ﻭﺣﺪﺓ ﺍﻟﻔﻜﺮ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺎﺻﺮ

Unit of Contemporary Political Thought www.kfcris.com

A monthly report issued by the Unit of Contemporary Political Thought for the analysis and evaluation of crucial events in the Islamic world

Iranian Presidential Elections, 2013

- Factions, Personalities and Contrasts in the late post- Khomeini period.

- Run-up to 2013 Elections. - The New President: Background Profile and Relationship with other bodies. - The New President: His views on Iranian Foreign Policy Perspective (in terms of the regional neighbors). - Rowhani and Nuclear Issue

Issue 3, June,2013 © KFCRIS, 2013 or over three decades, presidential elections in FIran have been a defining moment of transition in different political periods of the Islamic Republic. A unique state institution, the presidency in Iran is at once hampered by constitutional restrictions on the power and authority of its incumbent and a desired target for factions internal to the political regime and ambitious politicians alike.

The eleventh presidential elections of the Islamic Republic were held on June 15 2013 and presented several marked differences with respect to the previous presidential contest of 12 June 2009. The most visible of these was the absence of any sizable instances of violence, both before and after the poll, and of any intra-elite strife. None of the campaign teams furthermore produced complaints on broad or systematic fraud, and accepted the results swiftly. All of this is in marked contrast with four years ago, when two of the four final candidates, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, voiced concern about the possibility of wide scale falsification of the electoral results prior to the vote and then effectively never recognized the validity of the results released by the Interior ministry, setting off the wave of protest, strife and inner-regime crisis that are yet to be fully resolved.

This issue of Masarat will focus on the recent presidential elections to better predict the future of Iranian foreign policy and its nuclear program. 4

Elections: “Presidents of Iran (1989-2013)”

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani Mohammad Khatami Elections Rafsanjani is a centrist, pragmatic and conservative poli- Khatami is a reformist politician and the 5th President tician and the 4th president of Iran from August 1989 to of Iran from August 1997 to August 2005. Khatami won August 1997. by 70% of the votes. He was re-elected to a second term in June 2001.

Policy Rafsanjani’s clout and influence within the political By the time Khatami won a landslide in the elections system had derived, during the Eighties, from the fact of 1997, the Islamic Republic’s political elite was divided that he was seen as the necessary conduit for inner-re- into two broad and heterogeneous umbrella definitions: a gime stability by both of the emerging factions. When group called jenah-e rast, or “right-wing faction”, and one thrust into a powerful executive position, Rafsanjani correspondingly called jenah-e chap, or “left-wing faction”. at once was bereft of the support of a dedicated faction Once in power, Khatami fell prey to limitations and ob- within Parliament, a factor which led to a long period stacles similar to those which had hampered Rafsanjani’s of repeated obstruction by the left-wing parliamentary quest for authority. Despite having a clear and well-organ- majority, which sought to stymie Rafsanjani’s economic ised group of inner-elite supporters, which later assumed the plans, most prominently his attempts to secure foreign name of “reformists’, Khatami was not the head of any party, financing for the state’s reconstruction efforts and his at- nor did he share the more radical outlook of some of the key tempts to woo the exiled entrepreneurs of the Shah’s era. elements of the reformist group. Program Nuclear Iran worked with Russian institutions to improve Germany, France and the United Kingdom (EU-3) Iranian missiles and allowed IAEA inspections to visit played a key role in persuading Iran to suspend enrichment nuclear sites. activities. Iran declared that it will cooperate with the IAEA by signing a protocol to report to the agency on its activities and to allow its inspectors to visit nuclear sites in the country. Policy Foreign Rafsanjani played a key role in improving ties with Khatami improved Iran’s relations with Western coun- Arab countries. He also tried to establish relations with tries as he was known to be a supporter of a “dialogue some Western countries. among civilizations”, hence, pushing for conciliation in- stead of confrontation.

Foreign Policy: Issue 3, June,2013 Foreign Policy: Mohammad Khatami:

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Mahmoud Ahmadinajad

Ahmadinejad was a populist and rambunctious political up- start who had suddenly become Tehran mayor in 2003 and who embodied the style of life and aspirations of the lower middle Hassan Rowhani class. Through notorious and well-timed slogan, he managed to garner enough inner-elite and popular support to defeat Hashemi Rafsanjani, whom had entered the race assured of an easy ride to victory. He was the 6th president of Iran from August 2005 to Rowhani, a moderate conservative, won more than 50% of August 2013. He was re-elected to a second term in 2009. the vote.

By 2005, the weakness of the reformist factions to effectively Rowhani’s regional policies are to be seen as sharp change govern the country had become apparent to the electorate, which with respect to those hitherto pursued by both Ahmadinejad aspired, once again, to perform a clean break with the past. For and Jalili in style as well as partially in substance, but a sharp reasons similar to the ones which led to a build-up of support for U-turn from the objectives nurtured by the Islamic Republic in Khatami in 1997, namely that of punishing the incumbent faction theaters such as Iraq and Syria should not be expected. and starting a new era, voters turned, with less enthusiasm, to Mah- moud Ahmadinejad. Rowhani is expected to make use of his considerable reputa- Despite emerging as the candidate of choice of the right- tion within Western capitals to strike a deal on the nuclear issue, wing in the elections of 2009, Ahmadinejad lack of synergy although through the guiding principle of instilling “confidence” and cooperation with nearly all other state bodies came to a rather than backtracking on achievements such as the enrich- head between 2011-2013, when the president was repeatedly ment of uranium. He will also rely on the trust he accrued in his hampered by the rise of inner-regime criticism to his rule. stint as chief nuclear negotiator to compel the European nations to resume negotiations with Iran at the foreign minister level.

After the elections, Iran appointed Ali Larijani as the Chief Ira- nian nuclear negotiator and removed seals on its uranium enrich- As his recent books, “National Security and Nuclear Diplo- ment equipment in Isfahan. In 2006, Ahmadinejad declared that macy” and “National Security and Economic Development” at- Iran managed successfully to enrich uranium. test, he is also by far the incoming president with more direct ex- perience in the international arena, and appreciation of the need to adopt active diplomacy to safeguard Iran’s national interest. He is likely to use his first trip abroad, which shall most During his first four years, the president sought to stamp his probably be the UN General Assembly in New York in Septem- authority across the state system by laying off hundreds to top- ber, to attempt to mend fences with European countries such as level state managers and administrators and by engaging in a Great Britain, and reopen the respective embassies. robust foreign policy rhetoric which sought to assert him as the most prominent politician of the Muslim Third World.

Foreign Policy: Issue 3, June,2013 www.kfcris.com 6

Factions, Personalities and Contrasts in the late post-Khomeini period

n order to understand the reasons for such different outcomes between the two successive Ipresidential elections, a look at the ideological rivalries and conflicts which have charac- terized Iranian domestic politics during the past decade is necessary.

The rise to power of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 accentuated the growing divide between Khomeini’s followers which had been seeded while the founding father of the Islamic Repub- lic was still alive and had blossomed in the de- cade following his death in 1989. By the time Khatami won a landslide in the elections of 1997, the Islamic Republic’s political elite was divided into two broad and heterogeneous um- brella definitions: a group called jenah-e rast, or “right-wing faction”, and one correspondingly called jenah-e chap, or “left-wing faction”. Fac- tion is a term which has to be used with care: despite coalescing around a set of common goals and outlooks, the constituent elements of each faction rarely maintained or upheld orga- nizational unity and often were bereft of a cen- tralized command structure, such as a central committee or council tasked and entrusted with taking decisions for the rest of the jenah. In- not rooted in the corresponding Western politi- stead, the various parties and groups belonging cal ideologies but rather in the economic realm. to a given faction come together in the run-up The right-wing mainly emerged from within the to key events such as presidential elections, to ranks of the mercantile associations which sup- jointly back a candidate, or to create a loosely- ported and buttressed Khomeini’s rise to power. allied electoral list for parliamentary elections. They included bazaari elements and social con- Furthermore, the right-left denominations are servatives. Despite their “right-wing” moniker,

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these groups at times exhibited less xenophobia MPs by the Guardian Council. and anti-Americanism than the left-wing, which By 2005, the reformist movement had large- repeatedly stymied Rafsanjani’s attempts at se- ly failed in its attempt to give structural founda- curing IMF financing for his early reconstruc- tions to the core components of its political ide- tion projects in the early 1990s or even called ology, the freedom of expression and genuine upon him to officially recognize the short-lived competitive elections, and had been largely de- Soviet coup administration in 1990 or support serted by the electorate, which chose apathy and Saddam in the first Gulf war the following year. a sudden interest for the combative populism of By 1997, the left-wing had toned down its Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Tehran mayor who anti-Western stance and had made use of its registered a shock victory in the presidential ejection from power following the 1992 Majles race of that year. Ahmadinejad’s win in those elections to develop a new discourse, which elections, and more prominently his success in became known as the eslah-talab, or reformist the second round against Hashemi Rafsanjani, aim. Over the following 8 years, the reform- came as a consequence of both Rafsanjani’s ists made an attempt to group under a smaller waning popularity and the decision by several number of organizations, and initially suc- elements within the political system to use their ceeded in creating a new front, called the Par- influence to ensure Ahmadinejad’s victory. ticipation Front (Jebheh Mosharekat), which The victory of Ahmadinejad in the 2005 won the lion’s share of the reformist majority presidential elections did not result in the cre- in the Sixth Majles (2000-2004). However, by ation of a compact, united conservative fac- the admission of the Mosharekat leaders, in- tion backing the president. Despite being in the cluding the president’s brother, Reza Khatami, hands of the conservatives who wrestled away the president never saw himself as the leader of control of the Parliament from the reformists, the Mosharekat or of any other reformist forma- Ahmadinejad was not considered by the conser- tion and chose to superimpose his own standing vatives as their flag bearer, as indicated by the within the state system rather than to lead a fac- four months which were necessary to complete tion. This led to a considerable amount of fric- the creation of the first Ahmadinejad cabinet in tion and lack of cooperation between the Parlia- 2005. As shall be seen in more detail below, by ment and the president between 2000 and 2004 2013 the conservatives loosely clustered sev- and, more importantly, to the organization, by eral key themes, such as steadfast loyalty to the government, of the parliamentary elections the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, of 2004; despite the prevailing view, within the a decidedly socially conservative outlook, and, Mosharekat and the Mojahedin-e Enqelab for- especially, common aversion to the reformists, mations, that the Interior ministry should refrain who were held mostly responsible for the post- from organizing the same, due to the undue dis- 2009 disturbances. This latter trait was the ma- qualification of a considerable number of sitting jor factor in their definition. • • •

Issue 3, June,2013 www.kfcris.com القرض��اوي: إي��ران عدوتنا

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Run-up to 2013 Elections:

he events following the 2009 elections views. They also managed to instill a sense of Tconsiderably restricted the variety of distance and separation between them and the factions described above. The reformist fac- more unpopular elements of the ruling class, tion was mutilated through the arrest of some such as the Supreme Leader himself and the of its top cadres, the dissolution of two main Guardian Council. In short, the reformist lead- formations, the Mosharekat and the Mojahedin- ership succeeded, despite the myriad limitations e Enqelab organizations, and the creation of and repressive policies levied against them, to wide ranging limitations on the political activi- continuously assert itself as an active political ties of the top leadership. Its two main leaders, force which could not be weeded away from the former presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and the body politic of the Islamic Republic in the Mohammad Khatami effectively ceased to hold same way the aforementioned and other non- public gatherings after July 2009 and were lim- clerical groups were successfully routed from ited to talk to audiences who would visit their the political scene during the first decade of the offices, at times with considerable security Islamic Republic. restrictions. The two presidential candidates, In full control of all state institutions after the Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, re-election of Ahmadinejad, the conservative witnessed the start of their detention, incom- front was ultimately enfeebled by the loose and municado, in their private residences after the aloof nature of its internal organization. Presi- 25 Bahman demonstrations. dent Ahmadinejad’s lack of a solid power base Yet the very nature of Iranian politics en- within the right-wing, which had manifested sured that the reformist faction would not un- itself at various instances during his first man- dergo the same fate of the previous dissident date, became more apparent and finally burst and antagonist movements, such as the Mojahe- into the open in 2011, when his closest associ- din-e Khalq (MKO) or Tudeh Party in the early ates, including aides such as Esfandiar Rahim- Eighties. The looseness of the bonds linking the Mashai and Abbas Amirifar, were relentlessly top leadership to the persecuted organizations vilified by conservative media and politicians, meant that the leaders were effectively capable who accused them of being a “deviant current” of maintaining relevance and popularity with- which aspired, through sorcery and witchcraft, out needing the support and even operation of to control the president and turn him into an the political organizations which had backed antagonistic force to the entire edifice of the them. Both Khatami and Rafsanjani succeeded Islamic Republic. The developments of 2011, in maintaining and regularly updating their per- which started with a failed attempt by Ahma- sonal websites and ensure that newspapers and dinejad to remove his minister of intelligence, websites sympathetic to them would air their effectively brought an end to any realistic hope

Issue 3, June,2013

على م��دى يومني )11-12 يناير 2013( احت�ضنت جامعة SOAS م��� ًؤمت��را ًدوليا عن اليمن بعنوان )اليمن: حتديات من �أجل امل�ستقبل(، وقدمت يف امل�ؤمتر قرابة 40 ورقة علمية �شملت املحاور التالية: • اليمن: العتبارات الإقليمية والعاملية، 9

for a transition from the outgoing president to a joint presidential candidate. Such a choice did close ally. not emerge due to strong personal differences The scene was therefore set for the rise to and a clannish-based organization which ulti- power of the mainstream conservative groups, mately fostered short-lived coalitions between those which coalesced, in early 2012, in the different personalities. Besides the aforemen- United Principalist Front, which selected Ali tioned 2+1 and 5+1 coalitions, the Endurance Larijani as speaker of the Parliament. Auspices Front (Jebheh Paydari), formed by former Ah- for the elevation of a single, strong conserva- madinejad allies and associates, united by their tive candidate were reinforced by the creation common admiration and subservience to the of a powerful three-person coalition, called the maverick and controversial Ayatollah Mesbah “Progress Alliance” or informally the 2+1. This Yazdi, also entered the presidential race with was composed of the Tehran Mayor Moham- its own candidate, Kamran Bagheri Lankarani, mad Baqer Qalibaf, the former Majlis speaker the youthful Health minister of the first Ahma- Gholam Ali Haddad Adel, and the former long- dinejad administration (2005-2009), who was serving foreign minister, Ali Akbar Velayati. All curiously described as a “peach” by the presi- three were considered very close to Ayatollah Ali dent during the formation process of his second Khamenei, Qalibaf having been nominated to the cabinet but did not make it there. mayoral post upon direct indication of Khame- Despite these attempts to reach a consensus nei’s office in 2006, Haddad Adel being the fa- candidate through the formation of coalitions, all ther of one of Khamenei’s daughters in law, and semblance of order and unity within the conser- Velayati having been, as seen in part 1, a very vative camp dissipated during the five-day pro- close associate of Khamenei and his first choice cess within which all prospective candidates have for the prime ministerial position in both 1981 to formally register their intention to run with the and 1985. The fickleness of such short-term po- Interior ministry. No less than 32 inner-regime litical alliances was reinforced, however, by the figures, most of them conservatives, registered to failing of the main objective of the 2+1 coalition: run. The 5+1 coalition effectively splintered af- that of choosing, as shall be seen below, a single, ter both Mottaki and other figures declined to ac- consensual candidate before voting day. cept the results of internal opinion polls. The 2+1, The conservatives’ quest for unity was fur- which had pledged to reach a decision on a single ther hampered by the emergence of another candidate before the registration window started, coalition, called the 5+1, composed of several failed to do so and ended up with all three candi- prominent conservative grandees, such as the dates registered, with the coalition’s spokesman, former foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki. who had repeatedly upheld the pledge, resigning. These divisions underscored the point that To make matters worse, conservatives who had the conservatives were bereft of internal unity been on the sidelines for years, at times decades, and rather clustered together based on their sep- and who were unaffiliated with the main forma- arate, but converging interests; namely those tions, such as the former intelligence minister, Ali of opposing the reformists, professing strict Fallahian, or the former Post and Telecommuni- loyalty to the Supreme Leader and, progres- cations minister, Mohammad Gharazi, suddenly sively, being opposed to Ahmadinejad and his registered for the competition. small camp. These converging interests should Alongside these figures, two self-styled inde- not, however, give the impression of an orga- pendent conservatives also formally entered the nized, structured group capable of deciding a fray. These were the former IRGC commander

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Mohsen Rezai, who appears to have progressive- supporters and political allies. On the first day ly cut most, if not all, of his ties and influence of the registration period, however, Mohammad within the organization after his departure from Khatami made a crucial and politically signifi- it in 1998, and Said Jalili, the hardline chief nu- cant remark by expressing his happiness at hav- clear negotiator who campaigned on a platform ing heard that Rafsanjani was about to run, and of steadfast defense of the current nuclear policy, calling him the best possible option. which has been run under his aegis since 2007, Rafsanjani’s intention to run started to gain and of a general hardline approach towards the traction after Khatami’s declaration. However, West. Jalili also made good use of irony in his the former president made his candidacy con- campaign material, which emphasized him as tingent and conditional on Khamenei’s approval the member of a “People+1” coalition, a jesting of the same. Attempts to obtain a formal accep- take on the other alliances and formations. tance by the Supreme Leader went apparently The non-conservative camp on other hand unheeded, to the extent that Rafsanjani decided, clustered around several figures who had - ten at the very last minute, to make a very heated tatively announced their intention to run in the and rambunctious appearance at the Interior months prior to the contest. Both Hassan Row- ministry without a firm statement of support by hani and Mohammad Reza Aref, had tested the the Leader. waters regarding their candidacies in lengthy Coupled with the similarly last minute and interviews with media close to their camp, such game-changing registration of Ahmadinejad’s as Mehrnameh and Aseman periodicals in the closest associate, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, the months preceding the vote. Both held high of- race was now in the hands of the Guardian Coun- fice during the Rafsanjani and Khatami admin- cil, which made full use of the 10 days period istrations and had maintained a distance from for examining the candidates’ competence. De- the leaders of the Green opposition, Mir-Hossein spite not being required or mandated to provide Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, while remaining any reason for the disqualification of candidates, within the bosom of the pragmatist-reformist the Council’s spokesman did reveal, a couple of camp and therefore identified by the general days before the period came to an end, that those public as being close to Rafsanjani and Khatami. who were considered to be of an age too old for This combination of factors made them suitable withholding the daily exertions of a president for registering to run in the elections without be- were likely to be disqualified, a remark which ing hemmed in by the conservatives’ vitriol re- turned out to be directed towards Rafsanjani. garding possible roles in the fomenting of the The remaining eight candidates’ high point of protests of 2009 and 2010, which could have led campaigning, were three live televised debates. to their disqualification by the Guardian Council. Each of them four hours long, the first two were The pragmatist-reformist camp’s plans were lack luster arguments that caused the consterna- thrown into disarray, however, by the unexpect- tion of the contenders because of the quiz-like ed and last-minute registration of the former format and lack of bite. The third one, which president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Accord- was centered on domestic and foreign policies, ing to several accounts provided since by close electrified the campaign. Held on the last Friday associates and allies, Rafsanjani had kept his before the poll, it also had the highest number cards close to his chest until the very last day of viewers. The debate quickly descended into of registration, giving the impression that he a series of rows indicative of the gap between was not willing to run despite incessant calls by the various candidates. The perception of Saeed

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Jalili being supported in an unassailable way by out the protestors through use of tear gas. He the Leader quickly dissipated as Ali Akbar Ve- then stated that he was “a jurist, not a colonel” layati launched into a fiery rebuke of his nuclear and would work towards reducing the current diplomatic strategy, by recalling that 5+1 ses- repressive security environment. sions, such as the Almaty ones, which had just Clearly sensing a growing popularity, Row- concluded, are not “philosophy classes” where hani’s task became easier on June 11, when slogans can be shouted in a hollow way. Rather, both former presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani diplomacy was to be considered the “art of give broke their silence, which had persisted since and take”; and he stated that Jalili was reticent Rafsanjani’s exclusion, and endorsed Rowhani, or unable to understand this concept. compelling Aref to withdraw from the race. The other major contest of this televised de- Their decision, which marked the first time bate was between Rowhani and Qalibaf, who since the Khatami re-election in 2001 that the discussed the 2003 student protests, when they reformist-pragmatic camp would show up com- were respectively national security advisor and pletely united at a presidential contest, was also national chief of police. Qalibaf sought to limit influenced by the realization that Rowhani was the damage caused by the leaking of the audio proving to be more and more a candidate ac- recording of a speech he made to Basij mem- ceptable to the conservative camp. The joint bers in which he had prided himself on club- intervention by the former presidents would bing protestors from his motorbike during the prove decisive, as Rowhani went on to receive protests of 1999. Rowhani retorted by reveal- 50.7% of the votes cast on election day, a sliver ing details of a still-classified session of the above the absolute majority mark but nearly National Security Council, during which he had 35% more than the votes garnered by his near- resisted a request by Qalibaf to allow the police est rival, Qalibaf. Jalili, long considered the to enter the Tehran University campus and snuff Leader’s favorite, trailed in third place. • • • The New President: Background Profile and Relationship with other bodies

orn Hassan Fereydoun in Sorkheh, the called Khomeini the «Imam», a term usually Bnew president was an early supporter reserved, within Shia Islam, to the twelve de- of Ayatollah Khomeini and remained loyal to scendants of the Prophet Muhammad, the last him during the latter’s exile in Najaf and Paris. one of whom being the occulted Twelfth Imam. Rowhani shot to fame during the funeral pro- Rowhani›s elevation of Khomeini was ceedings for the death of Mostafa Khomeini, the picked up by media and supporters of the Aya- eldest son of the founding father of the Islamic tollah, to the extent that the term became the of- Republic, in 1977. At the gathering, Rowhani ficial and standard term adopted by the Islamic

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Republic, in the same way Chairman has been Rowhani established the Center for Strategic Re- used for Mao in China or Commandante to in- search (CSR), a research institute which attracted troduce Che Guevara in Cuba. many expatriate academics and provided a fer- Soon after the revolution, Rowhani became tile ground for a relatively liberal interaction for a trusted aide and deputy of the figure who the formulation of policy recommendations on would define his worldview and ideological a range of fields. Along the way, in 1998, he ob- inclinations, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. A key tained a PhD in Law from Glasgow Caledonian architect and essential arbitrator of the growing University, thereby following other leading Ira- factional divide of the 1980s, Rafsanjani took nian state figures in obtaining distance degrees Rowhani under his wing and progressively en- from lesser-known Western universities. trusted him with military and security affairs, in- Rowhani›s role became more active in the fusing into him a clear understanding of realism Khatami period, when he waded into the domes- in foreign policy and middle of the road postures tic political sphere between 1999 and 2003, when in the domestic realm. Rafsanjani also provided he played a hitherto unclear role in the quelling Rowhani with a solid platform on the upper ech- of the student protests of those years. Whereas elons of the Majlis, where he remained uninter- there is evidence suggesting that Rowhani was ruptedly for the first five legislatures between in favor of a swift repression of the 1999 pro- 1980 and 2000. Despite remaining a member tests, an on air quarrel between him and Qalibaf, of the influential clerical organization, Jamee who was then national police chief, suggests that Rowhaniyat Mobarez, after the exit of the left- he had a more compromising posture during the leaning clerics from it in 1988, Rowhani never subsequent 2003 ones. During the same year, he became an integral member of the conservative took over the nuclear file. According to several establishment, rather choosing the trajectory books published on the issue by the CSR, in- of his mentor: proximity to the Leader, but not cluding his own 1000-page memoirs, Rowhani’s overly allegiant to any of the two factions. main concern at the time was avoiding a referral Rowhani ascended to a natural leadership of Iran’s case to the UN Security Council, where position in 1989. The constitutional revision of he was certain sanctions would be levied against that year resulted in the creation of the Supreme the country. Aware of the importance and wide- National Security Council, a new body tasked, ranging effect of these sanctions, Rowhani there- much like its American counterpart, with as- fore engaged in walking a tightrope between the sisting the Supreme Leader and the newly re- West’s distrust towards Iran’s real aims and the inforced presidency in making key national se- goal of avoiding an end to the country’s nuclear curity decisions. Rafsanjani›s ascendancy and dreams. In the end, Rowhani prevailed with the Rowhani›s proximity to the latter made him the Supreme Leader to accept an interruption in the natural choice for heading the SNSC. Rowhani›s most sensitive part of the program, the produc- wily realism became apparent as the Rafsanjani tion of enriched uranium. It was under Row- administration adopted a balanced foreign pol- hani’s watch that Iran signed what are its only icy which led to the rebuffing of the left-wing nuclear agreements to date with the West: the faction›s attempts to foster an intervention on Paris, Tehran and Brussels declarations of 2003 Saddam›s side in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. In and 2004. Despite not representing a break- his role as Majlis MP, he openly berated such a through, they provided a rare backtracking of move, as one which would endanger and greatly Iran on the nuclear issue and the sole instance harm Iran’s national interest. In the mid Nineties, where the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei agreed

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to provide his open consent to Western demands. president in the summer of 2005, Ahmadinejad Rowhani recounts in his hefty nuclear memoirs insisted on Iran paying the bulk of the IAEA’s that as the crucial Tehran talks between him and budget as a way of securing permanent positive the EU-3 foreign ministers were locked in stale- influence in its governing board. mate at noon, his team suddenly realized that Rowhani is therefore an establishment fig- matters could swiftly move towards a marked ure, with extensive experience in the most sen- deterioration, and even the start of military activ- sitive realms of statecraft and with a proven ity against Iran, should the EU-3 ministers return track record of succeeding in obtaining the home empty handed. He therefore took the ini- Supreme Leader›s support, albeit one which tiative of contacting both the Supreme Leader’s lapsed during the initial phases of the Ahma- office and president Khatami, both sides provid- dinejad administration. He was, therefore, an ing their agreement for the basis of the Tehran ideal choice of the political elite in need of a Declaration - the suspension of uranium enrich- figure who could heal and bridge fissures and ment by Iran for a limited period. divisions which have been enlarged by the cri- By 2005, however, Rowhani’s star had sis of the past four years. In this sense, Row- waned in the Iranian political firmament which hani is a belated political heir to his mentor. was strongly shaken up by Mahmoud Ahma- Furthermore, his extensive experience in man- dinejad’s victory in the elections of the same aging top-level research at the CSR also makes year. The shock defeat of Rafsanjani in the run- him the first incoming Iranian president to as- off also meant that those high state officials af- cend to the position with a thorough insight on filiated to him would fall from power. A firm the theoretical underpinnings of economic de- believer in the “treason” of Rowhani’s nuclear velopment and reform and international diplo- team, Ahmadinejad swiftly moved to replace macy. As his recent books, “National Security Rowhani at the helm of the SNSC with a like- and Nuclear Diplomacy” and “National Secu- minded conservative, Ali Larijani, and attempt rity and Economic Development” attest, he is to drag Rowhani’s closest confidantes to justice. also by far the incoming president with more Cyrus Nasseri, a skilled negotiator, was forced direct experience in the international arena, and to flee to Geneva, while Seyyed Hossein Mousa- appreciation of the need to adopt active diplo- vian was arrested on espionage charges and later macy to safeguard Iran’s national interest. Con- acquitted. Rowhani’s sole port of call became scious of the hopes and confidence given to him the CSR, which progressively was filled with by the core reformist electorate who voted for high level diplomats and politicians who found Mousavi and Karroubi in 2009, Rowhani will themselves at the fringes of political life after also have to deliver on his pledge to loosen the Ahmadinejad’s purges. Rowhani himself brave- security atmosphere and the restrictions on in- ly fought back, openly criticizing Ahmadine- tellectual and political life which have become jad’s fiery remarks on Israel and the Holocaust, a staple of the past eight years. Lastly, he will which shattered the thin wall of trust that he had have to assuage influential stakeholders such as built with the Europeans, and berated the new the Leader and the Revolutionary Guards that president’s economic policies. In his memoirs, he does not represent a challenge or threat to published initially in 2011, he also provides a their dominant position. graphic description of Ahmadinejad’s parochial The extent of Rowhani›s success on the understanding of international affairs by narrat- points just described depends on his ability to ing how, in his only meeting with the incoming bridge the still considerable divide between

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the various factions, who have been curiously icy decisions and indicate that he has received jostling on his affiliation in the past few days a free hand on the nuclear issue by Khamenei. and effectively calling him “one of their own”. The relationship between Rowhani and While the reformist press has been hailing his Khamenei is likely to be grounded in the trust victory as a sign of the return of the influence Khamenei afforded Rowhani during the latter’s of Khatami and Rafsanjani in government, the handling of the nuclear file between 2003 and hardline Kayhan has emphasized Rowhani›s 2005. Perhaps aware of the damage caused by hawkish postures during the 1999 protests to the intransigent attitude of Jalili during the past underscore his affiliation with the conservative seven years, Khamenei might be willing to as- wing. A senior clerical representative of Khame- sign the file back to Rowhani, with the proviso nei with the IRGC, which has remained largely that none of Iran’s major achievements, includ- silent with regards to the unfolding events of ing the enrichment of uranium, be scaled back in- the presidential election, also stated his confi- definitely. The two, however, will face a key test dence in Rowhani and called him a “critic” of in their relationship when Rowhani will decide the status quo who was, however, grounded in to broach the issue of the continued house incar- usul which made him capable of working in ceration of Mousavi and Karroubi. The libera- tandem with the Leader. tion of the two reformist candidates of 2009 was Despite its leadership probably backing a major demand of the crowds which thronged other candidates, such as Qalibaf and Jalili in Rowhani’s main campaign events and who took the presidential contest, it is therefore unlikely part in the street celebrations in Tehran and other that the IRGC will, in the first phase of the new major cities after his electoral victory and even government, voice any significant opposition after the national football team’s qualification to to it, due to the swift acceptance and endorse- the World Cup. Rowhani has been ambiguous ment of the electoral results by both the Guard- on the issue both during campaigning and dur- ian Council and the Supreme Leader. It should ing his first press conference as president-elect, be also noted here that Rowhani has probably appearing to indicate that it will take time before kept contact with the IRGC in his role as one such an issue can be discussed. He did, however, of the Supreme Leader’s representatives within mention a few weeks ago that the order to place the SNSC to date and has steered clear of being or remove the two from house arrest was issued labeled as a supporter of the “sedition” of 2009 by the SNSC. His renewed control over the latter by, for example, backing the heavy handed reac- body could therefore result in an acceleration of tion to the protests of February 2011, which led the case for their liberation. to the incarceration of Mousavi and Karroubi. Rowhani will likely rely on Rafsanjani and However, the extent to which Rowhani has the Khatami-era politicians, such as Mohammad backing of them will emerge when the succes- Reza Nowbakht, Ali Younesi, Mahmud Vaezi, sor to Saeed Jalili as secretary of the National and Akbar Torkan, in his key decision making. Security Council will be known. Jalili is not ex- However, it is likely that he will refrain from pected to remain in his position for much lon- leaning upon any of the more radical reform- ger, and there are rumors that either Velayati or ists, such as the members of the Mosharekat and the current foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, Enqelab-e Eslami, to avoid causing the conster- might replace him. Such an appointment would nation of the IRGC and the conservative groups strengthen Rowhani’s influence in foreign pol- clustered around Khamenei.

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The New President: His views on Iranian Foreign Policy Perspective (in terms of the regional neighbors)

owhani is an avowed realist who was possibly the most esteem and personal warmth Rmany times indicated his belief that in ties of any Iranian political figure in Saudi Iran must have correct relations with the entire Arabia. He then stated that he intends to make international community, with the exception of use of this personal capital in his attempt to re- Israel, in order to further its national interest. establish the trust Iran has lost during the past He is therefore likely to use his first trip abroad, eight years. Rowhani however did not show which shall most probably be the UN General signs of aspiring to dramatic changes in Iranian Assembly in New York in September, to at- foreign policy when it came to Syria. After ex- tempt to mend fences with European countries pressing support for the Assad regime’s inten- such as Great Britain, and reopen the respective tion to hold what it deems to be free elections in embassies. He will also rely on the trust he ac- 2014, Rowhani essentially buttressed the Iranian crued in his stint as chief nuclear negotiator to establishment’s overall line on support for the compel the European nations to resume nego- Assad regime. Nevertheless, several European tiations with Iran at the foreign minister level. governments, including the French and Italian During his first press conference as president- ones, stated their belief that his administration’s elect, Rowhani also referred to the relationship presence at the Geneva peace talks will be a ne- between the Iran and the US as a “very old cessity, and that Iran needs to be dragged into wound” which needs to be healed. the main diplomatic efforts from now onwards. He also devoted special attention to replying In short, Rowhani’s regional policies are to in detail to a question posed by the Al Jazeera be seen as a sharp change with respect to those journalist on what the countries of the Gulf can hitherto pursued by both Ahmadinejad and expect from him. Rowhani reminded his audi- Jalili, in style as well as partially in substance, ence that he was the main negotiator of the Iran- but a sharp U-turn from the objectives nurtured Saudi Arabia Security Pact of 1999, and that, by the Islamic Republic in theaters such as Iraq together with his mentor, Rafsanjani he enjoys and Syria should not be expected. • • •

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Rowhani and Nuclear Issue

Rowhani’s election as president marks a West over the former’s nuclear program was of possible sharp change in the direction of the a political, rather than legal or technical nature. nuclear issue. Between 2003 and 2005, Row- Rowhani voiced this concept also at a speech hani handled the nuclear file on behalf of the to the Supreme Cultural Revolution. It, there- rest of the Iranian leadership. He was not as- fore, had to be resolved at the political level, signed this remit automatically, as sitting head through bringing about confidence and trust of the Supreme National Security Council. between both sides. In remarks made at the end Rather, as he states within several published of his tenure, in the summer of 2005, Rowhani reminiscences of the process, he was prevail- noted that trust was still missing at both ends at ing against his wish to be assigned with the that point in time. As it is now clear, such trust task by several other branches of state, includ- has not been gained and has rather been further ing the Supreme Leader and the then president, lost during the following eight years. Another Mohammad Khatami. The main reason for this key factor in Rowhani’s strategy was the firm was that a common belief emerged, within intention to avoid any referral of the Iranian these stakeholders, that the “traditional” han- nuclear case to the UN Security Council, which dlers of the nuclear brief, the Iranian Atomic he correctly forecast as being tantamount to the Energy Organization and the Foreign Ministry, start of a process of economic sanctions at vari- had committed several procedural errors, most ous levels being levied against Iran. notably in failing to inform the IAEA of the This rationale motivated Rowhani to suc- imminent start-up of operations in the Natanz cessfully convince the rest of the Iranian politi- plant and thereby exposing Iran to the sensa- cal leadership to accept European demands for tional revelations by the opposition Mojahe- the suspension of uranium-enrichment activi- din-e Khalq group, and that these revelations ties. Rowhani makes it clear, in his writings and and the build-up to war in neighboring Iraq had sayings, that such a suspension was affected as given a national security dimension to the is- a voluntary, confidence-building measure, - be sue which was better tackled by the SNSC. It cause the Western side lacked at the time the is important to note, however, that the SNSC legal and technical reasons for enforcing such was not ordinarily involved in the technical a suspension at the UN-IAEA resolution level. or political handling of the nuclear brief and However, it must be emphasized that Rowhani, effectively did not do so throughout the Nine- has not, and is not calling for the indefinite sus- ties. The continued involvement of the body pension, or even termination of the uranium in the nuclear issue is therefore indicative of enrichment process. In this, he is on the same Rowhani’s tenure at the helm of the nuclear wavelength as the other elements of the regime. dossier was driven by several key factors and During the recent presidential campaign, realizations. Principal amongst these was the Rowhani has several times stated that he is will- belief that the contention between Iran and the ing and capable of “resolving” the nuclear is-

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sue ie, bringing about an end to the sanctions the form of the suspension of 20% enrichment, regime levied by the UN, EU and other parties which he himself labeled at the threshold for - through the re-establishment of this trust. He the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the past has not provided specifics on how he intends and which Iran was looking to trade off in re- to do this. One major challenge for him is the cent years as well. changed international environment. While he Much of the above scenario depends, how- negotiated with the EU3 (France, Great Britain, ever, on the extent to which Rowhani will ex- Germany) prior to 2005, he now has to deal with ert control over the nuclear negotiation process. the 5+1, an enlarged group comprising Russia In order to do so, Rowhani has to push for and and the United States. The latter had, accord- obtain the replacement of Saeed Jalili at the ing to Rowhani, created obstacles for the reach- helm of the SNSC, possibly with a figure more ing of an agreement tentatively broached and aligned to him. Such a figure is not necessarily a agreed between Rowhani and Chirac in 2004- reformist, and could come in the form of figures 2005. However, Rowhani is endowed with con- such as Ali Akbar Velayati, a trusted confidant siderable respect amongst his former European of Khamenei who has shown notable realism negotiating counterparts, a factor which could on the nuclear issue and willingness to engage be to his benefit in renewed negotiations. It is in renewed negotiations with the West during unlikely that Rowhani will change the course the televised debates. It is therefore necessary of action described above - he will press for a to wait until the formal start of the Rowhani trust-based solution, offering firm guarantees administration in August for verification. How- on the peaceful nature of Iran’s program but in- ever, his ascent to the presidency will no doubt volving little or no change to the current setup have a strong impact on the nuclear file, as Ah- of the program. The one leeway could be in madinejad’s rise to the presidency did in 2005. • • •

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P.O.Box 51049 Riyadh 11543 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Tel: (+966 11) 4652255 Ext: 6764 Fax: (+966 11) 4162281 E-mail: [email protected] Issue 3, June,2013