DOCSLIB.ORG

Iran's Warfighting Capabilities

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Iran's Warfighting Capabilities DISCUSSION PAPER Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities: Roots, Roles and Evolution Merve Akın DISCUSSION PAPER Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities: Roots, Roles and Evolution Merve Akın Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities: Roots, Roles and Evolution © TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WRITTEN BY Merve Akın PUBLISHER TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE June 2020 TRT WORLD İSTANBUL AHMET ADNAN SAYGUN STREET NO:83 34347 ULUS, BEŞİKTAŞ İSTANBUL / TURKEY TRT WORLD LONDON PORTLAND HOUSE 4 GREAT PORTLAND STREET NO:4 LONDON / UNITED KINGDOM TRT WORLD WASHINGTON D.C. 1819 L STREET NW SUITE 700 20036 WASHINGTON DC www.trtworld.com researchcentre.trtworld.com The opinions expressed in this discussion paper represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the TRT World Research Centre. 4 Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities: Roots, Roles and Evolution Introduction his discussion paper focuses sent its first military satellite into the orbit recent- on Iran's military capabilities. ly. The United States (US) criticised this action, Although Iran's armament stating that this development showed that Iran’s is restricted by international space program is “neither peaceful nor civilian” sanctions and and arms em- (U.S. Department of State, 2020). US Secretary bargoes, the country has still of State Mike Pompeo found Iran's launch in- Tmanaged to develop its military capabilities to consistent with UN Security Council Resolution the extent that has raised concerns regionally. 2231 which refrains Tehran to develop ballistic These concerns are understandable, particular- missiles designed to carry a nuclear payload. ly when one considering that Iran has the larg- These developments raise eyebrows and sharp est ballistic missile force in the Middle East. discussions concerning Iran's real intentions and capabilities. While Iran claims that its military operations are defensive, they are far from being considered On the other hand, Iran's latest military blun- as such by other states. As Iran's conventional ders, which caused significant civilian loss, military capabilities are not sufficiently strong to raised questions about the lack of professional- pose significant threats against its adversaries, ism of the Iranian army. On 8 January 2020, the the same cannot be said for Tehran’s unconven- Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) shot tional means of fighting via the use of proxies, down Ukrainian aeroplane, killing everyone on terror networks, and militias. board, on the day Iranian strikes targeted US bases in Iraq. The most recent accident affect- One of the biggest concerns of Iran's neighbours ed the Iran Naval Forces in the Gulf of Oman on is the expansion of such militias or proxies, 11 May and led to the death of 19 Iranian sailors. which are operating on behalf of Iran's author- These incidents reveal the existence of a gap ity and for its national interests. Another signif- between Iran's claims and existent capacity and icant issue in the region is Iran's feverish efforts add nuances and caveats to the discussion of to boost its ballistic missile capabilities. Iran also Iran’s military might. Iranian Ballistic Missile Ranges UKRAINE RUSSIA KAZAKHSTAN FRANCE MONGOLIA ROMANIA GREECE TURKEY TURKMENISTAN CHINA SYRIA Tehran AFGHANISTAN IRAQ IRAN LIBYA EGYPT PAKISTAN SAUDI System (Max Range) ARABIA INDIA Shahab 1 (300 km) Fateh-110 (300-500 km) Shahab 2 SRBM (500 km) YEMEN Zolfaghar SRBM (700 km) Qiam-1 SRBM (750 km) Shahab 3/Emad-1/ SOMALIA Seijil MRBMs (2000 km) Source: US Defence Intelligence Agency 5 Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities: Roots, Roles and Evolution Iran’s Security Environment Despite changes affecting security paradigms in the gether with new technologies. The aggressive policies post Cold war era, military security is still considered pursued by the United States in the Middle East, with a as the most significant asset for nation-states to defend vast number of US military bases and troops stationed their national interests and territorial integrity, and de- there, constituted a double edge sword. On the one ter military aggression. It includes states’ defence and hand, the US presence in the region provides securi- deterrence capabilities, the capacity of the regular ty for US allies. On the other hand, it poses threats in army, nuclear power and so on. However, the nature the eyes of non-US allies, such as Iran. The continuous of conventional warfare is also evolving with the rise antagonism between Iran and its adversaries, such as of unconventional fighting strategies and asymmetric the Gulf States, accelerated the arms race in the region. capabilities not only by states but also by non-state Iran’s past military experiences vis-à-vis its regional ri- armed actors. Therefore, all new developments pushed vals provided a significant incentive for Tehran to en- countries to invest more in their defence industries to- hance its defence capabilities. The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War The Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) was one of the longest offensive. Tehran managed to absorb the aggression and bloodiest wars of the 20th century that reached and launched a counter-offensive. However, after eight unprecedented peaks of violence with more than a years, the war ended without a conclusive victory for million casualties (Karsh, 1989). It was a catastrophic either side. It resulted in more than a million casualties chapter for Iran, as the Khomeini regime was mostly following the use of chemical weapons and bombings occupied with revolution and state formation at that of many cities. time. When Iraq started the war, the Iranian military was not prepared to deal with the threat since the new The war caused a big impact on Tehran’s military doc- regime eliminated ‘some 10,000 senior officers’ and re- trine, threat perception, and defence policies. Numer- duced conscription levels by September 1980 (Chubin, ous lessons were drawn from the involvement of formal 1986, p. 310). The Khomeini regime disregarded the and informal military organisations, which constituted Shah's military, called Artesh, and saw them as royalist the backbone of Iran's military structure (such as IRGC and pro-Western (ibid.). The IRGC named as Pasdaran and Shia armed forces in Iraq, i.e. Badr corps). Iran re- (or Sepah in Persian) was established as a force loyal to alised its weakness in conventional military power and the Supreme Leader in 1979. Without experience and focused on the development of ballistic missiles. It also discipline, the Iranian military was in a very disadvan- further developed its unconventional military strategy tageous position. through proxies, insurgencies, and guerrilla attacks. All these approaches were synthesised and adopted During the war, Iran's already limited conventional formally after the war. Since then, Iran has been imple- military power was heavily degraded during the Iraqi menting this approach with only minor revisions. Iran's Military Doctrine and Defence Policies The focal point of Iran's military doctrine is its alleged However, in the mid-1990s, Tehran altered its security animosity towards the United States. At the same time, perception and started to move away from its earlier Tehran has to deal with various constraints on its mili- doctrine. This shift took place following the defeat of tary and economy in a complex security environment Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War and the sanc- (Ward, 2005, p. 559). In the early 1990s, Tehran pursued tions against Iraq that followed. What also affected an ideology-oriented defensive strategy codified in Iran’s position was the general instability in the region 1992, aiming at the preservation of national independ- due to the tensions between Israel and Lebanon, the ence, territorial integrity of the Islamic regime and the hostile relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Sub- purported protection of Muslims and other ‘oppressed’ sequently, Iran shifted its strategy towards 'deterrence' nations across the world (ibid., p. 560). by assuming a more practical perspective considering national interests. 6 Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities: Roots, Roles and Evolution The Deterrence Strategy Deterrence is one of the core elements of Iran's mili- According to Ajili & Rouhi (2019, p. 142), there are five tary doctrine, which refers to military actions that aim key operational pillars of this strategy: ‘fixed and mobile to increase rival's risks and costs while decreasing its air defence; artillery and ballistic missiles; electronic constraints to avoid any possible conventional military and cyber warfare; limited use of airpower; and naval conflict. Tehran's declared goal is to deter the United combat’. Some of these tactics date back to the military States, which is depicted as the principal enemy, as experiences during the Iran-Iraq war, such as naval well as other US allies in the region. For this purpose, combat, which is based on anti-ship cruise missiles as Iran has relied on this strategy and tried to enhance its cost-effective tools (ibid.). Anti-ship cruise missiles are relations with the neighbours, while at the same time crucial tools for Iran to deter enemy naval forces in the weakening US influence in the region (Ward, 2005). Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The geopoliti- However, boosting relations with neighbouring coun- cal position of the Strait of Hormuz for oil trade, where tries is not an easy task for Tehran, since US-allied more than 20% of world’s oil moves through, has always countries border Iran. Similarly, it shares borders with been used by Iran to threaten its adversaries (RFERL, NATO-member countries, such as Turkey. In 2010, it 2020). Iranian leaders (Euronews, 2011) and military was announced that a radar station belonging to the officials (Asriran, 2019) threaten countries to close the NATO missile defence system would be built in Malat- strait to international shipping. Several confrontations ya, Turkey (CNN, 2012).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Winning the Salvo Competition Rebalancing America’S Air and Missile Defenses
    WINNING THE SALVO COMPETITION REBALANCING AMERICA’S AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES MARK GUNZINGER BRYAN CLARK WINNING THE SALVO COMPETITION REBALANCING AMERICA’S AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES MARK GUNZINGER BRYAN CLARK 2016 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2016 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mark Gunzinger is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Mr. Gunzinger has served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Transformation and Resources. A retired Air Force Colonel and Command Pilot, he joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2004. Mark was appointed to the Senior Executive Service and served as Principal Director of the Department’s central staff for the 2005–2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Following the QDR, he served as Director for Defense Transformation, Force Planning and Resources on the National Security Council staff. Mr. Gunzinger holds an M.S. in National Security Strategy from the National War College, a Master of Airpower Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, a Master of Public Administration from Central Michigan University, and a B.S. in chemistry from the United States Air Force Academy.
    [Show full text]
  • Design Characteristics of Iran's Ballistic and Cruise Missiles
    Design Characteristics of Iran’s Ballistic and Cruise Missiles Last update: January 2013 Missile Nato or Type/ Length Diameter Payload Range (km) Accuracy ‐ Propellant Guidance Other Name System (m) (m) (kg)/warhead CEP (m) /Stages Artillery* Hasib/Fajr‐11* Rocket artillery (O) 0.83 0.107 6; HE 8.5 ‐ Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐12* Rocket artillery (O) 1.29 0.244 50; HE 10 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐23* Rocket artillery (O) 1.82 0.333 120; HE 11 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐14* Rocket artillery (O) 2.8 0.122 18.3; HE 21.5 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐25* Rocket artillery (O) 3.2 0.122 18.3; HE 30 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐36* Rocket artillery (O) 2 0.122 18.3; HE 18 Solid Spin stabilized Shahin‐17* Rocket artillery (O) 2.9 0.33 190; HE 13 Solid Spin stabilized Shahin‐28* Rocket artillery (O) 3.9 0.33 190; HE 20 Solid Spin stabilized Oghab9* Rocket artillery (O) 4.82 0.233 70; HE 40 Solid Spin stabilized Fajr‐310* Rocket artillery (O) 5.2 0.24 45; HE 45 Solid Spin stabilized Fajr‐511* Rocket artillery (O) 6.6 0.33 90; HE 75 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐112* Rocket artillery (O) 1.38 0.24 50; HE 10 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐213* Rocket artillery (O) 1.8 0.333 60; HE 11 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat‐614* Rocket artillery (O) 6.3 0.355 150; HE 100 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat15* Rocket artillery (O) 5.9 0.355 150; HE 120 Solid Spin stabilized Zelzal‐116* Iran‐130 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.61 500‐600; HE 100‐125 Solid Spin stabilized Zelzal‐1A17* Mushak‐120 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.61 500‐600; HE 160 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat‐1018* Mushak‐160 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.45 250; HE 150 Solid Spin stabilized Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
    [Show full text]
  • Design Characteristics of Iran's Ballistic and Cruise Missiles
    Design Characteristics of Iran’s Ballistic and Cruise Missiles Last update: February 2013 Missile Nato or Type/ Length Diameter Payload Range (km) Accuracy ‐ Propellant Guidance Other Name System (m) (m) (kg)/warhead CEP (m) /Stages Artillery* Hasib/Fajr‐11* Rocket artillery (O) 0.83 0.107 6; HE 8.5 ‐ Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐12* Rocket artillery (O) 1.29 0.244 50; HE 10 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐23* Rocket artillery (O) 1.82 0.333 120; HE 11 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐14* Rocket artillery (O) 2.8 0.122 18.3; HE 21.5 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐25* Rocket artillery (O) 3.2 0.122 18.3; HE 30 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐36* Rocket artillery (O) 2 0.122 18.3; HE 18 Solid Spin stabilized Shahin‐17* Rocket artillery (O) 2.9 0.33 190; HE 13 Solid Spin stabilized Shahin‐28* Rocket artillery (O) 3.9 0.33 190; HE 20 Solid Spin stabilized Oghab9* Rocket artillery (O) 4.82 0.233 70; HE 40 Solid Spin stabilized Fajr‐310* Rocket artillery (O) 5.2 0.24 45; HE 45 Solid Spin stabilized Fajr‐511* Rocket artillery (O) 6.6 0.33 90; HE 75 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐112* Rocket artillery (O) 1.38 0.24 50; HE 10 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐213* Rocket artillery (O) 1.8 0.333 60; HE 11 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat‐614* Rocket artillery (O) 6.3 0.355 150; HE 100 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat15* Rocket artillery (O) 5.9 0.355 150; HE 120 Solid Spin stabilized Zelzal‐116* Iran‐130 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.61 500‐600; HE 100‐125 Solid Spin stabilized Zelzal‐1A17* Mushak‐120 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.61 500‐600; HE 160 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat‐1018* Mushak‐160 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.45 250; HE 150 Solid Spin stabilized Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
    [Show full text]
  • The Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Threat to Gulf Shipping
    burke chair in strategy The Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Threat to Gulf Shipping By Anthony H. Cordesman August 14, 2014 with the assistance of Aaron Lin Request for comments: This draft has been prepared for the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies conference on Arab-U.S. Relations in Doha in June 2014, and is being circulated for comments and suggestions. Please provide them to [email protected]. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman-Lin: Iranian Danger to Maritime Traffic August 2014 2 Table of Contents I. THE ROLE OF ENERGY EXPORTS IN DETERMINING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE IRANIAN THREAT .................................................................................................................................... 5 THE GROWING GLOBAL IMPORTANCE OF MARITIME TRAFFIC TO AND FROM THE GULF .......................... 6 CHOKEPOINTS AND THE BROADER MARITIME THREAT ................................................................................... 9 POTENTIAL GLOBAL AND US IMPACTS .............................................................................................................. 10 THE IRANIAN MARITIME THREAT TO IRAN ...................................................................................................... 11 II. THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF IRAN’S NAVAL FORCES .................................... 17 THE RANGE OF MARITIME THREATS ................................................................................................................. 17 Submarines .............................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - I
    IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE - I The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions FIFTH WORKING DRAFT By Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner Revised July 11, 2012 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 2 Acknowledgements This analysis was made possible by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. It draws on the work of Dr. Abdullah Toukan and a series of reports on Iran by Adam Seitz, a Senior Research Associate and Instructor, Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University. 2 Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 5 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 6 Figure III.1: Summary Chronology of US-Iranian Military Competition: 2000-2011 ............................... 8 CURRENT PATTERNS IN THE STRUCTURE OF US AND IRANIAN MILITARY COMPETITION ........................................... 13 DIFFERING NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 17 US Perceptions .................................................................................................................................... 17 Iranian Perceptions............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies
    Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies Updated May 8, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44017 SUMMARY R44017 Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies May 8, 2019 Iran’s national security policy is the product of many overlapping and sometimes competing factors such as the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, perception of threats Kenneth Katzman to the regime and to the country, long-standing national interests, and the interaction of Specialist in Middle the Iranian regime’s factions and constituencies. Iran’s leadership: Eastern Affairs x Seeks to deter or thwart U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to bring about a change of regime. x Has sought to take advantage of opportunities of regional conflicts to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that it asserts favors the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. x Seeks to enhance its international prestige and restore a sense of “greatness” reminiscent of ancient Persian empires. x Advances its foreign policy goals, in part by providing material support to regional allied governments and armed factions. Iranian officials characterize the support as helping the region’s “oppressed” and assert that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs. x Sometimes disagrees on tactics and strategies. Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i and key hardline institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), oppose any compromises of Iran’s national security core goals. Iran’s elected president, Hassan Rouhani, and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif support Iran’s integration into regional and international diplomacy.
    [Show full text]
  • Gholamreza Rouhani
    CURRICULUM VITAE First Name: Gholamreza Last Name: Rouhani Date of Birth: 24 February.1971 Marital Status: Married Nationality: Iranian Cell Phone: +98-912-1769307 Email: [email protected] Gholamreza Rouhani WORK EXPERIENCES 0- IAIO – Iran Aviation Industries Organization. 1989-1994 (Internship) 1- The Government sector. 1994-2014 Manager and Chief designer and Research Assistant & Head of Overall Design Department of Mechanic & Aerospace Engineering in some research and development center (AIO-DIO-MIO).1994-2014 1-1- AIO - Aerospace Industries Organization. 1994-2006 Senior Expert of 122 mm Mortar, Shahid Dastvare Industry, 1994-1995 Senior Expert of Research project (H satellite), Research Center of Shahid Bakeri industries group, 1995-1996 Senior Expert of Aerodynamics, Research Center of Shahid Bakeri industries group, 1996-1997 Senior Expert of Propulsion, Shahid Sanikhani Industry, Shahid Bakeri industries group, 1997-1998 Head of Solid Propellant Motor design, Shahid Sanikhani Industry, Shahid Bakeri industries group, 1998-1999 Head of Structural design, Shahid Sanikhani Industry, Shahid Bakeri industries group, 1999-2000 Manager of Final Assembly, Shahid Sanikhani Industry, Shahid Bakeri industries group, 2000-2001 Senior Expert and Manager (Sub cooperation) of projects of Ashoura missile - optimization of Zelzal artillery rockets - Katyusha 122 mm artillery rockets - Misagh missile SAM -Two stage ballistic missile - Fateh SSM - JTO - Standard motor - , ... Shahid Sanikhani Industry, Shahid Bakeri industries
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies
    Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Updated April 29, 2020 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R44017 SUMMARY R44017 Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies April 29, 2020 Iran’s national security policy is arguably the product of many overlapping and sometimes competing factors such as the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, Kenneth Katzman perception of threats to the regime and to the country, and long-standing national Specialist in Middle interests. Iran’s leadership: Eastern Affairs [email protected] Seeks to deter or thwart U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to bring about a change of regime. For a copy of the full report, please call 7-.... or visit Takes advantage of regional conflicts to advance a broader goal of overturning a www.crs.gov. power structure in the Middle East that it asserts favors the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. Seeks to restore a sense of “greatness” reminiscent of ancient Persian empires. Provides material support to regional allied governments and armed factions, including increasingly precise missile systems that enable Iran to project power. Supports acts of international terrorism, as the “leading” or “most active” state sponsor of terrorism, according to annual State Department reports on international terrorism. Backs actions against international shipping in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq that represent, in part, an attempt to pressure the United States to relax sanctions on Iran. These actions have continued despite Iran’s struggles with the effects of the COVID-19 outbreak there.
    [Show full text]
  • Bahgat – Iran's Missiles
    BAHGAT: IRAN’S BALLISTIC-MISSILE AND SPACE PROGRAM IRAN’S BALLISTIC-MISSILE AND SPACE PROGRAM: AN ASSESSMENT Gawdat Bahgat Dr. Bahgat is a professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA), National Defense University. All opinions are the author’s alone.* ince the early 1970s, Iran has cities. Initially, Iran was poorly prepared to sought to develop strong mis- retaliate, and the international community sile capabilities. In recent years, did very little to stop these attacks. In a Tehran’s arsenal has evolved to few months, however, Tehran was able to Sbecome the largest and most diverse in the receive missiles from foreign countries, Middle East, though not the most lethal and the war with Baghdad became the or longest-range. Israel and Saudi Arabia ferocious “war of the cities,” with the two have also developed formidable capabili- sides launching missiles at each other’s ties. Iran’s program, however, has attracted population and industrial centers. This bit- more political and academic controversies. ter experience has left its mark on Iranian The Trump administration’s decision to strategists. They are determined to address withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal — their vulnerability and deter attacks. the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Second, for four decades Iran has (JCPOA) — was partly driven by the fact been under different kinds of bilateral and that it had failed to slow the progress of multilateral sanction regimes. Unlike its Iran’s missile capabilities. The U.S. with- regional adversaries, Tehran does not have drawal and occasional European criticism the financial resources or strategic op- of frequent missile testing have had little, tions to buy the most advanced weaponry, if any, impact on Tehran’s determination to particularly military jets.
    [Show full text]
  • Going Ballistic: Responding to Iranian Missile Advances
    Going Ballistic: Responding to Iranian Missile Advances Centre for the New Middle East Policy Paper No. 14 (2018) Timothy Stafford The Henry Jackson Society May 2018 GOING BALLISTIC : RESPONDING TO IRANIAN MISSILE ADVANCES Executive Summary Iran’s ballistic missile programme poses a distinct threat to international peace and security. There is broad agreement that Tehran has adhered to restrictions imposed upon its nuclear programme by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, Iran has used the relaxation of international sanctions, brought into effect by the agreement, to invest heavily in modernising its ballistic missiles. In particular, it has gone to great lengths to update its short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). With the lifting of the UN-mandated moratorium on ballistic missile testing, Iran has engaged in a number of live fire exercises. Iranian officials claim such tests systems are not covered by the terms of the JCPOA. At the same time, Iranian officials assert that any national or international response to such tests that encompasses the imposition of economic sanctions, would constitute a violation of the agreement. In recent years, Iran has broken with a longstanding pledge not to employ its ballistic missiles in an offensive capacity. It has also engaged in substantial proliferation, providing Houthi rebels in Yemen with Iranian-made missiles that have been fired into Saudi Arabia, endowing Hezbollah with one of the Middle East’s most sophisticated missile arsenals, and constructing missile production factories in Lebanon. These provocative moves threaten to disrupt the delicate balance of power in the Middle East.
    [Show full text]
  • Breaking Down Borders and Bridging Barriers: Iranian Taziyeh Theatre
    Breaking Down Borders and Bridging Barriers: Iranian Taziyeh Theatre Khosrow Shahriari A thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Media, Film and Theatre University of New South Wales July 2006 ABSTRACT In the twentieth century, Western theatre practitioners, aware of the gap between actor and spectator and the barrier between the stage and the auditorium, experimented with ways to bridge this gap and cross barriers, which in the western theatrical tradition have been ignored over the centuries. Stanislavski, Meyerhold, Piscator, Brecht, Grotowski, and more recently Peter Brook are only a few of the figures who tried to engage spectators and enable them to participate more fully in the play. Yet in Iran there has existed for over three centuries a form of theatre which, thanks to its unique method of approaching reality, creates precise moments in which the worlds of the actor and the spectator come together in perfect unity. It is called ‘taziyeh’, and the aim of this thesis is to offer a comprehensive account of this complex and sophisticated theatre. The thesis examines taziyeh through the accounts of eyewitnesses, and explores taziyeh’s method of acting, its form, concepts, the aims of each performance, its sources and origins, and the evolution of this Iranian phenomenon from its emergence in the tenth century. Developed from the philosophical point of view of Iranian mysticism on the one hand, and annual mourning ceremonies with ancient roots on the other, taziyeh has been performed by hundreds of different professional groups for more than three hundred years.
    [Show full text]
  • The IRGC Command Network Formal Structures and Informal Influence
    THE IRGC COMMAND NETWORK FORMAL STRUCTURES AND INFORMAL INFLUENCE A REPOrt BY AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT JULY 2013 WILL FULTON All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. ©2013 AEI’s Critical Threats Project Cover Image: Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei addresses IRGC commanders, Tehran, July 2011. Left to right: Mohammad Bagheri, Ali Saidi, Mohammad Ali Jafari, Qassem Suleimani, Mohammad Pakpour, Gholam Ali Rashid. Credit: leader.ir. The IRGC Command Network Formal Structures and Informal Influence Will Fulton July 2013 A report by AEI’s Critical Threats Project ABOUT US About the Author Will Fulton is an analyst, a Palantir fellow, and the IRGC Project team lead at the Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute. His research focuses on Iran’s IRGC and its global force projection network, including the Quds Force, Lebanese Hezbollah, and proxies, as well as Iranian domestic politics. Will has testified before Congress and briefed congressional staff, as well as members of the defense community. He received his B.A. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin- Madison, and received his M.A. in Near Eastern Studies with a concentration in Persian and Iranian Studies from the University of Arizona. Acknowledgments The author would like to thank: Frederick W. Kagan for his patient guidance throughout the research, analysis, and writing process; Jessica Lewis for helping to frame the assessment in its early stages; Katherine Faley for her editorial expertise and support; Stephen Gailliot and Amir Toumaj for their invaluable research and analytical support; Maggie Obriwin for InDesign training, and; Marie Donovan and Mary Ella Simmons for their assistance.
    [Show full text]