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Fighting Terror Effectively: an Assessment of Israel’S Experience on the Home Front

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FIGHTING TERROR EFFECTIVELY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE ON THE HOME FRONT HIGH LEVEL HOME FRONT GROUP NOVEMBER 2016 FIGHTING TERROR EFFECTIVELY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE ON THE HOME FRONT Copyright © 2016 by Friends of Israel Initiative All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other non-commercial uses permitted by copyright law. 2 FIGHTING TERROR EFFECTIVELY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE ON THE HOME FRONT TABLE OF CONTENTS HIGH LEVEL HOME FRONT GROUP BIOGRAPHIES 6 FOREWORD 9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 10 THE HIGH LEVEL HOME FRONT GROUP 19 SECTION A: ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE OF TERRORISM AGAINST ITS HOME FRONT 21 ISRAEL’S HISTORIC EXPERIENCE OF TERRORISM 22 1 1.1 Background 22 1.1.1 A Potentially Existential Threat 22 1.2 The History of Terrorism Against Israel 22 1.2.1 Pre-Statehood Violence and Conventional Warfare 22 1.2.2 Cross-Border Terror Raids 23 1.2.3 The Palestine Liberation Organization and the Globalization of Terror Against Israel 23 1.2.4 The Rise of the Terror-Army Hybrid 23 1.2.5 The First Intifada and the First Gulf War 23 1.2.6 Suicide Bombings and The Second Intifada 24 1.2.7 Rocket Attacks from Gaza and Lebanon 25 1.2.8 Terror at Home and Abroad 26 TERRORISM AGAINST ISRAEL TODAY: 2 THE SMALL-SCALE TERROR CAMPAIGN 27 2.1 Decentralized, Small-Scale, High Volume: A New Type of Terror Threat 28 2.1.1 Major Escalation of Terrorist Attacks 28 2.1.2 The Nature of the New Terror Threat 29 2.1.3 Perpetrator Profile of the New Terror Threat 29 2.1.4 Attack Profile of the New Terror Threat 30 2.2 Key Factors Driving the Small-Scale Terror Campaign 31 2.2.1 The Myth of the ‘Lone Wolf’ 31 2.3 Palestinian Incitement 31 2.3.1 The Iconography of Incitement 32 2.3.2 The Political and Security Context Within the Palestinian Polity 33 2.3.3 A Strategic Decision for Escalation 33 2.4 The Role of Social Media 34 2.4.1 A Dangerous New Paradigm 34 2.4.2 Social Media and the Small-Scale Terror Wave 35 2.4.3 An Inadequate Response from Social Media “Superpowers” 36 3 FIGHTING TERROR EFFECTIVELY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE ON THE HOME FRONT ADDITIONAL THREATS ISRAEL FACES IN THE CONTEXT 3 OF THE SMALL-SCALE TERROR CAMPAIGN 37 3.1 The Gaza Strip and Regional Actors 38 3.1.1 Gaza: A Constant Source of Terrorism Against Israel 38 3.1.2 Internal Discord in Islamist Politics in Gaza 38 3.1.3 Gaza in the Context of the Small-Scale Terror Wave 38 3.2 Wider Regional Dynamics and State-Sponsored Terrorism 39 3.3 Cyber Security 39 3.3.1 Trends in the Cyber Domain 39 3.3.2 Key Threats in the Cyber Domain 40 3.3.3 Israel’s Response to the Challenges from the Cyber Domain 40 SECTION B: ISRAEL’S RESPONSES TO TERRORISM AGAINST ITS HOME FRONT 43 ISRAEL’S SECURITY APPARATUS AND COUNTER- 4 TERROR STRATEGIES 44 4.1 Israel’s Security Apparatus 44 4.2 The Israel Police 44 4.2.1 Police Doctrines 45 4.2.2 Police Versatility 46 4.2.3 Rules of Engagement and the Doctrine of Minimum Force 47 4.2.4 Case Study: Protecting the Damascus Gate in Jerusalem 48 4.2.5 Community Policing 49 4.3 The Israel Defense Forces 50 4.3.1 The Operational Context in the West Bank 51 4.3.2 Operational Parameters and Rules of Engagement 52 4.3.3 Operational Response to the Small-Scale Terror Wave 52 4.3.4 Community Engagement as part of IDF Operational Procedures 53 4.3.5 Case Study: Containing the Violence – The Sa’ir Model 53 4.4 Intelligence Agencies 53 4.4.1 Israel’s Intelligence Doctrine and Capabilities 54 4.4.2 Real-Time Intelligence 55 4.5 Inter-Agency Cooperation 56 4.5.1 Strategic Oversight 56 4.5.2 Intelligence Sharing 56 4.5.3 Case Study: The 2003 Mike’s Place Bombing 56 4.5.4 Tactical Coordination 57 4.6 Combating Terror Finance 57 5 JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT 59 5.1 Checks and Balances in the Fight Against Terrorism 60 5.1.1 Legal Framework 60 5.1.2 Regulation 61 5.2 Administrative Measures and Judicial Review 61 5.2.1 Administrative Detention 62 5.2.2 House Demolitions 62 5.2.3 Restrictions on Movement 63 5.2.4 Designating Terrorist Organizations 63 5.2.5 Confiscation of Property 64 4 FIGHTING TERROR EFFECTIVELY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE ON THE HOME FRONT 5.2.6 Case Study: Judicial Checks and Balances in Israel’s Fight Against Terrorism 64 5.2.6.1 Targeted Killings 64 5.2.6.2 Military Tactics and Security Measures 66 6 RESILIENCE 67 6.1 Risk Mitigation and Effective Policymaking 68 6.1.1 Threat Prioritization 68 6.1.2 Case Study: Public Beaches 68 6.2 Political – Operational Coordination 69 6.3 The Role of the Public and the Private Sector in Countering Terrorism 70 6.3.1 The Private Security Sector 70 6.3.2 Public Resilience 70 6.3.3 Enabling Resilience 71 6.3.4 Regulated Gun Access 72 6.4 Civilian and Critical Infrastructure Protection 72 6.4.1 Critical Infrastructure Protection 73 6.5 Case Study: The ‘Layers’ of Security Paradigm 74 6.6 Transport Security 74 6.7 Technology 75 CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE FIGHTING TERRORISM ON ITS HOME 7 FRONT FOR OTHER DEMOCRATIC NATIONS 77 7.1 Israel, A Paragon of Resilience 78 7.2 International Cooperation 78 7.2.1 Intelligence 78 7.3 Doctrines, Tactics and Best Practices 78 7.4 Technological Expertise 79 7.5 Legal Expertise and Experience 79 7.6 Action Areas 79 5 FIGHTING TERROR EFFECTIVELY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE ON THE HOME FRONT HIGH LEVEL MILITARY GROUP General Klaus Dieter Naumann (Germany) is the served in Iraq, the Balkans, South Asia and Northern former Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, the German Ireland. He has led the international terrorism team armed forces and served as Chairman of the NATO at the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee and served Military Committee from 1996 to 1999. as chairman of the strategic intelligence group General Vincenzo Camporini (Italy) is the former for COBRA, the UK national crisis management Chief of Defence Staff of Italy. He served as Deputy committee. Chief of Defence General Staff and President of the Colonel Vincent Alcazar (United States) served as a Italian Centre for High Defence Studies before being fighter pilot in Operations Desert Storm and Southern appointed Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force and Watch as well as various other post 9/11 theatres. He subsequently Chief of Defence General Staff. subsequently served in strategic roles at the Pentagon, Lieutenant General David A. Deptula (United the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and at the U.S. States) was the principal attack planner for the Desert embassy, Baghdad, Iraq. Storm coalition air campaign in 1991, served as Colonel Eduardo Ramirez (Colombia) is an Director of the Combined Air Operations Center in Advisor to the Congress of Colombia who served Afghanistan and served as the first Deputy Chief of with the Colombian National Police from 1987 until Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 2013. He was formerly the Chief of Security Staff (ISR), Headquarters Air Force. for President Uribe of Colombia, as well as Chief of Admiral José María Terán (Spain) serves in the Section at the Judicial and Criminal Directory of the Office of Strategic Assessment of the Minister of National Police. Defence of Spain. A former Chief of the Joint Staff Ambassador Pierre-Richard Prosper (United and Chief of the Strategic Analysis Group, he has also States) was Ambassador-at-large in charge of the US served as Director for Reorganisation of the Spanish Secretary of State’s Office of War Crimes Issues. A Intelligence Service. former Presidential envoy and adviser to the National Major General Andrew James Molan (Australia) Security Council he was previously a war crimes served as the Chief of Operations for the Headquarters prosecutor for the United Nations International Multinational Force in Iraq. He is a former Commander Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. of the Australian Defence College and has served as Rafael L. Bardají is the Executive Director of the Adviser to the Vice Chief of the Australian Defence Friends of Israel Initiative and National Security Force on Joint Warfighting Lessons and Concepts. Advisor to Former President, José María Aznar. He Lieutenant General Kamal Davar (India) formerly served in the Government of Spain as the served as the first Director General of the Defence National Security Adviser and in leadership positions Intelligence Agency of India. A former Director- in the Ministry of Defence. General, Mechanised Forces at Army Headquarters, Davis Lewin is the Director of the High Level he has held a large number of high ranking command Military Group project. posts in the Indian Army and served on the Indian Military Training Team in Iraq. Brigadier General Alain Lamballe (France) served in the General Secretariat for National Defence as head of the Southeast Asia and Europe sections as well as heading the Central Liaison Mission for Assistance to Foreign Forces.
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