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Deterring Iran After the Nuclear Deal

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Deterring Iran After the Nuclear Deal MARCH 2017 COVER PHOTO NIEL HESTER | FLICKR 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036 202 887 0200 | www.csis.org Lanham • Boulder • New York • London 4501 Forbes Boulevard Lanham, MD 20706 301 459 3366 | www.rowman.com Deterring Iran After the Nuclear Deal PROJECT DIRECTORS AND EDITORS Kathleen H. Hicks Melissa G. Dalton CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS Melissa G. Dalton Thomas Karako Jon B. Alterman J. Matthew McInnis Michael Connell Hijab Shah Michael Eisenstadt Michael Sulmeyer ISBN 978-1-4422-7993-3 Farideh Farhi Ian Williams Kathleen H. Hicks 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Washington,Ë|xHSLEOCy279933z DC 20036v*:+:!:+:! 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org Blank MARCH 2017 Deterring Iran after the Nuclear Deal PROJ ECT DIRECTORS AND EDITORS Kathleen H. Hicks Melissa G. Dalton CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS Melissa G. Dalton Thomas Karako Jon B. Alterman J. Matthew McInnis Michael Connell Hijab Shah Michael Eisenstadt Michael Sulmeyer Farideh Farhi Ian Williams Kathleen H. Hicks Lanham • Boulder • New York • London 594-68742_ch00_6P.indd 1 3/13/17 7:13 AM About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. T oday, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organ ization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full- time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analy sis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015. Former U.S. deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre has served as the Center’s president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). ISBN: 978-1-4422-7993-3 (pb); 978-1-4422-7994-0 (eBook) © 2017 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefield 1616 Rhode Island Ave nue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard Washington, DC 20036 Lanham, MD 20706 202-887-0200 | www . csis . org 301 - 459 - 3366 | www . rowman . com 594-68742_ch00_6P.indd 2 3/13/17 7:13 AM Contents iv Acknowl edgments v Executive Summary ix Introduction PART 1. IRAN’S ORIENTATION 2 CHAPTER 1 | The Ira nian Paradox Jon B. Alterman 8 CHAPTER 2 | Ira nian Power Projection Strategy and Goals Farideh Farhi PART 2. IRAN’S COERCIVE AND SHAPING TOOLS 25 CHAPTER 3 | Proxies: Iran’s Global Arm and Frontline Deterrent J. Matthew McInnis 34 CHAPTER 4 | Cyberspace: A Growing Domain for Ira nian Disruption Michael Sulmeyer 44 CHAPTER 5 | Close Quarters Provocations: Iran’s Naval Strategy in the Gulf Michael Connell 52 CHAPTER 6 | Missiles: A Critical Tool in Iran’s Defense Posture and Power Projection Thomas Karako and Ian Williams 62 CHAPTER 7 | Information Warfare: Centerpiece of Iran’s Way of War Michael Eisenstadt PART 3. A U.S. DETERRENCE FRAMEWORK FOR IRAN 74 CHAPTER 8 | Regional Perspectives on Iran Jon B. Alterman 86 CHAPTER 9 | Crafting a U.S. Security Strategy for Iran 107 About the Authors III 594-68742_ch00_6P.indd 3 3/13/17 7:13 AM Acknowl edgments The authors hope that the findings and recommendations of this report provide a practical fram- ing of the challenges and opportunities of deterring Iran for the Trump administration and Congress. The authors thank David Beleson, Abigail Kukura, Sam Lisbonne, and Joe Federici for their re- search contributions and coordination of the proj ect. They would also like to thank Jim Dunton for managing the editing pro cess and Alison Bours for her creativity in the design of the report’s cover. Over 50 U.S. government experts, foreign government officials, industry representatives, and regional and functional security experts w ere willing to answer questions and pose additional ones throughout this study’s research pro cess. Their insights and perspectives informed the report’s findings and analy sis, and the authors are grateful to them for their expertise. The authors alone are responsible for any error in fact, analy sis, or omission. This report is made pos si ble by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship has contributed to its publication. IV 594-68742_ch00_6P.indd 4 3/13/17 7:13 AM Executive Summary The United States has deterred significant leaps forward in Iran’s destabilizing activities and capability development. However, it has largely failed to deter Iran’s incremental extension of regional power and threshold testing using a range of military and paramilitary tools. Iran por- trays its security posture as defensive in nature, a kind of self- reliant deterrence against more power ful adversaries bent on keeping it weak, while it wants to end its isolation. Regardless of its actual motivations, however, Iran’s regional be hav ior often manifests in aggressive and subver- sive ways. The Trump administration must create a strategy that holistically accounts for the range of Ira nian objectives and activities, addresses ambiguities in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear program, constricts Iran’s destabilizing activities, and incentivizes Ira nian coop- eration where pos si ble. It should take the following steps: 1. UPHOLD U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE JCPOA, BUT STRENGTHEN IT BY ADDRESSING AMBIGUITIES Revoking the JCPOA would allow Iran to resume its nuclear activities without oversight provisions and would have very little punitive impact on the country other wise, seeing as the rest of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) have made it abundantly clear that they wi ll continue the trajectory set forth by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231. Moreover, the deal itself is not easily undone, as it is a multinational agreement. It would thus be in the Trump administration’s best interests to work within the par ameters of the JCPOA, clarifying guidelines on Iran’s nuclear development in the last years of the JCPOA, its missile development, and commercial transactions to strengthen the deal. This will be met with re sis tance by Iran. Negotiations to strengthen the JCPOA wi ll inevitably require further tradeoffs among the United States, other members of the P5+1, and Iran, but are worth pursuing and will require a balance of punitive action and incentives. V 594-68742_ch00_6P.indd 5 3/13/17 7:13 AM 2. FORGE A COMPREHENSIVE IRAN STRATEGY WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS The United States should work closely with allies and partners in the M iddle East, Eu rope, and Asia to create a unified Iran strategy. The Trump administration should convene regular se nior leader dialogue and scenario- based exercises to address differing threat perceptions, and to develop solutions to deter Iran’s destabilizing be hav ior and capability development. To reassure regional partners of continued U.S. commitment to regional security and to empower partners to better deter Iran on their own, the United States should continue to build partner capacity. This engagement should include, but would not be limited to, enhancing military training and exer- cises, improving missile defense and counterterrorism capabilities, bolstering regional partners’ and allies’ critical cyber infrastructure, and maintaining a credible U.S. deterrent posture in the region, comprised of conventional ground and special operations forces, maritime forces, missile defense, and strike capabilities. 3. AMPLIFY EFFORTS TO COUNTER IRA NIAN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM The Trump administration should ratchet up direct and indirect targeted operations aimed at disrupt- ing Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) activities. The United States has the capability to push back on these groups but has refrained from taking actions that Iran may deem too provoca- tive and jeopardize the JCPOA or other regional objectives. The United States must calibrate its operations to determine which threats to prioritize and act upon, assess Ira nian redlines to avoid unnecessary escalation, communicate its intentions clearly, and refrain from playing into the narrative of Iran’s proxy groups which paint U.S. presence as an invading force. 4. SUSTAIN FINANCIAL PRESSURE ON IRA NIAN DESTABILIZING BE HAV IOR The United States should maintain its economic sanctions on Iran for its human rights violations, support for terrorist proxies, and development and testing of ballistic missiles. Sustaining interna- tional co ali tion cohesion to financially pressure Iranwi ll require deft U.S. diplomacy and suasion, given the countervailing economic and energy interests Eu rope, Japan, South Korea, China, and Rus sia have in Iran. Lessons from the current sanctions regime, including how funds flow through the Ira nian system and affect entities linked to the IRGC and what works in terms of “snapback effects,” should inform future sanctions development. U.S. lawmakers should design sanctions to include indicators and trigger mechanisms to track Ira nian be hav ior. VI Executive Summary 594-68742_ch00_6P.indd 6 3/13/17 7:13 AM 5. INCENTIVIZE AREAS OF IRA NIAN COOPERATION WHERE POS SI BLE Solely relying on punitive actions would, in the long run, be insufficient for the Trump administra- tion. A combination of punitive actions for bad be hav ior and incentives to encourage behavioral change is a more likely formula for success in deterring and compelling Iran.
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