Insights from the Second Lebanon War
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This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. All Glory Is Fleeting Insights from the Second Lebanon War Russell W. Glenn Prepared for the United States Joint Forces Command Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Joint Forces Command Joint Urban Operations Office. The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H- 06-C-0002. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R ® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2012 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/ permissions.html). Published 2012 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface On July 12, 2006, Hizballah attacked two Israeli Army vehicles during a raid along the Lebanon-Israel border. Three soldiers were killed, and another three were wounded while the raiders captured two others. Subsequent military operations were costly to antagonists and innocents alike prior to UN Security Council resolution 1701 halt- ing combat operations on August 14 (UNSC, 2006). Debates over the relative advantages that the adversaries gained aside, Israel’s military looked back on the war with recognition that there was need for con- siderable improvement of its capabilities. This book draws on insights provided during firsthand interviews with serving and former mem- bers of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), as well as available literature, to identify the source of that nation’s concerns and contemplate what these observations offer in the way of lessons for today’s militaries and their political masters. This document will be of interest to individuals in the govern- ment, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organiza- tions, and the commercial and academic sectors whose responsibili- ties include the study, planning, policy, doctrine, training, support, or conduct of insurgencies or counterinsurgencies in both the immediate future and longer term. This research was sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Urban Operations Office and conducted within the Interna- tional Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and develop- ment center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. iii iv All Glory Is Fleeting: Insights from the Second Lebanon War For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp.html or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page). Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figure .............................................................................. ix Summary .......................................................................... xi Acknowledgments .............................................................. xix Abbreviations .................................................................... xxi CHAPTER ONE Introduction and Background ................................................. 1 Preliminary Notes .................................................................. 1 Historical Overview ............................................................... 2 Book Structure ....................................................................12 CHAPTER TWO Israeli Postwar Analysis and Reaction .......................................15 Inappropriate National Defense Strategy and Failure to Update Campaign Plans ..............................................................16 Confusion Surrounding New Military Concepts and Doctrine ............19 Preoccupation with Intifada-Type Operations to the Neglect of Warfighting Skills ........................................................... 23 Inadequate Synchronization of Joint and Combined Arms Capabilities................................................................... 26 Excessive Concern Regarding IDF Casualties ................................ 28 Unrealistic Intelligence Expectations and Problems with Providing Intelligence of Use to the Field .................................31 CHAPTER THREE Responding to the Lessons: IDF Reactions in the Aftermath of the Second Lebanon War ..............................................35 v vi All Glory Is Fleeting: Insights from the Second Lebanon War CHAPTER FOUR Additional Thoughts Regarding Lessons from the Second Lebanon War ............................................................... 43 Misreading the Means and Ends Relationship ............................... 44 Misunderstanding the Nature of the Conflict ................................ 50 Implications for Israel’s Application of the Operational Art . and for Operational Art Generally .........................................59 Center of Gravity: A Fundamental Issue .....................................59 Orchestrating Operations at the Three Levels of War ......................62 Surrendering Without a Fight: Giving Up in the Shaping War .......... 64 Other Lessons .....................................................................65 CHAPTER FIVE Revalidations and New Considerations: Implications for the United States and Other Nations ........................................67 Revisiting Old Lessons ...........................................................69 Clarity and Simplicity Are Essential to Military Thinking and the Guidance That Comes from That Thinking .......................69 There Is a Need to Broaden Understanding of What Constitutes an Insurgency ................................................72 Militaries Must Be Capable of Operating Across the Spectrum of Conflict ..................................................................73 Joint Operations Remain Essential ...........................................76 Leaders Need Training, Too .................................................. 77 Virtually Every Moment of Every Day Is a Training Opportunity ................................................................78 Appropriate Location of Leaders on the Battlefield .........................78 Military and Political Leaders at the Senior Levels Require Educating No Less Than Do Those at Lower Echelons ...............79 It Is Important Not to Overreact to Failure ................................ 80 Know Thy Enemy; Know What Thy Enemy Knows of You ............. 80 Contents vii Less Familiar Lessons .............................................................81 Intelligence Boundaries Differ from National Boundaries ................82 Balancing Casualty and Other Concerns ....................................83