DOCSLIB.ORG

Kateb Hazara Association Inc

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Kateb Hazara Association Inc Kateb Hazara Association Inc 40 Adderley Street Lidcombe 2141 ABN 28 553 244 239 Submission to the Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade on the Issues facing diaspora communities in Australia by the Kateb Hazara Asociation Kateb Hazara Association welcomes the opportunity to provide a Submission to the Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade on the Issues facing diaspora communities in Australia. Kateb Hazara Association is the largest Hazara association in NSW representing multiple Hazara social and community groups. The Hazara community also offers its members a range of cultural, sporting, religious and social events that encourage social interactions that help community members to feel less isolated and lonely. Events and activities include volleyball, soccer and cricket teams and tournaments, English Classes, music classes, Hazaragi community language classes, community gatherings where food is shared and cultural performances presented, celebrations of specific religious and cultural events such as Eid (Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr, Muharram (Islamic New Year and commemoration of the assassination of the grand-son of the Prophet Mohammad, and Nowruz (Persian New Year), prayers for the family members who were deceased in Australia or overseas, and commemoration of any tragic events that occur in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Background to Hazara Community in NSW Hazara community members speak a number of languages including Hazaragi, Dari, Farsi, Arabic and Urdu. However, the primary language spoken by the Hazara community in Australia is Hazaragi. According to the 2016 Census, there were close to 5000 Hazaragi speakers in NSW with the majority settled in Cumberland Local Government Area (69%). Over 55% arrived between 2006 and 2011. There were also close to 10,000 Dari speakers; the majority live in Cumberland LGA (41%) followed by Blacktown LGA (22%). It is essential to consider settlement patterns of the speakers of both languages as many Hazaras would say they speak Dari. Overall, it is clear that Cumberland LGA hosts the highest number of Hazaras in NSW. (Multicultural NSW, 2018). It is also essential to consider high level of disadvantage in this community. For example, at the time of the 2016 Census, only 8% of Hazaragi speakers had tertiary qualifications compared to 32.3 % of the total population of NSW. Close to 80% of Hazaragi speakers had no qualifications compared to 39.1% of the total population of NSW. The unemployment rate of Hazaragi speakers was 17.6% compared to 6.3% of the total NSW population. Finally, 36.9% reported difficulties in speaking English compared to 4.5% of the total NSW population. Many Hazaras are illiterate in their first language. This is due to the history of persecution as outlined below, deliberate denial of education particularly for women, and suppression of the Hazaragi language. (“The Afghanistan-born Community | Department of Social Services, Australian Government,” n.d.) Along with other Shia minorities in Afghanistan, Hazaras have faced long-term persecution and human rights abuses. Hazaras traditionally lived in Hazarajat in the central mountains of Afghanistan. Before 1 | Page Kateb Hazara Association Inc 40 Adderley Street Lidcombe 2141 ABN 28 553 244 239 the 19th century the proportion of Hazaras in the overall population of Afghanistan was higher than today. The intense persecution began with massacres by King Abdul Rahman in late 1800s. There are also records of Hazaras having been sold as slaves in the 19th century. Since then their numbers have gradually decreased. During the 19th and 20th centuries, they were marginalised and discriminated against to such an extent that majority were employed in unskilled labour and hard and dangerous work, which further segregated them through socioeconomic disadvantage. Hazarajat was deliberately kept underdeveloped with no roads, schools or clinics. (Ibrahimi, 2017; Marie, 2013; Bacon, 2951; Monsutti, 2005; Poladi, 1989) The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan temporarily changed the fate of the Hazara. While they were opposed to the Soviet occupation, the conflict at that time allowed them to organise politically and gain political and financial support from the Shia community in Iran. This was lost when Afghanistan descended into civil war in 1989 and the country fell under the Taliban in 1996. The Taliban targeted the Shi'a Hazara as infidels and subjected them to gross human rights abuses, causing them to flee to other countries as refugees. When Hamid Karzai came to power in 2002, persecution of the Hazaras decreased in urban areas and they were able to regroup politically and gain a significant number of parliamentary seats in the 2005 elections. From 2007, the Taliban built itself back up from their base in Pakistan and expanded back into Afghanistan. Once again, the Hazara were targeted for persecution. This has continued in recent years with Hazaras targeted by both the Taliban and the Afghan branch of Da’esh (ISIS) who have claimed responsibility for a number of large scale bombings of Hazara events or sites (Adlparvar, N. 2014; Maley, 2018). Although Hazaras have been given full rights under the 2004 Afghan constitution, they still face discrimination in many areas of the country. They are vulnerable to attack and death on Afghanistan’s road network, particularly on the roads to and from Hazarajat that are targeted by criminals, insurgent forces and the Taliban and more recently by ISIS affiliated organisations. Many Hazaras fled to the Balochistan province of Pakistan, mostly in and around the city of Quetta, with a sizeable number also in Iran. Hazaras have also fled to western countries such as Canada, Europe, the US and Australia. (Maley, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2018; UNAMA, 2018; Refugee Council of Australia, 2018) Hazaras have come to Australia in large numbers on boats from Indonesia since 2000, regarding the journey as a safer option than staying in Afghanistan or Pakistan waiting for UNHCR resettlement. After the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, a number of Hazaras were forced to return from Nauru to Afghanistan. Most fled immediately to Pakistan and some returned to their villages in Afghanistan. Some of them have since been killed by the Taliban who, though no longer in government, nevertheless have substantial power in Afghanistan. Hazaras from Afghanistan still form one of the major groups of boat arrivals in Australia seeking asylum. Many Hazara have relatives remaining in Afghanistan and Pakistan who still suffer constant harassment and persecution. Worry over the safety of relatives is a constant source of stress and anxiety, as well as guilt and shame over leaving them behind and being separated from them. (Maley, 2018; UNAMA, 2018; Refugee Council of Australia, 2018; Ibrahimi & Maley, 2018) Anecdotes from Hazara Australians suggest that rates of depression 2 | Page Kateb Hazara Association Inc 40 Adderley Street Lidcombe 2141 ABN 28 553 244 239 amongst the Hazara community are high and substance abuse is common, especially amongst those on bridging visas. Many Hazaras have arrived to Australia via unauthorised means, usually by boats. They have applied for refugee status post-arrival and while they are awaiting the decision on their application, they remain on Bridging Visas. There are different classes of Bridging Visas, but in general this leads to significant challenges: no means of family reunion; limited or no access to financial assistance (due to recent policy changes); limited access to free outpatient medical services; limited or no access to government-funded casework support and employment services. In the past, rules related to particular Bridging Visas included no access to work rights and free education beyond compulsory schooling age. This has changed in more recent times. Practically, this can result in poverty, homelessness, unemployment or employment in the so called “gig economy” with minimal protection or workers’ rights, and drug and alcohol abuse as methods of coping with distress. It also means long term family separation and extended anxiety over forced return. (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2019) What do you think about the support offered to diaspora community associations and similar organisations, including government grants and other funding? Did the organisations receive enough support? Were the right things supported? If they did not receive enough support and if the right projects were not supported, what should be supported? Kateb Hazara Association has never received substantial funding from the Commonwealth Government. We have managed to purchase a community centre using only our own community resources. We provide various community services on a voluntary basis. However, this model is unsustainable as it does not encourage Hazara community to take leadership in settlement and support of our own community members. For small community organisations, securing funding is critical in allowing them to engage with government agencies on an equal footing. The experience of negotiating funding contracts, delivery of funded programs, evaluation and acquittals would require that Hazara community organisations not only learn how government agencies work but also work on systemic change relevant to our community. In addition, the current funding system tends to concentrate funding in the hands of few large organisations who then subcontract to smaller organisations. This may be useful for the Government as they only need to deal with a single Contractor, but it has a negative impact on organisations such as Kateb Hazara Association. We never develop capacity to manage our affairs and work directly with Australian Government. We can be a bridge between our community and Australian society but we need channels to have our voices heard directly by Australian Government. Recommendations 3 | Page Kateb Hazara Association Inc 40 Adderley Street Lidcombe 2141 ABN 28 553 244 239 • Funding for ethno-specific community associations - The Australian Governments should commit to capacity building for refugee and migrant communities such as Kateb Hazara Association by directing funding and supporting organisational capacity building.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Refugees Refugees Unreached & Unengaged People Groups Living in Hamburg, Germany Unreached & Unengaged People Groups Living in Hamburg, Germany
    Refugees Refugees Unreached & Unengaged People Groups living in Hamburg, Germany Unreached & Unengaged People Groups living in Hamburg, Germany Refugees in Hamburg, Gemany Languages in Camp Refugees in Hamburg, Gemany Languages in Camp Unrest in the Middle East has Unrest in the Middle East has brought a flood of refugees to Farsi brought a flood of refugees to Farsi Europe. Europe. Hamburg Hamburg Germany has taken in Kurdish Germany has taken in Kurdish over1million refugees in Germany over1million refugees in Germany the past two years. German the past two years. German There are 200 camps in There are 200 camps in Hamburg where about 100,000 refugees reside. English Hamburg where about 100,000 refugees reside. English These refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, These refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, Albania and other locations have proven to be a Italian Albania and other locations have proven to be a Italian fertile harvest field. fertile harvest field. Population Religion Shared Experience Population Religion Shared Experience Refugee People Groups In the context of a Refugee People Groups In the context of a living in Hamburg include: Islam 99% refugee camp, refugees living in Hamburg include: Islam 99% refugee camp, refugees Iran – Persians, Azer- become a people group. Iran – Persians, Azer- become a people group. baijanis, Armenians, They end up having baijanis, Armenians, They end up having Other <1% Other <1% Turkmen, Afghans and an affinity due to their Turkmen, Afghans and an affinity due to their Sorani Kurds. shared experience. Sorani Kurds. shared experience. Afghanistan – Tajiks, Christian <1% As long as they have Afghanistan – Tajiks, Christian <1% As long as they have Pashtuns, Hazaras, some sort of ability to Pashtuns, Hazaras, some sort of ability to Uzbeks and Balochs.
    [Show full text]
  • Assessing the Circumstances and Needs of Refugee Communities
    HELPING STRANGERS BECOME NEIGHBOURS Assessing The Circumstances And Needs Of Refugee Communities In Derby Upbeat Communities Overdale House 96 Whitaker Road Derby, DE23 6AP [email protected] 01332 916150 www.upbeatcommunities.org CONTENTS Welcome 4 Executive Summary 5 Assessing The Circumstances And Needs Of 6 Refugee Communities In Derby Research Methodology 8 Community Snapshots 10 Eritrean Community 11 Iranian Community 11 Pakistani Community 13 Iraq – Kurdish Community 14 Albanian Community 15 Syrian Community 15 Sri Lanka – Tamil Community 16 Afghanistan – Hazara Community 16 Chinese Community 17 Themes Arising From The Cross-Section 19 Of Communities Stages Of Development Of Refugee Communities 20 Choosing To Stay In Derby Or Not? 21 English Language Provision 22 Refugee Mental Health 24 The Path To Work 25 Concern For The Next Generation 27 Patterns Of Community Engagement 28 Community Organisation And Voice 29 Conclusions And Recommendations 30 Conclusion / Recommendation 31 Appendix 1 33 Communities With Established Organisations 34 Appendix 2 35 New Communities Research 36 Questionnaire 1 – Individuals Appendix 3 39 New Communities Research 40 Questionnaire 2 – Focus Groups Acknowledgements 43 Abbreviations 43 As well as a providing a unique window into each of these communities – their WELCOME hopes, aspirations and concerns – common themes are drawn together which point to Upbeat Communities’ mission specific interventions which would greatly is ‘to help strangers become aid integration. The outcome of this will be neighbours’. We recognise that that refugees choose to stay in the city, becoming, as stated in our conclusion; engaging communities is key to that mission - both the refugee “powerful assets to the City of Derby, communities arriving in the city providing productive labour, generating and the settled community that new jobs and contributing across all areas of society”.
    [Show full text]
  • Ethnicity, Space, and Politics in Afghanistan
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Urban Studies Senior Seminar Papers Urban Studies Program 11-2009 Ethnicity, Space, and Politics in Afghanistan Benjamin Dubow University of Pennsylvania Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/senior_seminar Dubow, Benjamin, "Ethnicity, Space, and Politics in Afghanistan" (2009). Urban Studies Senior Seminar Papers. 13. https://repository.upenn.edu/senior_seminar/13 Suggested Citation: Benjamin Dubow. "Ethnicity, Space, and Politics in Afghanistan." University of Pennsylvania, Urban Studies Program. 2009. This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/senior_seminar/13 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Ethnicity, Space, and Politics in Afghanistan Abstract The 2004 election was a disaster. For all the unity that could have come from 2001, the election results shattered any hope that the country had overcome its fractures. The winner needed to find a way to unite a country that could not be more divided. In Afghanistan’s Panjshir Province, runner-up Yunis Qanooni received 95.0% of the vote. In Paktia Province, incumbent Hamid Karzai received 95.9%. Those were only two of the seven provinces where more than 90% or more of the vote went to a single candidate. Two minor candidates who received less than a tenth of the total won 83% and 78% of the vote in their home provinces. For comparison, the most lopsided state in the 2004 United States was Wyoming, with 69% of the vote going to Bush. This means Wyoming voters were 1.8 times as likely to vote for Bush as were Massachusetts voters. Paktia voters were 120 times as likely to vote for Karzai as were Panjshir voters.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Laws and Ethnic Accommodation: Why Cross-Ethnic Coalitions Have Failed to Institutionalize in Afghanistan
    Political Laws and Ethnic Accommodation: Why Cross-Ethnic Coalitions Have Failed to Institutionalize in Afghanistan Mohammad Bashir Mobasher A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2017 Reading Committee: Robert Pekannen, Chair Jonathan Eddy, Co-Chair James Long Scott Radnitz Leigh Anderson Program Authorized to Offer Degree: School of Law © Copyright 2017 Mohammad Bashir Mobasher University of Washington ABSTRACT Political Laws and Ethnic Accommodation: Why Cross-Ethnic Coalitions Have Failed to Institutionalize in Afghanistan Mohammad Bashir Mobasher Chairs of the Supervisory Committee: Professor Robert Pekannen – Jackson School of International Studies Professor Jonathan Eddy – School of Law Afghanistan suffers from an ethnic-based and fragmented party system. Although some cross-ethnic coalitions have emerged, especially during the presidential elections, these coalitions have failed to survive across elections and branches of government. As for what explains the failure of the consolidation of coalitions, some scholars pointed to the SNTV system and others to the presidential system. This study examines all related institutional designs, including the SNTV system for parliamentary elections, the runoff system for presidential elections, the presidential system, dual vice presidency, and party qualification thresholds. These systems and institutions are designed by three bodies of political laws: the Constitution, electoral laws, and party laws. Analyzing these laws and institutional designs, this study makes three observations. First, the failure of coalitions to institutionalize in Afghanistan is not due to a single political law or institutional design but due to the influence of a number of them. Second, for cross-ethnic coalitions to institutionalize, all related institutional designs must act cohesively or else they fail to incentivize coalition-building, as is the case in Afghanistan.
    [Show full text]
  • Over a Century of Persecution: Massive Human Rights Violation Against Hazaras in Afghanistan
    OVER A CENTURY OF PERSECUTION: MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION AGAINST HAZARAS IN AFGHANISTAN CONCENTRATED ON ATTACKS OCCURRED DURING THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT PREPARED BY: MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN HASRAT DATE: FEBRUARY,2019 ABBREVIATIONS AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission ALP Afghan Local Police ANA Afghanistan National Army ANBP Afghanistan National Border Police ANP Afghanistan National Police ANSF Afghanistan National Security Forces ANDS Afghanistan National Directorate of Security BBC British Broadcasting Corporation DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade EU European Union HRW Human Rights Watch IDE Improvised Explosive Devices IDP Internal Displaced Person ISAF International Security Assistance Force IS-PK Islamic state- Khorasan Province MP Member of Parliament NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organizations NUG National Unity Government PC Provincial Council UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNDP United Nations Development Programmes I TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….…1 2. SECURITY CONTEXT OF AFGHANISTAN …………………………………………………………………………….….…3 3. METHODOLOGY…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………6 4. THE EXTENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION AGAINST HAZARAS IN AFGHANISTAN....6 5. TARGET KILLING AND ORCHESTRATED ATTACK...………………………....…….………….………………….11 a. THE TALIBAN ATTACKS ON JAGHORI, UROZGAN AND MALISTAN…...…................………….….…11 b. SUICIDE ATTACKS ON MAIWAND WRESTLING CLUB..................................................................................16
    [Show full text]
  • Hazara Stories of Settlement, Success and Separation
    8 FROM DAHMARDA TO DANDENONG VIA DENPASSAR Hazara stories of settlement, success and separation Laurel Mackenzie The chapter draws on interviews conducted with three post-settlement refugee Hazaras living in Victoria who described their journeys from Afghanistan to Australia. These interview participants saw themselves as having overcome obstacles and hardships to arrive at a place of active participation in Australian life. All three interviewees described themselves as successful, having achieved their goals of escape, resettlement and – in most cases – family reunification. This last is significant as all three narratives highlight the importance of family, rather than simply being stories of individual effort. The driving motivation of each story’s protagonist was clearly to bring their families to safety: individual success or happiness in each case is bound up with that of family and community. The narratives in this chapter reveal a shared humanity as the people in them describe resettlement experiences both as triumphs and difficulties. Underlying each of these stories is the invisible hand of Australian immigration policy, which provides the legal context in which people seek asylum in Australia. The experience of coming to Australia is not just an experience of emergent immigrant identity, but also includes the 169 REFUGEE JOURNEYS shattering encounter with immigration policy that indefinitely detains people and causes families to be heartbreakingly separated. Excerpts from Salmi’s, Hassan’s and Jahan’s narratives give a sense of how policy frameworks manifest in the lived experiences of real people. To further emphasise the real-life impact of policy on human lives, their stories are framed here in the context of their embodied interviews, drawing attention not just to the events contained within the stories, but to the act of telling and sharing the stories as part of lived experience.
    [Show full text]
  • Issues of Hazara Community and Sectarianism in Quetta (Pakistan)
    IMPACT: Journal of Modern Developments in Social Sciences Research (IMPACT: JMDSSR) Vol. 1, Issue 1, Jun 2017, 45-54 © Impact Journals ISSUES OF HAZARA COMMUNITY AND SECTARIANISM IN QUETTA (PAKISTAN) RAB NAWAZ 1 & NAVEED UL HASSAN 2 1Research Scholar, School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-I-Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan 2Research Scholar, University of Peshawar, Pakistan ABSTRACT Almost 500,000 to 550,000 people of Hazara community of Quetta, Baluchistan are facing sectarianism. Historically the people of Hazara community are peace loving, law abiding and hard working citizens of Pakistan. They are loyal with Pakistan and are serving different departments of Pakistan. The well known banned terrorist organization named Lashkar e Jhangvi claims public responsibility of Hazara Shia killing in Quetta and profess it as a major objective of their organization until annihilation of the Hazara Shia people from Pakistan. Similarly Hazara community facing many other serious problems to protect themselves from terrorism: Inability of Pakistani state to take legal actions against terrorist who does sectarian killings, different government’s tendency to support militant and terrorist organizations and individuals also for so called strategic objectives. Many families migrated not only in other cities of Pakistan like Peshawar and Karachi but also from Pakistan to Australia and other countries. In this situation the Hazara Shia community must do something for self protection and advocacy for their safety with governmental help. In last ten years they had done many efforts through lawful file suits, media awareness for their rights and through other legal tactics. This document focused some incidents of terrorist activities against Hazara Shia community in Quetta.
    [Show full text]
  • The Dissipation of Political Capital Among Afghanistan's Hazaras
    Working Paper no. 51 THE DISSIPATION OF POLITICAL CAPITAL AMONG AFGHANISTAN’S HAZARAS : 2001-2009 Niamatullah Ibrahimi Crisis States Research Centre June 2009 Crisis States Working Papers Series No.2 ISSN 1749-1797 (print) ISSN 1749-1800 (online) Copyright © N. Ibrahimi, 2009 24 Crisis States Research Centre The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009 Niamatullah Ibrahimi Crisis States Research Centre Introduction Since its establishment in 1989 Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan (The Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan) has been an important political and military player in Afghanistan. Like most contemporary major political parties in Afghanistan, Hizb-e Wahdat is rooted in the turbulent period of the anti-Soviet resistance movements in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It was formed to bring together nine separate and mostly inimical military and ideological groups into a single entity. During the period of the civil war in the early 1990s, it emerged as one of the major actors in Kabul and some other parts of the country. Political Islamism was the ideology of most of its key leaders but it gradually tilted towards its Hazara ethnic support base and became the key vehicle of the community’s political demands and aspirations. Its ideological background and ethnic support base has continuously shaped its character and political agenda. Through the jihad and the civil war, Wahdat accumulated significant political capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras, which arguably could have been spent in the establishment of long-lasting political institutions in Afghanistan. By 2009, however, Wahdat was so fragmented and divided that the political weight it carried in the country bore little resemblance to what it had once been.
    [Show full text]
  • The Multi-Layered Minority: Exploring the Intersection of Gender, Class and Religious-Ethnic Affiliation in the Marginalisation of Hazara Women in Pakistan
    CREID INTERSECTIONS SERIES Religious Inequalities and Gender The Multi-Layered Minority: Exploring the Intersection of Gender, Class and Religious-Ethnic Affiliation in the Marginalisation of Hazara Women in Pakistan Sadiqa Sultan, Maryam Kanwer and Jaffer Abbas Mirza December 2020 Part of the CREID Intersection Series Collection on Violence and Discrimination Against Women of Religious Minority Backgrounds in Pakistan About CREID The Coalition for Religious Equality and Inclusive Development (CREID) provides research evidence and delivers practical programmes which aim to redress poverty, hardship, and exclusion resulting from discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief. CREID is an international consortium led by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and funded by UK aid from the UK Government. Key partners include Al-Khoei Foundation, Minority Rights Group (MRG), and Refcemi. Find out more: www.ids.ac.uk/creid. © Institute of Development Studies 2020 Front cover image credit: Surian Soosay CC BY-2.0 ISBN: 978-1-78118-728-9 DOI: 10.19088/CREID.2020.005 This is an Open Access paper distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence (CC BY), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source are credited and any modifications or adaptations are indicated. Available from: Coalition for Religious Equality and Inclusive Development (CREID), Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Brighton BN1 9RE, UK Tel: +44(0) 1273 915704
    [Show full text]
  • From Boats to Businesses
    From Boats to Businesses The Remarkable Journey of Hazara Refugee Entrepreneurs in Adelaide Full Report By Professor Jock Collins and Dr Katherine Watson (UTS Business School) and Associate Professor Branka Krivokapic-Skoko (CSU School of Management) Centre for Business and Social Innovation Corresponding Author: Katherine Watson [email protected] © 2017 University of Technology Sydney Acknowledgements We would like to thank all those who assisted in the fieldwork for this report. In particular Aref Ahmadi, who was our key link to the Adelaide Hazara business community and without whom this research would not be possible. Aref drove us to the interviews and provided the bridge of trust that enabled the informants to open up to us about their remarkable journeys from boat people to business people. We would also like to thank Multicultural Youth South Australia Inc (MYSA) and Tamara Stewart-Jones who linked us to Aref and provided the transport for our fieldwork in Adelaide. Finally we thank the informants, the Hazara refugee entrepreneur informants in Adelaide, whose stories and experiences comprise the bulk of this report. Because of human research ethical safeguards and procedures, we do not name them in this report, but we are forever indebted to them for the warmth, friendliness and hospitality that they showed us and for the trust that they placed in us to tell their story. Citation for this report Collins, J., Watson, K. and Krivokapic- Skoko, B. 2017, From Boats to Businesses: the Remarkable Journey of Hazara Refugee Entrepreneurs in Adelaide: Full Report, Centre for Business and Social Innovation, UTS Business School: Sydney.
    [Show full text]
  • Creativity Strategies in the Hazara Struggle Toward Identity and Healing
    Confronting Misconstrued Histories: Creativity Strategies in the Hazara Struggle toward Identity and Healing Farzana Marie This paper explores creative means of nonviolent social struggle among the Hazara people of Afghanistan as an effective and widespread response to the violence and oppression they have endured for more than a century both in and outside of Afghanistan. Systematic eth- nic and religious persecution against Hazaras, who are majority Shi’a, by extremist Sunni, usually Pashtun groups has attempted to destroy their culture and belittle their identity. However, despite available means of armed resistance, most Hazaras have seen violence as a last resort and have chosen to creatively confront their situation in more subtle yet powerful ways such as education, academic research, political activism, and the arts. At their core, these strategies serve not only as means of resistance, but more importantly as a way to collectively acknowledge and remember lost history, recreate lost identity, and thereby open the way for healing. Acknowledgments The nature of the subject naturally led to a unique research approach. While a variety of written primary and secondary sources provided an essential understanding of historical narratives and debates, the lifeblood of my argument and insights flows from interviews with a number of Hazara leaders, public figures, and activists in several fields and diverse locations from Kabul to Australia and Norway. I am indebted to these consultants for their insights and thankful for the time spent in discussion of these topics, leading to a much-refined understanding. All 86 | Arizona Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies | Volume 2 | Spring 2013 material is used by permission.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan's Ethnic Divides
    CIDOB POLICY RESEARCH PROJECT “SOURCES OF TENSION IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE” AFGHANISTAN’S ETHNIC DIVIDES Abubakar Siddique January 2012 WITH THE SUPPORT OF 1 AFGHANISTAN’S ETHNIC DIVIDES Abubakar Siddique Senior Correspondent covering Afghanistan and Pakistan for RFE/RL's. He has spent the past decade researching and writing about security, political, humanitarian and cultural issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Pashtun heartland along the border region where he was born." A Tapestry of Ethnicities Afghanistan’s national anthem recognizes 14 ethnic groups among the country’s 27 million people: Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Balochis, Turkmens, Nooristanis, Pamiris, Arabs, Gujars, Brahuis, Qizilbash, Aimaq and Pashai. Few groups are indigenous to Afghanistan; most of the larger ones have significantly greater populations in neighboring countries. Governing a viable state with these demographics has always been a core challenge. Maintaining harmony among these groups is one of the biggest problems confronting Afghanistan today and a key determinant of whether its future is to be one of peace and reconciliation or conflict and discord. The largest group, the Pashtuns, have many more members in neighbor- ing Pakistan. The Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens are much more numerous in the contiguous Central Asian countries to the north.1 Nevertheless, as a people, Afghans do have a sense of nationhood despite their lack of a uniform national culture. Their shared history together with the country’s unique historical development clearly distinguishes the various ethnic groups living in Afghanistan from those in neighboring countries. But their ties also link Afghans with ethnic conflicts in neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan.
    [Show full text]