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Bahgat – Iran's Missiles BAHGAT: IRAN’S BALLISTIC-MISSILE AND SPACE PROGRAM IRAN’S BALLISTIC-MISSILE AND SPACE PROGRAM: AN ASSESSMENT Gawdat Bahgat Dr. Bahgat is a professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA), National Defense University. All opinions are the author’s alone.* ince the early 1970s, Iran has cities. Initially, Iran was poorly prepared to sought to develop strong mis- retaliate, and the international community sile capabilities. In recent years, did very little to stop these attacks. In a Tehran’s arsenal has evolved to few months, however, Tehran was able to Sbecome the largest and most diverse in the receive missiles from foreign countries, Middle East, though not the most lethal and the war with Baghdad became the or longest-range. Israel and Saudi Arabia ferocious “war of the cities,” with the two have also developed formidable capabili- sides launching missiles at each other’s ties. Iran’s program, however, has attracted population and industrial centers. This bit- more political and academic controversies. ter experience has left its mark on Iranian The Trump administration’s decision to strategists. They are determined to address withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal — their vulnerability and deter attacks. the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Second, for four decades Iran has (JCPOA) — was partly driven by the fact been under different kinds of bilateral and that it had failed to slow the progress of multilateral sanction regimes. Unlike its Iran’s missile capabilities. The U.S. with- regional adversaries, Tehran does not have drawal and occasional European criticism the financial resources or strategic op- of frequent missile testing have had little, tions to buy the most advanced weaponry, if any, impact on Tehran’s determination to particularly military jets. While the United advance its capabilities. States, Britain, France and other European This unwavering determination is due powers have been providing Israel, Saudi to the fact that missiles play a prominent Arabia and the United Arab Emirates role in Iran’s defense and deterrence strat- (UAE) with state-of-the-art weapons, the egy. Three forces explain the significance Iranian air force has been under strict sanc- of ballistic missiles. First, during Iran’s tions. Iranian leaders perceive their coun- war with Iraq (1980-88) Saddam Hus- try as surrounded on all sides by American sein’s missiles targeted Iranian forces and troops. Within this context, missiles are * Dr. Bahgat would like to thank Ms. Camille Majors, librarian at the NDU, for her generous help. © 2019, The Author Middle East Policy © 2019, Middle East Policy Council 31 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XXVI, NO. 1, SPRING 2019 seen as a cost-effective way to match the pressure, Iran is highly unlikely to accept air power of the United States and regional restraints on these programs. Missiles are adversaries. As one analyst argues, Iranian perceived as an essential component in the leaders appear to see ballistic missiles as country’s defense strategy and indeed to an “equalizer.”1 the survival of the Islamic Republic. As the Third, in addition to the perceived current regional and global efforts to halt military contribution missiles make to Iran’s progress have had little impact, there Iran’s defense and deterrence strategy, is a need for a new approach. it is important not to underestimate the program’s symbolic value. Surrounded BACKGROUND by global and regional adversaries, Ira- Two developments shaped the strate- nian leaders take pride in the tremendous gic environment under which Iran’s missile progress their country has made in advanc- program was initiated. The first was the ing its missile capabilities, particularly its 1973 Arab-Israeli war, which was fol- indigenous industry. Being almost self- lowed by what became known as the first sufficient in producing a variety of missile oil shock. Arab countries cut production systems is seen domestically as a symbol and imposed an oil embargo on the United of the country’s scientific and technologi- States and a few other countries to pun- cal advances.2 ish them for their support to Israel. Iran, a Given these forces — historical experi- major oil producer and leading member of ence, perceived military value and national the Organization of Petroleum Exporting pride — Iran’s most senior leaders have Countries (OPEC), did not participate in shown little inclination to compromise this embargo. Rather, the Pahlavi regime over the missile program. Supreme Leader sought to take advantage of this geo-eco- Ayatollah Khamenei urged his generals to nomic opportunity and pumped up produc- “keep working on the missile program as tion. This combination of more exports far as you can.”3 Similarly, the commander and higher prices left Iran with substantial of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps revenues. (IRGC), Major General Mohammad The second development, which Ali Jafari, asserted that missile power is contributed to the birth of the missile “non-negotiable, and we will defend it.”4 program, was the shah’s ambition to make Equally important, Iranian leaders have Iran the dominant power in the Middle always maintained that their missile ca- East and South Asia. In October 1955, pabilities are defensive and conventional, Tehran joined the Baghdad Pact, of which a tool for deterring attack by threatening Britain, Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan were to punish the adversary’s population and already members, and with which the civilian infrastructure.5 United States was closely associated. In This study examines Tehran’s missile the 1970s, Iran, along with Saudi Arabia, program and its historical roots, develop- was the leading U.S. regional ally in what ments and capabilities, along with Iran’s was called a twin-pillar strategy; Washing- related space program. This will be fol- ton relied on Tehran, and to a lesser extent lowed by an examination of regional and Riyadh, to protect its strategic interests global responses. The analysis suggests in the Middle East and South Asia. The that, despite severe economic and political shah exploited a historical opportunity to 32 BAHGAT: IRAN’S BALLISTIC-MISSILE AND SPACE PROGRAM consolidate and further expand his regional and close relations with an important Mus- power in the late 1960s and early 1970s, lim country. In 1978, Iran made a down when Britain announced its intention to payment for the missiles with $260 million withdraw east of Suez. This left a power worth of oil from Kharg Island. Shortly vacuum that could be filled by imperial after this transaction, Iranian experts began Iran, endorsed by Western powers and fu- work on a missile-assembly plant near Sir- eled by oil wealth. jan, in central Iran. The missiles had a pay- The Pahlavi regime sharply increased load of 750 kilograms (1,650 pounds) and its huge military spending. Iran’s air force a range of up to 300 miles. Shortly after was, by far, the shah was the strongest The significant weakening of Iran’s overthrown, in the region, Project and the shah air force, in combination with Saddam Flower (along invested in Hussein’s intense use of missiles against with other a range of Iranian military targets and civilian projects) was weapon sys- population, were the major drivers of suspended. tems. In 1974, The missiles the Defense the nation’s missile program. were never Industries delivered.8 Organization was created as part of the The 1979 Islamic Revolution was a Ministry of War, tasked with overseeing major turning point not only in Iran’s do- the production of military equipment.6 In mestic and foreign policies, but in its mili- the mid-1970s, it began developing and tary strategy too. The newly born Islamic testing the Arash system, a short-range Republic was banned from buying Western unguided rocket based on the Russian arms, ammunition and spare parts; training Bm-11.7 The plan to build and expand a programs were suspended and foreign ad- missile capability was further consolidated visers and technicians withdrawn.9 These through cooperation with Israel. developments dealt a heavy blow to Iran’s Before the fall of the Pahlavi regime in armed forces. At the time, the country was 1979, Israel was involved in a multibillion heavily dependent on foreign arms sup- dollar project to modify advanced surface- pliers, particularly the United States and, to-surface missiles for sale to Iran. This to a lesser extent, Europe. The indigenous initiative, code-named “Project Flower,” military industry was still in its infancy was one of six oil-for-arms contracts and needed some time to train and build up signed in Tehran in April 1977, less than its manpower and technical infrastructure. two years before the shah was toppled. The war with Iraq (1980-88) put more At that time, the two nations did not have pressure on the Iranian military. The new diplomatic relations, but they had trade leaders had not had the opportunity to missions. Project Flower was strategically develop their own capabilities or replace important to both sides, part of a grand Western arms suppliers. Indeed, one can scheme to turn Iran into a formidable argue, four decades after the revolution, military power. For Israel, cooperation the air force has yet to fully recover to with Iran offered a guaranteed oil supply, the level it enjoyed in the late 1970s. The financing for advanced military research significant weakening of Iran’s air force, 33 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XXVI, NO. 1, SPRING 2019 in combination with Saddam Hussein’s 1990-91 war to liberate Kuwait and the intense use of missiles against Iranian mili- 2003 war to topple Saddam Hussein fur- tary targets and civilian population, were ther reinforced Iranian strategists’ percep- the major drivers of the nation’s missile tion of the significance of ballistic missiles.
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