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Gaza-Israel: the Legal and the Military View Transcript
Gaza-Israel: The Legal and the Military View Transcript Date: Wednesday, 7 October 2015 - 6:00PM Location: Barnard's Inn Hall 07 October 2015 Gaza-Israel: The Legal and Military View Professor Sir Geoffrey Nice QC General Sir Nick Parker For long enough commentators have usually assumed the Israel - Palestine armed conflict might be lawful, even if individual incidents on both sides attracted condemnation. But is that assumption right? May the conflict lack legality altogether, on one side or both? Have there been war crimes committed by both sides as many suggest? The 2014 Israeli – Gaza conflict (that lasted some 52 days and that was called 'Operation Protective Edge' by the Israeli Defence Force) allows a way to explore some of the underlying issues of the overall conflict. General Sir Nick Parker explains how he advised Geoffrey Nice to approach the conflict's legality and reality from a military point of view. Geoffrey Nice explains what conclusions he then reached. Were war crimes committed by either side? Introduction No human is on this earth as a volunteer; we are all created by an act of force, sometimes of violence just as the universe itself arrived by force. We do not leave the world voluntarily but often by the force of disease. As pressed men on earth we operate according to rules of nature – gravity, energy etc. – and the rules we make for ourselves but focus much attention on what to do when our rules are broken, less on how to save ourselves from ever breaking them. That thought certainly will feature in later lectures on prison and sex in this last year of my lectures as Gresham Professor of Law but is also central to this and the next lecture both on Israel and on parts of its continuing conflict with Gaza. -
CEPS Middle East & Euro-Med Project
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY WORKING PAPER NO. 9 STUDIES JUNE 2003 Searching for Solutions THE NEW WALLS AND FENCES: CONSEQUENCES FOR ISRAEL AND PALESTINE GERSHON BASKIN WITH SHARON ROSENBERG This Working Paper is published by the CEPS Middle East and Euro-Med Project. The project addresses issues of policy and strategy of the European Union in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the wider issues of EU relations with the countries of the Barcelona Process and the Arab world. Participants in the project include independent experts from the region and the European Union, as well as a core team at CEPS in Brussels led by Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci. Support for the project is gratefully acknowledged from: • Compagnia di San Paolo, Torino • Department for International Development (DFID), London. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is associated. ISBN 92-9079-436-4 Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.be) CEPS Middle East & Euro-Med Project Copyright 2003, CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies Place du Congrès 1 • B-1000 Brussels • Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 • Fax: (32.2) 219.41.41 e-mail: [email protected] • website: http://www.ceps.be THE NEW WALLS AND FENCES – CONSEQUENCES FOR ISRAEL AND PALESTINE WORKING PAPER NO. 9 OF THE CEPS MIDDLE EAST & EURO-MED PROJECT * GERSHON BASKIN WITH ** SHARON ROSENBERG ABSTRACT ood fences make good neighbours’ wrote the poet Robert Frost. Israel and Palestine are certainly not good neighbours and the question that arises is will a ‘G fence between Israel and Palestine turn them into ‘good neighbours’. -
HAMAS DIVIDED: TIME for a NEW POLICY? by Tally Helfont
Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes A Catalyst for Ideas Distributed via Email and Posted at www.fpri.org October 2010 HAMAS DIVIDED: TIME FOR A NEW POLICY? By Tally Helfont Tally Helfont is an FPRI research fellow. Her research focuses on Middle East-related issues and radical Islamic movements. She has also instructed training courses on behalf of K3 Enterprises in Civil Information Management to U.S. Military Civil Affairs Units and Human Terrain Teams assigned to Iraq and Afghanistan. September 2010 marked the beginning of renewed peace negotiations in the Middle East. The American-brokered talks took some time to restart—18-months to be exact—and its two primary participants, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, were reluctant at best. The parties met on three separate occasions: in Washington D.C. from September 1-2, in Sharm El-Sheikh from September 13-14, and at the Israeli Prime Minister's official residence in Jerusalem on September 15. It is difficult to say whether there was any tangible progress achieved during these meetings, but as it currently stands, the continuation of these efforts is uncertain, and some would even say, unlikely. The United States, on the one hand, and Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia on the other, are exerting significant diplomatic pressure to bridge the current gaps and bring the two sides back to the negotiating table. But what about those who seek to obstruct such efforts? Chief among this camp is the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas. Through numerous statements and acts of violence, Hamas seemed intent on attracting attention during this period of negotiations. -
The Humanitarian Monitor CAP Occupied Palestinian Territory Number 17 September 2007
The Humanitarian Monitor CAP occupied Palestinian territory Number 17 September 2007 Overview- Key Issues Table of Contents Update on Continued Closure of Gaza Key Issues 1 - 2 Crossings Regional Focus 3 Access and Crossings Rafah and Karni crossings remain closed after more than threemonths. Protection of Civilians 4 - 5 The movement of goods via Gaza border crossings significantly Child Protection 6-7 declined in September compared to previous months. The average Violence & Private 8-9 of 106 truckloads per day that was recorded between 19 June and Property 13 September has dropped to approximately 50 truckloads per day 10 - 11 since mid-September. Sufa crossing (usually opened 5 days a week) Access was closed for 16 days in September, including 8 days for Israeli Socio-economic 12 - 13 holidays, while Kerem Shalom was open only 14 days throughout Conditions the month. The Israeli Civil Liaison Administration reported that the Health 14 - 15 reduction of working hours was due to the Muslim holy month Food Security & 16 - 18 of Ramadan, Jewish holidays and more importantly attacks on the Agriculture crossings by Palestinian militants from inside Gaza. Water & Sanitation 19 Impact of Closure Education 20 As a result of the increased restrictions on Gaza border crossings, The Response 21 - 22 an increasing number of food items – including fruits, fresh meat and fish, frozen meat, frozen vegetables, chicken, powdered milk, dairy Sources & End Notes 23 - 26 products, beverages and cooking oil – are experiencing shortages on the local market. The World Food Programme (WFP) has also reported significant increases in the costs of these items, due to supply, paid for by deductions from overdue Palestinian tax increases in prices on the global market as well as due to restrictions revenues that Israel withholds. -
Inside Gaza: the Challenge of Clans and Families
INSIDE GAZA: THE CHALLENGE OF CLANS AND FAMILIES Middle East Report N°71 – 20 December 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE ............................................... 1 II. THE CHANGING FORTUNES OF KINSHIP NETWORKS................................... 2 A. THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND CLAN POLITICS .............................................................2 B. THE 2000 UPRISING AND THE RISE OF CLAN POWER.............................................................3 C. ISRAEL’S GAZA DISENGAGEMENT AND FACTIONAL CONFLICT..............................................3 D. BETWEEN THE 2006 ELECTIONS AND HAMAS’S 2007 SEIZURE OF POWER.............................5 III. KINSHIP NETWORKS IN OPERATION .................................................................. 6 A. ECONOMIC SUPPORT .............................................................................................................6 B. FEUDS AND INFORMAL JUSTICE.............................................................................................7 C. POLITICAL AND SECURITY LEVERAGE...................................................................................9 IV. THE CLANS AND HAMAS........................................................................................ 13 A. BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND CHAOS .................................................................................13 B. HAMAS’S SEIZURE OF POWER .............................................................................................14 -
Israel at the UN: a History of Bias and Progress - September 2013
Israel at the UN: A History of Bias and Progress - September 2013 Introduction The United Nations (UN) has long been a source of mixed feelings for the Jewish community. While the UN played a pivotal role in the creation of the State of Israel, the international body has a continuing history of a one-sided, hostile approach to Israel. After decades of bias and marginalization, recent years have brought some positive developments for Israel to the UN. Nonetheless, the UN‟s record and culture continue to demonstrate a predisposition against Israel. Israel is prevented from fully participating in the international body. Indeed, in a meeting in April 2007, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged to ADL leaders that Israel has been treated poorly at the UN and that, while some progress has been made, this bias still remains an issue. Secretary Ban stated this view publicly during his visit to Israel in August 2013. Considering the international body‟s pivotal role in the establishment of the Jewish State, there is a certain paradox that the UN is often a forum for the delegitimization of the State of Israel. In fact, the UN laid the essential groundwork for the establishment of Israel by passing UN Resolution 181 in 1947, which called for the partition of British Mandate Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. Following Israel's independence in 1948, the Jewish State became an official member-state of the international body. Since Israel‟s establishment, Arab member states of the UN have used the General Assembly (GA) as a forum for isolating and chastising Israel. -
Annual Report 2012
Consolidating the past – shaping the future A strategy for 2010-2012 Annual Report 2012 Annual Report 2012 Table of Contents Part I – Narrative Report ............................................................................................................................... 3 General Information ................................................................................................................................. 3 Short Political Brief.................................................................................................................................... 3 Progress towards strategic goals .............................................................................................................. 6 Highlights of the year, by strategic goal ................................................................................................ 6 Some Challenges and lessons learnt ..................................................................................................... 6 Part II – Detailed Activity Report................................................................................................................... 9 Strategic Goal 1: To contriBute to the development of Both a legislative environment and specific institutional policies that support, protect and empower women. .............................................................................. 9 Strategic goal 2: To contriBute to raising awareness within Palestinian society regarding gender issues and women's rights, and to comBat negative practices -
Yavne: a Jewish Case for Equality in Israel-Palestine
Yavne: A Jewish Case for Equality in Israel-Palestine https://jewishcurrents.org/yavne-a-jewish-case-for-equality-in-israel-pa... Separation wall between Israel and the West Bank near Jerusalem. Photo: Mazur Travel via Shutterstock July 7, 2020 Peter Beinart 1 sur 20 14.08.2020 à 15:39 Yavne: A Jewish Case for Equality in Israel-Palestine https://jewishcurrents.org/yavne-a-jewish-case-for-equality-in-israel-pa... 2 sur 20 14.08.2020 à 15:39 Yavne: A Jewish Case for Equality in Israel-Palestine https://jewishcurrents.org/yavne-a-jewish-case-for-equality-in-israel-pa... 3 sur 20 14.08.2020 à 15:39 Yavne: A Jewish Case for Equality in Israel-Palestine https://jewishcurrents.org/yavne-a-jewish-case-for-equality-in-israel-pa... 4 sur 20 14.08.2020 à 15:39 Yavne: A Jewish Case for Equality in Israel-Palestine https://jewishcurrents.org/yavne-a-jewish-case-for-equality-in-israel-pa... 5 sur 20 14.08.2020 à 15:39 Yavne: A Jewish Case for Equality in Israel-Palestine https://jewishcurrents.org/yavne-a-jewish-case-for-equality-in-israel-pa... 6 sur 20 14.08.2020 à 15:39 Yavne: A Jewish Case for Equality in Israel-Palestine https://jewishcurrents.org/yavne-a-jewish-case-for-equality-in-israel-pa... Ayman Odeh, a leader in the Arab-dominated Joint List, casts his vote in Haifa, Israel, on September 17th, 2019. Photo: Ariel Schalit/AP Photo 7 sur 20 14.08.2020 à 15:39 Yavne: A Jewish Case for Equality in Israel-Palestine https://jewishcurrents.org/yavne-a-jewish-case-for-equality-in-israel-pa.. -
Israel: Growing Pains at 60
Viewpoints Special Edition Israel: Growing Pains at 60 The Middle East Institute Washington, DC Middle East Institute The mission of the Middle East Institute is to promote knowledge of the Middle East in Amer- ica and strengthen understanding of the United States by the people and governments of the region. For more than 60 years, MEI has dealt with the momentous events in the Middle East — from the birth of the state of Israel to the invasion of Iraq. Today, MEI is a foremost authority on contemporary Middle East issues. It pro- vides a vital forum for honest and open debate that attracts politicians, scholars, government officials, and policy experts from the US, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. MEI enjoys wide access to political and business leaders in countries throughout the region. Along with information exchanges, facilities for research, objective analysis, and thoughtful commentary, MEI’s programs and publications help counter simplistic notions about the Middle East and America. We are at the forefront of private sector public diplomacy. Viewpoints are another MEI service to audiences interested in learning more about the complexities of issues affecting the Middle East and US rela- tions with the region. To learn more about the Middle East Institute, visit our website at http://www.mideasti.org The maps on pages 96-103 are copyright The Foundation for Middle East Peace. Our thanks to the Foundation for graciously allowing the inclusion of the maps in this publication. Cover photo in the top row, middle is © Tom Spender/IRIN, as is the photo in the bottom row, extreme left. -
Peace Between Israel and the Palestinians Appears to Be As Elusive As Ever. Following the Most Recent Collapse of American-Broke
38 REVIVING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS: HISTORICAL LES- SONS FOR THE MARCH 2015 ISRAELI ELECTIONS Elijah Jatovsky Lessons derived from the successes that led to the signing of the 1993 Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization highlight modern criteria by which a debilitated Israeli-Palestinian peace process can be revitalized. Writ- ten in the run-up to the March 2015 Israeli elections, this article examines a scenario for the emergence of a security-credentialed leadership of the Israeli Center-Left. Such leadership did not in fact emerge in this election cycle. However, should this occur in the future, this paper proposes a Plan A, whereby Israel submits a generous two-state deal to the Palestinians based roughly on that of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s offer in 2008. Should Palestinians find this offer unacceptable whether due to reservations on borders, Jerusalem or refugees, this paper proposes a Plan B by which Israel would conduct a staged, unilateral withdrawal from large areas of the West Bank to preserve the viability of a two-state solution. INTRODUCTION Peace between Israel and the Palestinians appears to be as elusive as ever. Following the most recent collapse of American-brokered negotiations in April 2014, Palestinians announced they would revert to pursuing statehood through the United Nations (UN), a move Israel vehemently opposes. A UN Security Council (UNSC) vote on some form of a proposal calling for an end to “Israeli occupation in the West Bank” by 2016 is expected later this month.1 In July 2014, a two-month war between Hamas-controlled Gaza and Israel broke out, claiming the lives of over 2,100 Gazans (this number encompassing both combatants and civilians), 66 Israeli soldiers and seven Israeli civilians—the low number of Israeli civilians credited to Israel’s sophisti- cated anti-missile Iron Dome system. -
Gaza CRISIS)P H C S Ti P P I U
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory Zikim e Karmiya s n e o il Z P m A g l in a AGCCESSA ANDZ AMOV EMENTSTRI (GAZA CRISIS)P h c s ti P P i u F a ¥ SEPTEMBER 2014 o nA P N .5 F 1 Yad Mordekhai EREZ CROSSING (BEIT HANOUN) occupied Palestinian territory: ID a As-Siafa OPEN, six days (daytime) a B?week4 for B?3the4 movement d Governorates e e of international workers and limited number of y h s a b R authorized Palestinians including aid workers, medical, P r 2 e A humanitarian cases, businessmen and aid workers. Jenin d 1 e 0 Netiv ha-Asara P c 2 P Tubas r Tulkarm r fo e S P Al Attarta Temporary Wastewater P n b Treatment Lagoons Qalqiliya Nablus Erez Crossing E Ghaboon m Hai Al Amal r Fado's 4 e B? (Beit Hanoun) Salfit t e P P v i Al Qaraya al Badawiya i v P! W e s t R n m (Umm An-Naser) n i o » B a n k a North Gaza º Al Jam'ia ¹¹ M E D I TER RAN EAN Hatabiyya Ramallah da Jericho d L N n r n r KJ S E A ee o Beit Lahia D P o o J g Wastewater Ed t Al Salateen Beit Lahiya h 5 Al Kur'a J a 9 P l D n Treatment Plant D D D D 9 ) D s As Sultan D 1 2 El Khamsa D " Sa D e J D D l i D 0 D s i D D 0 D D d D D m 2 9 Abedl Hamaid D D r D D l D D o s D D a t D D c Jerusalem D D c n P a D D c h D D i t D D s e P! D D A u P 0 D D D e D D D a l m d D D o i t D D l i " D D n . -
Gaza Violence: Hamas's Tragic Mistake | the Washington Institute
MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds Gaza Violence: Hamas's Tragic Mistake Nov 20, 2012 Articles & Testimony Hamas and its new Egyptian supporters have to learn once and for all that firing rockets on Israel's civilian population is unacceptable. he latest actions against Hamas in Gaza -- that began with the killing of its military leader Ahmed Jabari -- T should come as a surprise to no one. Even though it was not reported in great detail in the international media, since the beginning of 2012, 450 rockets have been launched from Gaza into the adjoining Israeli communities, with the town of Sderot the most vulnerable of all. It should also be recalled that since Operation Cast Lead in 2008 -- whose objective was also to halt Hamas rocket attacks on Israel -- Hamas has launched more than 1,500 missiles at Israel, or an average of about 500 per year. The current bloody encounter did not have to happen and comes as a deep disappointment to people of goodwill on both sides of the Israeli and Palestinian divide. To understand the true tragedy of the moment we need to look back to the summer of 2005 when Israel evacuated all of its settlements and military installations from the Gaza Strip and turned the territory over to the Palestinian Authority as part of the policy of "Disengagement." At the time, polls showed that a majority of Israelis supported disengagement, despite the anguish of dislocating citizens from their homes as well as the deep political struggle that this engendered. It was assumed that the transfer of the territory to the Palestinians, even if unilateral, would finally bring about a period of quiet to the south of Israel and the transformation of the Gaza Strip into a productive economy.