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ISSUE BRIEF 08.25.20 The Gulf States and the Peace Process: Considerations, Stakes, and Options

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Ph.D, Fellow for the Middle East

conflict, the Gulf states complied with and INTRODUCTION enforced the boycott of This issue brief examines where the six until at least 1994 and participated in the nations of the — oil embargo of that supported 1 , , , , Saudi Israel in the of 1973. In Arabia, and the United Arab 1973, for example, the president of the (UAE)—currently stand in their outlook and UAE, Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, approaches toward the Israeli-Palestinian claimed that “No Arab is safe from issue. The first section of this brief begins by the perils of the battle with Zionism unless outlining how positions among the six Gulf it plays its role and bears its responsibilities, 2 states have evolved over the three decades in confronting the Israeli enemy.” In since the Madrid Conference of 1991. Section Kuwait, Sheikh Fahd al-Ahmad Al Sabah, a two analyzes the degree to which the six brother of two future Emirs, was wounded Gulf states’ relations with Israel are based while fighting with in in 3 on interests, values, or a combination of 1968, while in 1981 the Saudi government both, and how these differ from state to offered to finance the reconstruction of state. Section three details the Gulf states’ ’s Osirak nuclear reactor after it was 4 responses to the peace plan unveiled by destroyed by an Israeli airstrike. the Trump administration in January 2020. Iraq’s in August This section also analyzes the impact of the 1990 and the of early 1991 began Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait the process of recalibrating views of Israel uncertainties in domestic politics both in in August 1990 and the Israel and in the , as well as the in (most) Gulf capitals. The Iraqi occupation August 13, 2020 announcement by President of Kuwait demonstrated that it was not Gulf War of early 1991 that Israel and the UAE had Israel that presented the greatest threat to began the process of reached an agreement to normalize relations. national or even to regional security, and recalibrating views Saudi officials, in particular, appreciated Israel’s restraint under fire from Iraqi Scud of Israel in (most) FROM HOSTILITY TO PRAGMATISM missiles during the Gulf War.5 Discreet Gulf capitals. and direct contact between officials and With the partial exception of Kuwait, the policymakers from the Gulf states and position of the Gulf states toward Israel has Israel began at the Madrid Conference from shifted from varying degrees of outright October to November 1991 and has since hostility through the 1970s and 1980s to increased in scope, scale, and seniority. In one of pragmatic and increasingly open 1994, U.S. officials credited ’s accommodation since the 1990s. While longtime ambassador to the United States, not “front-line states” in the Arab-Israeli Prince Bandar bin Sultan Al Saud, with RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 08.25.20

lobbying for the Gulf states’ lifting of the nuclear file from the wider issue of ’s secondary boycott of entities that trade regionally destabilizing policies.11 Contacts with Israel.6 Also in 1994, Oman became between Saudi, Emirati, and Israeli officials the first Gulf state to host an Israeli became more visible, higher-level and more delegation for a post-Madrid working group frequent once the Trump administration meeting, as well as the first Gulf state to entered the White House in January 2017 host a visit by an Israeli prime minister, and made public its intent to leave the Joint Yitzhak Rabin.7 Comprehensive Plan of Action.12 Since the mid-1990s, Oman has hosted the Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC). A product of the multilateral GULF-ISRAEL RELATIONS TODAY working group on water resources, The shift in attitude among ruling elites in the MEDRC is today the only surviving Gulf states toward Israel is to some extent a organization established by decisions made result of generational change and the rise to in the of 1993 and 1995. The prominence of a younger cadre of leaders for MEDRC has become a model of cooperation whom the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 in shared research and capacity-building are no longer a visceral personal experience. between Israel and Arab states and has The pragmatic engagement of the current also supported multi-track diplomacy by prince of , Sheikh enabling and facilitating professional and Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, differs diplomatic interaction.8 A generation later, markedly from the (above-noted) ardent in 2009, the headquartering of the newly stance of his father, Sheikh Zayed. The same created International Renewable Energy can be said of the current crown prince of Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi provided further Saudi Arabia, Al Saud, opportunities for such engagement around whose criticism of the Palestinians during “apolitical” and technocratic issues of mutual his March 2018 visit to the United States importance to Israel and the Gulf states. Israel, may have surprised his father, Salman, which has been a member of the organization who counted his leadership of the Popular since its launch, supported the Emirati bid to Committee for Assisting the Palestinian host IRENA and in 2015 opened a permanent Mujahideen among his many roles in his six office in the UAE to house the Israeli mission decades in public life.13 accredited to IRENA.9 Age, however, is not the sole What changed after 2011 was the determinant. Aging leaders in Bahrain (King upheaval that redrew threat ) and Oman (the perceptions and geopolitical interests in key late Sultan Al Said) were regional capitals around a shared interest in among the most open—in different ways combating the perceived spread of Iranian and for different reasons—to engaging influence and political Islam in the Middle with Israeli counterparts. In Qatar, the 2013 East. At the macro-level, this realignment handover from Father Emir Sheikh Hamad was strongest in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, bin Khalifa Al Thani to his 33-year-old and Bahrain and coincided with a growing son, Sheikh , led sentiment that the Palestinian issue was only to a change in style, not substance, of no longer the defining fault-line of regional Qatar’s pragmatic relationship with Israel politics in the twenty-first century. As and the Palestinian issue. Kuwait’s often security interests converged, new forms of populist makes it likely (tacit) cooperation emerged, such as the that the Kuwaiti leadership will continue to sharing of surveillance technology and the oppose normalization with Israel, absent a coordination of messaging during the Iran comprehensive peace settlement, after the nuclear negotiations.10 Officials in , 91-year-old Emir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah, Abu Dhabi, and felt cut out of a staunch and lifelong defender of the the negotiating process and expressed Palestinian cause, passes from the scene. reservations at the separation of the

2 THE GULF STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS: CONSIDERATIONS, STAKES, AND OPTIONS

Leaders in each of the Gulf states Israeli (and U.S.) actions that contravened instead base their decision on whether internationally agreed positions.18 (or not) and how to engage with Israel on Since about 2015, commentary in Saudi- a set of primarily domestic considerations owned pan-Arab media outlets has often that are best examined on a case-by-case placed greater emphasis on shared security basis. Oman has hosted visits by three and geopolitical interests (if not values), Israeli prime ministers ( in while official and nonofficial dialogue 1996 and in 2018, in between Saudi and Israeli officials not only addition to Rabin’s already-noted visit in has become more open, but has also been 1994) as well as an Israeli trade office in the covered by local media. An example was 1990s.14 Qatar also hosted an Israeli trade the visit of a “delegation” of Saudi academic office in the 2000s and visits by senior and business figures to Israel in 2016 Israeli officials, including Shimon Peres led by a retired general, Anwar Eshki, who in 1996 (as prime minister) and 2007 (as had developed a channel of communication, vice prime minister) and Foreign Minister via multiple Track II meetings, with Dore in 2008.15 In 2012, Emir Hamad Gold, the director general of Israel’s became the first head of state to visit Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a trusted Gaza since secured control of the confidante of Prime Minister Netanyahu. Like Saudi Arabia, territory in 2007, while under Emir Tamim, Unlike previous meetings, Eshki’s visit was the UAE has drawn Qatar has provided humanitarian and covered by Saudi as well as Israeli media, financial support to Gaza in coordination and, in an interview with the -based closer to Israel in with Israeli officials. In February 2020, the newspaper , Eshki asserted regional geopolitics and head of , Yossi Cohen, visited that “circumstances have changed” in the security, but the Emirati 19 to request that Qatar continue its monthly geopolitics of the Middle East. leadership has felt freer cash transfers that enable the payment of Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE has drawn civil service salaries and the provision of aid closer to Israel in regional geopolitics and to express and pursue to impoverished families in Gaza.16 security, but the Emirati leadership has closer ties than their While Oman and Qatar have prioritized felt freer to express and pursue closer Saudi counterparts. low-level trade and pragmatic diplomatic ties than their Saudi counterparts, who engagement with Israel, the decade since remain cautiously mindful of their role as the Arab uprisings began in December 2010 Custodians of the Two Holy Mosques (of has witnessed a geopolitical realignment Islam). Trade between the UAE and Israel has that provides the context for the greater multiplied in recent years and is conducted formalization of links between Israel and mostly through intermediary companies Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For decades, the and focused primarily on agricultural and “official” Saudi position vis-à-vis the peace medical technologies and security and process was encapsulated in the Fahd communications systems.20 In 2016, Abu Plan of 1981 and the Dhabi installed an -wide surveillance unveiled by Crown Prince (later King) system, Falcon Eye, developed by a Abdullah in 2002. Both plans put forward company owned by an Israeli businessman, proposals for Arab recognition of Israel in and UAE entities are believed to have return for Israeli withdrawal from occupied utilized software and cybersecurity products Arab territory, but, whereas Fahd’s plan developed by Israel-based technology faced stiff resistance from Hafez al-Assad’s companies.21 Coordination in other , the Abdullah initiative was endorsed sectors also expanded, and in the months unanimously by the Arab League at its preceding the August 2020 declaration 2002 summit.17 In April 2018, amid the on the normalization of ties, the UAE and controversy over the U.S. embassy’s move Israel announced plans to work together on to Jerusalem, King Salman followed the research technology to combat Covid-19.22 example of his two predecessors as he Along with Bahrain, the UAE has also labeled an Arab League summit hosted by developed a values-based form of outreach Saudi Arabia as the “Jerusalem Summit” based on interfaith dialogue and religious and restated Saudi opposition to unilateral tolerance that has added an additional 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 08.25.20

layer to the alignment of interests. As tools of “soft power,” the Emirati and Bahraini THE TRUMP PLAN AND THE initiatives send a message of moderation ACCORD to an international audience that, in part, The cautious responses by officials in all Gulf deflects from and obscures the domestic states to the Trump administration’s attempts crackdowns on Islamists (in the UAE) and since 2017 to push forward its own approach a primarily Shia-led political opposition (in to the peace process have been tempered, Bahrain). Since 2014, Abu Dhabi has hosted in part, by the desire to avoid a rupture with an annual Forum for Promoting Peace in this most transactional and unconventional of Muslim Societies attended by Christian, recent U.S. presidencies. The strong economic Jewish, and Muslim faith leaders. The focus of the initiative that Trump tasked December 2019 summit released the New his senior advisor (and son-in-law) Jared Alliance of Virtue that affirmed the shared Kushner to draw up, led the administration values of the three Abrahamic faiths and to identify the Gulf states as partners to a enshrined those values in a charter based peace deal. In addition, the White House 23 on tolerance and religious freedom. Also appeared to have settled on an “outside-in” in 2019 the UAE made history by welcoming process that focused on normalizing Arab- the first papal visit to the , Israeli relations rather than advocating for as paid a high-profile visit that an Israeli-Palestinian agreement in the first included a public mass before an audience of instance.28 This approach was manifest in 24 135,000 in Abu Dhabi. the “Peace to Prosperity” conference that Bahrain is home to the only surviving took place in Bahrain in June 2019 as the indigenous Jewish community in any of economic component of the vision for peace the Gulf states, and its leaders have been that Trump later unveiled at the White House among the most prominent and vocal in in January 2020, with the Bahraini, Emirati, calling for a paradigm shift in the region’s and Omani ambassadors in attendance, and relationship with Israel. A July 2009 op-ed in the August 2020 agreement to normalize Regardless of what may in by Crown Prince or may not occur in U.S. UAE-Israel relations brokered by the Trump Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa called for fresh administration.29 and Israeli politics in the thinking on Arab-Israeli issues and direct Officials in Gulf capitals responded to the final months of 2020, communication between the leaders and January 2020 peace plan, officially entitled there is demonstrably people of the regions. In writing that “peace Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the will bring prosperity,” the crown prince a greater willingness in Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People and anticipated by almost exactly 10 years the launched by Trump at a press conference (most) Gulf capitals to theme and of the “Peace to Prosperity” with Prime Minister Netanyahu without any work with Israel. economic conference that took place in Palestinian representatives present, in careful Bahrain in June 2019 as part of the Trump and measured tones. While there was some administration’s push for a new approach appreciation that a new approach to the 25 to the peace process. By the time of the decades-old peace process was required, 2019 conference, Bahrain’s King Hamad had officials in Gulf capitals gave qualified support gone on record opposing the Arab boycott to the Trump administration’s willingness of Israel (in 2017), while Bahrain’s foreign to think outside the box, albeit not to the minister, Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, specific proposals contained in the plan, and had done the same over Israel’s right to reiterated the call for direct negotiations 26 defend itself (against Iran in 2018). between Israelis and Palestinians.30 Kuwait remains the regional outlier, Officials in Gulf capitals additionally although a 2008 U.S. diplomatic cable expressed some concern that they could released by WikiLeaks asserted that a senior be asked or expected to foot a large part of member of the ruling Al Sabah family had the bill of the economic component of any been entrusted with “maintaining a discreet successful peace initiative, which might, in and confidential liaison relationship with a part, explain why there was little follow- dual national Israeli representative based through to the June 2019 conference in elsewhere in the Gulf.”27 4 THE GULF STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS: CONSIDERATIONS, STAKES, AND OPTIONS

Bahrain. With all six economies hit hard by degrees across five of the six Gulf states.34 the spread of Covid-19 and the fall in energy To the extent that there was a backlash prices in 2020, the coronavirus pandemic to the prospect of normalization, it was has exposed economic vulnerabilities and concentrated in media and social media created new fragilities in the Gulf states. commentary, including in Saudi Arabia, and Decision-makers in the Gulf are likely to in statements of opposition by civil society focus more on domestic rather than regional organizations and public intellectuals in spending priorities in a “post-Covid” era, other Gulf states.35 In addition, the lack and the multiple uncertainties mean that of an immediate statement from the Arab Gulf actors may refrain from any further League, in contrast to its rapid February moves until the political and economic 2020 rejection of the Trump plan, is likely landscape becomes clearer. a reflection of the challenge it now faces, The need to balance their careful given the breaking of the regional consensus diplomatic non-rejection of the plan with by such a prominent and powerful member domestic and regional media and public as the UAE. criticism of its perceived imbalance in favor The so-called “Abraham Accord” of Israeli interests led representatives of all between Israel and the UAE nevertheless six Gulf states to sign statements by the represents a departure from the “land for Arab League and Organization of the Islamic peace” principle at the heart of the Arab Conference (OIC) that rejected the plan Peace Initiative. It also represents a break and restated their support for .31 in the consensus (at least on paper, if not Symbolically, given Saudi Arabia’s role in the always in practice) that a comprehensive Muslim , the emergency meeting of the peace agreement would precede any formal OIC took place in , and its statement, normalization with Israel. Like Trump’s adopted unanimously, declared categorically “Peace to Prosperity” plan earlier in 2020, it that the Trump plan “lacks the minimum has upended years of settled precedent on requirements of justice and destroys the the contours of a deal to end the Israeli- foundations of peace.”32 Palestinian conflict and establishes new Regardless of what may or may not parameters whose durability may outlast the occur in U.S. and Israeli politics in the final Trump administration and complicate any months of 2020, there is demonstrably a effort to reengage in Arab-Israeli negotiations greater willingness in (most) Gulf capitals later on. Moreover, any suggestion that the to work with Israel, and to do so openly, Abraham Accord has traded annexation for as well as to work with the Palestinian normalization is facile at best, as the threat leadership and with the U.S. to support a of annexation has merely been suspended breakthrough in the peace process. The and remains on the table. In any case, it is August 2020 announcement of the Israel- also inconsistent with the long-established UAE plan to normalize ties did not elicit any principle of land for peace.36 diplomatic backlash in other Gulf states, Key issues remain unresolved for with Bahrain and Oman going on record to any serious push for a meaningful peace support the deal. The Saudi foreign minister, settlement, whether in a second Trump term Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, restated or a presidency. Political dynamics the Kingdom’s support for the 2002 Arab in Israel and the U.S. may make the threat Peace Initiative and the importance of of annexation of parts of the West basing a peace agreement on international either more or less likely, depending on how parameters. However, he qualified this by they evolve. However, should annexation adding that the Israel-UAE deal “could be occur, it would likely suspend, if not halt, viewed as positive” if it suspended unilateral the process of Emirati normalization with Israeli actions on annexation.33 Israel and place all Gulf leaders in a position Such nuanced reactions were hardly where they would have to take a direct a surprise as the agreement formalized stance most have tried to avoid. The ongoing the already existing and barely concealed political uncertainty in Israel and the informal connections that extend to varying November 2020 presidential election in the 5 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 08.25.20

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17. Gawdat Bahgat, “Saudi Arabia and 25. Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, “ the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,” Middle East Need to Talk to the Israelis,” Washington Policy 14, no. 3 (2007): 54-55, https://mepc. Post, July 16, 2009, https://www. org/journal/saudi-arabia-and-arab-israeli- washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ peace-process. article/2009/07/16/AR2009071602737.html. 18. “Saudi King Salman Concludes 26. Dov Lieber, “Bahrain’s King Opposes ‘Jerusalem Summit’ in ,” , Arab Boycott of Israel, Jewish Leader Says,” April 15, 2018, https://english.alarabiya.net/ Times of Israel, September 18, 2017, https:// en/News/gulf/2018/04/15/Saudi-King- www.timesofisrael.com/bahrains-king- Salman-inaugurates-Jerusalem-Summit- opposes-arab-boycott-of-israel-jewish- in-Dhahran.html. leader-says/; “Arab Gulf Country of Bahrain: 19. Akiva Eldar, “What Saudi Arabia Israel Has ‘Right’ to Defend Itself Against Can Offer Israel,” Al-Monitor, July 28, 2016, Iran,” , May 10, 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east- originals/2016/07/saudi-arabia-- news/bahrain-defends-israel-s-right-to- visit-jerusalem-arab-peace-initiative.html. defend-itself-against-iran-1.6075271. 20. Hagar Shezaf and Rori Donaghy, 27. “Response to Request “Israel Eyes Improved Ties with Gulf States for Information on Kuwaiti after ‘Foothold’ Gained in UAE,” Middle Leadership Dynamics,” September East Eye, January 19, 2016, https://www. 1, 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ middleeasteye.net/news/israel-eyes- cables/08KUWAIT934_a.html. improved-ties-gulf-states-after-foothold- 28. Kristin Smith Diwan, “The gained-uae. Workshop and the Course of Normalization 21. Rori Donaghy, “Abu Dhabi Announces in the Gulf,” Arab Gulf States Institute in Launch of Israeli-Installed Washington, July 3, 2019, https://agsiw.org/ System,” Open Democracy, July 15, 2016, the-manama-workshop-and-the-course- https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/ of-normalization-in-the-gulf/. north-africa-west-/abu-dhabi- 29. Oliver Holmes, Sufian Taha, Hazem announces-launch-of-israeli-installed- Balousha, and Chris McGreal, “Trump Unveils mass-surveillance-system/; David Middle East Peace Plan With No Palestinian Kirkpatrick and Azam Ahmed, “Hacking a Support,” , January 25, 2020, Prince, an Emir and a Journalist to Impress https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/ a Client,” New York Times, August 31, 2018, jan/28/donald-trump-middle-east-peace- https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/31/ plan-israel-netanyahu-palestinians; “Will world/middleeast/hacking-united-arab- U.S.-Brokered Agreement between UAE and emirates-nso-group.html. Israel Be a Regional Gamechanger?” Atlantic 22. and Ben Hubbard, Council (blog), August 13, 2020, https:// “Israel Announces Partnership with UAE, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new- Which Throws Cold Water on It,” New York atlanticist/will-us-brokered-agreement- Times, June 25, 2020, https://www.nytimes. between-uae-and-israel-be-a-regional- com/2020/06/25/world/middleeast/israel- gamechanger/. united-arab-emirates-coronavirus.html. 30. Hussein Ibish, “Gulf Countries Strike 23. “Initiative for the Charter of the New a Delicate Balance on Trump’s Israeli- Alliance of Virtue,” Alliance of Virtue, 2019, Palestinian Proposal,” Arab Gulf States https://www.allianceofvirtues.com/english/ Institute in Washington, January 31, 2020, charter.asp. https://agsiw.org/gulf-countries-strike- 24. Callista Gingrich, “US Vatican a-delicate-balance-on-trumps-israeli- Ambassador: Pope’s Historic UAE Visit palestinian-proposal/. Advances Religious Freedom and Tolerance,” 31. “Arab League Rejects Trump’s Middle Fox News, February 9, 2019, https://www. East Plan,” Al Jazeera, February 1, 2020, foxnews.com/opinion/u-s-vatican- https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/ ambassador-popes-historic-uae-visit- arab-league-holds-emergency-meeting- advances-religious-freedom-and-tolerance. trump-plan-200201105251740.html; 7 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 08.25.20

Mina Aldroubi, “Muslim States Reject and Support Palestinian Cause,” AUTHOR The National, February 3, 2020, https:// Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Ph.D., is a Baker www.thenational.ae/world//muslim- Institute fellow for the Middle East. Working states-reject-trump-peace-plan-and- across the disciplines of political science, support-palestinian-cause-1.973354. international relations and international 32. Aya Batrawy, “Muslim Nations Reject political economy, his research examines the Trump’s Mideast Plan in Saudi Meeting,” AP, changing position of states in February 3, 2020, https://apnews.com/0c12 the global order, as well as the emergence 43146eaaac8bdcb8e76b50aa158c. of longer-term, nonmilitary challenges to 33. Aaron Boxerman, “Saudi FM: No regional security. Israel Normalization without Peace for the Palestinians,” , August 19, 2020, https://www.timesofisrael. com/saudi-fm-no-israel-normalization- without-peace-with-the-palestinians/. 34. Salma El Wardany, “Bahrain Joins Egypt, Oman in Supporting UAE, Israel Deal,” Bloomberg, , 2020, https://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-15/ bahrain-joins-egypt-oman-in-supporting- uae-israel-deal. 35. For useful roundups of political, civil society, and individual responses in the Gulf states to the Israel-UAE See more issue briefs at: www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs agreement, see Twitter threads by Kristin Smith Diwan (, 2020) This publication was written by a at https://twitter.com/kdiwaniya/ researcher (or researchers) who status/1294390661844738049?s=20 and participated in a Baker Institute project. Elham Fakhro (August 16, 2020) at https:// Wherever feasible, this research is reviewed by outside experts before it is twitter.com/elhamfakhro/status/129494374 released. However, the views expressed 6430312448?s=20. herein are those of the individual 36. Cnaan Liphshiz, “Netanyahu Says author(s), and do not necessarily Annexation ‘Remains on the represent the views of Rice University’s Table’ Following Israel-UAE Agreement,” Baker Institute for Public Policy. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, August 14, 2020, © 2020 Rice University’s Baker https://www.jta.org/2020/08/14/politics/ Institute for Public Policy netanyahu-says-west-bank-annexation- remains-on-the-table-following-israel- This material may be quoted or uae-agreement. reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

Cite as: Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. 2020. The Gulf States and the Middle East Peace Process: Considerations, Stakes, and Options. Issue brief no. 08.25.20. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas. https://doi.org/10.25613/taeg-zm52

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