Terrorism in Israel Learning from the Very Best!!
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The Mediterranean Coast of Israel Is a New City,Now Under
University of Rhode Island DigitalCommons@URI Theses and Major Papers Marine Affairs 12-1973 The editM erranean Coast of Israel: A Planner's Approach Sophia Professorsky University of Rhode Island Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/ma_etds Part of the Natural Resources Management and Policy Commons, and the Oceanography and Atmospheric Sciences and Meteorology Commons Recommended Citation Professorsky, Sophia, "The eM diterranean Coast of Israel: A Planner's Approach" (1973). Theses and Major Papers. Paper 146. This Major Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Marine Affairs at DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Major Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact [email protected]. l~ .' t. ,." ,: .. , ~'!lB~'MEDI'1'ERRANEAN-GQAsT ~F.~"IsMt~·;.·(Al!~.oS:-A~PROACH ::".~~========= =~.~~=~~~==b======~~==~====~==.=~=====~ " ,. ••'. '. ,_ . .. ... ..p.... "".. ,j,] , . .;~ ; , ....: ./ :' ",., , " ",' '. 'a ". .... " ' ....:. ' ' .."~".,. :.' , v : ".'. , ~ . :)(A;R:t.::·AF'~~RS'· B~NMi'»APER. '..":. " i . .: '.'-. .: " ~ . : '. ". ..." '-" .~" ~-,.,. .... .., ''-~' ' -.... , . ", ~,~~~~"ed .' bYr. SOph1a,Ji~ofes.orsJcy .. " • "..' - 01 .,.-~ ~ ".··,::.,,;$~ld~~:' ·to,,:" f;~f.... ;)J~:Uexa~d.r . -". , , . ., .."• '! , :.. '> ...; • I ~:'::':":" '. ~ ... : .....1. ' ..~fn··tr8Jti~:·'btt·,~e~Mar1ne.~a1~S·~r~~. ", .:' ~ ~ ": ",~', "-". ~_"." ,' ~~. ;.,·;·X;'::/: u-=" .. _ " -. • ',. ,~,At:·;t.he ,un:lvers:U:~; tif Rh~:<:rs1..J\d. ~ "~.; ~' ~.. ~,- -~ !:).~ ~~~ ~,: ~:, .~ ~ ~< .~ . " . -, -. ... ... ... ... , •• : ·~·J;t.1l9ston.l~~;&:I( .. t)eceiDber; 1~73.• ". .:. ' -.. /~ NOTES, ===== 1. Prior to readinq this paper, please study the map of the country (located in the back-eover pocket), in order to get acquain:t.ed with names and locations of sites mentioned here thereafter. 2.- No ~eqaJ. aspects were introduced in this essay since r - _.-~ 1 lack the professional background for feedinq in tbe information. -
Combating Political Violence Movements with Third-Force Options Doron Zimmermann ∗
Between Minimum Force and Maximum Violence: Combating Political Violence Movements with Third-Force Options Doron Zimmermann ∗ Introduction: Balancing the Tools of Counter-Terrorism In most liberal democratic states it is the responsibility of the police forces to cope with “internal” threats, including terrorism, since in such states terrorism is invariably defined as a criminal act rather than a manifestation of insurgent political violence. In many such instances, the resultant quantitative and qualitative overtaxing of law en- forcement capabilities to keep the peace has led to calls by sections of the public, as well as by the legislative and executive branches of government, to expand both the le- gal and operational means available to combat terrorism, and to boost civilian agen- cies’ capacity to deal with terrorism in proportion to the perceived threat. The deterio- rating situation in Ulster in Northern Ireland between 1968 and 1972 and beyond is an illustrative case in point.1 Although there have been cases of successfully transmogrifying police forces into military-like formations, the best-known and arguably most frequent example of aug- mented state responses to the threat posed by insurgent political violence movements is the use of the military in the fight against terrorism and in the maintenance of internal security. While it is imperative that the threat of a collapse of national cohesion due to the overextension of internal civil security forces be averted, the deployment of all branches of the armed forces against a terrorist threat is not without its own pitfalls. Paul Wilkinson has enunciated some of the problems posed by the use of counter-ter- rorism military task forces, not the least of which is that [a] fully militarized response implies the complete suspension of the civilian legal system and its replacement by martial law, summary punishments, the imposition of curfews, military censorship and extensive infringements of normal civil liberties in the name of the exigencies of war. -
Clarification Notice-4- Amended
Procurement and Contracting Division November 14, 2016 To: Participants - Tender No. 41612 Re: NOTICE #4 TO PARTICIPANTS Tender No. 41612 For the Design, Manufacture and Supply of Track Motor Vehicles With Crane for Israel Railways Ltd. (“Tender”) This notice (this “ Notice ”) is being issued to Bidders in accordance with the provisions of Sections 22.5 and 23 of the General Terms and Conditions of the Tender Documents (the "General Terms "). For the removal of doubt, unless otherwise explicitly stated herein, the Tender Documents remain unchanged and fully binding. It is hereby further clarified that throughout the Tender Process, ISR shall only be bound to the information submitted by ISR in writing, and no oral or other non-written response or information will bind ISR for any and all purposes. Capitalized words and terms used herein and not otherwise defined shall have the same meaning ascribed to them in the Tender Documents. Explanatory Note Some of the questions required explanation and clarification rather than amendment to the Tender Documents and ISR has thus prepared responses in this Notice accordingly. For the removal of doubt, with respect to any question or request not specifically addressed in this Notice, the Tender Documents remain unchanged . Furthermore, ISR shall only be bound by the final version of the Tender Documents that will be executed by ISR. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all the references to the Tender Documents in ISR's answers refer to the Documents as published in ISR's website. Israel Railways, P.O. Box 18085 Tel Aviv 61180, Israel, Phone: 972-3-6937570 ,Fax: 972-3-6937416 | www.rail.co.il | *5770 Procurement and Contracting Division The General Terms and Conditions of the Tender Documents Tender Documents 1. -
World Bank Document
Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized Report No. 4464 Public Disclosure Authorized PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ISRAEL: SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 781-IS) Public Disclosure Authorized May 2, 1983 Public Disclosure Authorized Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ISRAEL: SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 781-IS) Table of Contents Page No. Preface. Key Project Data . .ii Highlights ................... iv I. INTRODUCTION . 1 II. SECTOR BACKGROUND. 2 III. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL . 3 IV. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST A. General . 4 B. Execution of Civil Works . 4 C. Costs .. .. 7 D. Quality of Completed Works . 9 E. Equipment Procurement . 9 F. Consulting Services . 9 G. Loan Covenants .9 V. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT . 11 VI. ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION . A. General .12 B. Traffic 12 C. Economic Benefits/Costs . 13 D. Economic Return .14 VII. CONCLUSIONS .16 Annexes Borrower Comments. .17a Tables 1. SAR Estimates and Actual Construction Periods . 18 2. SAR Estimates and Actual Project Costs . 19 3. Actual Construction Costs . 20 4. Variations in Construction Costs from SAR Estimates . 21 5. Variations in Currency Exchange Rates . 22 6. Cumulative Expenditures for MAZ and Ayalon Components . 23 7. Expenditures for MAZ Components . 24 | This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of | their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. -
A Security System for the Two-State Solution
MAY 2016 ADVANCING THE DIALOGUE A Security System for the Two-State Solution Ilan Goldenberg, Major General (Res.) Gadi Shamni, Nimrod Novik, and Colonel Kris Bauman About the Authors Acknowledgements Ilan Goldenberg is a Senior Fellow and This report was the product of numerous consultations Director of the Middle East Security and workshops with former and current Israeli, Palestinian, Program at the Center for a New American Jordanian, and American security officials and negotiators. Security (CNAS). Prior to CNAS, he served We are deeply grateful to all of them for their time, insights, at the U.S. Department of State as Chief and creativity. A special thank you goes to our colleagues of Staff for the small team supporting at Commanders for Israel’s Security and the Amman Center Secretary John Kerry’s initiative to for Peace and Development for their close collaboration on conduct permanent status negotiations between Israelis this effort, as well as our colleagues at Israel Policy Forum, and Palestinians. Goldenberg previously served as a Special whose advice and support have been invaluable. We thank Advisor on the Middle East and then as the Iran Team Chief Loren Dejonge Schulman for her thoughtful inputs, Nicholas in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. A. Heras and Peter Kirechu for their research support, and Maura McCarthy and Melody Cook for assistance with Major General (Res.) Gadi Shamni is editing and design. Finally, we would like to thank the Smith Vice President for Land Systems at Richardson Foundation, Peter A. Joseph, Gideon Argov, Israel Aerospace Industries. He served in the Goldman Sonnenfeldt Foundation, and the Morningstar the Israel Defense Forces for 36 years, Foundation for their generous support of this project. -
2 Palestine Logistics Infrastructure
2 Palestine Logistics Infrastructure Seaports The Port of Ashdod - just 40 km from Tel Aviv, it is the closest to the country's major commercial centres and highways. Ashdod Port has been operating since 1965 and is one of the few ports in the world built on open sea. The Port of Haifa - the Port of Haifa is the largest of Israel's three major international seaports, which include the Port of Ashdod, and the Port of Eilat. It has a natural deep-water harbour which operates all year long and serves both passenger and cargo ships. The Port of Haifa lies to the north of Haifa's Downtown quarter at the Mediterranean and stretches to some 3 km along the city's central shore with activities ranging from military, industrial and commercial aside to a nowadays-small passenger cruising facility. The Port of Eilat - the Port of Eilat is the only Israeli port on the Red Sea, located at the northern tip of the Gulf of Aqaba. It has significant economic and strategic importance. The Port of Eilat was opened in 1957 and is today mainly used for trading with Far East countries as it allows Israeli shipping to reach the Indian Ocean without having to sail through the Suez Canal. International airports There are two international airports operational in Israel, managed by theIsrael Airports Authority.Ben Gurion Airportserves as the main entrance and exit airport in and out of Israel.Ramon Airportbeing the second largest airport serves as the primarydiversion airportfor Ben Gurion Airport. Road and Rail Transport Roads - Transportation in Israelis based mainly on private motor vehicles and bus service and an expanding railway network. -
Israel's Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its Aftermath
Israel’s Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its Aftermath Carol Migdalovitz Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs June 23, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R41275 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Israel’s Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its Aftermath Summary Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005, but retained control of its borders. Hamas, a U.S. State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and forcibly seized control of the territory in 2007. Israel imposed a tighter blockade of Gaza in response to Hamas’s takeover and tightened the flow of goods and materials into Gaza after its military offensive against Hamas from December 2008 to January 2009. That offensive destroyed much of Gaza’s infrastructure, but Israel has obstructed the delivery of rebuilding materials that it said could also be used to manufacture weapons and for other military purposes. Israel, the U.N., and international non-governmental organizations differ about the severity of the blockade’s effects on the humanitarian situation of Palestinian residents of Gaza. Nonetheless, it is clear that the territory’s economy and people are suffering. In recent years, humanitarian aid groups have sent supply ships and activists to Gaza. However, Israel directs them to its port of Ashdod for inspection before delivery to Gaza. In May 2010, the pro-Palestinian Free Gaza Movement and the pro-Hamas Turkish Humanitarian Relief Fund organized a six-ship flotilla to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza and to break Israel’s blockade of the territory. -
Israel's Struggle Against Hamas
Università degli Studi “Roma Tre” Scuola Dottorale in Scienze Politiche XXV Ciclo Israel’s Struggle Against Hamas Supervisore Dottorando Prof. Leopoldo Nuti Niccolò Petrelli Coordinatore della Sezione Prof. Leopoldo Nuti Introduction The PhD research, ‘Israel’s Struggle against Hamas: Strategic Culture, Adaptation and War’, studies the impact of cultural factors on the Israeli counter-insurgency vis-à-vis Hamas in the period comprised between 1987 and 2005, analyzing to what extent the peculiar traits of the Israeli approach to security and military affairs account for the shaping of a distinct ‘way of war’ and for the successes and failures of the Jewish state in countering the Islamic Resistance Movement’s insurgency. The concept of ‘counter-insurgency’ is logically contingent on that of ‘insurgency’, to which it applies. Being insurgency a protracted struggle to control a contested political space conducted by one or more popularly based non-state challengers1, ‘counter-insurgency’ could be defined as all those measures through which elements of national power are applied for the purpose of suppressing an insurgency. From this definition it appears clear how the concept constitutes an analytical paradigm through which scholars and practitioners approach asymmetric warfare (or war against ‘irregulars’, ‘partisans’ or ‘guerrillas’), that is struggles between non-state and state actors.2 Although old as human civilization, asymmetric warfare rose to prominence after 1945, coming to represent the norm, rather than the exception, of war.3 The end of the Cold War and the last two decades seemed to confirm the ascendancy of this specific kind of warfare over ‘conventional’ or ‘symmetric warfare’ and the setting of a pattern that will probably continue for some time.4 Counter-insurgency represents therefore a topic worth to study not only by virtue of its prominence in the history of warfare, but also in light of the nature of the conflicts confronting the international community, either currently and possibly also in the near future. -
The Future of Israeli-Turkish Relations
The Future of Israeli- Turkish Relations Shira Efron C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2445 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018947061 ISBN: 978-1-9774-0086-4 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: cil86/stock.adobe.com Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface Since their inception, Israel-Turkey relations have been characterized by ups and downs; they have been particularly sensitive to developments related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Throughout the countries’ seven-decade history of bilateral ties, Turkey has downgraded its diplomatic relations with Israel three times, most recently in 2011. -
Fighting Terror Effectively: an Assessment of Israel’S Experience on the Home Front
FIGHTING TERROR EFFECTIVELY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE ON THE HOME FRONT HIGH LEVEL HOME FRONT GROUP NOVEMBER 2016 FIGHTING TERROR EFFECTIVELY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE ON THE HOME FRONT Copyright © 2016 by Friends of Israel Initiative All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other non-commercial uses permitted by copyright law. 2 FIGHTING TERROR EFFECTIVELY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE ON THE HOME FRONT TABLE OF CONTENTS HIGH LEVEL HOME FRONT GROUP BIOGRAPHIES 6 FOREWORD 9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 10 THE HIGH LEVEL HOME FRONT GROUP 19 SECTION A: ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE OF TERRORISM AGAINST ITS HOME FRONT 21 ISRAEL’S HISTORIC EXPERIENCE OF TERRORISM 22 1 1.1 Background 22 1.1.1 A Potentially Existential Threat 22 1.2 The History of Terrorism Against Israel 22 1.2.1 Pre-Statehood Violence and Conventional Warfare 22 1.2.2 Cross-Border Terror Raids 23 1.2.3 The Palestine Liberation Organization and the Globalization of Terror Against Israel 23 1.2.4 The Rise of the Terror-Army Hybrid 23 1.2.5 The First Intifada and the First Gulf War 23 1.2.6 Suicide Bombings and The Second Intifada 24 1.2.7 Rocket Attacks from Gaza and Lebanon 25 1.2.8 Terror at Home and Abroad 26 TERRORISM AGAINST ISRAEL TODAY: 2 THE SMALL-SCALE TERROR CAMPAIGN -
Port Security
Safety and Security in Ports By: Dov Gerber Motorways of the sea TEN T Brussels forum 18.05.2016 History lessons Decades of maritime terror o As coastal country, all Israel’s strategic facilities are threats located on the coast. o Nearby terrorist organizations with maritime abilities o Ports are crucial and strategic gate-way. o Real life and daily terror threats (terror attack in the Port of Ashdod) G.D> GO LTD 18.05.2016 Ashdod 2004 Why ports? o Constructed to be widely oPen and accessible by land and sea o Their infrastructures are interlined with neighboring cities o Hazardous storage facilities built according to cost benefit analysis o Stream of thousands of workers, passengers and seamen every day Why containers? o 17 million containers making 200 million triPs a year o 5% insPection rate world wide o Difficulties in controlling and insPecting the contents o One of the easiest ways for delivery of weapons of mass distraction G.D> GO LTD 18.05.2016 Why ships? o Can be used as a weapon against a port, offshore facilities and other vessels . o Heavy traffic of cruise shiPs create large flow of peoPle o Can be used as a transPort for terrorists o Sinking a shiP at chokepoints that can paralyze a port o Threat of misuse of a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) G.D> GO LTD 18.05.2016 What is required from us Right training program for senior staff for each and every port G.D> GO LTD 18.05.2016 What is needed? Senior Staff, CEOs, CFOs training program Staff psychological Security and emergency concept strength of oPerations Emergency planning Contingency -
World Bank Document
tjitE COriY RESTRICTED Report No. PTR-74a Public Disclosure Authorized Thisreport isfor officialuse only by tho BankGroup and spedficallyauthorzed arpnizations or perons. It maynot be published,quoted or cited without BankGroup authorization. The DankGroup does not acceptresponibty for theaccurcy or completenu of thereport. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTlONAND DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONALDEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION Public Disclosure Authorized APPRAISAL OF A SECOND HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT ISRAEL Public Disclosure Authorized June 21, 1971 Public Disclosure Authorized Transportation Projects Department Currency Equivalents Currency Unit - Israeli Pound (It) US$1.00 = It 3.5 Iz 1.0 a US 28.6¢ It 1 million - US$286,000 Fiscal Year April 1 - March 31 Units of Weights and Measures Metric Metric: British/ITS-Equivalent 1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 miles (mi) 1 meter (a) 2 - 3.28 feet (ft) 1 squarekilometer (km') - 0.386 squaremiles (sq mi) 1 metricton (m ton) = 0.98 lg ton 1 metricton (m ton) - 1.1 US shortton Abbreviations. ADT - Average Daily Traffic BCEO( - BureauCentral d'Etudes pour les Equipements d'Outre-Mer (Consultants - France) FYB - First Year Benefit GNP - Gross National Product IER - Internal Economic Return IPA - Israel Ports Authority PW:D - Public Works Department SETEC - Societe de Etudes Techniques et Economiques (Consultants - France) I S R A E L APPRAISAL OF A SECOND HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTIONPROJECT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ....................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................... 1 II. BACKGROUND ................................................. 2 A. General ................................................. 2 B. The Transport Sector .................................... 2 C. Transport Policy and Coordination ....................... 4 III. HIGHWAY SECTOR ................................... 5 A. The Highway Network ..................................... 5 B. Characteristics and Growth of Road Traffic .... .......... 6 C.