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Iraq's Displacement Crisis

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Iraq's Displacement Crisis CEASEFIRE centre for civilian rights Lahib Higel Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: Security and protection © Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights and Minority Rights Group International March 2016 Cover photo: This report has been produced as part of the Ceasefire project, a multi-year pro- gramme supported by the European Union to implement a system of civilian-led An Iraqi boy watches as internally- displaced Iraq families return to their monitoring of human rights abuses in Iraq, focusing in particular on the rights of homes in the western Melhaniyeh vulnerable civilians including vulnerable women, internally-displaced persons (IDPs), neighbourhood of Baghdad in stateless persons, and ethnic or religious minorities, and to assess the feasibility of September 2008. Some 150 Shi’a and Sunni families returned after an extending civilian-led monitoring to other country situations. earlier wave of displacement some two years before when sectarian This report has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union violence escalated and families fled and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada. The con- to neighbourhoods where their sect was in the majority. tents of this report are the sole responsibility of the publishers and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union. © Ahmad Al-Rubaye /AFP / Getty Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights The Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights is a new initiative to develop ‘civilian-led monitoring’ of violations of international humanitarian law or human rights, to pursue legal and political accountability for those responsible for such violations, and to develop the practice of civilian rights. The Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights is registered as a charity and a company limited by guarantee under English law; charity no: 1160083, company no: 9069133. Minority Rights Group International MRG is an NGO working to secure the rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities and indigenous peoples worldwide, and to promote cooperation and understanding between communities. MRG works with over 150 partner organi- zations in nearly 50 countries. It has consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and observer status with the African Com- mission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). MRG is registered as a charity and a company limited by guarantee under English law; charity no: 282305, company no: 1544957. Report designed by Staša Sukic. ISBN: 978-1-907919-78-7 Material from this publication may be reproduced for teaching or other non-com- mercial purpoes, with appropriate attribution. No part of it may be reproduced in any form for commercial purposes without the prior express permission of the copyright holders. Published March 2016. Printed in the UK on recycled paper. Table of contents Abbreviations 4 1 Introduction 5 Vulnerability factors 6 2 Displacement in Iraq – old and new 8 Anbar 9 Babylon 12 Baghdad 12 Diyala 13 Kirkuk 14 Salahaddin 15 Ninewa 15 3 Protection and mistreatment 18 Access to legal documentation 18 Entry and residency 19 Detention 20 4 Prospects and challenges of return 21 Ethnic and sectarian tensions: the case of Diyala 22 Tribal tensions: the case of Salahaddin 22 Minority–majority tensions: the case of Ninewa 23 5 Conclusions and recommendations 25 Endnotes 28 Abbreviations CRRPD – Commission on the Resolution of Real Property Disputes Daesh – Arabic acronym for ISIS DIB – disputed internal boundaries FFIS – Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization GoI – Government of Iraq IDPs – internally displaced persons IED – improvised explosive device IGO – international governmental organization IOM – International Organization for Migration ISF – Iraqi Security Forces ISIS – Islamic State in Iraq and Al Sham KDP – Kurdistan Democratic Party KRI – Kurdistan Region of Iraq KRG – Kurdistan Regional Government MoDM – Ministry of Displacement and Migration PDS – Public Distribution System Peshmerga – Kurdish military forces PKK – Kurdistan Workers’ Party PMF – Popular Mobilization Forces PMUs – Popular Mobilization Units PUK – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan UN – United Nations UNDP – United Nations Development Programme UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNAMI – United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq YPG – People’s Protection Units 5 1 Introduction Since the present displacement crisis began in January 2014, following territorial gains by the Islamic State in Iraq and Al Sham (ISIS) in northern and central Iraq, the humanitarian emergency in Iraq has become more severe. According to UN estimates, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq now stands at 3.2 million, while more than 8 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance.1 With the UN lacking funding2 and the Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Regional Government of Kurdistan (KRG) also under economic strain while battling ISIS, the protection of basic human rights and provision of humanitarian assistance are gravely compromised. Collapse of the rule of law, widespread impunity, territorial This report aims to provide an up-to-date overview of the or tribal disputes and the inability or sometimes unwilling- human rights situation of IDPs in Iraq since the onslaught of ness of the Iraqi Government and KRG to respond to the ISIS and the ongoing armed conflict. The mapping of human sheer scale of the crises, have further complicated the pro- rights abuses in this report is not restricted to those commit- tection of IDPs in Iraq. ted by ISIS, but includes those by all armed groups, including government forces, as well as international and local actors. Armed conflict continues across the country causing further displacement, while the situation for people already dis- This report explores the facilitation of returns to areas of ori- placed is worsening due to overburdened infrastructure and gin as the process has started in all provinces of the country, public services in most host areas of the country.3 Nearly two although to a greater degree in certain governorates. Almost years after ISIS’ advances, IDPs are in a dire financial posi- without exception, liberated areas are in need of reconstruc- tion. Vulnerable families are quickly depleting productive tion of basic infrastructure, property restitution and support assets in order to meet daily household needs as there are to resume provision of public services and livelihoods.4 limited livelihood opportunities in areas of displacement. Many are relying on corrosive coping strategies, such as re- Due to poor living conditions in certain areas of displace- ducing meals, borrowing money and, in the worst cases, re- ment, many families are returning even though the situ- sorting to child labour, prostitution, organ sale and begging. ation in their area of origin may not be better. This en- 6 Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: security and protection tails negative push-factors, which may entail The information presented in this text is based on difficulties of reintegration upon return, or even primary and secondary research, including exten- re-displacement. sive fieldwork in Iraq. Interviews were conducted and testimonies collected from the ground between Armed groups are today acting with impunity as September and November 2015. In addition, a lit- the rule of law has collapsed in many areas. Due erature review and supporting phone interviews to the displacement crisis, governorate authorities were carried out before and after the fieldwork. such as provincial councils, governors, mayors and IDPs’ testimonies were collected in the governo- other institutions are either operating from a dis- rates of Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk tance or have ceased operating altogether. This can and Sulaymaniyah, and over phone from Ninewa be seen to different degrees in the governorates of and Salahaddin. Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa and Salahaddin. As the displacement crisis will soon enter its third Vulnerability factors year for those who first fled as a result of the ISIS conflict, social tensions are rising in areas of dis- Several factors contribute to the vulnerability of placement. With new population movements, au- internally displaced persons in Iraq. These range thorities, armed groups and host communities are from public service provision to legal status, the po- under greater pressure. Intimidation and harass- litical situation and security conditions. The report ment of IDPs based on their origins are common is by no means exhaustive but provides a general and increasing in areas of displacement. Commu- overview of the main factors influencing vulner- nities who find themselves in areas where they ability and seeks to convey their relative urgency. are a religious, ethnic or linguistic minority tend to live in constant fear of becoming victims of hate Distinguishing between different areas of displace- speech, physical assault and discriminatory or se- ment has also proved important in order to better lective practices with regard to access to public ser- understand the situation of IDPs, since each gover- vices, employment and humanitarian aid. norate of Iraq has specific characteristics regarding the ethnic or religious make-up of its population, Geographically, this research is focused on IDPs local politics and administrative system, involve- originating from Anbar and the governorates of ment of international actors and activity of armed Babylon, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salahaddin, groups. Accordingly, the
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