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Honored, Not Contained the Future of Iraq’S Popular Mobilization Forces

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Honored, Not Contained the Future of Iraq’S Popular Mobilization Forces MICHAEL KNIGHTS HAMDI MALIK AYMENN JAWAD AL-TAMIMI HONORED, NOT CONTAINED THE FUTURE OF IRAQ’S POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES HONORED, NOT CONTAINED THE FUTURE OF IRAQ’S POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES MICHAEL KNIGHTS, HAMDI MALIK, AND AYMENN JAWAD AL-TAMIMI THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org Policy Focus 163 First publication: March 2020 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2020 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1111 19th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington DC 20036 www.washingtoninstitute.org Cover photo: Reuters ii Contents LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS........................................................................................................... v PREFACE: KEY FINDINGS.......................................................................................................... vii PART I: THE LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND NOMINAL STRUCTURE OF THE HASHD............................................................................................................................................. xxi 1. Legal Basis of the Hashd ..................................................................................................... 1 2. Organizational Structure of the Hashd ......................................................................... 21 PART II: ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE HASHD............................................... 53 3. Rights of Hashd Members ................................................................................................ 55 4. Responsibilities of Hashd Members............................................................................... 79 PART III: OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE HASHD................. 99 5. Command and Control of the Hashd............................................................................. 101 6. Operational Employment and Capabilities of the Hashd...................................... 125 7. Security-Sector Reform and the Hashd......................................................................... 143 ANNEXES A. Cabinet Decree 301, June 10, 2014............................................................................... 173 B. National Guard Law (Draft) of February 3, 2015....................................................... 174 C. Sahwa Law (Draft) of 2018................................................................................................ 182 D. Executive Order 91, February 24, 2016........................................................................ 184 E. Popular Mobilization Commission Law of 2016....................................................... 185 F. Advice and Guidelines to the Fighters in the Arena of Jihad, May 26, 2016.......................................................................................................................... 186 G. Executive Order 85, Instructions on Hashd Fighters Affairs, March 7, 2018......................................................................................................................... 188 H. Order to Cancel Operations Commands, August 2, 2018........................................ 191 I. Statement by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, June 18, 2019......................................................................................................................... 192 J. Executive Order 237, July 1, 2019.................................................................................. 194 K. Memo from PMC Chairman Regarding Executive Order 237, July 29, 2019.......................................................................................................................... 196 L. NSC Directive, August 15, 2019....................................................................................... 198 M. Statement on Behalf of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, September 12, 2019........................................................................................................... 199 N. Executive Order 328, September 14, 2019................................................................. 200 O. Executive Order 331, September 17, 2019................................................................. 202 P. Hashd Brigade Index.......................................................................................................... 204 iii Honored, Not Contained iv Contents ILLUSTRATIONS Figures 2.1. Pre–Executive Order 331 Structure of the Hashd.................................................. 25 2.2. Hashd Commission Structure Decreed by Executive Order 331....................... 26 3.1. Letterhead from the al-Hashd al-Shabi Commission of the Prime Minister’s Office Department of Logistical Support, January 10, 2015........... 71 4.1. Al-Abbas Combat Division Recruitment Conditions, 2015................................. 81 6.1. Major Hashd Units with Known Personnel Numbers........................................... 127 7.1. Power Distribution Graphs............................................................................................. 145 7.2. Weighted Hashd Numbered Combat Value............................................................. 146 Tables 2.1. Hashd Commanders by Region................................................................................... 36 3.1. Sample of Registered vs. Unregistered Hashd Members by Unit, Circa 2018............................................................................................................................. 62 4.1. Entry Requirements for Joining the Iraqi Security Forces.................................. 80 6.1. Numbered Units of the Hashd, Sorted by Assessed Offensive Capability... 133 6.2. Assessed Establishment Strengths of Different Types of Units........................ 136 6.3. Assessed On-Duty Strengths of Different Types of Units..................................... 136 A.1. Hashd Commission Structure Decreed by Executive Order 331 (in Arabic).............................................................................................................................. 203 Map 6.1. Northern Iraq and Anbar.................................................................................................. 129 v PREFACE Key Findings "Al-Hashd al-Shabi must be honored and contained." —Senior Iraqi government figure, interview with one of the authors, summer 2019, Baghdad hereas many studies have sought to explain the phenom- enon of al-Hashd al-Shabi (hereafter the Hashd, or Popular Mobilization Forces, PMF), this report fills a fundamental gap W 1 by looking in great depth at the Hashd as a military institution. This is not an exhaustive group-by-group gazetteer of Hashd subunits, even though a great deal of unit-specific data is threaded throughout the study, and a special annex includes an annotated snapshot of num- bered Hashd brigades.2 Instead, this study is intended to function as a primer for any international or Iraqi agency that is contemplating security-sector reform (SSR) or disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs involving the Hashd. The first step in developing effective SSR or DDR programs for the Hashd is gaining a clear-sighted view of the institution and the concerns surrounding it. Reforming the Hashd requires a granular mechanical understanding of the Hashd as an institution. In 2019, one of the authors was told by a top-level Iraqi politician that the Hashd needs to be “honored and contained.“ This study concludes with ideas concerning what can and should be done to preserve the positive aspects of the Hashd while minimizing the negative facets. The study was completed across an extended period that saw Hashd power greatly consolidated in the hands of its vice chair, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was killed by a U.S. airstrike on January 3, 2020, alongside his Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) sponsor, vii Honored, Not Contained Qasem Soleimani. The study was fully updated to reflect the deaths of Muhandis and Soleimani, including the high potential that Muhandis’s power base will be cannibalized by the main power bases in the Badr Organization—Hadi al-Ameri, Abu Ali al-Basri, Abu Muntadher al- Husseini, Mohammed Salem al-Ghabban, and Qasim al-Araji—and also by Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Saraya al-Salam, and smaller Hashd factions. The “Muhandis core,” in essence, was a powerful center of gravity composed of a reliable and effective man (Muhandis), backed by the most dynamic player in Iran’s system (Soleimani). Rebuilding this kind of center of gravity at the heart of the Hashd will not be easy or quick, and those who resented Muhandis’s power will move rapidly to scavenge his base. Such factions could in time be driven back toward cohesion by the emergence of a new leader, or by the threat of Hashd demobilization, budget cuts, or regulation. The study seeks to provide a valuable and timely basis for understanding how the Hashd will evolve in the absence of both Muhandis and Soleimani. PART I SUMMARY: LEGAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF THE HASHD The first part of the study looks at the nominal legal basis and structure of the Hashd. This approach means identifying the basis of the Hashd in Iraq’s constitution, laws, executive orders, and cabinet decrees. (The annexes of
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