SEPTEMBER 2014 . VOL 7. ISSUE 9 The Combat Performance a clear improvement in performance of medium range and dozens of long since the Hamas-Israel war in 2009.5 range systems capable of reaching as of Hamas in the Gaza War far as Haifa in northern Israel.9 Hamas’ of 2014 Nevertheless, Hamas also showed rocket forces were well prepared for the weaknesses within its military forces. campaign, with a system of underground By Jeffrey White Its rocket offensive, while disrupting launchers spread across Gaza and the life in Israel, and especially in southern means of moving rockets and rocket in its war with israel in the Israel, caused few casualties and little squads to launch areas under cover.10 summer of 2014, Hamas displayed damage. Its offensive tunnel system, a wide range of combat capabilities, while allowing infiltration inside Israel, Hamas expended considerable effort including new offensive and defensive did not lead to successful penetration into the build-up of its ground tactics.1 Hamas’ evolution on the of the border defense system, except forces. These forces were to be battlefield presented serious challenges perhaps in one case.6 Despite the employed offensively against Israel to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and, defensive tunnel system, Israeli forces and defensively to prevent deep when combined with Israeli operations, caused extensive damage to Hamas’ penetrations into Gaza by Israeli made the conflict the most costly in military infrastructure.7 Hamas’ ground ground forces. Hamas organized the terms of casualties and damage to Gaza forces, notwithstanding their upgrades, defensive battlefield by deploying since Hamas seized power in 2007.2 were unable to prevent IDF ground dense systems of improvised explosive operations. devices (IEDs)11 and converting Hamas once again demonstrated that it civilian areas to defensive localities.12 It is a learning organization. It studies its This article reviews Hamas’ deployed modern anti-tank forces, mortar experience in battle, develops lessons, preparations for battle, its offensive units, and snipers to support ground and incorporates them into its combat and defensive operations, the group’s operations. doctrine, forces, and operations.3 It lessons learned, and the likely plays down the effects of Israeli actions contours of the next conflict. It finds Tunnels were the third major component publicly, does not admit losses or that Hamas conducted significant of Hamas’ war preparations.13 Tunnels mistakes, and presents a face of victory. offensive and defensive operations, offered cover and concealment for Inside the organization, however, Hamas absorbed intense attacks from the IDF, infrastructure, command functions engages in a serious learning process.4 and emerged with reduced but still and commanders, forces, weapons Major improvements by Hamas in its intact military capabilities. Hamas and ammunition. They were integral latest war with Israel included: enhanced will study the lessons learned from this to rocket operations, increasing the range and numbers of rockets, improved conflict to better prepare for its next difficulty for Israel in finding launch protection of its military infrastructure military confrontation with Israel. positions and launchers, and allowing from Israeli attack, a system of offensive launch teams a chance to escape and defensive tunnels, and increased Hamas’ Preparations for Battle Israeli strikes. Communications and effectiveness and cohesion of its Hamas prepared for an asymmetric defensive tunnels enabled movement ground combat forces. Taken together, conflict with Israel. The group’s on the battlefield and for fighting from these improvements allowed Hamas to preparation focused on three principle protected positions. They supported conduct sustained strikes deep inside elements: rocket forces, ground forces, offensive infiltration operations and Israel, even while under siege from and the tunnel system. defensive tactical maneuver. Israeli military operations, to conduct offensive ground actions inside Israel By July 2014, Hamas’ arsenal was In addition, much of Hamas’ military and to present significant opposition estimated at approximately 6,000 infrastructure was embedded in to Israel’s ground incursion. This was rockets,8 consisting primarily of short civilian areas of Gaza.14 This created range weapons, but with hundreds in effect a “human dome,” reducing or 1 This paper focuses on Hamas’ military operations and complicating Israel’s willingness and tactics. There are a number of other Palestinian organi- 5 An unnamed Israeli intelligence officer admitted that zations in the Gaza Strip with substantial military forces while nothing Hamas did in the war was a surprise, the 9 IDF estimates for the Hamas rocket arsenal in July and capabilities, and with whom Hamas cooperated resilience of the organization was surprising. See Isabel 2014 were: 3,900 short range systems, more than 1,600 during the conflict. See Asmaa al-Ghoul, “Gaza’s Armed Kershner, “Israel Says Hamas Is Hurt Significantly,”New medium range systems, and several dozen long range Factions Coordinate Response to Israeli Attacks,” al- York Times, September 2, 2014. systems. See ibid. Monitor, July 7, 2014. 6 This was the attack on the security post at Nahal Oz 10 Christa Case Bryant, “Hamas Unveils Bigger, Better 2 “Scale of Gaza Destruction Unprecedented, Rehabilita- on July 28, 2014, in which five Israeli soldiers were killed Rocket Arsenal Against Israel,” Christian Science Monitor, tion Will Cost $7.8 Billion, PA Says,” Reuters, September and the Hamas squad escaped back into Gaza. See Elad July 9, 2014. 4, 2014. Benari and Gil Ronen, “Five Soldiers Killed During At- 11 “Hamas Booby Traps Palestinian Houses,” IDF Blog, 3 Amos Yadlin, “Dealing With Hamas’ Military Force tempted Infiltration,” Israel National News, July 29, July 27, 2014. Reconstruction,” The Institute for National Security 2014. 12 “New Declassified Report Exposes Hamas Human Studies, September 11, 2014. 7 Yadlin. Shield Policy,” IDF Blog, August 20, 2014. 4 Yoram Cohen and Jeffrey White, “Hamas in Combat: 8 Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other Palestinian combat 13 Shlomi Eldar, “Gaza Tunnels Take IDF by Surprise,” The Military Performance of the Palestinian Islamic Re- groups had their own rocket arsenals. See “Special Re- al-Monitor, July 20, 2014. sistance Movement,” The Washington Institute for Near port: The Deadly Rocket Arsenal of Hamas,” Israel De- 14 “New Declassified Report Exposes Hamas Human East Policy, October 2009, p. 22. fense Forces, July 10, 2014. Shield Policy,” IDF Blog, August 20, 2014. 9 SEPTEMBER 2014 . VOL 7. ISSUE 9 ability to strike them and providing a • 185 - M75 (mid-range) Offensive tunnels constituted the measure of protection.15 • 64 - M55/Fajr 5 (mid-range) second major offensive capability of • 3344 - Grad/Qassam/Katyusha/ Hamas. The IDF discovered 32 offensive Offensive Operations mortar (short-range) tunnels in the course of operations.29 Hamas had two main offensive forces Fourteen reportedly reached into Israel in the conflict: rocket units and These numbers demonstrate that the and two more had exits within 500 ground combat forces. Hamas also had bulk of rocket strikes fell on southern meters of the Israeli border.30 These a naval unit for sea-borne infiltration Israel, although 271 rockets were tunnels were designed to allow Hamas operations.16 Israeli reports indicated directed at central Israel. Hamas was assault squads to penetrate Israeli that Hamas had even prepared a able to modulate firing as it deemed border defenses without detection and unit equipped with paragliders for necessary and launched salvo attacks to attack targets inside Israel with the operations inside Israel.17 Hamas on numerous occasions.22 According to advantage of surprise. According to employed nearly all types of its one Israeli account: “Analysis of the Israeli information, each tunnel was offensive forces in the conflict.18 fighting indicates that rocket fire is under the control of a Hamas battalion, proceeding according to preset plans, responsible for its digging and probably For the first 10 days of the war, the with every local commander knowing operations during wartime.31 focus was on rocket operations. Despite how many to launch, where to direct intensive efforts by the Israeli Air them and at what time each day. This Hamas assault squads were relatively Force (IAF), rocket strikes continued decentralized method allows Hamas small32 but heavily armed, carrying throughout the war, including salvo to continue firing even under intense rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), light firing and targeting deep into Israel. pressure by the IDF.”23 machine guns, assault rifles, and hand Even as the final cease-fire approached, grenades. Hamas personnel in some Hamas was able to fire large quantities Nevertheless, Israeli active (Iron Dome) cases wore IDF uniforms to increase of rockets.19 For the Palestinians, the and passive (civil defense) measures confusion and hesitation on the part ability to keep Israel under threat and limited the overall impact of the rocket of IDF soldiers.33 Offensive tunnels disrupt day-to-day life were major offensive. Iron Dome intercepted sometimes also contained equipment accomplishments, with the single most 735 of the rockets fired at Israel that for hostage taking34 (plastic handcuffs, dramatic success being the temporary were identified as threats.24 Israel’s anesthetics), and in one case three interruption of air traffic to Ben Gurion