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THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict Between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides Are Preparing for It

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THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict Between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides Are Preparing for It ANALYSIS PAPER Number 24, August 2011 THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides are Preparing for It Bilal Y. Saab Nicholas Blanford The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. Copyright © 2011 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 www.brookings.edu ANALYSIS PAPER Number 24, August 2011 THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides are Preparing for It Bilal Y. Saab Nicholas Blanford Table of Contents Executive Summary . iii Acknowledgements . vi The Authors . vii Introduction . 1 Potential Return to Arms . 3 Hizballah Prepares for War . 6 Israel Prepares for War . 14 Conclusion . 20 THE NEXT WAR The Saban Center at BROOKINGS ii Executive Summary ebanon and Israel have enjoyed a rare calm waged between them, and both sides have been in the five years since the August 14, 2006 feverishly preparing for the next war ever since the ceasefire that brought an end to that sum- last one ended. Lmer’s month-long war, the fiercest ever action waged between Hizballah and the Israel Defense Hizballah’s Posture Forces (IDF). Since the end of the 2006 war, Hizballah has under- Both sides drew sharp lessons from the 2006 conflict. gone the largest recruitment and training drive in its Despite fighting the IDF to a standstill in southern thirty-year history, swelling its ranks with dedicated Lebanon, Hizballah experienced substantial—but cadres and reviving its former multi-sectarian reserv- sustainable—losses and its “divine victory” came at a ist units. In terms of weapons procurement, Hizbal- cost. Hizballah lost its autonomy over the southern lah has focused on acquiring long-range rockets fit- border district, its battle tactics were prematurely ted with guidance systems to target a list of specific exposed, and it had to abandon the military infra- military and infrastructure sites in Israel. Hizballah structure of bunkers and firing positions that it had also is believed to have received training on more installed over the previous six years. advanced air defense systems that could pose an in- creased threat to low-flying Israeli air assets, such as Israel suffered the humiliation of underestimating helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles. its foe, and achieved none of its overly ambitious war goals. The IDF’s poor performance on multi- With the support of Iran, Hizballah has made fur- ple levels—leadership, coordination, logistics, and ther advances in its signals intelligence (SIGINT) fighting capabilities—undermined Israel’s much- and communications capabilities. Hizballah is ex- prized deterrent factor, and led to the perception pected to use these upgraded weapons and SIGINT of defeat. capabilities to play an offensive role in a future con- flict with Israel, attempting to seize the initiative, The prevailing peace along the Lebanon-Israel bor- rather than adopting the reactive and defensive der in the intervening five years is a result of both posture of 2006. Among the new battle plans being sides absorbing the costs of the 2006 war and the prepared by Hizballah are land and seaborne inser- risks inherent in another round of fighting. Yet, tions into Israel to carry out commando-style raids. although this is the longest period of tranquility Given the range of the missiles in Hizballah’s pos- along the traditionally volatile frontier since the late session, the battlespace in the next war will likely 1960s, the calm remains precarious and could be be larger than the traditional theater of southern shattered at any time. Neither Hizballah nor Israel Lebanon and northern Israel, encompassing large believes that the 2006 conflict will be the last battle portions of both countries. THE NEXT WAR The Saban Center at BROOKINGS iii The war preparations notwithstanding, Hizballah simulates a variety of Lebanese villages, towns, and does not seek nor want another conflict with Isra- refugee camps . el at this time . Its strategy is based on deterrence, striking a “balance of terror” with Israel through a The IDF has also introduced a number of new tech- concept of reciprocity . In a series of speeches in the nologies that it is expected to use in any new conflict past three years, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbal- with Hizballah . These include a multi-tiered missile lah’s leader, has warned Israel that it has the ability to defense shield to intercept and destroy both Hizbal- inflict devastating blows against Israel on land and lah’s short-range and long-range weapons and Iran’s at sea in response to an Israeli attack on Lebanon . ballistic missiles . Also, all new tanks are now fitted with the Trophy defense system to protect against Despite Hizballah’s jihadist instincts and ideological anti-armor projectiles . How these new systems cope opposition to the Jewish state, it is beholden to two in a war situation, and with Hizballah’s rocket bar- sometimes conflicting interests that have compelled rages and anti-armor tactics remains to be seen . it to honor the 2006 cessation of hostilities . First, Hizballah serves as a deterrent factor on behalf of Despite the IDF’s extensive military preparations, Iran . Iran has invested millions of dollars in Hizballah Israel still faces formidable challenges in another since 2000 to boost its retaliatory capabilities, and as confrontation with Hizballah, and its options are a result, planners of an attack on Iran and its nuclear less than perfect . A concerted attempt to smash facilities have to take into account the reaction of Hizballah’s military capabilities once and for all Hizballah . Second, Hizballah’s continued existence would cause a large number of civilian casualties as a powerful force in Lebanon is dependent upon and infrastructure damage in both Lebanon and Is- the support of its Shi’i constituency . No amount of rael, draw international opprobrium, and offer no Iranian funds would save Hizballah if it were to lose guarantees of success . the backing of Lebanon’s Shi’i population . Therefore, Hizballah has to tread a fine line between following The “Dahiyah doctrine” that Israel revealed in the edicts of Iran and respecting the interests of the 2008, which calls for an intense bombing campaign Lebanese Shi’i community, the crushing majority of against civilian infrastructure in Lebanon, serves as which does not want war with Israel . a factor of deterrence . But, its successful application is dependent on Hizballah quickly backing down Israel’s Position and suing for a ceasefire, a most unlikely outcome . Instead, Hizballah is more likely to continue fight- Israel also has been busy implementing the lessons ing in the hope of forcing Israel into a prolonged it learned from 2006 in preparation for the possibil- ground campaign, exactly the outcome the Dahi- ity of another conflict with Hizballah . The IDF has yah doctrine is supposed to prevent . instituted greater logistical autonomy and sustain- ability in its combat units, and has strengthened the A Fragile Calm ability of its ground forces, navy, and air force to carry out joint operations . It also has trained exten- Although mutual deterrence has prevented a repeti- sively in large-scale ground operations, employing tion of the low-intensity conflict that existed along rapid maneuver techniques and using more robust the Lebanon-Israel border from 2000 to 2006, the and flexible equipment to reduce tactical vulner- underlying factors that led to war five years ago still ability . The IDF created several urban warfare cen- have not been addressed . The prevailing balance of ters shortly after the 2006 war, the largest of which, terror is inherently unstable and even though both the Urban Warfare Training Center (UWTC), sides are aware of the risks of miscalculation, the THE NEXT WAR The Saban Center at BROOKINGS iv chances of one side misreading the actions of the diplomatic efforts should focus on ways to prevent other remain dangerously high . In that regard, the misunderstandings from developing into conflict . uncertainties of the popular uprising in Syria could In this context, the monthly tripartite meetings play into the Israel-Hizballah dynamic . Specifically, hosted by the UNIFIL commander which groups if the regime of Bashar al-Asad, the Syrian president, Israeli and Lebanese military representatives in feels it faces imminent collapse, it could ignite a lim- Naqoura has proved to be an effective means of ited conflict with Israel in the Golan Heights, which resolving issues linked to the United Nations-de- could quickly escalate and drag in Hizballah, even lineated Blue Line and a forum for advancing and against the latter’s will . If the Asad regime falls and addressing concerns voiced by either side . There the new leadership in Damascus decides to abandon also exists an emergency communications facility its alliance with Iran and Hizballah, Israel may decide between the Lebanese Army and the IDF with the it is an opportune moment to attack Hizballah in the UNIFIL commander as go-between to resolve any hope of permanently degrading its military capabili- pressing problems that cannot wait for the next tri- ties and neutralizing the group as a future threat . partite session . Ultimately, the likelihood of renewed war between Yet, as long as the underlying political issues be- Hizballah and Israel remains high in the mid- to tween Lebanon, Syria, and Israel are not negoti- long-term . It is critically important that as the Mid- ated, Iran continues to enrich uranium and build dle East convulses with the shockwaves engendered an extensive military infrastructure in Lebanon, by the “Arab Spring,” the international community and Hizballah and Israel aggressively prepare for continue to play close attention to the nascent con- another war, the chances of another, more deadly flict under preparation in Lebanon and Israel .
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