The Evolution of the Revolution

THE CHANGING NATURE OF ’S

KENNETH M. POLLACK MARCH 2020

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Executive Summary

ince the earliest days after the 1979 Islamic Soleimani in January 2020 could significantly impede S Revolution, the Iranian regime has sought to build further progress. a coalition across the to help it achieve its As it stands currently, the Axis is comprised of ideological and geostrategic goals. understood both state and non-state actors. These groups include that its ability to secure the Islamic Republic in Iran, , , the Popular Front for the Liber- overturn the regional status quo, drive out the United ation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC), States, and make Iran the regional hegemon was lim- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and occasionally the ited if it acted on its own. It could only succeed with Kurdistan Workers’ Party. State and quasi-state actors the help of others. openly aligned with Tehran include Hamas in Gaza, However, for the next two decades, the Axis was , Hezbollah in , , and the Houthis little more than rhetoric, ascribing greater unity in . of effort to an amalgam of states,semi-states , and Ultimately, the new operating method of Iran’s non-state actors than was ever the reality. It was pri- Axis of Resistance is a strategy born of necessity. It marily a psychological ploy to frighten its adversaries is a strategy of the weak, unlikely to succeed against and make its members feel less isolated in the face the strong except when they are badly constrained of American hostility. However, the Axis today has by politics, diplomacy, or other exogenous factors. evolved into an increasingly cohesive coalition func- Thousands of Afghan and Iraqi militiamen will not tioning more directly under Iranian guidance. enable Iran to hold off an American armored force, Events in the Middle East over the past five to six nor will it allow them to conquer . In the con- years, most of them unanticipated and unwelcome text of the new Middle Eastern cold war, it is a clever to the Axis members, forged a greater integration approach to waging long-term, low-intensity strug- of their activities under the stewardship of former gles at low cost. By itself, it will not overcome those Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds with the ability and willingness to escalate to more Force Commander Qassem Soleimani. Guided by his potent forms of warfare. leadership, the Axis moved from largely covert terror- The challenges that Iran and its Axis pose to the ist collusion, funding, intelligence sharing, rhetori- region raise crucial questions for the future of Ameri- cal support, and tacit diplomacy to increasingly overt can leadership in the Middle East. The Trump admin- force deployments, joint military operations, eco- istration’s policy toward the region can be described nomic assistance, deterrence, and alliance solidarity. as a seesaw wavering between retrenchment and This reflects a meaningful change in the Axis’ func- reengagement. Whichever approach wins out, this tioning, capabilities, and potential threat toward the report informs those with interest about the future of United States and its allies. Nevertheless, the Axis is US policy in the Middle East, the region broadly, and hardly a well-oiled machine; there is still considerable the obstacles that Iran’s Axis of Resistance face mov- friction among its component parts, and the death of ing forward into the future.

1 The Evolution of the Revolution

THE CHANGING NATURE OF IRAN’S AXIS OF RESISTANCE

Kenneth M. Pollack

ince the earliest days after the 1979 revolution, amalgam of states, semi-states, and non-state actors S the Iranian regime has sought to build a coalition than was ever the reality. It was largely a psycholog- across the Middle East to help it achieve its ideologi- ical ploy to frighten their adversaries and make its cal and geostrategic goals. Tehran understood that its members feel less isolated in the face of American ability to secure the Islamic Republic in Iran, overturn hostility. Today, the Axis is comprised of an increas- the regional status quo, drive out the United States, ingly cohesive coalition of groups functioning more overthrow America’s Middle Eastern allies, obliterate directly under Iranian guidance. the state of Israel, and make Iran the regional hege- Of greatest importance, in the past decade, coop- mon was limited if it acted on its own. It could only eration among the Axis of Resistance has grown from succeed with the help of others. largely covert terrorist collusion, funding, intelligence Thus, beginning in the 1980s, Iran began to cul- sharing, rhetorical support, and tacit diplomacy to tivate other like-minded groups and states to try to increasingly overt force deployments, joint military weld them into a more unified alliance pursuing a operations, economic assistance, deterrence, and common set of goals—Tehran’s goals, as best as Iran alliance solidarity. They went from a pickup basket- could persuade them. Like in a bad superhero movie, ball team where the players showed up when and if thus was the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” born. they could and played all over the court in whatever And as if it leapt from the laptop of a bad screenwriter, style they liked to a semi-pro team with regular prac- through the mistakes and inactions of the heroes, this tices, assigned positions, set plays, and a coach call- league of villains has grown stronger over time, to the ing the shots. point where it threatens American interests in a way This reflects a meaningful change in the Axis’ func- it has not before. tioning, capabilities, and potential threat toward the In particular, there has been an important shift United States and its allies. Nevertheless, the Axis is in the Axis of Resistance, especially over the past hardly a well-oiled machine; there is still considerable five to six years. Events in the Middle East, most of friction among its component parts, and the death of them unanticipated and unwelcome to the Axis mem- Soleimani in January 2020 could significantly impede bers, forged a greater integration of their activities further progress. under the stewardship of former Islamic Revolution- ary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Qassem Soleimani. A History of Violence For the first two to three decades after the , the Axis was little more than Although the name “Axis of Resistance” did not rhetoric, ascribing greater unity of effort to an appear until after 9/11, the concept existed well before.

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During the Iran-, when Iran desperately to help one another out when doing so was conve- needed military, diplomatic, and economic assistance, nient, low cost, and low risk. it sought out allies across the region and touted them Not surprisingly, most of its activities were con- in its propaganda as a way of appearing less isolated. ducted covertly, in the intelligence and terrorism It is impossible to know how much of this was meant realms. The Axis members exchanged tips, weapons, to try to deter further attacks against Iran and how explosives, and informants. They may even have con- much was to buoy its own people’s morale. ducted terrorist operations on behalf of one another Those typically named included Libya, , from time to time. For instance, there is evidence that and Syria, along with a smattering of non-state ter- the Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 was a rorist groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Popular Libyan operation conducted on behalf of the Iranians Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Com- as revenge for the accidental shoot down of Iran Air mand (PFLP-GC), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Flight 655 in 1988.1 and occasionally the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. These Over time, however, the grouping went through states and non-states had almost nothing in common a series of stages in which the composition changed, except enmity toward Israel, the United States, and the region changed, and the coalition increasingly America’s allies. came into step with Iranian goals and direction.

1996–2009: Free Agency. In the late 1990s and the early years after 9/11, the Axis of Resistance gained Consequently, the its moniker but lost most of its strength. Under Hafiz al-Assad, Syria pursued the peace process with Axis of Resistance was Israel, much to Tehran’s dismay. His son, Bashar, continued to maintain correct but distant relations not an alliance in any with Iran while endlessly flirting with domestic reform and better ties to the West, both contrary to meaningful sense. Iranian interests. In the late 1990s, Muammar Qadhafi recognized that Western sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and Any coordination or cooperation among them was the threat of military force were all getting to be too episodic and transactional at best. Each had its own much for Libya, and he began to explore a rapproche- interests, most had other enemies beyond the US and ment with the United States. As former US Assistant Israel, and all of them ranked their enemies and inter- Secretary of State for the Near East Martin Indyk ests differently. Moreover, they lived in different geo- once put it, by the time the United States accepted graphic and economic circumstances. The terrorist the Libyan overtures in 2004, “Qadhafi had been try- groups were the most eager to cooperate because they ing to surrender to us for years. We just wouldn’t let needed the most support from other members; how- him.”2 Sudan remained a staunch Iranian ally, but as ever, they also had the least ability to do so. In addition, it descended deeper into civil war, its ability to help there were real rivalries among Iran, Libya, Sudan, and the wider Axis diminished. Syria. Even Hezbollah (which was effectively mid- About the best Tehran could do during this period wifed by the IRGC) had to respect Syrian interests and was encourage and enable Palestinian terrorist groups could play Syria and Iran against each other at times. such as Hamas, PIJ, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Consequently, the Axis of Resistance was not an to mount terrorist attacks against Israel to try to alliance in any meaningful sense. It was more the derail Arab-Israeli peacemaking. While they had some description of a group of actors in the greater Middle success, the murder of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak East with some overlapping needs and a willingness Rabin by a Jewish terrorist and the self-defeating

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violence of Yasser Arafat’s own “al-Aqsa Intifada” of influence, this can easily be exaggerated. The accomplished what the Axis could not. Taliban and the various Iraqi Sunni militias, start- Iran itself faced a series of threats in these ing with al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), always detested the years, although they were wrapped up in oppor- Iranians and accepted their help only cynically. Yet tunities with benefits. In 2001, the United States Iraq’s Shi’a and, to a lesser extent, the Afghan Shi’a of invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the anti-Iranian the Hazara mostly disliked the Iranians, too. Most of Taliban, with whom Tehran had nearly gone to war the Iraqi Shi’a regarded themselves as , forced in 1998. On Iran’s other flank, in 2003 the United to accept aid from the hated Persians because none of States overthrew Saddam Husayn’s regime in Iraq, the Sunni Arab states would help them—and instead which had waged the longest conventional war of the encouraged Iraq’s Sunnis to ethnically cleanse them. 20th century against Iran. While removing Tehran’s Their relationship with Iran was largely born of two greatest threats certainly helped the Islamic this necessity. Republic, Washington then made a hash of the occu- In 2007–09, the success of the American “surge” pation of both countries, unleashing civil war in Iraq strategy effectively drove the Iranians from Iraq. and a Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. In March 2008, Iraq’s Shi’a prime minister, Nuri Americans tend to emphasize the benefits to Iran al-Maliki, decided to take on Muqtada as-Sadr’s Jaysh from these conflicts, but the Iranians initially saw al-Mahdi (JAM), Iran’s last militia ally in Iraq. Using them as potential calamities. First, they worried that mostly Sunni troops from al-Anbar who had driven with hundreds of thousands of US troops on both out AQI as part of the Sahwa, the Sunni Awaken- sides, Washington might try to pursue regime change ing, and backed by heavy American air, intelligence, in Iran, too—something that many George W. Bush and fire support, Maliki and the drove administration officials and their supporters consid- JAM from its stronghold in Basra to the delight and ered or even advocated. This is almost certainly why euphoric welcome of the city’s (Shi’a) population.3 Iran agreed to freeze its nuclear program in 2003. It is Maliki followed this with similar offensives against also why Iran encouraged its Iraqi and Afghan allies the other JAM strongholds in Amarah, Qurnah, Kut, to participate in the American efforts to build democ- Nasiriyah, and in . By 2009, JAM racies in both countries and why Tehran allowed the was driven from the country, and Iranian influence in IRGC and Ministry of Intelligence and Security to Iraq was close to nonexistent. build a massive covert network in Iraq but initially would not allow it to attack American troops. 2010–14: The Arab Spring. The fortunes of Iran Only when it became clear that the half-baked and the Axis of Resistance began to change in 2010 American reconstruction efforts in Iraq and with Iraq’s disastrous national elections. Although Afghanistan were producing chaos and failed states Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiyyah party won the most seats, the in both did Tehran switch gears and begin to support United States allowed Maliki to paralyze the politi- any and all groups vying for power in both countries. cal process for months until he was allowed to form As American military and intelligence personnel a new government.4 Moreover, the challenge to his in Iraq used to say in the 2005–07 time frame, Iran authority prompted Maliki to go after Iraq’s Sunni was putting money on every number on the roulette Arab leadership hammer and tong, driving them into wheel. It put more money on the Shi’a groups than opposition and back into the arms of Salafi extrem- the Sunni, but it wanted to make sure it won no mat- ists, this time the Islamic state (Da’ish) growing in ter whose number came up. eastern Syria. While the weapons, funding, guidance, and know- All this opened the door for Iran to rebuild its how that Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah person- influence in Iraq, especially by reviving several of its nel provided to various Iraqi groups—and more former militia clients such as Qais al-Khazali’s Asaib indirectly to the Taliban—bought a certain degree Ahl al-Haq and Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis’ Khataib

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Hezbollah. Nevertheless, these groups were relatively them into backing him. Assad then called on the small, weak, and unpopular during this period—with Iranians for aid. Tehran responded, to both bring Maliki using Asaib Ahl al-Haq in particular as an irri- Assad and his regime back more firmly into the Axis tant to Muqtada as-Sadr, who hated Khazali. of Resistance and—of greater importance—ensure Then all hell broke loose. Across the Middle East that Salafi groups fighting against his regime did not in 2011, one Arab regime after another experienced win and carry the war on into Lebanon (artificially massive popular unrest, leading to revolutions severed from Syria by the French in the eyes of most that toppled five governments (, Libya, Syria, Syrian Sunnis) and so threaten Hezbollah and the Tunisia, and Yemen) and threatened most of the rest, Lebanese Shi’a community. including Bahrain and Iraq. One of the Arab Spring’s more lasting effects was At first, the Arab Spring was a godsend to Iran. In the exacerbation of Sunni-Shi’a tensions that began 2009, the Axis of Resistance had become a joke. It this way in Syria. Before the Arab Spring and the Iraqi consisted of Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist civil war, violent conflict between Sunni and Shi’a was groups, and a few other non-state actors. Effectively more a Western projection of Catholic-Protestant every other government in the region disliked or conflict than a reality on the ground. After the Arab loathed Iran and its band of misfits. The Arab Spring Spring, the Western myth came close to reality. threatened to topple most or all of Iran’s regional Moreover, Sunni-Shi’a tensions were greatly exac- foes, and while it was unclear who would succeed to erbated by a budding Saudi-Iranian rivalry. In this, those thrones, the chaos created both opportunities the Saudis liked to play up the religious aspects for Tehran to try to influence the outcomes and an because it was useful to them as the champion of expectation that whoever took power could not pos- 1.2 billion Sunni Muslims against barely 200 mil- sibly be as anti-Iranian as their predecessors. lion Shi’a. However, it was arguably driven more by the fiercerArab-Persian schism, with a layer of tra- ditional great-power rivalry on top. The more the Saudis opposed Iran, demanded the Middle East One of the Arab Spring’s choose a side, and treated Shi’a groups and govern- ments as inevitable allies of Iran, the more they drove more lasting effects otherwise ambivalent Shi’a into the Iranian camp. These events, particularly the civil wars in Syria was the exacerbation of and Iraq, thus proved crucial to the Axis of Resis- tance’s development. Beforehand, the Axis was a Sunni-Shi’a tensions that loose confederation of groups and states, coming and going as they pleased, helping each other when it was began this way in Syria. convenient to do so, but having little commitment to one another and even less formal coordination. Of equal importance, it was a strictly nonsectarian lot, But just as quickly, the Arab Spring turned on Iran with as many Sunni as Shi’a members and a number and its remaining minions. To save his power and his of secular, Marxist, and socialist participants to boot. skin, Bashar al-Assad turned a nonsectarian popular After these events, the Iranians began declar- revolt against his corrupt and incompetent regime ing for and more decidedly cultivating Shi’a groups into a sectarian civil war by convincing his own Allawi at the expense of Sunni causes, and they also com- power base and Syria’s other minorities that the upris- mitted themselves and their allies to fight in ways ing was really a Sunni-extremist pogrom. He argued they had not in the past. In particular, the deci- that if his regime were overthrown, the Salafis would sion to militarily and economically support Assad slaughter all of Syria’s non-Sunnis, which terrified against Syria’s Sunni-dominated opposition infuriated

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Sunnis across the world, forcing Hamas, PIJ, the Artesh. He convinced Hezbollah to not only send PFLP-GC, and other Sunni members of the Axis to more troops but also employ them in battles far- distance themselves from Iran—in effect, quitting or ther from the borders of Lebanon. He created the at least “suspending” their membership. Fatemiyoun militia from the 1.5 million Afghan Shi’a refugees in Iran, recruited the Zaynabiyoun mili- 2014–16: The Axis in Crisis. The key to understand- tia from Pakistan’s persecuted Shi’a minority, and ing the dramatic shift in the Axis of Resistance is the sent both to fight in Syria. He took groups of Iraqi events of 2014–16. During that period, Iran’s most Hashd militiamen, especially after the Da’ish threat important Shi’a allies were all challenged by serious had abated, and sent them to Syria as well. Finally, he threats that might have doomed them. Across the worked with Assad to convince the Russians to inter- board, Tehran chose to back them as best it could and vene in force and provide the firepower they desper- went looking for innovative ways to use its relatively ately needed to defeat the opposition’s manpower. weak resources and work within its significant con- These years also saw the explosion of the civil straints to save various Shi’a allies. war in Yemen and the Houthi seizure of the capital In June 2014, Da’ish overran nearly all of northern and most of the country. However, these gains were and western Iraq. Soleimani leapt to Iraq’s defense, then met in 2015 by a Saudi and Emirati joint mili- reportedly convincing Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani to tary counteroffensive, which pushed the Houthis out call on all Iraqis to help the Iraqi Security Forces fight of Aden and threatened their hold on Hudaydah and back. This led to the creation of the Hashd ash-Shaabi even Sanaa. The Saudi-Emirati intervention triggered militias. Iran then helped integrate the remnants of a deepening of Iranian support to the Houthis. its allied “special groups” (Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Khataib Tehran’s motive is not entirely clear: Iran may have Hezbollah, and Saraya as-Salaam), as well as the Badr seen Yemen as a low-cost way to bleed the Saudis brigades, into the Hashd and used it to rebuild their and Emiratis by bogging them down in a painful, manpower, armory, and finances. Although Da’ish fruitless conflict. Alternatively, the Iranians may was ultimately defeated in Iraq by the Iraqi Security have feared that a Saudi-Emirati victory there would Forces as part of the American-led Operation Inher- embolden them to mount similar interventions ent Resolve, early on, the Hashd were crucial in halt- elsewhere. Or both may have applied. Either way, ing the (overextended) Da’ish assault and beginning Soleimani once again began funneling them funds, to push them back in places such as Tikrit and Bayji. advanced weapons, Iranian and Hezbollah trainers Moreover, thanks to a brilliant propaganda effort, and “advisers,” and diplomatic support. In return, the Iraqis still tend to give the Hashd—and Iran—far Iranians encouraged Houthi attacks on , more credit than they deserve for stopping Da’ish. some clearly in the service of unrelated aspects of As noted above, the demographic weight of Syria’s Iranian foreign policy or the wider Axis of Resistance. Sunnis—aided enthusiastically by Saudi Arabia, Iran’s allies faced major challenges elsewhere too. Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and other Sunni Israel mounted punishing operations against Hamas states and grudgingly by the United States—resulted in Gaza in 2014. Even though Hamas had already in a dire military threat to the Assad regime by early stopped accepting Iranian weapons and cash, it was 2015. If the Allawites and other minorities crumbled still another “resistance” group in trouble. Both the in Syria, there would be little to prevent a Sunni- Da’ish successes and the American intervention cre- Salafi tidal wave from rolling into Lebanon. Iran’s key ated fears of Kurdish secession in Iraq and Syria. And problem was that the had a vast Sudan abandoned Iran for the Saudis. advantage in manpower that Tehran had to offset. In short, because Iran had lost all the countries Soleimani pulled out all the stops to help the that once shared its Axis of Resistance goals, before Assad regime. Iran sent weapons, advisers, trainers, 2014–15, Iran’s regional policy had devolved into pro- money, and even line formations from the IRGC and viding mostly covert support—typically just funding,

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weapons, intelligence, and training—to indigenous opposition strongholds, gradually regaining control groups that opposed the status quo, as personified by over most of the country for the Assad regime. Mean- Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. The mul- while, the new Trump administration kept trying to tiple crisis of 2014–15 forced Iran and the Quds Force abandon the Syrian , creating an expectation to improvise solutions lest they lose the remaining that at some point soon all of Syria would be back members of the Axis as well. That is why Iran shifted under the control of Assad and his increasingly dom- to providing mostly overt support to these groups, inant Iranian allies. including larger sums of money, more weapons, more Tehran coerced the United Arab Emirates into sophisticated weapons, the redeployment of militias withdrawing from Yemen by launching a series from one country to another to fight directly in the of attacks against Gulf oil exports, capped by the conflict, and—in extreme cases such as Syria and per- September 2019 drone attacks on Abqaiq and haps Iraq—the dispatch of Iranian regulars. Khurais, Saudi Arabia. When the US did not respond to the Iranian attacks, Abu Dhabi felt it had no choice 2017–19: Like a Phoenix from the Ashes. In the but to submit to Iran’s demands, even though it had years that followed, Iran and the Axis of Resistance come within a whisker of taking Hudaydah and cut- won a series of significant victories. ting off the Houthis from the sea. Once the Emirati ground forces pulled out, the Saudis were forced to rethink and scale back their own involvement in Yemen, all to the benefit of the Houthis and their The multiple crisis Iranian backers. None of these outcomes should be entirely of 2014–15 forced Iran attributed to the Axis of Resistance’s new camarade- rie and strategy, but that is still how many saw them. and the Quds Force to People across the Middle East and across the world viewed them as victories for Iran, its new allies, and improvise solutions lest their new way of waging war. While this may have been greatly exaggerated, the perception itself has made it they lose the remaining more of a reality. Because they believe that they won in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, the various militias of the members of the Axis new Axis and many of the communities from which they were drawn feel a greater sense of solidarity with as well. one another and with their Iranian leadership. That, in turn, has made them more willing to work together, come to one another’s assistance, and take direction Da’ish was destroyed as a conventional military from Iran. force, leaving Iraq’s Sunni community beaten down and the Shi’a triumphant. In the fall of 2017, the Iraqi The Axis of Resistance du Jour. Because of the Kurds held a referendum on independence (which crises of 2014–15 and the successful Iranian response passed overwhelmingly), only to have Soleimani orga- to them, the Axis of Resistance has changed in three nize a military operation by the Hashd and Iraqi gov- fundamental ways. ernment forces to drive the from Kirkuk. In the end, both of the main Iraqi Kurdish parties 1. Soleimani’s improvisations have created a were reduced to subservience to Baghdad and Tehran. doctrine that did not exist previously and was In Syria, the combination of Axis manpower probably never envisioned beforehand. Now and Russian firepower slowly steamrolled over that it exists, it is a playbook that the Iranians

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can and likely will employ in other situations back toward its original position of being anti–status moving forward. quo, anti-American, anti-Israeli, and anti-Saudi, but not exclusively Shi’a. 2. The Axis essentially has its own military forces that can be directed by its Iranian leadership largely as Tehran likes. There may be as many as Evidence of Collusion 100 Iranian-backed militias in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen, boasting The new solidarity and centralization of the Axis is anywhere from 50,000 to 180,000 fighters.5 evident in a wide variety of sources and activities, none of which were apparent before 2014, let alone 3. Their victories have established rickety at the Axis’ inception. but Iranian-leaning regimes in Gaza, Iraq, The clearest deepening of cooperation has been Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Not all these in the military realm. At the most obvious level, the regimes control all their territory or even their scale and sophistication of the weaponry that Iran entire government, but the Axis now con- is now providing to Axis members have grown enor- sists of far more “countries” than ever before. mously. Hezbollah has as many as 160,000 rockets Moreover, these “country” members are more and ballistic missiles, as well as C-802 anti-ship mis- closely aligned with Iran than were Libya, siles, and Iran is helping it build an infrastructure Sudan, or Syria under Hafizal-Assad . to manufacture some of these weapons itself. The Houthis, too, now have large numbers of Iranian bal- The latest major shift with the Axis of Resistance listic missiles, which they have been firing at Saudi and Soleimani’s last strategic adaptation before he Arabia, and anti-ship missiles, which they have used died was to push many of the constituent militias against vessels in the Red Sea. In 2016, the govern- of the Axis into politics.6 Hezbollah has insisted on ment of Bahrain even found a warehouse containing having a cabinet minister and is more openly domi- Iranian-origin materials that could be used to build nating the Lebanese government than ever before.7 explosively formed penetrators.10 Iran’s allies and proxies among the Hashd ferociously The idea of the Axis arguably began with the contested and rigged the 2018 elections in Iraq and 2,000 IRGC personnel sent to Lebanon to help then created the Binaa bloc, which is now one of the Lebanese Shi’a militias fight Israel (some of which two most powerful factions in the Iraqi parliament. later coalesced into Hezbollah). Thus, providing mil- In addition, at Soleimani’s direction and as part itary and terrorist training has always been a core of the drive to gain greater political power, the activity of the Axis of Resistance. However, in recent Axis members have been trying to tone down their years, Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah personnel Shi’a identity. They continue to emphasize the have been providing training across the Axis, playing Axis’ opposition to Salafi extremism—labeling it especially pronounced roles in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. takfirism—but they go to great pains to minimize Ultimately, the training component has been vastly sectarian differences. Indeed, they are trying to woo augmented—even overtaken—by the deployment of Christians, Druse, , Kurds, and even sec- combat units from Axis member groups to fight in ular groups and regimes.8 Both sides made a big the wars of other Axis members. Hezbollah combat show in July 2019 when a Hamas delegation went to formations were essential to most of the Axis’ victo- Tehran to revive their ties, and Hamas’ new Gaza ries in the . Afghan, Iraqi, and Pakistani chief, Imad al-Alami, is considered close to both Iran militiamen fought alongside Iranian IRGC and Artesh and Hezbollah.9 In this way, after the emergencies of soldiers and officers on those same battlefields. 2014–15 forced Iran to take the Axis in a more mili- Today, many Iraqis believe that thousands of tantly Shi’a direction, they are now trying to move it Afghans, Iranians, and Pakistanis have been infiltrated

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into Iraq to help Iran and its allies crush the pro- that killed Qassem Soleimani elicited bellicose lan- test movement that has helped bring Iraq’s political guage and popular protests from the Houthis and system to a grinding halt since October 2019. While even provoked them to fire three (Iranian-made) these claims cannot be substantiated from unclassi- Zelzal-1 rockets into Saudi Arabia on January 5, 2020.15 fied sources, numerous Iraqis note that many of the Command and control also appear to be increas- “security” personnel attacking the protesters wear ingly integrated in the Axis’ military operations. masks and unrecognizable, unmarked uniforms. Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah personnel often These same sources claim that many in these myste- exercise direct command over military and ter- rious bully squads speak with foreign accents or do rorist operations in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. One not speak at all. interesting example of this practice came after Meanwhile, Iran, Hezbollah, and the Assad Soleimani’s death. Rather than send Ismail Qaani or regime have been working in unison in Syria to eth- another Iranian to talk to the various Iranian-backed nically cleanse critical terrain—such as the Qusayr Iraqi Hashd leaders, Tehran instead asked Shaykh region—and repopulate these areas with both Syrian Muhammad al-Kawthrani to do so. Kawthrani is Hez- and foreign Shi’a brought in from Afghanistan, bollah’s senior officer responsible for Iraq, and he Bahrain, Iraq, Pakistan, and elsewhere.11 hosted numerous meetings with Iraqi militia com- manders and other leaders in Beirut and Tehran. In other words, the Axis members have become inte- grated enough that in their worst crisis in many Especially in the Levant, years, the Iranians felt they could send a Lebanese Hezbollah commander to take control of the Iraqi attacking one Axis Hashd. (Of course, Iraqi militia leaders from Hadi al-Ameri and Qais al-Khazali on down bristled at member now often this, indicating that the integration may not be quite as tight as Tehran would like to believe.) engenders a military Diplomatically and rhetorically, the various mem- bers of the Axis reflect this operational cooperation response from another. to a far greater extent than in the past. As a matter of routine, they support one another on issues that have nothing to do with them individually. For years, Especially in the Levant, attacking one Axis Hezbollah has threatened to retaliate against Israel member now often engenders a military response if Israel attacks Iran. Thus, Hezbollah, a junior part- from another. For instance, in February 2014, Israel ner in the Axis, is making deterrent threats on behalf struck a suspected arms convoy in Janta, Syria. of the senior partner, Iran. Likewise, after the drone Hezbollah then retaliated with attacks from the strike on Abqaiq and Khurais, Hezbollah leader , including a roadside ambush.12 called on Saudi Arabia to withdraw Likewise, in September 2019, Hezbollah retali- from Yemen: ated from Lebanon for an August Israeli strike into Syria by launching rockets at an Israeli vehicle in Continuing the war against Yemen with no solu- northern Israel.13 tion is pointless. You are starting to pay the Indeed, Hezbollah is a critical, fully integrated price. . . . One strike knocked out half the oil pro- component of Iran’s force against Israel in southern duction, and another strike, you can imagine what it Syria. When the Israel Defense Forces strike Iranian will do. . . . This attack shows the strength of the axis targets in Syria, they regularly kill both Iranian and of resistance.16 Lebanese Hezbollah personnel.14 The American strike

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Publicly, Hezbollah had nothing to do with the recognized government, one waging an all-out civil Abqaiq and Khurais attacks. Indeed, the Houthis war. Hezbollah and Hamas are proto-states responsi- publicly took credit for them. Thus, ostensibly, ble for governance, economics, and security. On the Hezbollah was backing the Houthis against Saudi other hand, PIJ and the PFLP-GC are still small ter- Arabia, and more realistically, it was conveying Iran’s rorist groups that do little more than try to kill Israelis diplomatic message to the Saudis on Tehran’s behalf. from time to time. In addition, despite Iran’s usual preference for plausible deniability, the Axis members have become increasingly open, even brazen, about their actions How Integrated Is the Axis? in support of one another. The Houthis publicly acknowledge Hezbollah and Iranian officers killed All this indicates a degree of cohesion and integra- in their military operations.17 Iraqi militias have spo- tion well beyond where the Axis began in the 1980s ken just as openly about their role in trying to estab- and ’90s. However, it is equally important not to over- lish a land corridor for the Axis from Iran, across state the Axis’ willingness or ability to act coopera- Iraq and Syria, to Lebanon. One Khataib Hezbollah tively or fight collectively. This is not NATO.21 spokesman told journalists in 2017, “Our aim is to Increasingly, because of Soleimani’s vision and the prevent any barriers from Iraq to Syria all the way to actual operations he executed, many alliance mem- Beirut. . . . The resistance is close to achieving this bers feel a greater sense of solidarity. It is more than goal.”18 Assad’s minister of information told the same the fact that they have the same enemies. They see journalists, “The aim is for a geographical connection themselves as part of a larger collective in a way they between Syria, Iraq and the axis of resistance.”19 did not in the past. In the economic realm, Iran typically provides the Some have proven willing to conduct military vast bulk of the financial support to the other Axis operations against third parties on behalf of other members, but in recent years, with American sanc- Axis members. Most will try to deter attacks on tions impinging on Tehran’s revenues, the members one another. Most will send forces to fight for one have been helping one another. According to a wide another. All of them look first to one another for variety of Iraqi and Lebanese sources, Iran’s allies assistance—military, diplomatic, economic, and in Iraq (Hashd commanders and government offi- intelligence—and have an expectation that they will cials) have been working hard to not only cover their receive at least some aid. It could be less or more own expenses through the Iraqi budget—coupled than they want, but there will be something. And it is with a healthy leavening of graft—but pump dollars typically provided out of a strong sense of loyalty, if back into Iran through currency manipulation and not outright enthusiasm. aid the Iranian economy through various forms of Of course, there is only one real nation-state in smuggling. They even try to provide some money to the bunch, Iran. It alone meets the Weberian stan- Lebanese Hezbollah to compensate for dimin- dard of sovereignty by having a monopoly of violence ished Iranian payments. Similarly, the Houthis pub- within its borders. The Houthis, Hezbollah, the Assad licly claimed to have raised $500,000 for Hezbollah, regime, and Hamas are all proto-states, semi-states, ostensibly to pay for its military presence in Yemen.20 or once-and-future states trying to gain or regain full Organizationally, a single Quds Force department sovereignty. There are also still a number of non-state (Department 2000) oversees all operations in the actors such as PIJ, PFLP-GC, the Iraqi Hashd Levant and so has responsibility for members of the ash-Shaabi, the Fatemiyoun, and the Zaynabiyoun. Axis as diverse as Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, and These differences are important. It is hard enough the PFLP-GC. These are very different entities that for full-fledged states to cooperate in an alliance. play very different roles in their societies. Even during It is harder still when the confederation includes the past eight years, the Assad regime remains a legally such a broad range of participants with such vast

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discrepancies in military, economic, and political It is all well and good for Hezbollah to threaten capacity; ability to mobilize their constituent society; to attack Israel or America if either attacked Iran; it international standing; legal rights; control of terri- would be something else entirely for them to do it. tory; and domestic challenges. Hezbollah and its Lebanese Shi’ite community could The Fatemiyoun and Zaynabiyoun are useful expe- suffer enormous damage if it inserted itself into an ditionary forces for Tehran and its allies, but they are Israeli-Iranian or US-Iranian war. While Hezbollah’s merely aggregations of Afghan and Pakistani men. leadership might believe that the destruction of Iran They certainly do not represent either Afghanistan would inevitably mean its own downfall, attacking or Pakistan, and it is unclear just how much even the Israel or the US would be an unusual, apocalyptic, and populations they were drawn from (the Afghan Shi’a irresponsible action. Even when facing the cliff, most refugee community in Iran and the Pakistani Shi’a countries have to be thrown off rather than jump will- community) stand behind them. ingly. And if this is true for Hezbollah, it would be far more so for the Houthis or Hamas.

While Hezbollah’s Why Reorient the Axis? leadership might believe Taking this one step further, because of the Axis’ recent successes, it is important not to lose sight of that the destruction of Iran the limits of its new approach. There is an inevita- ble, but dangerous, tendency to assume that success would inevitably mean its defines or derives from superiority and that what Soleimani did in reforging the Axis of Resistance in own downfall, attacking this fashion was a stroke of genius that has given Iran the ideal method for advancing its foreign policy Israel or the US would be agenda. Iran’s new approach to the Axis of Resistance has its strengths, but it also has real weaknesses. an unusual, apocalyptic, My guess is that if you told Qassem Soleimani in 2014 that he could have unlimited resources to achieve and irresponsible action. Iran’s goals in the region, what he would have asked for is not what he ultimately created. Instead, he prob- ably would have wanted several divisions of IRGC reg- Moreover, while Soleimani’s efforts to get them to ulars backed by all of Iran’s air and naval forces, plus work together and even fight on behalf of one another tens of billions of dollars for economic aid, logistical has created some solidarity, like all alliances, this one support, and bribes. That is because the Axis of Resis- is made up of individual members that will always tance as currently formulated relies on weak military have their unique interests. So far, we have not seen forces operating on something of a shoestring budget. any of these groups willing to sacrifice themselves As a result, Soleimani’s clever new scheme is still entirely for one another. They have proven themselves much slower and harder than more traditional mili- willing to take casualties; they have not proven them- tary, diplomatic, and economic strategies for pursuing selves willing to die to the last man for one another, foreign policy goals. It speaks to Soleimani’s abilities, as they presumably would for their own constituen- even genius, that he was able to employ such lim- cies and homelands. And while several are willing to ited tools to accomplish so much. Soleimani became threaten to make the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of the MacGyver of Iranian foreign policy, able to stop Iran, whether they actually would do so is unclear. an escaping villain by improvising a bazooka from a

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muffler, a cigarette lighter, and some car seat foam. its own authority and Iraqi oil revenues furnishing But it would have been so much faster and easier if he the money for the bribes that keep Iraqi politicians in had just had a rocket-propelled grenade. Tehran’s pocket. That is why it is worth pondering why Iran had to We should also ask how much the change in strat- employ this approach. Because it is decidedly not the egy was a product of internal Iranian bureaucratic pol- best—the easiest, the fastest, or the most straight- itics. By scraping together military formations entirely forward—way of achieving foreign policy goals. The within his own portfolio, Soleimani probably had far Iranians pursued it because they had to, not necessar- greater control over their strategic deployment and ily because they wanted to. Even recognizing that we tactical operations than if he had used main force may never know the real thinking of the Iranian lead- Iranian units. If he had wanted more Artesh forma- ership in this matter, considering their likely ratio- tions or even more IRGC conventional units, he would nales for doing so is still useful in trying to understand have had to request them from parts of the Iranian the potential constraints on Iran’s freedom of action, government not within his own chain of command. constraints that forced it to adopt this kind of a By the time of his death, Soleimani may have been convoluted approach. so powerful that neither the Artesh nor the rest of the First, it seems highly likely that one of the princi- Sepah would have refused him anything, but we do pal limitations the new Axis of Resistance approach not know that for a fact. And even if it became true was meant to circumvent was political. The vari- after all his successes, it may not have been true at ous protests in Iran since 2017 have demonstrated first. Indeed, it may have been those successes—and a degree of popular unhappiness with the blood and his own resourcefulness in engineering them—that treasure Tehran has committed to its foreign policy. brought him this degree of influence, if he ever had it. Soleimani’s approach to the Axis of Resistance keeps In contrast, forming up battalions of Afghan refugees those costs down. Fewer Iranians are dying in these and oppressed Pakistanis or shifting Iraqi militias wars because Tehran is instead squandering the lives from Tal Afar to Dayr az-Zawr probably lay entirely of Afghans, Iraqis, Lebanese, and Pakistanis. within his own writ. And to the extent that this was Second, money also seems to have been a con- a motive, was this merely Soleimani empire building sideration. This is neither the time nor the place to within the Iranian system, or does it reflect significant debate how much the Trump administration’s sanc- bureaucratic friction? tions are limiting Iran’s ability to wield influence To some extent, the new Axis of Resistance and support Axis of Resistance activities across the approach also preserves Iran’s plausible deniability. Middle East. The sanctions clearly are having some Working against Israel through Hezbollah, Hamas, impact, although they do not appear to have forced PIJ, the PFLP-GC, and other terrorist groups allows Iran to give up on anything it considered important. Tehran to attack the Jewish state with little fear that But Iran has not been a rich country since the days Jerusalem would retaliate directly against Iran. While of the Shah, and since then, it has always been finan- Iran had many reasons for supporting Iraqi militias cially hamstrung by international sanctions and the and insurgents in 2005–08, one of them was undoubt- horrific mismanagement of its own economy. edly that these groups could attack American troops One of the obvious virtues of Soleimani’s method in Iran with less likelihood that the US would respond is that it is cheap: Poorly armed and trained Afghan, militarily against Iran. Similarly, the new approach Iraqi, and Pakistani militias all cost less than better made it possible for Iran to direct military operations armed and trained IRGC or Artesh formations. More- in Iraq against Da’ish during 2014–18 while American over, at least some of Soleimani’s operations were troops were conducting their own parallel operations self-financing. As I noted above, it is widely believed against the same enemy. that Iranian efforts in Iraq pay for themselves, with As a final point related to Iran’s motives and the the Iraqi government funding the militias that subvert limitations that its new Axis of Resistance strategy

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was meant to avoid, a great deal of this new meth- remarkable intelligence, pragmatism, creativity, and odology may have been improvised. Although in the flexibility. They might all be lying or exaggerating, but wake of success, its authors—and the poseurs who that seems unlikely, especially since many of these inevitably claim to have been its architects—often people hated and feared Soleimani, and they repeat- insist that their accomplishments were the product edly commented on his abilities in a wide variety of of a well-crafted, deliberate design, that is not always circumstances over many years. the case. Especially in the years after 2011 when this The second is that even if Soleimani did not think new approach took shape, the Middle East was in of all or even most of the ideas that eventually came utter chaos, and Iran was struggling to react to all together to make up the new approach of the Axis the unexpected developments, some of which were of Resistance, he recognized the viability of these good for Iran and others of which were bad. Creat- ideas and was able to implement them. That alone ing the Shabiha was not Soleimani’s first move to aid would mark him out as an extremely capable and the Assad regime, and while many Iraqis insist that effective leader and manager, the kind that does not Soleimani convinced Ayatollah Sistani to create the come along frequently. As Ariane Tabatabai put it, Hashd ash-Shaabi, nothing indicates that he had the Soleimani “occupied a unique place in Iran’s security idea ahead of time and was preparing the ground for architecture and in some ways, was perhaps unparal- it before the Da’ish invasion of June 2014. leled in his ability to advance Iranian national inter- Most of these moves appear instead to have been ests as viewed by the regime.”22 Soleimani and the Quds Force making lemonade from On the other hand, all these practices are now lemons, which again is what makes it all so impres- institutionalized, and Soleimani’s death cannot tear sive. Yet that too should make us recognize that this them from the Iranian playbook. Before he died, was a clever strategy squeezed from a set of onerous Soleimani figured out the solution to Iran’s problems constraints. Those constraints are likely to continue circa 2014, devised its new doctrine for “grey zone” to limit Iran’s freedom of action in the future and con- or “hybrid” warfare, taught it to the Quds Force and stitute weaknesses that could be exploited. other members of the Axis of Resistance, and demon- strated how to make it work.23 His successors will now be able to continue to implement the ideas and The Axis of Resistance After Soleimani procedures that he devised. However, Iran may very much miss him in the future, when the next set of cri- The killing of Qassem Soleimani on January 2, 2020, ses comes along. calls into question how effective the Axis of Resis- Iran’s current means of handling the Axis of Resis- tance will be in the future. Unfortunately, we have tance and its new way of waging low-intensity con- only small bits of evidence on which to base any judg- flict represent a set of adaptations to a particular set ments, and there are several key questions that must of circumstances. It is just not clear that those same be answered for a more durable assessment. circumstances will continue to apply forever. At The first question is simply how much Soleimani some point in the future, perhaps soon, the circum- himself was responsible for these changes. It may be stances may change dramatically again, requiring fur- that he took credit for the work of one or more bril- ther refinements to these methods or an entirely new liant underlings—men and women who are likely still approach altogether. alive and part of the Quds Force. If that were the case, Without Soleimani, it is unclear how well Iran Soleimani’s death might mean relatively little. will recognize those changed circumstances or adapt However, there are several points arguing against to them. Will Ismail Qaani or another member of this idea. The first is that so many people—Afghans, the Quds Force be able to improvise a new set of Gulf Arabs, Iranians, Iraqis, Lebanese, Turks, and solutions to a different but equally dangerous set of so forth—all regularly commented on Soleimani’s crises as those that Iran and its allies faced in 2014–16?

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Again, it is entirely unclear, but when that happens, new Middle Eastern cold war, it is a clever approach Iran may sorely miss Soleimani and his exceptional to waging long-term, low-intensity struggles at low set of skills. cost. By itself, it will not overcome those with the This also reinforces the point that while the new ability and willingness to escalate to more potent solidarity and strategic doctrine of the Axis of Resis- forms of warfare. tance was a clever and successful solution to the problems that Iran and its allies faced in 2014–15, it does not necessarily represent a brilliant new way About the Author of waging war that will supplant all other ways. In truth, it is a strategy born of necessity. It is a strat- Kenneth M. Pollack is a resident scholar at the egy of the weak, unlikely to succeed against the strong American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he works except when they are badly constrained by politics, on Middle Eastern political-military affairs, focus- diplomacy, or other exogenous factors. Thousands ing in particular on Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the of Afghan and Iraqi militiamen will not allow Iran Gulf countries. He is the author of Armies of Sand: The to hold off an American armored force, nor will it Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness allow them to conquer Israel. In the context of the (Oxford University Press, 2019).

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Notes

1. See Defense Intelligence Agency, redacted report (response to a Freedom of Information Act request), https://web.archive.org/ web/20080308085805/http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Foia/panam103.pdf. 2. The quotation is from a conversation with Amb. Indyk. For his recounting of the history, see Martin S. Indyk, “The Iraq War Did Not Force Gaddafi’s Hand,”Financial Times, March 9, 2004, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-iraq-war-did-not-force- gadaffis-hand/. 3. The author was in Basra the week after the operation and debriefed all the major American and Iraqi participants. 4. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Fall and Rise and Fall of Iraq, , Saban Center for Middle East Policy, July 2013, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Pollack_Iraq.pdf; and Emma Sky, The Unravelling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq (New York: Perseus Books, 2015). 5. Seth G. Jones and Maxwell B. Markusen, “The Escalating Conflict with Hezbollah in Syria,” Center for Strategic and Interna- tional Studies, June 20, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalating-conflict-hezbollah-syria; Nader Uskowi, Temperature Rising: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and Wars in the Middle East (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2018); and Robin Wright, “Iran Entrenches Its ‘Axis of Resistance’ Across the Middle East,” New Yorker, September 20, 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/news/ our-columnists/iran-entrenches-its-axis-of-resistance-across-the-middle-east. 6. For concurring views, see Soufan Center, Iran’s Playbook: Deconstructing Tehran’s Regional Strategy, May 2019, 12, https:// thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Iran’s-Playbook-Deconstructing-Tehran’s-Regional-Strategy-by-The-Soufan- Center.pdf. 7. Firas Maksad, “Lebanon’s Halloween Government,” Foreign Policy, January 22, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/22/ lebanons-halloween-government/; and Reuters, “Hezbollah Picks Lebanon’s New Health Minister,” January 31, 2019, https://www. reuters.com/article/lebanon-government-hezbollah/hezbollah-picks-lebanons-new-health-minister-source-idUSS8N1XQ00N. 8. Payham Mohseni and Hussein Kalout, “Iran’s Axis of Resistance Rises: How It’s Forging a New Middle East,” Foreign Affairs, January 24, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2017-01-24/irans-axis-resistance-rises. 9. Tzvi Joffre, “Hamas Pursues ‘Axis of Resistance’ Alliance During Tehran Visit,”Jerusalem Post, July 24, 2019, https://www.jpost. com/Middle-East/Hamas-pursues-axis-of-resistance-alliance-during-Tehran-visit-596640. 10. Michael Knights, “Iranian EFPs in the Gulf: An Emerging Strategic Risk,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 23, 2016, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranian-efps-in-the-gulf-an-emerging-strategic-risk. 11. Hanin Ghaddar, “Hezbollah-Iran Dynamics: A Proxy, Not a Partner,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 12, 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hezbollah-iran-dynamics-a-proxy-not-a-partner. 12. Nicholas Blanford, “Though Strengthened in Syria, Hezbollah Faces Unprecedented Dangers Within,” World Politics Review, September 17, 2019, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28196/though-strengthened-in-syria-hezbollah-faces- unprecedented-dangers-within. 13. Blanford, “Though Strengthened in Syria, Hezbollah Faces Unprecedented Dangers Within”; and David M. Halbfinger, “Hezbol- lah Hits Back at Israeli Army but Without Casualties,” New York Times, September 1, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/01/ world/middleeast/hezbollah-israel-airstrike.html. 14. Blanford, “Though Strengthened in Syria, Hezbollah Faces Unprecedented Dangers Within.” 15. Ansarollah, “Three al-Zelzal Rockets Fired at the Mercenary Groupings of the Saudi Army in Asir,” January 5, 2020, https:// www.ansarollah.com/archives/306477. 16. Associated Press, “Hezbollah Tells Saudi Arabia to Stop Yemen War,” September 20, 2019, https://apnews.com/ 32ba67f739954cdf957bae3d109e2205. 17. Middle East Monitor, “Hezbollah Leaders Died in Yemen, Says Minister,” February 6, 2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/ 20200206-hezbollah-leaders-died-in-yemen-says-minister/.

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18. Bassem Mroue and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, “Iran Extends Reach with Fight for Land Link to Mediterranean,” Associated Press, August 23, 2017, https://www.apnews.com/e4f3608d718a413baf674d5373d14695. 19. Mroue and Abdul-Zahra, “Iran Extends Reach with Fight for Land Link to Mediterranean.” 20. Lizzie Porter, “Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Raise Nearly $300,000 for Hezbollah,” National, July 22, 2019, https://www.thenational.ae/ world/mena/yemen-s-houthi-rebels-raise-nearly-300-000-for-hezbollah-1.889034. 21. Of course, in some ways, they are more integrated and capable than is the NATO alliance. 22. Ariane M. Tabatabai, “After Soleimani: What’s Next for Iran’s Quds Force?,” CTC Sentinel 13, no. 1 (January 2020): 28–33, https:// ctc.usma.edu/after-soleimani-whats-next-irans-quds-force/. 23. Michael Eisenstadt, Operating in the Gray Zone: Countering Iran’s Asymmetric Way of War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus162-Eisenstadt-v3.pdf.

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