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A Security System for the Two-State Solution

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A Security System for the Two-State Solution MAY 2016 ADVANCING THE DIALOGUE A Security System for the Two-State Solution Ilan Goldenberg, Major General (Res.) Gadi Shamni, Nimrod Novik, and Colonel Kris Bauman About the Authors Acknowledgements Ilan Goldenberg is a Senior Fellow and This report was the product of numerous consultations Director of the Middle East Security and workshops with former and current Israeli, Palestinian, Program at the Center for a New American Jordanian, and American security officials and negotiators. Security (CNAS). Prior to CNAS, he served We are deeply grateful to all of them for their time, insights, at the U.S. Department of State as Chief and creativity. A special thank you goes to our colleagues of Staff for the small team supporting at Commanders for Israel’s Security and the Amman Center Secretary John Kerry’s initiative to for Peace and Development for their close collaboration on conduct permanent status negotiations between Israelis this effort, as well as our colleagues at Israel Policy Forum, and Palestinians. Goldenberg previously served as a Special whose advice and support have been invaluable. We thank Advisor on the Middle East and then as the Iran Team Chief Loren Dejonge Schulman for her thoughtful inputs, Nicholas in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. A. Heras and Peter Kirechu for their research support, and Maura McCarthy and Melody Cook for assistance with Major General (Res.) Gadi Shamni is editing and design. Finally, we would like to thank the Smith Vice President for Land Systems at Richardson Foundation, Peter A. Joseph, Gideon Argov, Israel Aerospace Industries. He served in the Goldman Sonnenfeldt Foundation, and the Morningstar the Israel Defense Forces for 36 years, Foundation for their generous support of this project. including as Commander of the Hebron Regional Brigade, Commander of the Gaza Division, and Commander for Central Disclaimer Command. He also served as the Military Advisor to the The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do Prime Minister and in Washington as the Israeli Defense not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Attaché to the United States. Defense, the Department of State, or the U.S. government. The authors alone are responsible for any errors of fact, analysis, or omission. Nimrod Novik, Ph.D., is President and CEO of Novik Networking (NN-DC). He was Chairman and is a Senior Associate About the Middle East Security of the Economic Cooperation Foundation and is the Israel Fellow of the Israel Policy Program Forum. He is also a member of the Steering The Middle East Security Program conducts cutting-edge Committee of Commanders for Israel’s research on the most pressing issues in this turbulent region. Security. He served as the Senior Advisor on Foreign Policy The program focuses on the sources of instability in the to Shimon Peres, as a Special Ambassador of the State of region, maintaining key U.S. strategic partnerships, and Israel, and as an Advisor to the Israeli National Security generating solutions that help policymakers respond to both Council, and has engaged extensively in Track II diplomacy. fast-moving events and long-term trends. The Middle East Security Program draws on a team with deep government Colonel Kris Bauman, Ph.D., is a Senior and nongovernment experience in regional studies, U.S. Military Fellow at the Institute for National foreign policy, and international security. It analyzes trends Strategic Studies at National Defense and generates practical and implementable policy solutions University in Washington. In 2013-14, he that defend and advance U.S. interests served as the Chief of Staff to General John Allen in his role as Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Defense. Allen’s team was responsible for the security portfolio during Kerry’s initiative to conduct permanent status negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. Cover Photo The top image shows members of the Israeli Border Police. The bottom image shows members of the Palestinian National Security Forces. Both the Israeli and Palestinian security forces will be key components of the security system for the two-state solution detailed in this report. (Getty Images) Advancing the Dialogue A SECURITY SYSTEM FOR THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION 0 Executive Summary 09 SECTION 1 Overview 10 Chapter 1 Political and Security Context 15 Chapter 2 Organizing Principles of the Security System 23 SECTION 2 The Security System at End State 24 Chapter 3 Internal Security 28 Chapter 4 Border Security 36 Chapter 5 Non-Ground Domains 43 Chapter 6 Regional Security 48 SECTION 3 Transitioning to the End State 49 Chapter 7 Transition Process After an Agreement 57 Chapter 8 Steps to Be Taken Today, Prior to an Agreement 60 Conclusion 2 @CNASDC Key Principles Israelis will never agree to a two-state solution unless their security concerns are addressed. Palestinians will never agree to what they view as an endless occupation. To address both sides’ needs, this report proposes a security system based on the following key principles: Build a multilayered system that addresses Israel’s security concerns in which Israel retains the right of self defense as well as the capacity to defend itself by itself, but ensures this is only necessary in extremis. Minimize Israeli visibility to Palestinian civilians and pursue significant early steps that signal a fundamental change on the ground to Palestinians. Plan a conditions-based, performance-dependent area-by-area phased rede- ployment of Israeli security forces with target timetables, benchmarks, and an effective remediation process. Conduct significant upgrades to security systems and infrastructure. Build joint operations centers and data sharing mechanisms for all parties such that there is maximum situational awareness of the security environ- ment for Israelis but minimal intrusion on Palestinian sovereignty. Employ American forces for training, equipping, evaluating, and monitoring, and for conducting highly limited operations along the Jordan River. 3 Middle East Security | May 2016 Advancing the Dialogue: A Security System for the Two-State Solution Executive Summary onfidence in the possibility of solving the Israeli- Bank could also likely be adjusted and implemented in Palestinian conflict is at a nadir. More than 20 similar form in Gaza. C years after Oslo, both sides are deeply disillu- This paper first provides key principles and objec- sioned and trust is nonexistent. The withdrawal from tives of a security architecture for the two-state solution Gaza and ensuing takeover by Hamas, combined with the that address Israeli anxieties but are still acceptable increasing instability in Syria, Egypt’s Sinai, and across to Palestinians. The second section describes the key the region, have led much of the Israeli public to conclude elements of a proposed security architecture as it would that for security reasons, Israel cannot move forward on appear at end state, after many years of planned transi- an agreement with the Palestinians. Meanwhile, many tion. The third part of the study addresses the elements Palestinians have decided that Israel has no intention of of a transition plan to move both parties safely from the ever redeploying from the West Bank. And the United current arrangement to the enduring security architec- States, the Arab world, and the international community ture we envision – including steps that can begin today in general are focused on more pressing security chal- even without an agreement. lenges and frustrated with the lack of progress between Finally, it is important to note that we consider this Israelis and Palestinians. study to be a constant work in progress. The purpose is Nonetheless, several factors point to the need to produce not to propose the one definitive solution to this chal- a public study on security arrangements that would provide lenge, but instead to lay out a series of solutions that better security for both Israelis and Palestinians in a two- should continue to be debated and refined to meet both state solution: parties’ needs. 1. The need to add legitimacy and infuse confidence Key Principles in some of the key concepts underpinning the The overall security system would be based on the fol- two-state solution; lowing key principles: 2. The increasing importance that the Israeli public • Build a multilayered system that addresses Israel’s ascribes to the security challenges associated with security concerns in which Israel retains the right of the two-state solution; and self defense as well as the capacity to defend itself by itself, but ensures this is only necessary in extremis. 3. The centrality of security considerations in Israeli reluctance to move toward an agreement. • Minimize Israeli visibility to Palestinian civilians and pursue significant early steps that signal a funda- The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that well- mental change on the ground to Palestinians. thought-through security measures in the context of the • Plan a conditions-based, performance-dependent two-state solution can provide Israelis and Palestinians area-by-area phased redeployment of Israeli security with a degree of security equal or greater to that provided forces with target timetables, benchmarks, and an today by Israel’s deployment into the West Bank, and that effective remediation process. such measures can be consistent with Palestinian needs for • Conduct significant upgrades to security systems sovereignty and dignity. In the context of a two-state agree- and infrastructure. ment, Israel would still have the right and ability to defend itself by itself as any sovereign state does. But the intent of • Build joint operations centers and data sharing this proposed security architecture is to build in a multilay- mechanisms for all parties such that there is ered system so that the need for unilateral Israeli action is maximum situational awareness of the security vastly reduced to rare emergency situations. environment for Israelis but minimal intrusion on The study also addresses security arrangements for Gaza Palestinian sovereignty.
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