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Home , Amos Yadlin, Gaza War (2008–2009), Hamas, Iron Dome, Isabel Kershner, Maglan

september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9

The Combat Performance a clear improvement in performance of medium range and dozens of long since the - war in 2009.5 range systems capable of reaching as of Hamas in the far as in northern Israel.9 Hamas’ of 2014 Nevertheless, Hamas also showed forces were well prepared for the weaknesses within its military forces. campaign, with a system of underground By Jeffrey White Its rocket offensive, while disrupting launchers spread across Gaza and the life in Israel, and especially in southern means of moving and rocket in its war with israel in the Israel, caused few casualties and little squads to launch areas under cover.10 summer of 2014, Hamas displayed damage. Its offensive tunnel system, a wide range of combat capabilities, while allowing infiltration inside Israel, Hamas expended considerable effort including new offensive and defensive did not lead to successful penetration into the build-up of its ground tactics.1 Hamas’ evolution on the of the border defense system, except forces. These forces were to be battlefield presented serious challenges perhaps in one case.6 Despite the employed offensively against Israel to the (IDF) and, defensive tunnel system, Israeli forces and defensively to prevent deep when combined with Israeli operations, caused extensive damage to Hamas’ penetrations into Gaza by Israeli made the conflict the most costly in military infrastructure.7 Hamas’ ground ground forces. Hamas organized the terms of casualties and damage to Gaza forces, notwithstanding their upgrades, defensive battlefield by deploying since Hamas seized power in 2007.2 were unable to prevent IDF ground dense systems of improvised explosive operations. devices (IEDs)11 and converting Hamas once again demonstrated that it civilian areas to defensive localities.12 It is a learning organization. It studies its This article reviews Hamas’ deployed modern anti- forces, experience in battle, develops lessons, preparations for battle, its offensive units, and snipers to support ground and incorporates them into its combat and defensive operations, the group’s operations. doctrine, forces, and operations.3 It lessons learned, and the likely plays down the effects of Israeli actions contours of the next conflict. It finds Tunnels were the third major component publicly, does not admit losses or that Hamas conducted significant of Hamas’ war preparations.13 Tunnels mistakes, and presents a face of victory. offensive and defensive operations, offered cover and concealment for Inside the organization, however, Hamas absorbed intense attacks from the IDF, infrastructure, command functions engages in a serious learning process.4 and emerged with reduced but still and commanders, forces, weapons Major improvements by Hamas in its intact military capabilities. Hamas and ammunition. They were integral latest war with Israel included: enhanced will study the lessons learned from this to rocket operations, increasing the range and numbers of rockets, improved conflict to better prepare for its next difficulty for Israel in finding launch protection of its military infrastructure military confrontation with Israel. positions and launchers, and allowing from Israeli attack, a system of offensive launch teams a chance to escape and defensive tunnels, and increased Hamas’ Preparations for Battle Israeli strikes. Communications and effectiveness and cohesion of its Hamas prepared for an asymmetric defensive tunnels enabled movement ground combat forces. Taken together, conflict with Israel. The group’s on the battlefield and for fighting from these improvements allowed Hamas to preparation focused on three principle protected positions. They supported conduct sustained strikes deep inside elements: rocket forces, ground forces, offensive infiltration operations and Israel, even while under siege from and the tunnel system. defensive tactical maneuver. Israeli military operations, to conduct offensive ground actions inside Israel By July 2014, Hamas’ arsenal was In addition, much of Hamas’ military and to present significant opposition estimated at approximately 6,000 infrastructure was embedded in to Israel’s ground incursion. This was rockets,8 consisting primarily of short civilian areas of Gaza.14 This created range weapons, but with hundreds in effect a “human dome,” reducing or

1 This paper focuses on Hamas’ military operations and complicating Israel’s willingness and tactics. There are a number of other Palestinian organi- 5 An unnamed Israeli intelligence officer admitted that zations in the with substantial military forces while nothing Hamas did in the war was a surprise, the 9 IDF estimates for the Hamas rocket arsenal in July and capabilities, and with whom Hamas cooperated resilience of the organization was surprising. See Isabel 2014 were: 3,900 short range systems, more than 1,600 during the conflict. See Asmaa al-Ghoul, “Gaza’s Armed Kershner, “Israel Says Hamas Is Hurt Significantly,”New medium range systems, and several dozen long range Factions Coordinate Response to Israeli Attacks,” al- York Times, September 2, 2014. systems. See ibid. Monitor, July 7, 2014. 6 This was the attack on the security post at 10 Christa Case Bryant, “Hamas Unveils Bigger, Better 2 “Scale of Gaza Destruction Unprecedented, Rehabilita- on July 28, 2014, in which five Israeli soldiers were killed Rocket Arsenal Against Israel,” Christian Science Monitor, tion Will Cost $7.8 Billion, PA Says,” , September and the Hamas squad escaped back into Gaza. See Elad July 9, 2014. 4, 2014. Benari and Gil Ronen, “Five Soldiers Killed During At- 11 “Hamas Booby Traps Palestinian Houses,” IDF , 3 , “Dealing With Hamas’ Military Force tempted Infiltration,” Israel National News, July 29, July 27, 2014. Reconstruction,” The Institute for National Security 2014. 12 “New Declassified Report Exposes Hamas Human Studies, September 11, 2014. 7 Yadlin. Shield Policy,” IDF Blog, August 20, 2014. 4 Yoram Cohen and Jeffrey White, “Hamas in Combat: 8 Palestinian Islamic and other Palestinian combat 13 Shlomi Eldar, “Gaza Tunnels Take IDF by Surprise,” The Military Performance of the Palestinian Islamic Re- groups had their own rocket arsenals. See “Special Re- al-Monitor, July 20, 2014. sistance Movement,” The Washington Institute for Near port: The Deadly Rocket Arsenal of Hamas,” Israel De- 14 “New Declassified Report Exposes Hamas Human East Policy, October 2009, p. 22. fense Forces, July 10, 2014. Shield Policy,” IDF Blog, August 20, 2014.

9 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 ability to strike them and providing a • 185 - M75 (mid-range) Offensive tunnels constituted the measure of protection.15 • 64 - M55/Fajr 5 (mid-range) second major offensive capability of • 3344 - Grad/Qassam/Katyusha/ Hamas. The IDF discovered 32 offensive Offensive Operations mortar (short-range) tunnels in the course of operations.29 Hamas had two main offensive forces Fourteen reportedly reached into Israel in the conflict: rocket units and These numbers demonstrate that the and two more had exits within 500 ground combat forces. Hamas also had bulk of rocket strikes fell on southern meters of the Israeli border.30 These a naval unit for sea-borne infiltration Israel, although 271 rockets were tunnels were designed to allow Hamas operations.16 Israeli reports indicated directed at central Israel. Hamas was assault squads to penetrate Israeli that Hamas had even prepared a able to modulate firing as it deemed border defenses without detection and unit equipped with paragliders for necessary and launched salvo attacks to attack targets inside Israel with the operations inside Israel.17 Hamas on numerous occasions.22 According to advantage of surprise. According to employed nearly all types of its one Israeli account: “Analysis of the Israeli information, each tunnel was offensive forces in the conflict.18 fighting indicates that rocket fire is under the control of a Hamas battalion, proceeding according to preset plans, responsible for its digging and probably For the first 10 days of the war, the with every local commander knowing operations during wartime.31 focus was on rocket operations. Despite how many to launch, where to direct intensive efforts by the Israeli Air them and at what time each day. This Hamas assault squads were relatively Force (IAF), rocket strikes continued decentralized method allows Hamas small32 but heavily armed, carrying throughout the war, including salvo to continue firing even under intense rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), light firing and targeting deep into Israel. pressure by the IDF.”23 machine guns, assault rifles, and hand Even as the final cease-fire approached, grenades. Hamas personnel in some Hamas was able to fire large quantities Nevertheless, Israeli active () cases wore IDF uniforms to increase of rockets.19 For the , the and passive (civil defense) measures confusion and hesitation on the part ability to keep Israel under threat and limited the overall impact of the rocket of IDF soldiers.33 Offensive tunnels disrupt day-to-day life were major offensive. Iron Dome intercepted sometimes also contained equipment accomplishments, with the single most 735 of the rockets fired at Israel that for hostage taking34 (plastic handcuffs, dramatic success being the temporary were identified as threats.24 Israel’s anesthetics), and in one case three interruption of air traffic to Ben Gurion civil defense system was important motorcycles were found, probably airport on July 22, 201420—although the in limiting casualties. It provided intended to facilitate movement inside evacuation of Israeli border settlements guidelines for how to respond when Israel.35 was perhaps the most important under attack, warning of attack, and achievement. shelter from attack.25 The inherent Hamas executed six tunnel-based inaccuracy of the rockets, successful infiltration operations during the war According to reports from Hamas’ interceptions, and civil defense with limited success.36 Assault squads military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam measures meant that there were few penetrated the border and in four cases Brigades, it was able to fire some 3,600 Israeli casualties: seven killed and rockets at Israel including the following 842 wounded, including “shock” 29 Jeremy Binnie, “IDF Detail the Damage Inflicted on 21 types and numbers: casualties by the rocket and mortar Gaza ,” IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, August 8, 26 attacks. Structures and property 2014. • 11 - R160 (long-range) suffered physical damage, but it was 30 Ibid. 27 • 22 - J80 (mid-range) quite limited. Disruption of life and 31 Yaakov Lappin, “Analysis: The Hidden Picture in economic activity were substantial, Gaza,” Post, July 31, 2014. 28 15 “How is the IDF Minimizing Harm to Civilians in especially in southern Israel. 32 The largest groups were 13-man squads involved in Gaza?” IDF Blog, July 16, 2014. the July 18 and July 19, 2014, infiltrations. See Joshua Mit- 16 Mohammed Najib, “IDF Repels New Hamas Naval nick, Nicholas Casey and Tamer El-Ghobashy, “Hamas Commandos,“ IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 9, 2014. 22 See, for example, Yaakov Lappin, “IDF Completes Fighters Infiltrate Israel Through Tunnel and Kill Two 17 “Israeli Strike on Hamas Leader Raed Attar Foiled Ga- Withdrawal from Gaza, Keeps Forces Massed on Bor- Soldiers,” Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2014. za-Area Paraglider Attack – ‘Attar’s Has der,” Jerusalem Post, August 5, 2014. 33 Mitch Ginsburg, “Hamas Will Start Tunnelling as Disrupted Everything,’” Algemeiner, September 1, 2014. 23 Amos Harel, “Hamas is Trying to Get Itself Out of a Soon as we Leave,” Times of Israel, July 27, 2014. 18 The paraglider unit was not used in the conflict prob- Tight Spot,” , August 24, 2014. 34 Mitnick et al. ably because the IDF disrupted it with its attack on the 24 Ben Hartman, “50 Days of Israel’s Gaza Operation, 35 “Israeli Forces Unearth ‘Terror Motorcycles’ From Al- unit’s leader. See ibid. Protective Edge – By the Numbers,” Jerusalem Post, Au- leged Hamas Tunnel in New Video,” Telegraph, August 19 “News of and the Israeli-Palestinian Con- gust 28, 2014. 4, 2014. flict (August 26-September 2, 2014),” The In- 25 See Israel website at www. 36 David Horovitz, “Israel Might Have Won; Hamas telligence and Terrorism Information Center, September oref.org.il/894-en/Pakar.aspx. Certainly Lost,” Times of Israel, August 6, 2014. Hamas 2, 2014. 26 Ben Hartman, “71st Israeli Fatality of Gazawar: Man also attempted a seaborne infiltration attempt along 20 “Flights Cancelled Into Israel’s Ben Gurion Interna- Succumbs to Wounds From Rocket Attack,” Jerusalem Israel’s coast near . This was detected by Israeli tional Airport As Rocket Falls Nearby,” Forbes, July 22, Post, August 29, 2014. naval observers and the infiltration unit was destroyed. 2014. 27 Zvi Zrahiya, “As Fighting Eases, Gaza Conflict Cost See Yaakov Lappin, “Watch: IDF Kills 5 Hamas Terror- 21 This was posted on @qassam_arabic1, August 27, Seen Totalling $8 Nillion,” Haaretz, August 6, 2014. ists Attempting to Infiltrate from the Sea,”Jerusalem Post, 2014. 28 Ibid. July 8, 2014.

10 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 they engaged Israeli forces. Hamas Hamas deployed six “brigades” of a “special unit” for close combat and attempted to ambush Israeli forces between 2,500 and 3,500 men for infiltration operations.51 and patrols using anti-tank weapons defense of the Gaza Strip.45 Each brigade against vehicles. In these clashes, 11 was responsible for a sector of the front Anti-Tank Actions Israeli soldiers were killed.37 The most with Israel.46 Brigades were apparently A second key category of Hamas ground successful action occurred on July 29, grouped together under a regional action consisted of attacks on Israeli 2014, when infiltrators surprised an commander.47 Each brigade probably armored vehicles, including , Israeli security post at Nahal Oz in an had a mix of forces including rocket and armored personnel carriers (APCs), and apparent hostage-taking attempt.38 Five mortar units, anti-tank units, snipers, armored engineering vehicles. Hamas IDF soldiers were killed with possibly and infantry.48 had specialized anti-tank units equipped only one Hamas combatant killed or with a variety of anti-tank guided wounded.39 Hamas forces engaged in a number of missiles (ATGM) and RPGs. ATGMs types of defensive action. reportedly included the Malyutka, Israel’s system of security fences, Konkurs, Fagot, and Kornet types.52 surveillance and patrols was generally Close Combat RPGs included the RPG-7 and the effective in countering the infiltration Close combat involved direct fire modern and capable RPG-29.53 Hamas actions, but the attempts inflicted engagements between Hamas and Israeli attempted to engage IDF armor with casualties on Israeli forces and ground forces, with Hamas using RPGs, ATGMs at long range, and with anti- contributed to the sense of insecurity machine guns, and small arms. Hamas tank teams in close combat.54 Hamas among the border settlements.40 employed mortars, short range rockets also used IEDs and mines against IDF and antitank guided missiles to support armor, and attempted to draw the IDF Throughout the conflict, Hamas used these engagements. Hamas fighters into prepared “ambushes” where all mortars and short range rockets, appeared more effective and aggressive anti-tank means could be brought to especially the 107mm type, in an than in past conflicts, surprising bear.55 role. These weapons were used Israeli forces and coordinating fire. to bombard border settlements,41 IDF Tunnels were a particular venue for Hamas was less effective with these force concentrations on both sides of the close combat. Israeli forces did not just tactics. Not a single IDF tank was border,42 Israeli military posts,43 and to discover tunnels; they had to fight for confirmed destroyed, nor were any support tunnel infiltration attempts.44 them.49 Hamas used tunnels to surprise heavy APCs lost in combat. Israeli forces with close engagements. Other armored vehicles appeared more Defensive Operations While Israel seems to have won most vulnerable, including the aging M113 Defensive operations included of the close combat actions, Hamas APC, in which seven Israeli troops were resistance to Israeli ground fighters inflicted casualties on even killed in an RPG blast.56 force penetration into Gaza and the best Israeli infantry and armored personnel were killed and wounded by counterattacks on Israeli forces inside formations.50 Hamas reportedly has sniping and mortar fire, but by and large Gaza. Defensive operations also served Hamas anti-tank weapons and tactics 57 as the shield behind which Hamas 45 , “Israel Says Hamas Is Hurt Sig- were not of great effect. This was could launch rockets and mortars nificantly,” New York Times, September 2, 2014. Hamas due to the anti-ATGM system 58 against Israel. sources estimate Qassam Brigades manpower at 30,000, employed on Mk 4 tanks, the but this is likely an exaggeration. See “The ‘Izz Al-Din protection provided by Merkava tanks 59 Al-Qassam Brigades’ Weapons And Units,” Middle East and Namer APCs, and probably Israeli Media Research Institute, September 2, 2014. 37 Horovitz. 46 Kershner. 7th, 188th, and 401st Armored Brigades, and the 38 Elad Benari and Gil Ronen, “Five Soldiers Killed Dur- 47 Israel’s of three senior Hamas mili- special forces unit and the Yahalom bri- ing Attempted Terrorist Infiltration,” Israel National tary commanders on August 21, 2014, revealed that one gade. News, July, 29, 2014. of them, Mohammed Abu Shamlah, was the director of 51 “The ‘Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades’ Weapons And 39 Ibid. Hamas forces in southern Gaza. See “IDF Targets Senior Units.” 40 Mitnick et al. Hamas Terrorists in Gaza,” Israel Defense Forces, Au- 52 Ibid. 41 See @Qassam_English for numerous tweets on this gust 21, 2014. 53 Ibid. activity during the war. For example: @Qassam_English, 48 For the structure of Qassam Brigades combat units 54 Qassam Brigades reporting provides numerous “Fired 4 107 rockets, 5 rockets & 2 mortars at and in 2009, see Yoram Cohen and Jeffrey White, “Hamas in claims of such actions. See, for example, “Al-Qassam Bri- 5 107 rockets & 5 mortars at in Combat: The Military Performance of the Palestinian Is- gades Fired Rocket-Propelled Grenades at Israeli Tank response to Israeli Crimes,” July 21, 2014. lamic ,” The Washington Institute in the al-Tuffah & Israeli Troop Carrier in ,” 42 @Qassam_English, “18:25 Al-Qassam Brigades for Near East Policy, October 2009, p. 15. @Qassam_English 4:35 AM, July 21, 2014. bombed a gathering of armored machines and soldiers 49 Avi Issacharoff, “Amid the Tunnels and the Traps 55 “Al Qassam Kills 14 Israeli Soldiers in an Ambush Rayyan area east of with 3 107 missiles,” August of Hamas’s Militarized Gaza,” Times of Israel, August 1, East of Gaza ,” al-Qassam website, July 20, 2014. 3, 2014. 2014. 56 Yaakov Lappin, “IDF Wants More Namer APCs and 43 @Qassam_English, “16:50 Al-Qassam fired 2 mortars 50 While the Golani infantry brigade seems to have tak- Trophy Protection Systems,” IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, on Hashudat military base, West of , North of en the most killed in action, all the other regular infantry August 21, 2014. in response to Israeli Crimes,” July 19, 2014. and armored brigades, as well as some specialized units, 57 Ibid. 44 This is based on correlation of mortar and rocket fire in Gaza took casualties. These included the Parachute 58 Ibid. with tunnel infiltration attempts. Brigade, the Nahal, and Givati infantry brigades, the 59 Ibid.

11 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 tactics that employed heavy firepower Air Defense Israeli sources report that as the against ATGM threats. Hamas claims to have an air defense conflict dragged on, there were cases unit equipped with heavy antiaircraft of Palestinian units breaking under Engineering Warfare machine guns and several types of the stress of combat,75 but this does not Engineering warfare was a principal man portable air defense systems appear to have been a general pattern. aspect of the ground fighting. (MANPADS), including the SA-7, SA- Defensively, Hamas used two primary 18, and SA-24.69 During the course of Lessons Learned types of engineering activity to improve the conflict, Hamas claimed to have Hamas is a learning organization and its ability to resist incursions by IDF “hit” several Israeli aircraft including will study this conflict to develop its ground forces: defensive tunneling60 an F-16 and an F-15.70 own set of “lessons learned.” One Israeli and IEDs.61 The objective of this activity analyst has described Hamas’ “learning” was to reduce the IDF’s ability to Overall, Hamas’ forces performed in these terms: maneuver, increase Israeli casualties, relatively well in the ground fighting.71 and allow Hamas’ combat forces to Resistance to Hamas has proven strikingly adept operate tactically against IDF units was skillful, adaptive, and conducted at steering its fighting doctrine even in the face of Israel’s firepower coherently. Personnel were willing to away from Israel’s strengths. advantage. Tunnel entrances were engage in close combat with Israeli If Israel has precise munitions, routinely booby-trapped to cause IDF forces and conducted infiltration and then Hamas has positioned its casualties.62 Tunnels were also difficult ambush missions with determination. weaponry and command centers to destroy, requiring significant The most successful day for Hamas’ in hospitals and in extreme engineering efforts to trace and then defensive operations was July 20, 2014, proximity to civilian centers. If destroy or disrupt them. 63 when 13 soldiers of the Golani Infantry Israel has highly advanced signals Brigade were killed while attempting intelligence capacities, then Fire Support to advance into the Shejaiya area east Hamas has turned toward runners Hamas used mortars extensively, of .72 This action involved a and other primitive forms of especially 120mm types, and short range minefield, antitank weapons, infantry communication. If Israel controls rockets to support defensive operations.64 and supporting fire from mortars.73 the skies and sees all from above, Israeli forces inside Gaza and on the then Hamas has carved out a Israeli side of the border were subject to Hamas’ forces were able to inflict subterranean network from which continual harassment fire.65 significantly greater casualties than in it launches ambushes and rocket the 2009 conflict: 66 Israeli soldiers strikes. And if, among other Sniping died in 2014, compared to 10 in 2009.74 things, Israel’s engineers have Hamas snipers harassed and inflicted manufactured a means of striking casualties on exposed Israeli troops and in Rafah Attack that Also Killed 2 Soldiers,” Times of Is- Hamas’ rockets out of the sky, 66 armored vehicle personnel. rael, August 1, 2014. then Hamas has moved toward 69 “The ‘Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades’ Weapons And mortars, which have a limited Units,” Middle East Media Research Institute, Septem- range but are largely immune to 76 Several suicide attacks were carried out ber 2, 2014. Iron Dome’s capabilities. 67 on Israeli forces inside Gaza. The most 70 See, for example, @Qassam_English, “#AllPraises- successful attack was against Givati ToAllah Today, Al-Qassam Brigades hit an Israeli F-16 There are a number of lessons that Infantry Brigade troops on August 1, warplane over the besieged Gaza Strip…The Israeli jet Hamas likely learned from the conflict. 2014, which killed three Israeli soldiers was targeted early Wednesday with a surface-to-air mis- At the highest level, the war at least and may have been part of a complex sile over the city of Deir al-Balah in central Gaza,” July partially validated Hamas’ way of war: 68 abduction operation. 23, 2014; @Qassam_English, “13:56: Managed one of the sustain strikes into Israel, prevent Qassam units of air defense weapon for targeting F15 deep IDF penetration of Gaza, cause 60 Ibid. warplane; was a direct hit which led to a fire,” July 25, Israel to kill civilians, inflict civilian 61 Ibid. 2014. and military casualties on Israel, and 62 Issacharoff. 71 Amos Harel, “As Casualties Mount, the Gaza Opera- achieve an image of victory. The first 63 Ibid. tion Threatens to Become a War,” Haaretz, July 21, 2014. three of these were largely achieved, the 64 According to the IDF, 356 rockets were fired against 72 Yaakov Lappin, “13 IDF Soldiers Killed in Gaza as last two much less so. Hamas will likely its forces in the Gaza Strip. See Jeremy Binnie, “IDF De- Operation Protective Edge Death Toll Climbs to 18,” Je- see no reason for drastic change. tail the Damage Inflicted on Gaza Militants,” IHS Jane’s rusalem Post, July 20, 2014. Defense Weekly, August 8, 2014. 73 “Al Qassam Kills 14 Israeli Soldiers in an Ambush Hamas learned, or re-learned, that it 65 Ibid. See also numerous Qassam Brigades’ tweets on East of Gaza City,” Al Qassam website, July 20, 2014. can continue military operations of all bombardment of Israeli positions and force concentra- 74 For IDF KIA in Operation Protective Edge, see Ze’ev types even while under intense attack. tions with mortars and 107mm rockets during the course Ben-Yechiel, “Last IDF Soldier Killed in Protective Edge Its investment in tunnels and building of war @Qassam_English. Laid to Rest,” Breaking Israel News, September 2, 2014. 66 The Qassam Brigades published numerous tweets on For IDF KIA in Operation Cast Lead, see Yoram Cohen 75 See, for example, Lilach Shoval, “This is War and We sniping actions at @Qassam_English during the conflict. and Jeffrey White, “Hamas in Combat: The Military Per- are Winning,” Israel Hayom, July 27, 2014. 67 “IDF Troops Foil Female Suicide Bombing Attack,” formance of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Move- 76 Mitch Ginsburg, “Ground Op is Still an Option, but IDF Blog, July 25, 2014. ment,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Time is Not on Israel’s Side,” Times of Israel, August 25, 68 Mitch Ginsburg, “IDF Searches for Officer Kidnapped October 2009, p. 22. 2014.

12 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 the rocket and mortar arsenal paid the people of Gaza. It can be expected the inaccuracy of their weapons.81 dividends. Israeli air and ground power, that Hamas will attempt to acquire more Improving the rocket warheads will while inflicting casualties and damage on and better MANPADs. mean that those that get through the Hamas’ forces, did not break or render Iron Dome will cause greater casualties them combat ineffective. Air power was There are also important lessons at and damage. These improvements not enough against a physically and the tactical level. Mortar systems will challenge the Iron Dome system. mentally hardened enemy, and Hamas’ are effective in inflicting casualties Hamas will likely pursue alternatives ground forces resisted IDF ground and damage on Israeli forces and to rockets for offensive operations, forces at least up to a point. civilian targets. Close combat can including drones, more powerful produce Israeli casualties in spite of mortars, and more offensive tunnels. Fighting from within the population is IDF firepower advantages. Defensive In a future war, Hamas will attempt effective. Israel is heavily constrained tunnels allow Hamas’ forces to engage to achieve the same level of disruption by the presence of civilians, and will Israeli units in close combat with, in central Israel that it achieved in not use all its available firepower. at least on occasion, the element of southern Israel. It will take measures to reduce surprise, giving Hamas’ forces a degree civilian casualties that will reduce of survivability in these engagements. In preparing for a future war, Hamas its effectiveness in striking targets IDF defensive measures reduced the will continue to place emphasis on and contribute to the survival of effectiveness of anti-tank weapons. In tunnels, including both offensive and Hamas’ assets and forces. According particular, the Trophy vehicle protection defensive tunnels. Hamas will likely to Palestinian and system worked against Hamas’ ATGM. strengthen and deepen its defensive sources, some 2,100 Gazans were killed Sniping inflicted a number of casualties layout and means. It will likely increase in the war.77 The proportion of civilians on IDF personnel, especially vehicle the number of anti-tank units and to combatants killed is in dispute, with commanders. weapons it can deploy in response to Palestinian and UN sources claiming the Israeli Trophy active protection that about 70% of the casualties were Finally, Hamas learned that it has no system and Israel’s likely acquisition of civilian and Israeli sources claiming answer to the . The IDF’s additional heavily armored tanks and that a little over 50% were civilians.78 naval forces were able to operate close APCs. Hamas will devote some effort Whatever the number, significant inshore to conduct naval gunfire and to improving its air defenses, although Palestinian civilian casualties will sea commando operations with virtual Israel’s air superiority means that occur regardless of the measures taken impunity. Although Hamas reportedly Hamas will probably not do more than by Israel.79 had an interest in coastal defense try to acquire a capability to perhaps missiles at one time,80 none were used shoot down an Israeli aircraft and claim The Iron Dome does not solve Israel’s in this conflict. an image of victory. rocket problem. While it is successful in reducing casualties and damage, The Contours of the Next Conflict Whatever its path forward, Hamas will rocket firing disrupts life across much Until and unless there is either a be ready for the next round of war with of Israel. Every time take to the political or military solution to the Gaza Israel. It will seek to fight longer, do shelters, Hamas scores a success. When problem, there will be future rounds of more damage, and defend itself more flights to and from conflict. It is possible to see the shape of vigorously. Whether or not Hamas can are disrupted, it is an important success. Hamas’ military operations in the next accomplish this in the face of Israel’s When Israelis are forced to abandon round. close monitoring of the situation and settlements close to the border, it is a Egyptian hostility to the group remains major success. Hamas will likely continue to emphasize to be seen. Yet Hamas cannot give up rockets as the mainstay of its offensive armed “resistance” without changing This war showed again that Hamas operations against Israel. Hamas will its fundamental nature. needs air defense capabilities. Without try to improve its rocket capability. effective air defense, or at least the There are several ways it can achieve Jeffrey White is a former senior U.S. ability to impose some limits or this, depending on access to technology defense intelligence officer and is currently complications on Israeli air operations, and critical materials. It can increase a defense fellow at The Washington Hamas will continue to lack effective the number of rockets in its arsenal to Institute for Near East Policy. He has means to defend its military assets and enable it to mount larger strikes and written extensively on the Gaza conflict sustain them longer. It can increase the and is the co-author (with Yoram Cohen) 77 William Booth, “The U.N. Says 7 in 10 Palestinians number of mid and long range rockets of the 2009 study Hamas in Combat: The Killed in Gaza Were Civilians. Israel Disagrees,” Wash- to bring heavier fire on central and Military Performance of the Palestinian ington Post, August 29, 2014. northern Israel to increase the damage Islamic Resistance Movement, published 78 See Judi Rudoren, “Civilian or Not? New Fight in Tal- and disruption in that region. It can by The Washington Institute for Near East lying the Dead From the Gaza Conflict,” New York Times, also attempt to improve the accuracy Policy. August 5, 2014. and destructiveness of its rockets. Its 79 These numbers can be manipulated to attract media leader, Khaled Meshaal, has noted attention as well. Even if later corrections to casualty counts occur, powerful and lasting impressions of civil- 80 “Hamas Seeks Chinese C-802 Antiship Missiles from 81 Michael Isikoff, “Hamas Leader: Don’t Compare Us to ian deaths will remain. ,” Free Republic, January 29, 2014. ISIL,” Yahoo News, August 22, 2014.

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