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Inside Gaza: the Challenge of Clans and Families

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Inside Gaza: the Challenge of Clans and Families INSIDE GAZA: THE CHALLENGE OF CLANS AND FAMILIES Middle East Report N°71 – 20 December 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE ............................................... 1 II. THE CHANGING FORTUNES OF KINSHIP NETWORKS................................... 2 A. THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND CLAN POLITICS .............................................................2 B. THE 2000 UPRISING AND THE RISE OF CLAN POWER.............................................................3 C. ISRAEL’S GAZA DISENGAGEMENT AND FACTIONAL CONFLICT..............................................3 D. BETWEEN THE 2006 ELECTIONS AND HAMAS’S 2007 SEIZURE OF POWER.............................5 III. KINSHIP NETWORKS IN OPERATION .................................................................. 6 A. ECONOMIC SUPPORT .............................................................................................................6 B. FEUDS AND INFORMAL JUSTICE.............................................................................................7 C. POLITICAL AND SECURITY LEVERAGE...................................................................................9 IV. THE CLANS AND HAMAS........................................................................................ 13 A. BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND CHAOS .................................................................................13 B. HAMAS’S SEIZURE OF POWER .............................................................................................14 C. HAMAS POLICY AFTER THE TAKEOVER ...............................................................................15 V. THE CLANS AND CHALLENGES TO HAMAS RULE ......................................... 18 VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 20 APPENDICES A. MAP OF GAZA STRIP ...........................................................................................................22 B. GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................................................23 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................24 D. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ...................................................................................................................25 E. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES.........................................................27 Middle East Report N°71 20 December 2007 INSIDE GAZA: THE CHALLENGE OF CLANS AND FAMILIES EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Throughout Gaza’s history, its powerful clans and families turbulent national unity government from March to June have played a part whose importance has fluctuated with 2007, such clans established near autonomous zones with the nature of central authority but never disappeared. As their own militias and informal justice and welfare systems the Palestinian Authority (PA) gradually collapsed under – a process facilitated by Israel’s unilateral withdrawal the weight of almost a decade of renewed confrontation in 2005. with Israel, they, along with political movements and militias, filled the void. Today they are one of the most Since its takeover, Hamas has dramatically reduced the significant obstacles Hamas faces in trying to consolidate chaos. It introduced measures designed to restore stability, its authority and reinstate stability in the territory it seized banning guns, masks and roadblocks. Those steps won control of in June 2007. Although they probably lack the praise from much of the population and, under different unity or motivation to become a consistent and effective political circumstances, might even have garnered opposition, either on their own or in alliance with international support, since donors had strongly urged many Fatah, they could become more effective should popular of them in the past. The belief by some that the siege dissatisfaction with the situation in Gaza grow. There somehow will lead to Hamas’s overthrow is an illusion. The are some, as yet inconclusive, indications that Hamas Islamists in many ways have consolidated their rule, and understands this and is moderating its approach in an the collapse of the private sector has increased dependence attempt to reach an accommodation. on them. They also benefit from a substantial reservoir of popular support. It has been six months since Hamas took control of Gaza, and, despite recent suggestions of possible reconciliation Still, economic deprivation, Hamas’s virtual monopoly on talks with Fatah, the geographic split of Palestinian power and its harsh methods have generated discontent, territories risks enduring. Israel’s tightening siege and which, in the absence of alternatives, finds a principal and continued conflict between Hamas and the Ramallah- natural focal point in the clans and families. They provide based government have imposed exceptional hardship on sustenance, protection, power and patronage and have Gazans, seriously crippling the Islamists’ ability to govern shown the capacity to resist central authority whenever and fostering popular dissatisfaction. As a result, Hamas is necessary and fuel conflict whenever needed. In recent focused on more achievable priorities, including restoring months, they have lowered their profile but they have also law and order after a period of tremendous chaos. established red lines: they will neither be disarmed by Hamas nor lose control over their neighbourhoods without The role of clans and families is central to this task. Over putting up a fight. recent years, their growing influence has been a double- edged sword. By providing a social safety net to numerous For Hamas, this presents a straightforward dilemma. needy Gazans in a time of uncertainty, they helped prevent Determined to impose order and consolidate its rule, it has a total collapse, yet they simultaneously contributed to the sought to crack down on unruly clan- and family-based mounting disorder. Although they have filled the void networks – all the more so since some have rallied to resulting from the judiciary’s breakdown, they have done Fatah’s side. But facing popular dissatisfaction as well as more than most to promote lawlessness. an effective boycott from other international, regional and local forces, it cannot afford to risk blowback by pushing Many observers have likened Gaza to a failed state. A core Gazan constituencies to the sidelines. There are signs number of powerful clans have formed militias, and some – early and insufficient – that Hamas is getting the message, of their leaders have become warlords. The symbiotic recognising it has alienated important segments of the relationship between clans and rival movements (Fatah, population and acknowledging that families, with arms, Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees) escalated numbers and loyalty, are there to stay. conflict among the latter by adding the dimension of family vendetta. In the final years of Fatah’s rule and during the Inside Gaza: The Challenge of Clans and Families Crisis Group Middle East Report N°71, 20 December 2007 Page ii Ultimately, effective governance and any sustainable resolution of the crisis in Gaza will require political reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and territorial unity with the West Bank, as well as a ceasefire with Israel (including an end to the firing of rockets from Gaza and Israeli military operations) and an end to the siege. In the meantime, however, Hamas could do much to preserve order and improve ultimate prospects for stability by taking steps to cease brutal measures, broaden participation in its rule and – beginning by compensating for their losses in vendettas and factional warfare – reach a workable arrangement with Gaza’s families. Gaza/Jerusalem/Brussels, 20 December 2007 Middle East Report N°71 20 December 2007 INSIDE GAZA: THE CHALLENGE OF CLANS AND FAMILIES I. INTRODUCTION: THE DYNAMICS The 1948 war fundamentally altered Gaza’s social OF CHANGE dynamics. Within a year, the native population of some 80,000 – henceforth known as muwatinun (citizens) – was reduced to a minority by the arrival of approximately Over the past six decades, war, displacement, occupation 200,000 refugees (laji’un). The population imbalance has and conflict repeatedly have reconfigured the role and intensified over time; of the Gaza Strip’s 1.4 million current 5 influence of kinship networks in Palestinian society. These inhabitants, over three quarters are registered refugees. networks fall broadly into two categories. For the 75 per Although most refugees stemmed from rural communities cent of the Gazan population which is sedentary (urban or where the clan system was entrenched, their networks rural) in origin, it consists of individual households (bayts) were fragmented and weakened by the chaos of war and that together form families (a’ilas) grouped together in displacement. Clans were physically dispersed; defeat and extended clans (hamulas).1 The Bedouin (badu), who trace the loss of land stripped elders of authority and a primary their roots to a (semi)-nomadic past and comprise some 25 instrument of patronage, while widespread destitution per cent of the local population, are categorised differently. reduced socio-economic inequalities.6 The United Nations The Gaza
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