Major (Staff) Razmdar 2 Pasdar worldview. Valued attributes include having a parent 6 First Sergeant Razmdar 3 Pasdar in the IRGC, being the relative of a martyr or vet- 5 Staff Sergeant Razmavar 1 Pasdar eran (e.g., of Iraq or Syria), being a “devotee of the 4 Sergeant Razmavar 2 Pasdar Islamic Revolution” (isargaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami) and belonging to the Basij. This contrasts with past 3 Corporal Razmavar 3 Pasdar years, when the Guard was more open to recruiting 2 Private First Class Razmyar Pasdar people from a broader ideological background. 1 Private Sarbaz Since 2010, moreover, recruitment to the IRGC † often happens through shared nomination by mem- Ranks 16–20 known as sardar pasdar in the IRGC; emir in the army. bers within the personnel department and the IPO. This system of “marking” (neshaneh gozari) and “find- Another Agency to Keep Tabs ing members” (ozv yabi) is, once again, informed on Military Personnel by an emphasis on ideological purity and fealty to Complementing the Inspection Bureau is a per- the Islamic regime. After being selected, nominees vasive institution called the Commanders’ Bureau attend the IRGC academies to take their exam and (Ashraf-e Farmandehi), created in 2002 by the thereafter enter Imam Hussein University, where they Supreme Leader. This cluster network, which like undergo highly intensive ideological-political training. others begins at the top within the AFGS and has Finally, Iran’s armed forces do not engage in tentacles extending down to individual units, serves ethnic discrimination, but they do practice religious to monitor the armed forces. It has a presence in all discrimination. Despite having to serve a mandatory branches, including the IPOs and OPIs. Yet unlike twenty-one months, minorities such as Bahai cannot the Inspection Bureau, which covers forces at many ultimately join the military or become officers. Gener- ranks, Commandership Dominance is focused solely ally, they serve in nonsensitive positions and in border on commanders and high-ranking personnel. Also areas such as Sistan and Baluchestan. Further, while distinct from the Inspection Bureau, which conducts non-Persians such as Shia Arabs, Kurds, or Baluch evaluations, Commandership Dominance relies on are recruited in massive numbers mainly by the Qods self-reporting by commanders, who send assess- Force for missions in neighboring countries, non-Shia ments on their forces. These reports are sent to the Persians cannot join the armed forces. Office of the Commanders’ Surveillance Bureau

20 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY THE SUPREME LEADER AND THE GUARD

(Dabirkhaneh-ye Ashraf-e Farmandehi) at AFGS, cal, Public Affairs, and Propaganda Bureaus. These currently headed by Maj. Gen. Mostafa Izadi. appointments show that while the IRGC has stretched Every year, this office sends a brief set of questions its influence over many corners of Iranian society, the to the lowest units in the armed forces, based on individual behind it all remains Khamenei, who has the self-reporting, and the most successful units made a priority of indoctrinating members with the receive accolades. regime’s Islamic ideology and his own ultimate legiti- Incentives are provided in part through salary and macy as Supreme Leader. He is referred to as Imam benefits. Despite an AFGS-approved system in 2008 instead of Ayatollah Khamenei only in the armed granting equal pay across all branches, IRGC mem- forces and especially in the IRGC. Thanks to all these bers still receive slightly better compensation than their policies and institutions, the current likelihood of the Artesh and NAJA counterparts: perhaps an extra $10– IRGC staging a coup against Khamenei is very low. $20 out of a total $170–$200 monthly. The gap in As this study has illustrated, Khamenei and his benefits, by comparison, is substantial—experienced representative have made sure that the newest gen- in better health care, equipment, merchandise, edu- erations to enter the Guard hold more conservative cation, recreation, and newer, more appealing hous- and religious views than their predecessors. This fol- ing. One account describes Artesh housing as “literally lows upon a religious/conservative IRGC class from in ruins.” A simple comparison of the IRGC’s Shahid the 1980s, but an insufficiently ideological crop Mahalati Housing Complex (Mojtame-ye Shahid Maha- in the next decade, due to a recruitment method lati) with Artesh housing in the southeast Tehran neigh- that allowed anyone to apply. These recruits from borhood of Qasr-e Firouzeh depicts the gulf between the 1990s were more pragmatic than any before the two.70 There are also “brighter career prospects in or after, with high numbers voting for the reform- the IRGC compared with the Army,” according to one ist president Mohammad Khatami in both the 1997 analyst, with the IRGC having the first pick in poten- and 2001 elections. But since then, a singular focus tial recruits.71 All these components generate loyalty to on the religious parts of society has produced far the Guard. more radical-ideological members representing the Guard’s third (entering in the 2000s) and fourth (in Conclusion the 2010s) generations. In appointing today’s IRGC commanders, the regime has passed over this sec- The IRGC is the most important organization for the ond generation, instead naming members from the survival of the Islamic Republic. It bolsters the cleri- ideologically vetted third generation. In 2018, three cal establishment by suppressing social and political IRGC commander appointees fit this description, in protests, deterring external intervention and attempts Hormozgan (Col. Hamid Dehghani), Semnan (Col. at regime change, and keeping Iran’s conventional Abazar Salari), and Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad army (Artesh) in check, reducing the threat of a coup. Provinces (Col. Hamid Khormdel).72 The IRGC is under the control of Ayatollah Khamenei, The increasingly ideological-religious composi- who by creating a web of institutions in counterintel- tion of the IRGC, reinforced by a thorough train- ligence and ideology/politics has only tightened his ing regimen, has forged a widening gap between grip. To do so, he has employed methods like coop- the Guard and the Iranian people. As illustrated tation, coercion, and indoctrination. For Khamenei, earlier, ideology reigns, leaving no place for civic the IPOs are the principal tools in subordinating the identity or traditional patriotism in the Guard, even Guard to his rule. as individual Guardsmen likely possess such views The Supreme Leader also asserts his author- privately, acquired from other sources. Given all this ity over the Guard through his representative to the work of indoctrination, the Guard’s current hardline organization, as well as other appointments. Since trajectory, and specifically its support for velayat-e his leadership began three decades ago, Khame- faqih, it will likely remain a bulwark for the Islamic nei has reassigned many responsibilities previously Republic, putting down any potential uprisings that belonging to IRGC commanders to his representa- might threaten its survival. The increasing breadth tive’s office in the Guard, including in the key Politi- and technical capacities of the IRGC, including its

POLICY NOTE 58 21 SAEID GOLKAR intelligence wings and anti-riot forces such as the cautioned, “How is it possible to criticize the clergy, Ammar Brigades and Imam Ali Battalions, suit it for seminarians, and jurisprudents as unknowing, and this role. then accept the authority of the leader who will be A countrywide uprising could, however, pose a elected by them...!”77 greater difficulty for the Guard than sporadic riot- One related fear is that the IRGC will not accept ing. To address this risk, in 2006–2007, the IRGC the next Supreme Leader, whose orientation will fall created provincial corps at the recommendation of somewhere between radical religiosity and pragma- IRGC commander Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, tism, with the latter end including current president incorporating Basij forces with Guard ground forces Hassan Rouhani, who has views far from Khamenei’s in every province. He did so in response to the U.S. notion of a revolutionary seminary. Rouhani and his invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, seeking to decen- allies hold the traditional belief that the seminary tralize his forces’ military might. But the military char- should not be subordinate to the political regime. acter of this plan changed to a security one in 2009, A final note on the next Supreme Leader involves following the Green Movement and the realization the dynamic between the IRGC and the Assembly that the United States was unlikely to attack Iran. of Experts, the eighty-eight member body charged The result for today is that the Guard has person- with selecting this potentate. Although the Guard nel in place throughout the country to defend against has no legal leverage over the assembly to influence unwanted activity. this decision, it has plenty of implicit power. To begin Another divide created by the radicalizing IRGC with, the assembly has a strongly conservative com- is one with a group of seminarians who support the position, making selection of a hardline successor separation of religion and state. Interestingly, semi- likely. But should the assembly choose a more mod- naries are generally reverting to a philosophy in erate figure, the Guard can show its displeasure in which they eschew politics, reflecting a Shia tradi- forceful ways. For starters, the IRGC’s Ansar Corps tion based on the idea that no government is “legiti- is responsible for the very physical protection of the mate” when the Hidden Imam is in occultation. All assembly members. Further, through its sleuthing, this is happening as the IRGC doubles down on a IRGC intelligence holds in-depth information about model in which Islam and the state are considered the assembly members’ lives, including their families. inseparable.73 Many people close to or affiliated with Because many members have engaged in unsavory the IRGC, including former IRGC IPO head Hoja- financial or moral acts, the Guard has the potential toleslam Saidi, criticize these seminaries, arguing to embarrass or harm them. Last but not least, family that seminarians must be revolutionary, not apoliti- ties unite the assembly and the Guard. Sons of cler- cal or neutral.74 In September 2018, Hassan Rahim- ics belong to the IRGC, and vice versa. For just one pour Azghadi, a former IRGC commander closely example, Gen. Mohammad Bagherzadeh’s son is a allied with Ayatollah Khamenei, criticized seminaries cleric who has a very close relationship with Ayatol- as “the root of secularism.”75 But fissures between lah Khamenei’s son. the clergy and the IRGC are hardly new. When, in Invested with these powers, the IRGC will surely 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini appointed Hojatoleslam set the goal of making the next Supreme Leader its Abdullah Nouri as his representative to the Guard, puppet. And should this occur, U.S.-Iran relations the cleric complained about being named to a force will undoubtedly continue to deteriorate. Because of where everybody considered himself a mujtahid. the importance of the IRGC in shaping the Islamic Responding to these cracks in the current scene, Republic’s future, including its domestic and foreign some have advised Khamenei to strengthen “the rela- policies, the study of the IRGC, its commanders, and tionship between the Revolutionary Guard and the its educational regime is vital for U.S. policymakers. religious authorities, or Shia maraji.”76 One reason They should watch closely the evolution of the IRGC, is that the rift could have real consequences in the especially after Khamenei dies, to identify where the post-Khamenei era. As one cleric in the IRGC IPO most serious threats to U.S. interests arise.

22 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY THE SUPREME LEADER AND THE GUARD

ington Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2011), 45–59; Ali Alfoneh, Notes Iran Unveiled: How the Revolutionary Guards Is Trans- forming Iran from Theocracy into Military Dictatorship 1. Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Pat- (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2013). terns in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, And see Ali Alfoneh, “After Public Humiliation by the 1971), 7. IRGC, Is It the End of Khamenei’s Era”? Arab Weekly, 2. As to the fall of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Feb. 4, 2018, http://bit.ly/2WPraMI. situation in Iran was complicated: namely, a sociocul- 10. Mehdi Khalaji, Tightening the Reins: How Khame- tural split had emerged wherein the officer class mainly nei Makes Decisions, Policy Focus 126 (Washing- supported him but noncommissioned officers tended to ton DC: Washington Institute, 2014), https://washin. be more religious and receptive to the views of Ruhol- st/2SmN7nW. lah Khomeini. For an excellent analysis of the current scene, see Zoltan Barany, “Who Will Shield the Imams? 11. “Islamic Republic of Iran Navy: A Strategic Force” (in Regime Protection and the Military in Iran and the Mid- Persian), Offshore Press Club, Sept. 25, 2014, http:// dle East,” forthcoming in Journal of Middle East Policy. bit.ly/2TUwuMr. Also see Twitter post by SinaNoor- ikhani (@SinaNoorikhani), the gist of which is that 3. For the armed forces in general, see Nader Entes- antiarmor missiles are expensive and not worth the sar, “Military and Politics in the Islamic Republic of cost (in Persian), Jan. 5, 2019, 8:35 a.m., http://bit. Iran,” in Post-Revolutionary Iran, ed. Hooshang Ami- ly/2RM8w4D. rahmadi and Manoucher Parvin (Boulder, CO: West- view, 1988), 57–58; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s 12. Elaine Sciolino, “Human-Wave Raid Losses Iran’s Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Favor,” New York Times, July 5, 1987, https://nyti. Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, CT: Praeger, ms/2tc5Q6E. 1999), Michael Eisenstadt, “The Armed Forces of the 13. Mike Gallagher, “The ‘Beauty’ and the Horror of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment,” in Barry Ru- Iran-Iraq War,” BBC, Sept. 26, 2015, https://bbc. bin, Armed Forces in the Middle East and Strategy, ed. in/2DdSStm. Barry Rubin (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 231–58. For how clerics help prop up the Guard, see Afshon 14. Bayram Sinkaya, The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations (Abingdon, UK: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (New York: Oxford Uni- Routledge, 2016), 63. versity Press, 2016); Hesam Forozan, The Military in 15. Michael Eisenstadt, Iran’s Islamic Revolution: Lessons Post-Revolutionary Iran: The Evaluation and Roles of for the Arab Spring of 2011? Strategic Forum 267 (In- the Revolutionary Guards (London: Routledge, 2018). stitute for National Strategic Studies, April 2011), 2. For IRGC involvement in Iranian foreign policy, see Nader Uskowi, Temperature Rising: Iran’s Revolution- 16. Ali Akbar Ahmadian, “Asymmetric Battle and the Alavi ary Guards and Wars in the Middle East (Lanham, MD: Battle Pattern” (in Persian), Hasoun, no. 21 (Fall 2009), Rowman & Littlefield, 2018). 142–51. 4. See, e.g., Ahmed S. Hashim, “Civil-Military Relations 17. See Karim Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei: The World in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in Iran, Iraq, and the View of Iran’s Most Powerful Leader (Washington DC: Arab Gulf States, ed. Joseph A. Kechichian (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), Palgrave, 2001), 31–53. http://bit.ly/2ROYsrL. 5. “The Martyr Hojatoleslam Sheikh Abbas Shirazi, in 18. Ali Alfoneh, Changing of the Guards: Iran’s Supreme One View” (in Persian), Navide Shahed, June 9, 2018, Leader Struggles to Control Military, Middle Eastern http://bit.ly/2QWstp1. Outlook 1 (Washington DC: American Enterprise Insti- tute, 2010), http://bit.ly/2RUYthJ. 6. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2018 (London: IISS, 2018), 334. 19. Michael Eisenstadt, “The Security Forces of the Islamic Republic and the Fate of the Opposition,” PolicyWatch 7. For those interested in recruitment within the Vali Asr 1538 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June Corps, Khuzestan, see Basij News, Apr. 27, 2016, 19, 2009), https://washin.st/2VT4Ot8. http://bit.ly/2MeDNMi. 20. “Hojatoleslam Toyserkani: Our Goal Is the Growth and 8. Patrick H. O’Neil, “The Deep State: An Emerging Con- Improvement of Faith and Spirituality in the IRGC,” Ba- cept in Comparative Politics,” Social Science Research sirat, April 21, 2011, http://bit.ly/2W2TevR. Network,” Nov. 20, 2017, http://bit.ly/2Slgrex; Robert Springborg, “Deep States in MENA,” Middle East Policy 21. Iranian Students News Agency, “Activity of 9,000 Ideo- 25, no. 1 (Spring 2018), 136–57. logical Political Trainers in the IRGC” (in Persian), Apr. 21, 2018, http://bit.ly/2FDjR4F. 9. Elliot Hen-Tov and Nathan Gonzalez, “The Militariza- tion of Post-Khomeini Iran: Praetorianism 2.0,” Wash- 22. See http://serajnet.org/default/lang/Fa.aspx.

POLICY NOTE 58 23 SAEID GOLKAR

23. Mohammad Reza Toyserkani, “Our Programs Are Train- 41. See the Seraj-e Andishe website (in Persian) for vertical ing-Centered” (in Persian), Sobh-e Sadegh, no. 347 education courses, http://bit.ly/2UOnGs1. (2008), 9. 42. “Our Goal Is the Growth and Improvement of Faith and 24. For Basirat, see http://basirat.ir/. Spirituality in the IRGC” (in Persian), Basirat, May 1, 2011, http://bit.ly/2W2TevR. 25. Iran Book News Agency, “The IRGC Intellectual Ready to Build the World” (in Persian), May 8, 2008. 43. International Quran News Agency, “Implementation of the Mesbah Plan: The Basis for Future Appointments 26. Hawzah News Agency, “40 Percent of the Country’s in Iran’s Navy” (in Persian), Oct. 16, 2018, http://bit. Ideological and Political Educators Come from the ly/2Hhg7YR. Seminary Schools” (in Persian), Apr. 21, 2018, http:// hawzahnews.com/TextVersionDetail/449104. 44. Hashem Nedaei, Hassan Bakhtiari, and Jafar Moham- madi, “Study of the Indications of Religious Education 27. “Yadollah Javani: The IRGC Will Act Against Any Threats” in the IRGC’s Commanders and Managers Curricu- (in Persian), Sobh-e Sadegh, no. 396 (2009), 8. lum” (in Persian), Journal of Research in Islamic Educa- 28. “The Establishment of Cultural Guides” (in Persian), tion 21, no. 19 (Summer 2013), 83–102, esp. 99. Sobh-e Sadegh, no. 399 (2009), 5. 45. Mojtaba Eskandiari and Ismail Samani, “Designing 29. Fars News Agency, “General Ramazan Ali Sharif: The and Explaining the Pattern of Following in the Islamic Most Practical Weapon of the IRGC Was Interaction Revolutionary Guard Corps from Imam Khomeini’s and with the People,” July 14, 2012, http://bit.ly/2swJc8s. Imam Khamenei’s Viewpoints” (in Persian), Journal of 30. “Interview with General Qurayshi, Deputy of Supervising Islamic Management 20, no. 1 (2012), 39–60, http:// and Confirmation of Qualification” (in Persian), http:// bit.ly/2Mi1kfB. nvs.ir/Default.aspx?tabid=64&articleType=ArticleView 46. “Enemy” constitutes a vague label that the IRGC uses &articleId=426 (link inactive at time of publication). to tag any person, group, or country not aligned with 31. Islamic Republic News Agency, “Interview with Hoja- the Islamic Republic’s belief system or policies. Mem- toleslam Ibrahim Razini, Head of the Office of Sharia bers of the Bahai faith, for example, are considered Conformance” (in Persian), Nov. 22, 2015, http:// enemies of Iran. In regional terms, Gulf monarchies, www.irna.ir/fa/News/81842135. with the exception of Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait, are regarded as enemies. Without a doubt, on the inter- 32. “Recruitment at the IRGC: Seminary Student Level 1” national scene, the United States and Israel are the (in Persian), Agahitolab, Sept. 12, 2018, http://www. greatest enemies. In IRGC ideological training, two agahitolab.ir/post/70. different narratives can be found: one in which the 33. Mehdi Khalaji, “Iran’s Regime of Religion,” Journal of United States is cast as the puppet of Israel, with Jews International Affairs 65, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2011), 131– portrayed as rulers of the world, and a second in 47, esp. 138, https://washin.st/2FDpe3P. which Israel is depicted as the guardian of U.S. policies in the Middle East. But while these narratives treat 34. Mehdi Khalaji, “The Iranian Clergy’s Silence,” Current the United States as a hostile country, they depict Israel Trends in Islamist Ideology 10 (2010), 44–55, http:// as illegitimate or cancerous. bit.ly/2ROGTMo. 47. Adapted from Saeid Golkar, “Iran’s Revolutionary 35. Fars News Agency, “The Activity of 1,400 Clerical Basij Guard: Its Views of the United States,” Middle East in the Seminary” (in Persian), Dec. 12, 2017, http:// Policy 21, no. 2 (2014), 53–63, available at http://bit. qom.farsnews.com/news/13960921000615. ly/2W0tb8g. 36. Saeid Golkar, “Clerical Militia and Securitization of 48. “Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi’s Grave Criticism of Promot- Seminary Schools in Iran,” Contemporary Islam 11, no. ing Some Deviant Thoughts About Holy Defense on Ra- 3 (2017), 215–35, esp. 220. dio and Television” (in Persian), Jameh-ye Elmiyeh Amir 37. See http://www.smc.ac.ir. al-Mouminin, Oct. 6, 2011, http://bit.ly/2DdUcMQ. 38. Fars News Agency, “Training 2,000 Clerics at the IRGC 49. Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, “Crows and Center of Clerics’ Affairs” (in Persian), Apr. 16, 2015, Wolves Defend Both Territories” (in Persian), Tarikh-e http://bit.ly/2Fxk7Tp. Irani, July 27, 2011, http://bit.ly/2CvhwFJ. 39. “Application of the Guard’s ‘Merit Competency Note- 50. Abdullah Javadi Amoli, “New Reaction to Promote Ira- book’ in the IRGC” (in Persian), Mashregh News, May nian School” (in Persian), Entekhab, Mar. 21, 2011, 8, 2016, http://bit.ly/2svWceJ. http://bit.ly/2BMtJ9o. 40. Saeid Golkar, Captive Society: The Basij Militia and So- 51. Iranian Students News Agency, “The Supreme Leader’s cial Control in Post-Revolutionary Iran (Washington DC: Representative in the Revolutionary Guards: The Ideas of Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Columbia University the Reformists Are Different from the Imam’s Thoughts” Press, 2015), 57. (in Persian), Dec. 7, 2010, http://bit.ly/2RORxCQ.

24 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY THE SUPREME LEADER AND THE GUARD

52. Scott Peterson, “Gen. Soleimani: A New Brand of Irani- ect (American Enterprise Institute, April 2013), 35, an Hero for Nationalist Times,” Christian Science Moni- http://bit.ly/2RSHNr5. tor, http://bit.ly/2HkHBgc. 65. “Asasnameh-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Esl- 53. Hossein Zarif Manesh and Hossein Abbasi, “The Status ami” (IRGC charter), Majlis Research Center, Oct. 3, of Organizational Culture in the IRGC’s Higher Educa- 1982, http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/90595. tion Academies” (in Persian), Journal of Defense Man- 66. “The Quality and Quantity of the IRGC’s ‘Competen- agement and Research, no. 63 (Spring 2009), 107–34. cy Evaluation System’” (in Persian), Basirat, June 12, 54. This section is adapted from Saeid Golkar, The Ideolog- 2011, http://bit.ly/2FxrfiP. ical-Political Training of Iran’s Basij, Middle East Brief 44 67. Ibid. (Waltham, MA: Crown Center for Middle East Studies, 2010), http://bit.ly/2B3njSZ. 68. “An Interview with the IRGC’s Deputy of Human Re- 55. See http://zamzamhedayat.ir/. sources” (in Persian), Basirat, July 4, 2010, http://bit. ly/2FHnCpK. 56. Saeid Golkar, The Islamic Republic’s Art of Survival: Neutralizing Foreign and Domestic Threats, Policy Fo- 69. “The Story of the Supreme Leader Wearing a Kef- cus 125 (Washington DC: Washington Institute, June fiyeh” (in Persian), Tabnak, June 6, 2010, http://bit. 2013), 9–10, https://washin.st/2CtBq3X. ly/2ARe8Fb. 57. Aida Qajar, “First Narrative: The Police Officer Who 70. Alfoneh, Iran Unveiled, 170. Fled to Turkey,” Iran Wire, Oct. 19, 2018, https://iran- 71. Ali Alfoneh, “Eternal Rivals? The Artesh and the IRGC,” wire.com/fa/features/28041. Middle East Institute, Nov. 15, 2011, http://bit. 58. The charter for the Artesh (Islamic Republic army) is ly/2RN3i8z. available, in Persian, from the Ministry of Intelligence, 72. “Youths in the IRGC” (in Persian), Javann, Oct. 19, June 25, 2012, http://bit.ly/2TXsbQy. 2018, http://www.Javann.ir/003uJT. 59. Ibid. 73. Mostafa (@MHozeh), “Slowly, I am feeling that the 60. Saeid Golkar, The Evolution of Iran’s Police Forces and seminary is missing from the IRGC” (in Persian), Twit- Social Control in the Islamic Republic, Middle East Brief ter, Apr. 10, 2018, 11:53 a.m., http://bit.ly/2U0UNbP. 120 (Waltham, MA: Crown Center, 2018), 3, http:// 74. “Should the Mosque and Seminary Be in Opposition?” bit.ly/2HTLVmW. (in Persian), Donya-e-Eqtesad, Jan. 22, 2018, http:// 61. “Fatah: When I Returned to the Revolutionary Guards bit.ly/2W0MqyF. from the Ahmadinejad Government” (in Persian), Telex 75. Rohollah Faghihi, “New Hardline Voices Rise in Iran’s Iran, Nov. 22, 2017, http://bit.ly/2QVwwSz. Theocratic Center,” Atlantic Council, Sept. 18, 2018, 62. For a case in point, see Solmaz Ekdar, “Kavous Seyed- http://bit.ly/2TVGyoo. Emami Deceived Israel” (in Persian), Zeitoon News, 76. “Makarem Shirazi Wanted to Strengthen the Relation- Jan. 2, 2019, https://zeitoons.com/59469. ship Between the Revolutionary Guards and the Reli- 63. The Confrontation Between Artesh and IRGC, Iranian gious Authorities” (in Persian), Radio Zamaneh, Sept. Election” (in Persian), Kayhan London, May 18, 2017, 12, 2018, https://www.radiozamaneh.com/411770. http://bit.ly/2FBFenE. 77. For the full Twitter post (in Persian), see Mostafa (@ 64. Will Fulton, The IRGC Command Network: Formal MHozeh), Sept. 25, 2018, 5:54 a.m., http://bit. Structures and Informal Influence, Critical Threats Proj- ly/2CtXtHL.

POLICY NOTE 58 25 THE AUTHOR

SAEID GOLKAR is a visiting Golkar received a PhD from assistant professor in the the Department of Political Department of Political Science Science at Tehran University & Public Service at the University in June 2008. His recent work of Tennessee, Chattanooga. can be found in publications Previously an adjunct professor such as Middle East Journal; at Northwestern University’s Armed Forces & Society; Politics, Middle East and North African Religion & Ideology; and Middle Studies Program and a visiting East Policy. Captive Society, his scholar at the Buffett Institute for book on the Basij paramilitary Global Studies, he was also a force and the securitization of postdoctoral fellow at Stanford Iranian society, was copublished University’s Center on Democracy, by Columbia University Press Development and the Rule of Law. and Woodrow Wilson Center Golkar was a lecturer from Press in June 2015. Golkar is the 2004 to 2009 in the Department author of the April 2018 Institute of Social Sciences at Azad study Cultural Heterogeneity in University, Iran, where he taught Post-Revolutionary Iran. undergraduate courses on the political sociology of Iran and the sociology of war and military forces.

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 1111 19TH STREET NW • WASHINGTON, DC 20036 WWW.WASHINGTONINSTITUTE.ORG