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The Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Threat to Gulf Shipping

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The Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Threat to Gulf Shipping burke chair in strategy The Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Threat to Gulf Shipping By Anthony H. Cordesman August 14, 2014 with the assistance of Aaron Lin Request for comments: This draft has been prepared for the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies conference on Arab-U.S. Relations in Doha in June 2014, and is being circulated for comments and suggestions. Please provide them to [email protected]. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman-Lin: Iranian Danger to Maritime Traffic August 2014 2 Table of Contents I. THE ROLE OF ENERGY EXPORTS IN DETERMINING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE IRANIAN THREAT .................................................................................................................................... 5 THE GROWING GLOBAL IMPORTANCE OF MARITIME TRAFFIC TO AND FROM THE GULF .......................... 6 CHOKEPOINTS AND THE BROADER MARITIME THREAT ................................................................................... 9 POTENTIAL GLOBAL AND US IMPACTS .............................................................................................................. 10 THE IRANIAN MARITIME THREAT TO IRAN ...................................................................................................... 11 II. THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF IRAN’S NAVAL FORCES .................................... 17 THE RANGE OF MARITIME THREATS ................................................................................................................. 17 Submarines .............................................................................................................................................................. 25 Corvettes and Major Surface Ships .............................................................................................................. 28 Missile Patrol Boats ............................................................................................................................................. 29 Other Patrol Boats and Smaller Vessels ..................................................................................................... 29 Mine Warfare ......................................................................................................................................................... 29 Amphibious Vessels .............................................................................................................................................. 31 Hovercraft ................................................................................................................................................................ 31 Naval Aviation ....................................................................................................................................................... 31 Anti-Ship Missile Forces ..................................................................................................................................... 32 NAVAL GUARDS, MARINES, SPECIAL FORCES, AND MARINES ....................................................................... 34 Structure and Organization ............................................................................................................................ 34 Ships and Small Craft ......................................................................................................................................... 35 Probable Effectiveness ....................................................................................................................................... 35 THE NAVAL SIDE OF THE SHIFT TO ASYMMETRIC WARFARE ....................................................................... 37 IRANIAN OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS ON IRAN’S NAVAL POSTURE IN THE GULF ......................................... 39 III. THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE: A WEAK AND AGING FORCE .................................................... 43 THE UNCERTAINTIES AFFECTING IRAN’S AIRCRAFT AND MODERNIZATION ............................................. 43 IRAN’S NAVAL AVIATION BRANCH ..................................................................................................................... 46 IRANIAN CLAIMS TO AIR MODERNIZATION AND COMBAT CAPABILITY ...................................................... 46 IRAN’S STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN FIGHTING A SIGNIFICANT AIR WAR ........................................ 48 THE IMPACT OF THE AIR BALANCE: THE US, THE SOUTHERN GULF PROBLEM, AND IRAN’S CAPABILITY FOR AIR COMBAT .................................................................................................................................................. 60 IV. LINKAGES TO IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE AND NUCLEAR PROGRAMS ........................ 63 ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, AND NUCLEAR FORCES ........................................................................................... 63 ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND WARS OF INTIMIDATION ................................................................................ 65 ANTI-SHIP BALLISTIC MISSILE: THE KHALIJ FARS ......................................................................................... 65 V. FOCUSING ON THE BROADER THREAT FROM ASYMMETRIC FORCES .......................... 72 IRANIAN VIEWS OF IRAN’S ASYMMETRIC FORCES ........................................................................................... 73 ASYMMETRIC FORCES AND THE ART OF LIMITED WAR ................................................................................. 76 ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN’S GROWING MIX OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE FORCES .................... 76 A PROVEN HISTORY AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE ............................................................................................... 77 USING ASYMMETRIC FORCES TO COMPENSATE FOR CONVENTIONAL WEAKNESS .................................... 78 VI. “CLOSING THE GULF:” IRAN’S REAL WORLD MILITARY OPTIONS FOR ASYMMETRIC WARFARE ................................................................................................................................................ 79 STRATEGIC, ENERGY, AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS .............................................................................. 81 STRATEGIC DEPENDENCE ON THE OVERALL FLOW OF GULF EXPORTS ...................................................... 84 Cordesman-Lin: Iranian Danger to Maritime Traffic August 2014 3 SHIFTS IN FUTURE GLOBAL DEPENDENCE ....................................................................................................... 89 The Critical Impact of Asian Dependence on Maritime Traffic Out of the Gulf ....................... 89 The Uncertainties in US Import Dependence ............................ 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GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SUSTAINED INTERRUPTIONS....................................................................... 95 IRAN’S MILITARY ASSETS FOR SUCH A MISSION ........................................................................................... 101 Iran’s Submarines ............................................................................................................................................. 101 Iran’s Submersibles and Midget Submarines ...................................................................................... 104 Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDVs) ........................................................................................................................................ 104 Major Surface Warships................................................................................................................................................................ 105 Fast-attack Watercraft, Speedboats, Patrol Craft, and Hovercraft. .......................................................................... 106 Shore and Ship-based ASCMs ................................................................................................................................................... 110 Naval Mines .......................................................................................................................................................... 113 Maritime Patrol Aircraft ............................................................................................................................................................... 116 Helicopters .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 116 Torpedoes ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 116 UCAVs and UAVs................................................................................................................................................. 118 IRAN’S BASES AND OTHER ASSETS FOR “CLOSING THE GULF” .................................................................. 118 Figure ? Iranian Military Installations in the Gulf ............................................................................................................ 119 Prioritizing These Threats ............................................................................................................................ 121 VII. US AND ARAB GULF OPTIONS FOR COMPETING WITH IRAN’S ASYMMETRIC FORCES ..................................................................................................................................................
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