Research Notes

RESEARCH NOTES The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ■ No. 38 ■ Oc t ober 2016 How to Secure Mosul Lessons from 2008—2014 MICHAEL KNIGHTS N EARLY 2017, Iraqi security forces (ISF) are likely to liberate Mosul from Islamic State control. But given the dramatic comebacks staged by the Islamic State and its predecessors in the city in I2004, 2007, and 2014, one can justifiably ask what will stop IS or a similar movement from lying low, regenerating, and wiping away the costly gains of the current war. This paper aims to fill an important gap in the literature on Mosul, the capital of Ninawa province, by looking closely at the underexplored issue of security arrangements for the city after its liberation, in particular how security forces should be structured and controlled to prevent an IS recurrence. Though “big picture” political deals over Mosul’s future may ultimately be decisive, the first priority of the Iraqi-international coalition is to secure Mosul. As John Paul Vann, a U.S. military advisor in Vietnam, noted decades ago: “Security may be ten percent of the problem, or it may be ninety percent, but whichever it is, it’s the first ten percent or the first ninety percent. Without security, nothing else we do will last.”1 This study focuses on two distinct periods of Mosul’s Explanations for both the 2007–2011 successes and recent history. In 2007–2011, the U.S.-backed Iraqi the failures of 2011–2014 are easily identified. In the security forces achieved significant success, reducing earlier span, Baghdad committed to Mosul’s stabilization security incidents in the city from a high point of 666 and Iraq’s prime minister focused on the issue, authoriz- per month in the first quarter of 2008 to an average ing compromises such as partial amnesty and a reopen- of 32 incidents in the first quarter of 2011. Then, in ing of security recruitment to former regime officers. 2011–2014, the trend reversed, until monthly security Elections produced a provincial council and governor incidents had risen to an average of 297 in the first with whom urban Sunni Arab Moslawis, as Mosul resi- quarter of 2014. This research is aimed at deducing dents are known, could identify. While the U.S. military what political drivers and security strategies contrib- was embedded in Mosul until 2011, the ISF achieved uted to the partial success and later the failure of the a basic “unity of command,” and key command posi- Iraqi security effort in Mosul. tions were allocated to respected officers, including ©2016 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Research Note 38 . KNIGHTS Sunni Arab Moslawis, in part as a result of U.S. urging. body. Likewise, the recruitment and management of Available government troops in Mosul were increased, local government bodies and police should formulai- including through significant local recruitment of Mos- cally reflect the pre-IS composition of the city’s popu- lawis from poorer Sunni Arab neighborhoods. lation.2 Major recruitment of urban locals to the police During the 2011–2014 stretch, by contrast, the force, including returning minorities, is a priority. Islamic State’s victory was assured by chronically defi- At the operational level, requirements include cient unity of effort and unity of command among stable nonpoliticized command appointments and Iraqi government, Kurdish, and Ninawa factions. much stronger unity and coordination among federal Baghdad and the Kurdish-backed Ninawa provin- Iraqi, Kurdish, and local Ninawa security forces. The cial leaders worked at cross-proposes throughout Ninawa Operations Command (NiOC) remains the the three-year period. Indeed, the command climate most appropriate command-and-control architecture, set by Baghdad’s politically appointed command- but the concept needs to be implemented much more ers resulted in security forces conducting operations effectively than in the pre-2014 years. Just as the U.S.- intended to humiliate and punish Moslawis. From the led coalition has successfully worked since 2014 to outset of Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki’s second encourage Iraqi promotion to high command of tal- term, Baghdad tinkered with command and control ented Counter-Terrorism Service officers, the coalition in Mosul, undoing the reasonably depoliticized secu- should now use its influence and advisors to optimize rity structure that existed until that point. The constant NiOC’s leadership and setup. Such efforts should shuffling of commanders destroyed the ISF’s remain- include the establishment of key coordination bodies ing cohesion. on overall security policy, community relations, intel- Given the strategic opportunity posed by the future ligence sharing, and checkpoint placement. To aid liberation of Mosul—an opportunity that may not come coordination, Iraq should be encouraged to locate again—digesting and making use of these lessons is NiOC as close as possible to the Ninawa Provincial vitally important. Assuming neither Kurdish Peshmerga Council and police headquarters. nor Shiite militias flood the city, an outcome the coali- Coalition support to the stabilization effort should tion is trying to prevent, Moslawis may initially be more continue well after the liberation of Mosul. For more open to working with the ISF, following two and a half than a decade, the city’s reconstruction needs have years under the Islamic State, than at any point since been unmet, and the coalition should encourage Iraq 2003. But Mosul residents will also be closely watch- to target reconstruction in the areas most likely to ing their liberators for signs of a return to 2014, with present havens for IS and other militant actors. This its punitive measures, restrictive curfews, and the wide- means greater focus on the poor Arab neighborhoods spread specter of arrest. at the city’s outer northwest, southwest, and south- At the political level, Ninawa requires genuine east edges. Moreover, urban security must be linked pragmatic governing consensus, not just a shifting to stabilization of rural militant “hotspots” like Badush, series of “enemy of my enemy is my friend” alliances. Ash Shura, and Tal Afar, from which a disproportion- On this front, the U.S.-led coalition has made a good ate number of IS fighters have come. Related coali- start by bringing together for general dialogue Bagh- tion tasks are to help develop strong capabilities for dad and the Kurds, plus the Ninawa provincial leader- Ninawa security forces in countering organized crime ship, ahead of the Mosul battle. A compact among and for local governments in fighting corruption, given these factions should consist of simple ground rules for that IS will first reemerge in Mosul’s criminal under- future political conduct. In such an arrangement, the belly, as it did after the decimation of its predecessor, provincial council and any security coordination com- the Islamic State of Iraq, in 2010. mittee must be a consensus-based decisionmaking In helping prevent the reemergence of a negative 2 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Rabiyah Dohuk Zummar Tal Asquf Bashiqa Badush Sinjar Tal Afar Mosul Hammam al-Alil Erbil Baaj Qayyarah Makhmur Ninawa Map Situating Mosul City al-Arabi Kindi Qahira Zuhour Tahreer Andalus al-Nur UNIVERSITY Zirai Jazair Karada Goojali Zanjili Islah al-Zerai Nabi Yunis Karama Yarmuk Bab al-Jadeed al-Tanak Govt Ctr Risalla Wahda Intisar Wadi Hajar Tal al-Ruman Palestine AIRPORT Yarmja Sumer Mosul Neighborhoods Research Note 38 . KNIGHTS political backdrop such as that in 2011–2014, along brought into the army in appropriate numbers, a key with the attendant mistakes in setting the leadership reconciliation metric. Similarly, the Italian Carabinieri and coordination of Ninawa security policies, inter- training for the Iraqi Federal Police allows monitoring national partners can be an asset. First, the U.S.-led and influence over the development of new locally coalition needs to itself act in a coordinated manner. recruited Federal Police forces for Ninawa. Special- The current coalition against the Islamic State is far ized training initiatives could not only sustain coali- more useful than a unilateral U.S. mission, drawing tion leverage but also directly assist in Ninawa’s on key contributors such as Britain, Australia and New stabilization. Examples might include special forces Zealand, Italy, France, Germany, Spain, and Canada, and intelligence training for counterterrorism and to name just a handful. Such an alliance, including counter-organized-crime operations; development some of the world’s largest economies and security- of a “Counterinsurgency Center of Excellence for assistance partners, can help amplify diplomatic pres- the Iraqi Army and Federal Police”; and develop- sure in stressing the need for consensus approaches ment of border security and logistical capacities to to Ninawa in discussions in Mosul, Erbil, Baghdad, support operations in ungoverned spaces far from Ankara, and even Tehran. existing logistical infrastructure, such as the Ninawa- If the mandate of Combined Joint Task Force–Oper- Syria border. ation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) were extended, the Most of all, the coalition’s command staff, U.S. coalition’s leverage could be expanded beyond the Central Command, and Washington DC leaders must liberation of Mosul. Following the Mosul liberation, remain involved with the details of Mosul’s stabiliza- U.S. forces should commit to at least three more years tion long after political decisionmakers in coalition of extraordinary security cooperation, subject to review capitals have forgotten about the place. The coali- and extension. The aim would be to provide a bridge tion’s attention is simultaneously the cheapest and the for this enhanced security-cooperation relationship into most important investment that can be made in Mosul. the new Iraqi government in 2018–2022. The mes- Keeping the Baghdad, Kurdistan Region, and Ninawa sage should be clear: in contrast to the hasty depar- leaderships focused on stabilization, and keeping ture in 2009–2011, the United States and its partners them communicating and coordinating, is the greatest would be demonstrating commitment to intensified contribution the coalition can make.

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