Refugees Refugees Unreached & Unengaged People Groups Living in Hamburg, Germany Unreached & Unengaged People Groups Living in Hamburg, Germany

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Refugees Refugees Unreached & Unengaged People Groups Living in Hamburg, Germany Unreached & Unengaged People Groups Living in Hamburg, Germany Refugees Refugees Unreached & Unengaged People Groups living in Hamburg, Germany Unreached & Unengaged People Groups living in Hamburg, Germany Refugees in Hamburg, Gemany Languages in Camp Refugees in Hamburg, Gemany Languages in Camp Unrest in the Middle East has Unrest in the Middle East has brought a flood of refugees to Farsi brought a flood of refugees to Farsi Europe. Europe. Hamburg Hamburg Germany has taken in Kurdish Germany has taken in Kurdish over1million refugees in Germany over1million refugees in Germany the past two years. German the past two years. German There are 200 camps in There are 200 camps in Hamburg where about 100,000 refugees reside. English Hamburg where about 100,000 refugees reside. English These refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, These refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, Albania and other locations have proven to be a Italian Albania and other locations have proven to be a Italian fertile harvest field. fertile harvest field. Population Religion Shared Experience Population Religion Shared Experience Refugee People Groups In the context of a Refugee People Groups In the context of a living in Hamburg include: Islam 99% refugee camp, refugees living in Hamburg include: Islam 99% refugee camp, refugees Iran – Persians, Azer- become a people group. Iran – Persians, Azer- become a people group. baijanis, Armenians, They end up having baijanis, Armenians, They end up having Other <1% Other <1% Turkmen, Afghans and an affinity due to their Turkmen, Afghans and an affinity due to their Sorani Kurds. shared experience. Sorani Kurds. shared experience. Afghanistan – Tajiks, Christian <1% As long as they have Afghanistan – Tajiks, Christian <1% As long as they have Pashtuns, Hazaras, some sort of ability to Pashtuns, Hazaras, some sort of ability to Uzbeks and Balochs. Most refugees are communicate, they are Uzbeks and Balochs. Most refugees are communicate, they are Syria – Arabs, Druze, Muslim (Shia and Sunni). often willing to bond Syria – Arabs, Druze, Muslim (Shia and Sunni). often willing to bond Kurmanji Kurds, Alawites, There are also Yazidi and with each other as they Kurmanji Kurds, Alawites, There are also Yazidi and with each other as they Iraqi Arabs, Sorani Kurds a few Christians. struggle together. Iraqi Arabs, Sorani Kurds a few Christians. struggle together. and Yazidis. and Yazidis. Refugee Gathering Churches Refugee Gathering Churches About 150 refugees attend church every Sunday. Missionaries and About 150 refugees attend church every Sunday. Missionaries and some of the first believers have baptized close to 300 new some of the first believers have baptized close to 300 new believers between 2015 and 2017. believers between 2015 and 2017. Sunday gatherings are led in: Farsi, Kurdish, English, German, and Sunday gatherings are led in: Farsi, Kurdish, English, German, and sometimes Italian. There is an Arabic house church and two Italian sometimes Italian. There is an Arabic house church and two Italian house churches. house churches. Engaging with God Engaging with God Sharing Jesus in camp is not allowed, so refugees come out to see our mission- Sharing Jesus in camp is not allowed, so refugees come out to see our mission- aries and hear His story. Nine other groups are also actively discovering Jesus aries and hear His story. Nine other groups are also actively discovering Jesus together: 3 led by non-refugees and 6 led by refugees (8 are Farsi speaking and together: 3 led by non-refugees and 6 led by refugees (8 are Farsi speaking and one is Kurdish speaking) one is Kurdish speaking) Sources: joshuaproject.net, UNHCR.org and everyculture.com Sources: joshuaproject.net, UNHCR.org and everyculture.com ALL NATI O N S ALL NATI O N S For more information please visit www.allnationsfamily.org For more information please visit www.allnationsfamily.org.
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