The Path Dependent Nature of Factionalism in Post- Khomeini Iran
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HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Publication Series The Path Dependent Nature of Factionalism in Post-Khomeini Iran Ariabarzan Mohammadi Number 13: December 2014 About the Author Dr Ariabarzan Mohammadi is a Visiting Research Fellow with teaching duties in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University for 2014-15. Disclaimer The views expressed in the HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Publication Series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the School or of Durham University. These wide ranging Research Working Papers are products of the scholarship under the auspices of the al-Sabah Programme and are disseminated in this early form to encourage debate on the important academic and policy issues of our time. Copyright belongs to the Author(s). Bibliographical references to the HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Publication Series should be as follows: Author(s), Paper Title (Durham, UK: al-Sabah Number, date). 2 | P a g e The Path Dependent Nature of Factionalism in Post- Khomeini Iran Dr Ariabarzan Mohammadi Abstract The main claim of this paper is that the anti-party system in Iran, or what is known as factionalism, is subject to a path dependent process. The political system in post- Khomeini Iran is not based on political parties. The authoritarian regime in Iran has not developed into a ruling party system as in Egypt under Mubarak. Instead, through its different stages of institutionalisation, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has gradually degenerated from what looked like a single party system during the ascendancy of the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) in the first and second Majlis (the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran), to an anti-party, factional system that has continued to the present. My contention is that the institutionalisation of a ‘factional system’ in Iran is subject to ‘path dependency’ and consequently difficult to undo due to a self-reinforcing feedback loop which is in place and because of the considerable amount of money, as well as other resources, invested on the path of factionalism over an extended period of time. Introduction This paper contends that contingent events on the eve of the revolution and some choices made by IRI leaders in the infancy of the state set a convention (path dependence) which, after a while, became hard to break, not because of dogma or the conservativeness of the leaders per se, but because those events and policies triggered a self-reinforcing dynamic that led to a long-lasting ‘inertia’1 in the system. Although most of the substantial literature on post-Khomeini Iran deals with the notion of factionalism in the IRI,2 an institutionalist approach to the problem of factionalism in 3 | P a g e Iran has yet to receive the attention it deserves. The literature on factionalism focuses predominantly on descriptive accounts of the views and affiliations of the factions, the growing conflict between traditional and modern forces, analysis of parliamentary politics and struggles over the definition (as well as control) of the state between proponents of religious values, populist principles, and revolutionary doctrine. Whereas this literature informs my project, it is insufficient in explaining why the ideological conflicts within the IRI have taken the shape of factional conflicts rather than party conflicts. Moreover, this literature does not consider institutionalist perspectives, including path dependency, as a way to understand the persistence of factionalism in Iran. Most general approaches to understanding institutions treat the origins, persistence and demise of institutions as being derived from a single causal process. Path dependence perspectives, by contrast, emphasise some contingency at the genesis of an institution and suggest that “factors responsible for the reproduction of an institution may be quite different from those that account for the existence of the institution in the first place”.3 In the context of the Islamic Republic, factors contributing to the genesis of factionalism appear to be different from those that explain the reproduction of the system. To address the shortfall of research on this important subject, this study adopts an analytical framework which uses Mahoney’s (2000)4 and Pierson’s (2004)5 contributions to institutional analysis, grounded in an historical, path dependent methodology, as a starting point to analyse the trajectory of IRI history. In so doing, it investigates whether the anti-party system in Iran, or what is known as factionalism, is subject to a path dependent process. To study the instances and/or possibilities of change in the factional system that would not require institutional breakdown, this project will draw on Thelen’s (2003)6 work on path dependency theory. Furthermore, it examines the various aspects of factionalism in post-Khomeini Iran by drawing on a number of research streams such as work by Keshavarzian (2005)7, Moslem (2002)8, Bakhtiari (1996)9 and Alamdari (2005).10 Path Dependency ‘Path dependency’ (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2004)11 holds that institutions become increasingly dependent on the paths chosen during the ‘critical junctures’ of their institutionalisation history. The path that has been chosen at a critical juncture from among other possible alternatives will be difficult to undo (long lasting ‘inertia’ in the system) if a self-reinforcing ‘positive feedback’ loop is in place and if a considerable amount of money and other resources are invested on the path over an extended 4 | P a g e period of time. As a result, the institution becomes less dependent on human agency and more suggestive of ‘autopilot’ status. The longer the process is in place, the more complicated the reversing operation becomes.12 Critical Junctures Critical junctures, as Pierson explains, “are brief moments in which opportunities for major institutional reforms appear, followed by long stretches of institutional stability.”13 They are those historical windows during which opportunities for new institutional arrangements become available, albeit for a limited time only. Path dependent processes begin by adopting a particular institutional arrangement from among two or more available alternatives present at these moments. As James Mahoney points out, “These junctures are ‘critical’ because once a particular option is selected it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available”.14 Critical junctures correspond with periods of institutional genesis and the selection process during critical junctures is specified by contingency.15 However, to argue that an event is contingent is not to suggest that it is random or without previous causes. What is meant by contingency in the path dependent context is that the factors responsible for the genesis of an institution may be quite different from those that account for the reproduction of the institution. As Mahoney insinuates, contingent events include “both small events that are too specific to be accommodated by prevailing social theories, such as the assassination of a political leader or the specific choices and ‘agency’ of particular individuals, and large, seemingly random processes such as natural disasters or sudden market fluctuation”.16 Positive Feedback ‘Positive feedback’ (or ‘self-reinforcement sequences’)17 in institutions is another characteristic feature of path dependent processes. Positive feedback, or as economists call it ‘increasing returns’, explains institutional persistence in path dependent patterns. In Mahoney’s words, “[w]ith increasing returns, an institutional pattern, once adopted delivers increasing benefits with its continued adoption, and thus over time it becomes more and more difficult to transform the pattern or select previously available options, even if these alternative options would have been more ‘efficient’”.18 An option selected during a critical juncture may result in a path dependent institutional pattern if a positive feedback loop is established generating 5 | P a g e increasing benefits which feed back into the institution as a benefactor, which in turn reinforces the favoured option. Positive feedback dynamics capture two key elements central to most analysts’ intuitive sense of path dependence. First, they clearly reveal how the costs of switching from one alternative to another will, in certain social contexts, increase markedly over time. Second, and related, they draw attention to issues of timing and sequence, distinguishing formative moments or conjunctures from the periods that reinforce divergent paths. In a process involving positive feedback, it is not just a question of what happens, but of when it happens. Issues of temporality are at the heart of the analysis.19 For instance, it could be argued that the contingent events which occurred in the first two years after the revolution, such as the assassination of IRP leaders, put the country on the path of factionalism, which could have been altered with fewer costs at the beginning of those processes than at a later stage when more resources had been invested and positive feedback processes had been initiated. Changing the course of factionalism at such a late stage would be very difficult, unless another critical juncture were to arise at some point. Timing and Sequence (Temporality) in Path Dependent Patterns In historical institutionalisation, what happens, when, and in what order, are of utmost importance. As Paul Pierson notes, in