Political Laws and Ethnic Accommodation: Why Cross-Ethnic Coalitions Have Failed to Institutionalize in Afghanistan
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Political Laws and Ethnic Accommodation: Why Cross-Ethnic Coalitions Have Failed to Institutionalize in Afghanistan Mohammad Bashir Mobasher A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2017 Reading Committee: Robert Pekannen, Chair Jonathan Eddy, Co-Chair James Long Scott Radnitz Leigh Anderson Program Authorized to Offer Degree: School of Law © Copyright 2017 Mohammad Bashir Mobasher University of Washington ABSTRACT Political Laws and Ethnic Accommodation: Why Cross-Ethnic Coalitions Have Failed to Institutionalize in Afghanistan Mohammad Bashir Mobasher Chairs of the Supervisory Committee: Professor Robert Pekannen – Jackson School of International Studies Professor Jonathan Eddy – School of Law Afghanistan suffers from an ethnic-based and fragmented party system. Although some cross-ethnic coalitions have emerged, especially during the presidential elections, these coalitions have failed to survive across elections and branches of government. As for what explains the failure of the consolidation of coalitions, some scholars pointed to the SNTV system and others to the presidential system. This study examines all related institutional designs, including the SNTV system for parliamentary elections, the runoff system for presidential elections, the presidential system, dual vice presidency, and party qualification thresholds. These systems and institutions are designed by three bodies of political laws: the Constitution, electoral laws, and party laws. Analyzing these laws and institutional designs, this study makes three observations. First, the failure of coalitions to institutionalize in Afghanistan is not due to a single political law or institutional design but due to the influence of a number of them. Second, for cross-ethnic coalitions to institutionalize, all related institutional designs must act cohesively or else they fail to incentivize coalition-building, as is the case in Afghanistan. Finally, the formation of cross-ethnic coalitions does not necessarily engender their institutionalization and by the same token an institutional design may be conducive to the formation of coalitions, but not necessarily to their institutionalization. Afghan political laws and institutions tell a story partly of success and partly of failure. Table of Contents Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................... iii List of Figures and Tables ...........................................................................................................v Introduction ..................................................................................................................................1 I. Political Practices, Ideals, & Laws in Afghanistan .............................................................35 Chapter One: Ethnic-Electoral Dynamics and the Politics of Coalition-Making in Afghan Presidential Elections ............................................................................................................46 Chapter Two: Identity Politics and Parliamentary Elections in Afghanistan .......................81 Chapter Three: Centrifugal Practices and Centripetal Tendencies .......................................99 II. Election Laws, Electoral Systems, and the Failure of Cross-Ethnic Coalitions to Surive Beyond Elections .................................................................................................................113 Chapter Four: Runoff System and Cross-Ethnic Coalitions in Presidential Elections .......116 Chapter Five: SNTV System and the Coalition-Free Parliamentary Elections ..................139 III. Constitutional Design and the Failure of Parliamentary Coalition-Making ...............160 Chapter Six: Constitutional Features of Presidential Elections and the Failure of Cross- Ethnic Coalitions to Institutionalize ....................................................................................166 Chapter Seven: A System of Dual Vice Presidency and the Path to Executive Coalition- Building...............................................................................................................................190 Chapter Eight: Constitutional Prerogatives of the President and Prospects for Inter-Branch Coalitions ............................................................................................................................212 i IV. Party Laws and the Failing Coalitions ............................................................................245 Chapter Nine: Afghan Political Party Laws: The Laws of Parties, Not Coalitions ............247 V. Redesigning Political Laws and Institutions in Afghanistan ..........................................273 Chapter Ten: Reforming Afghan Electoral Laws ...............................................................277 Chapter Eleven: Amending the Afghan Constitution .........................................................310 Chapter Twelve: Re-engineering Afghanistan’s Party Laws ..............................................348 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................357 Bibliography ..............................................................................................................................367 Appendix I .................................................................................................................................. I-1 Appendix II .............................................................................................................................III-1 Appendix III ............................................................................................................................III-1 Appendix IV ............................................................................................................................ IV-1 ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study has explored institutional designs and ethnic accommodation, a topic close to my heart, having suffered from ethnic conflicts and dark regimes. Writing this dissertation has been a step towards fulfilling my commitment to study ethnic conflicts and to explore pathways to peace-building and valuing human lives. I would like to express my immense gratitude to everyone who has helped and supported me on this journey of learning and becoming. Due to a large number of individuals and organizations supporting me during my research and writing at personal, academic, and institutional levels. I apologizein advance to those whom I may have forgotten. First and foremost, I would like to thank my parents, Mohammad Ishaq Jallah and Shamim Jallah, for their love, patience and support from afar; to my elder sister and brother, Sina Pazhman and Dr. Nasir Jallah, who taught me primary education and English language; to my younger siblings, Jamil Jallah, Shaima Lutfi, and Samira Jallah. This dissertation would not have come to a successful end without your continuous encouragement and moral support. Various organizations and individuals provided me with the financial and logistical resources to be able complete my dissertation and I would like to express my appreciation. I received an incredible amount of support from LESPA, who offered me scholarships for both my LLM and Ph.D. degrees at the prestigious University of Washington School of Law. In particular, I would like thank Professor Jon Eddy and Alice Stokke for considering me a good candidate for Ph.D. in Law and supporting me throughout the program. Rebecca Alhadeff and Sara Ayoubi deserve special recognition for helping me with all administrative and procedural issues during the Ph.D. program. In relation to my scholarship, I would also like to express my gratitude to the United States’ Department of State. Such scholarship programs have led to iii capacity building in Afghanistan as Afghan fellow scholars would return with better knowledge and expertise to help develop Afghanistan in its different legal and political aspects. My Ph.D. would not have been possible without your financial support. On the academic level, I greatly benefited from my academic advisors, Professor Robert Pekannen and Professor Jon Eddy. Their helpful suggestions, encouragement, and patience have been priceless. Special thanks to Professor Elizabeth Baldwin, who reviewed my dissertation numerous times and provided editorial comments and to Professor Daniel Chirot, who has given me timely feedback when I needed it. I am grateful to you all for challenging me to think deeper and make a more concrete analysis. Additionally, I would like to express my appreciation to my committee members, Professor James Long, Professor Scott Radnitz, and Professor Leigh Anderson for their intellectual support. I have been fortunate to have surrounded myself with very supportive friends. Here, I would like to appreciate the support of Nasiruldin Nezami, then the Deputy-Dean of Kabul Law School, Sayed Jamaludin Saberi, Dean of Kabul University, School of Public Policy and Administration, Abdullah Dastageer Popalzai, Subghatullah, a member of Electoral Complaint Commission, and Jafar Rezaee, the Legal Advisor of Independent Electoral Commission, who helped me with my interviews and surveys. I also take the opportunity to thank all my interviewees and those who participated in surveys. At the end, I dedicate this dissertation to all who suffered during ethnic conflict and