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The Evolution of the Revolution

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The Evolution of the Revolution The Evolution of the Revolution THE CHANGING NATURE OF IRAN’S AXIS OF RESISTANCE KENNETH M. POLLACK MARCH 2020 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Executive Summary ince the earliest days after the 1979 Islamic Soleimani in January 2020 could significantly impede S Revolution, the Iranian regime has sought to build further progress. a coalition across the Middle East to help it achieve its As it stands currently, the Axis is comprised of ideological and geostrategic goals. Tehran understood both state and non-state actors. These groups include that its ability to secure the Islamic Republic in Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liber- overturn the regional status quo, drive out the United ation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC), States, and make Iran the regional hegemon was lim- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and occasionally the ited if it acted on its own. It could only succeed with Kurdistan Workers’ Party. State and quasi-state actors the help of others. openly aligned with Tehran include Hamas in Gaza, However, for the next two decades, the Axis was Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria, and the Houthis little more than rhetoric, ascribing greater unity in Yemen. of effort to an amalgam of states,semi-states , and Ultimately, the new operating method of Iran’s non-state actors than was ever the reality. It was pri- Axis of Resistance is a strategy born of necessity. It marily a psychological ploy to frighten its adversaries is a strategy of the weak, unlikely to succeed against and make its members feel less isolated in the face the strong except when they are badly constrained of American hostility. However, the Axis today has by politics, diplomacy, or other exogenous factors. evolved into an increasingly cohesive coalition func- Thousands of Afghan and Iraqi militiamen will not tioning more directly under Iranian guidance. enable Iran to hold off an American armored force, Events in the Middle East over the past five to six nor will it allow them to conquer Israel. In the con- years, most of them unanticipated and unwelcome text of the new Middle Eastern cold war, it is a clever to the Axis members, forged a greater integration approach to waging long-term, low-intensity strug- of their activities under the stewardship of former gles at low cost. By itself, it will not overcome those Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds with the ability and willingness to escalate to more Force Commander Qassem Soleimani. Guided by his potent forms of warfare. leadership, the Axis moved from largely covert terror- The challenges that Iran and its Axis pose to the ist collusion, funding, intelligence sharing, rhetori- region raise crucial questions for the future of Ameri- cal support, and tacit diplomacy to increasingly overt can leadership in the Middle East. The Trump admin- force deployments, joint military operations, eco- istration’s policy toward the region can be described nomic assistance, deterrence, and alliance solidarity. as a seesaw wavering between retrenchment and This reflects a meaningful change in the Axis’ func- reengagement. Whichever approach wins out, this tioning, capabilities, and potential threat toward the report informs those with interest about the future of United States and its allies. Nevertheless, the Axis is US policy in the Middle East, the region broadly, and hardly a well-oiled machine; there is still considerable the obstacles that Iran’s Axis of Resistance face mov- friction among its component parts, and the death of ing forward into the future. 1 The Evolution of the Revolution THE CHANGING NATURE OF IRAN’S AXIS OF RESISTANCE Kenneth M. Pollack ince the earliest days after the 1979 revolution, amalgam of states, semi-states, and non-state actors S the Iranian regime has sought to build a coalition than was ever the reality. It was largely a psycholog- across the Middle East to help it achieve its ideologi- ical ploy to frighten their adversaries and make its cal and geostrategic goals. Tehran understood that its members feel less isolated in the face of American ability to secure the Islamic Republic in Iran, overturn hostility. Today, the Axis is comprised of an increas- the regional status quo, drive out the United States, ingly cohesive coalition of groups functioning more overthrow America’s Middle Eastern allies, obliterate directly under Iranian guidance. the state of Israel, and make Iran the regional hege- Of greatest importance, in the past decade, coop- mon was limited if it acted on its own. It could only eration among the Axis of Resistance has grown from succeed with the help of others. largely covert terrorist collusion, funding, intelligence Thus, beginning in the 1980s, Iran began to cul- sharing, rhetorical support, and tacit diplomacy to tivate other like-minded groups and states to try to increasingly overt force deployments, joint military weld them into a more unified alliance pursuing a operations, economic assistance, deterrence, and common set of goals—Tehran’s goals, as best as Iran alliance solidarity. They went from a pickup basket- could persuade them. Like in a bad superhero movie, ball team where the players showed up when and if thus was the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” born. they could and played all over the court in whatever And as if it leapt from the laptop of a bad screenwriter, style they liked to a semi-pro team with regular prac- through the mistakes and inactions of the heroes, this tices, assigned positions, set plays, and a coach call- league of villains has grown stronger over time, to the ing the shots. point where it threatens American interests in a way This reflects a meaningful change in the Axis’ func- it has not before. tioning, capabilities, and potential threat toward the In particular, there has been an important shift United States and its allies. Nevertheless, the Axis is in the Axis of Resistance, especially over the past hardly a well-oiled machine; there is still considerable five to six years. Events in the Middle East, most of friction among its component parts, and the death of them unanticipated and unwelcome to the Axis mem- Soleimani in January 2020 could significantly impede bers, forged a greater integration of their activities further progress. under the stewardship of former Islamic Revolution- ary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani. A History of Violence For the first two to three decades after the Iranian Revolution, the Axis was little more than Although the name “Axis of Resistance” did not rhetoric, ascribing greater unity of effort to an appear until after 9/11, the concept existed well before. 2 THE EVOLUTION OF THE REVOLUTION KENNETH M. POLLACK During the Iran-Iraq War, when Iran desperately to help one another out when doing so was conve- needed military, diplomatic, and economic assistance, nient, low cost, and low risk. it sought out allies across the region and touted them Not surprisingly, most of its activities were con- in its propaganda as a way of appearing less isolated. ducted covertly, in the intelligence and terrorism It is impossible to know how much of this was meant realms. The Axis members exchanged tips, weapons, to try to deter further attacks against Iran and how explosives, and informants. They may even have con- much was to buoy its own people’s morale. ducted terrorist operations on behalf of one another Those typically named included Libya, Sudan, from time to time. For instance, there is evidence that and Syria, along with a smattering of non-state ter- the Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 was a rorist groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Popular Libyan operation conducted on behalf of the Iranians Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Com- as revenge for the accidental shoot down of Iran Air mand (PFLP-GC), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Flight 655 in 1988.1 and occasionally the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. These Over time, however, the grouping went through states and non-states had almost nothing in common a series of stages in which the composition changed, except enmity toward Israel, the United States, and the region changed, and the coalition increasingly America’s allies. came into step with Iranian goals and direction. 1996–2009: Free Agency. In the late 1990s and the early years after 9/11, the Axis of Resistance gained Consequently, the its moniker but lost most of its strength. Under Hafiz al-Assad, Syria pursued the peace process with Axis of Resistance was Israel, much to Tehran’s dismay. His son, Bashar, continued to maintain correct but distant relations not an alliance in any with Iran while endlessly flirting with domestic reform and better ties to the West, both contrary to meaningful sense. Iranian interests. In the late 1990s, Muammar Qadhafi recognized that Western sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and Any coordination or cooperation among them was the threat of military force were all getting to be too episodic and transactional at best. Each had its own much for Libya, and he began to explore a rapproche- interests, most had other enemies beyond the US and ment with the United States. As former US Assistant Israel, and all of them ranked their enemies and inter- Secretary of State for the Near East Martin Indyk ests differently. Moreover, they lived in different geo- once put it, by the time the United States accepted graphic and economic circumstances. The terrorist the Libyan overtures in 2004, “Qadhafi had been try- groups were the most eager to cooperate because they ing to surrender to us for years. We just wouldn’t let needed the most support from other members; how- him.”2 Sudan remained a staunch Iranian ally, but as ever, they also had the least ability to do so.
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