From Cast Lead to Protective Edge Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza Raphael S. Cohen, David E. Johnson, David E. Thaler, Brenna Allen, Elizabeth M. Bartels, James Cahill, Shira Efron C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1888 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9787-3 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover photos (clockwise): Nir Elias/Reuters; Amir Cohen/Reuters; Abu Mustafa/Reuters; Tsafrir Abayov/AP Photo Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report examines the Israel Defense Forces operations in Gaza from the end of Operation Cast Lead in 2009 through Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 to Operation Protective Edge in 2014. Drawing on a mixture of primary and secondary sources and extensive interviews, this report tells the history of Israel’s campaign and details Israeli efforts to adapt to hybrid adversaries in complex urban terrain. The report then extracts the relevant lessons from the Israeli experience for the U.S. Army and the joint force at large. This report speaks to multiple audiences. More directly, its find- ings should interest students of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East. This report, however, also wrestles with broader operational and strategic issues, and its conclusions should interest functional experts as well, specifically those interested in urban warfare, lawfare,1 and the ability of states to deter nonstate actors. This research was sponsored by the Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office, G-8, Headquarters, Department of the Army, and con- ducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Cor- poration, is a federally funded research and development center spon- sored by the U.S. Army. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is RAN157307. 1 Lawfare—or the combination of law and warfare—describes the exploitation of and adherence to national and international law to conduct warfare. iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures and Table ................................................................ ix Summary .......................................................................... xi Acknowledgments .............................................................. xix CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 A Short History of the Long Tradition of American-Israeli Military Learning ........................................................................ 2 Scope, Methodology, and Structure of the Report ............................. 8 CHAPTER TWO Israel in Gaza: A Brief Background ..........................................11 Emergence of Palestinian Armed Opposition to Israel and the 1967 War ......................................................................13 The First Intifada and the Emergence of Hamas ..............................15 The Second Intifada ...............................................................18 Israel’s Withdrawal from Gaza ................................................. 20 Conflict Between Hamas and Fatah ........................................... 22 Israel’s First Gaza War: Operation Cast Lead ................................ 24 CHAPTER THREE Operation Pillar of Defense, 2012 ........................................... 27 The Road to War: Internal Rivalries and Regional Turmoil ................ 28 How the Campaign Unfolded ..................................................37 The Campaign Ends Quickly Without Use of Ground Maneuver......... 60 Key Lessons from Operation Pillar of Defense ................................62 v vi From Cast Lead to Protective Edge: Lessons From Israel’s Wars in Gaza CHAPTER FOUR Operation Protective Edge, 2014 .............................................69 The Road to War ..................................................................70 Planning for Operation Protective Edge: An Imperfect Process ............83 Organizing for War ...............................................................85 Mobilization and Deployment ................................................. 88 Phase I: The Air Campaign (July 8–16) ....................................... 90 Phase II: The Ground Campaign (July 17–August 4) ....................... 96 Phase III: The Illusive Cease-Fire (August 5–26) ........................... 122 Aftermath of the Conflict ...................................................... 124 CHAPTER FIVE Protective Edge’s Other Fronts .............................................. 129 Iron Dome and the Counter-Rocket Fight During Operation Protective Edge ............................................................. 129 The Intelligence Fight: Strategic Versus Tactical Trade-Off? .............. 139 The Cyber Fight: Protective Edge’s Silent War .............................. 141 The Legal Wars: Balancing Targeting and Collateral Damage ............ 143 CHAPTER SIX Lessons of Israel’s Experience in Protective Edge ....................... 149 Victory Sensitivity Dominates Casualty Sensitivity ........................ 149 Understanding Hybrid Actors and the Broader Strategic Environment Is Vital ...................................................... 151 Lawfare Is Here to Stay ......................................................... 152 Precision Firepower Has Significant Limitations ............................ 156 CAS and ISR Coordination with Ground Forces Are Improving......... 158 Tunnels Remain an Unsolved Tactical Problem, but Perhaps Not a Strategic Threat ............................................................. 160 Reserve Component Proves Its Worth ........................................ 162 The IDF Still Wrestles with Other Organizational Challenges ........... 163 Iron Dome Is Effective . For Now ......................................... 165 Armored Vehicles Remains Key to Urban Combat ......................... 167 Active Protection Systems Are Effective and Produce Indirect Benefits .... 169 Conclusion ....................................................................... 170 Contents vii CHAPTER SEVEN Recommendations for the U.S. Army and the Joint Force ............. 171 What Lessons May Not Apply ................................................ 171 What the United States Should Learn from Protective Edge .............. 176 Recommendations for the U.S. Army and the Joint Force ................. 186 Final Thoughts .................................................................. 189 Abbreviations ................................................................... 193 References ....................................................................... 195 Figures and Table Figures 2.1. Aerial View of the Gaza Strip ......................................12 2.2. Fortifications Along the Israel-Gaza Border ......................19 3.1. Rocket Ranges from Gaza into Israel During Pillar of Defense ................................................................51 4.1. Monthly Distribution of Rocket and Mortar Attacks from Gaza into Israel, 2012–2013 ................................71 4.2. U.S. Ambassador to Israel Dan Shapiro Visits an Offensive Tunnel from Gaza in Kibbutz Ein HaShlosha, October 17, 2013 .....................................................76 4.3. Tunnel Fight ......................................................... 77 4.4. Attacks from Gaza Against Israel, First Six Months of 2014 ....79 4.5. IDF Task Organization ............................................ 86 4.6. IDF Disposition Around Gaza .....................................89 4.7. Damage Assessment in Gaza ...................................... 98 4.8. Shuja’iya ............................................................. 102 4.9. Shuja’iya Tunnel Fight ............................................ 103 4.10. Destruction in Shuja’iya .......................................... 109 5.1. Rocket Ranges from Gaza into Israel During Protective Edge ................................................................. 131 5.2. Daily Number of Rocket and Mortar Attacks from Gaza During Operation Protective Edge .............................. 134 Table 4.1. Operation Protective Edge Cease-Fires ......................... 121 ix Summary For more than a decade, Israel has