DISCUSSION PAPER Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities: Roots, Roles and Evolution Merve Akın DISCUSSION PAPER Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities: Roots, Roles and Evolution Merve Akın Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities: Roots, Roles and Evolution © TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WRITTEN BY Merve Akın PUBLISHER TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE June 2020 TRT WORLD İSTANBUL AHMET ADNAN SAYGUN STREET NO:83 34347 ULUS, BEŞİKTAŞ İSTANBUL / TURKEY TRT WORLD LONDON PORTLAND HOUSE 4 GREAT PORTLAND STREET NO:4 LONDON / UNITED KINGDOM TRT WORLD WASHINGTON D.C. 1819 L STREET NW SUITE 700 20036 WASHINGTON DC www.trtworld.com researchcentre.trtworld.com The opinions expressed in this discussion paper represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the TRT World Research Centre. 4 Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities: Roots, Roles and Evolution Introduction his discussion paper focuses sent its first military satellite into the orbit recent- on Iran's military capabilities. ly. The United States (US) criticised this action, Although Iran's armament stating that this development showed that Iran’s is restricted by international space program is “neither peaceful nor civilian” sanctions and and arms em- (U.S. Department of State, 2020). US Secretary bargoes, the country has still of State Mike Pompeo found Iran's launch in- Tmanaged to develop its military capabilities to consistent with UN Security Council Resolution the extent that has raised concerns regionally. 2231 which refrains Tehran to develop ballistic These concerns are understandable, particular- missiles designed to carry a nuclear payload. ly when one considering that Iran has the larg- These developments raise eyebrows and sharp est ballistic missile force in the Middle East. discussions concerning Iran's real intentions and capabilities. While Iran claims that its military operations are defensive, they are far from being considered On the other hand, Iran's latest military blun- as such by other states. As Iran's conventional ders, which caused significant civilian loss, military capabilities are not sufficiently strong to raised questions about the lack of professional- pose significant threats against its adversaries, ism of the Iranian army. On 8 January 2020, the the same cannot be said for Tehran’s unconven- Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) shot tional means of fighting via the use of proxies, down Ukrainian aeroplane, killing everyone on terror networks, and militias. board, on the day Iranian strikes targeted US bases in Iraq. The most recent accident affect- One of the biggest concerns of Iran's neighbours ed the Iran Naval Forces in the Gulf of Oman on is the expansion of such militias or proxies, 11 May and led to the death of 19 Iranian sailors. which are operating on behalf of Iran's author- These incidents reveal the existence of a gap ity and for its national interests. Another signif- between Iran's claims and existent capacity and icant issue in the region is Iran's feverish efforts add nuances and caveats to the discussion of to boost its ballistic missile capabilities. Iran also Iran’s military might. Iranian Ballistic Missile Ranges UKRAINE RUSSIA KAZAKHSTAN FRANCE MONGOLIA ROMANIA GREECE TURKEY TURKMENISTAN CHINA SYRIA Tehran AFGHANISTAN IRAQ IRAN LIBYA EGYPT PAKISTAN SAUDI System (Max Range) ARABIA INDIA Shahab 1 (300 km) Fateh-110 (300-500 km) Shahab 2 SRBM (500 km) YEMEN Zolfaghar SRBM (700 km) Qiam-1 SRBM (750 km) Shahab 3/Emad-1/ SOMALIA Seijil MRBMs (2000 km) Source: US Defence Intelligence Agency 5 Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities: Roots, Roles and Evolution Iran’s Security Environment Despite changes affecting security paradigms in the gether with new technologies. The aggressive policies post Cold war era, military security is still considered pursued by the United States in the Middle East, with a as the most significant asset for nation-states to defend vast number of US military bases and troops stationed their national interests and territorial integrity, and de- there, constituted a double edge sword. On the one ter military aggression. It includes states’ defence and hand, the US presence in the region provides securi- deterrence capabilities, the capacity of the regular ty for US allies. On the other hand, it poses threats in army, nuclear power and so on. However, the nature the eyes of non-US allies, such as Iran. The continuous of conventional warfare is also evolving with the rise antagonism between Iran and its adversaries, such as of unconventional fighting strategies and asymmetric the Gulf States, accelerated the arms race in the region. capabilities not only by states but also by non-state Iran’s past military experiences vis-à-vis its regional ri- armed actors. Therefore, all new developments pushed vals provided a significant incentive for Tehran to en- countries to invest more in their defence industries to- hance its defence capabilities. The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War The Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) was one of the longest offensive. Tehran managed to absorb the aggression and bloodiest wars of the 20th century that reached and launched a counter-offensive. However, after eight unprecedented peaks of violence with more than a years, the war ended without a conclusive victory for million casualties (Karsh, 1989). It was a catastrophic either side. It resulted in more than a million casualties chapter for Iran, as the Khomeini regime was mostly following the use of chemical weapons and bombings occupied with revolution and state formation at that of many cities. time. When Iraq started the war, the Iranian military was not prepared to deal with the threat since the new The war caused a big impact on Tehran’s military doc- regime eliminated ‘some 10,000 senior officers’ and re- trine, threat perception, and defence policies. Numer- duced conscription levels by September 1980 (Chubin, ous lessons were drawn from the involvement of formal 1986, p. 310). The Khomeini regime disregarded the and informal military organisations, which constituted Shah's military, called Artesh, and saw them as royalist the backbone of Iran's military structure (such as IRGC and pro-Western (ibid.). The IRGC named as Pasdaran and Shia armed forces in Iraq, i.e. Badr corps). Iran re- (or Sepah in Persian) was established as a force loyal to alised its weakness in conventional military power and the Supreme Leader in 1979. Without experience and focused on the development of ballistic missiles. It also discipline, the Iranian military was in a very disadvan- further developed its unconventional military strategy tageous position. through proxies, insurgencies, and guerrilla attacks. All these approaches were synthesised and adopted During the war, Iran's already limited conventional formally after the war. Since then, Iran has been imple- military power was heavily degraded during the Iraqi menting this approach with only minor revisions. Iran's Military Doctrine and Defence Policies The focal point of Iran's military doctrine is its alleged However, in the mid-1990s, Tehran altered its security animosity towards the United States. At the same time, perception and started to move away from its earlier Tehran has to deal with various constraints on its mili- doctrine. This shift took place following the defeat of tary and economy in a complex security environment Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War and the sanc- (Ward, 2005, p. 559). In the early 1990s, Tehran pursued tions against Iraq that followed. What also affected an ideology-oriented defensive strategy codified in Iran’s position was the general instability in the region 1992, aiming at the preservation of national independ- due to the tensions between Israel and Lebanon, the ence, territorial integrity of the Islamic regime and the hostile relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Sub- purported protection of Muslims and other ‘oppressed’ sequently, Iran shifted its strategy towards 'deterrence' nations across the world (ibid., p. 560). by assuming a more practical perspective considering national interests. 6 Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities: Roots, Roles and Evolution The Deterrence Strategy Deterrence is one of the core elements of Iran's mili- According to Ajili & Rouhi (2019, p. 142), there are five tary doctrine, which refers to military actions that aim key operational pillars of this strategy: ‘fixed and mobile to increase rival's risks and costs while decreasing its air defence; artillery and ballistic missiles; electronic constraints to avoid any possible conventional military and cyber warfare; limited use of airpower; and naval conflict. Tehran's declared goal is to deter the United combat’. Some of these tactics date back to the military States, which is depicted as the principal enemy, as experiences during the Iran-Iraq war, such as naval well as other US allies in the region. For this purpose, combat, which is based on anti-ship cruise missiles as Iran has relied on this strategy and tried to enhance its cost-effective tools (ibid.). Anti-ship cruise missiles are relations with the neighbours, while at the same time crucial tools for Iran to deter enemy naval forces in the weakening US influence in the region (Ward, 2005). Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The geopoliti- However, boosting relations with neighbouring coun- cal position of the Strait of Hormuz for oil trade, where tries is not an easy task for Tehran, since US-allied more than 20% of world’s oil moves through, has always countries border Iran. Similarly, it shares borders with been used by Iran to threaten its adversaries (RFERL, NATO-member countries, such as Turkey. In 2010, it 2020). Iranian leaders (Euronews, 2011) and military was announced that a radar station belonging to the officials (Asriran, 2019) threaten countries to close the NATO missile defence system would be built in Malat- strait to international shipping. Several confrontations ya, Turkey (CNN, 2012).