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Turkey and the European Union: Conflicting Policies and Opportunities for Cohesion and Cooperation in Iraq and Syria

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Turkey and the European Union: Conflicting Policies and Opportunities for Cohesion and Cooperation in Iraq and Syria Turkey and the European Union: Conflicting Policies and Opportunities for Cohesion and Cooperation In Iraq and Syria. Kamaran Palani Dlawer Ala’Aldeen Susan Cersosimo About MERI The Middle East Research Institute engages in policy issues contributing to the process of state building and democratisation in the Middle East. Through independent analysis and policy debates, our research aims to promote and develop good governance, human rights, rule of law and social and economic prosperity in the region. It was established in 2014 as an independent, not-for-profit organisation based in Erbil, Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Middle East Research Institute 1186 Dream City Erbil, Kurdistan Region of Iraq T: +964 (0)662649690 E: [email protected] www.meri-k.org NGO registration number. K843 © Middle East Research Institute, 2017 The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the authors. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of MERI, the copyright holder. Please direct all enquiries to the publisher. Turkey and the European Union: Conflicting Policies and Opportunities for Cohesion and Cooperation In Iraq and Syria. MERI Policy Report Kamaran Palani Research Fellow, MERI Dlawer Ala’Aldeen President of MERI Susan Cersosimo Associate Research Fellow, MERI April 2018 Contents Executive Summary .....................................................................................................................................5 1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................................................7 1.1 Turkey’s perspective .............................................................................................................................8 1.2 The EU’s Perspective ..........................................................................................................................10 2. The Middle East 2010-17: ....................................................................................................................12 2.1 Iraq between 2010-14 ..........................................................................................................................12 2.2 State Authority in Crisis and the Battle for a New Order .............................................................13 2.3 The Rise of Armed Non-State Actors/Sub-State Actors .............................................................14 2.3.1 Armed Non-State Actors & the State ...........................................................................................15 2.3.2 Armed Non-State Actors in Nineveh ...........................................................................................15 2.3.2.1 Turkish Armed Forces in Nineveh: Objectives and Implications .........................................16 2.4 Turkey’s Perception of the PKK in Shingal ....................................................................................17 2.5 Turkey and Sunni Arab Militant Group Cooperation in Iraq .......................................................18 2.6 Ankara-Baghdad Relations .................................................................................................................19 3.Most Probable Scenarios for Future Turkey-EU Relations .............................................................21 3.1 Conflict: Turkey’s Military Engagement in Iraq and Syria ............................................................21 3.1.1 Iraq ......................................................................................................................................................21 3.1.2 Syria ....................................................................................................................................................22 3.2 Conflict: Turkey-Iran and Turkey-Russia Entents ..........................................................................24 3.3 Conflict: The Militarisation of Iraq’s Ethno-religious Minorities ................................................26 3.4 Convergence and Cooperation: Persistent Population Displacement .........................................27 3.5 Convergence and Cooperation: The Future of Terrorism ...........................................................28 4. Policy Recommendations .....................................................................................................................29 5. Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................................32 6. Reference .................................................................................................................................................33 Acknowledgments Thanks are due to Yasir Kouti and Khogir Wirya (Research Fellows at MERI) for providing general feedback and additional intellectual input. Also, thanks to Mohammed Abubaker for designing the report and to other MERI staff for their logistic and administrative support. Appreciation also goes out to the EU Delegation - Erbil Liaison Office and Turkish Consulate General in Erbil for their engagement with this research. We also wish to thank all the interviewees and other participants for their time, knowledge and personal insights. The Middle East Research Institute Unless otherwise stated, the views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the views of The Middle East Research Institute. The Institute should be adequately credited should any of the text be used. Abbreviations AFIRI Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran AKP Justice and Development Party EU European Union FSA Free Syrian Army GCD Global Coalition against Daesh HW al-Hashd Watani IDP Internally displaced persons IS Islamic State ISF Iraq Security Forces KRG Kurdish Regional Government KRI Kurdistan Region of Iraq MENA Middle East North Africa OES Operation Euphrates Shield OOB Operation Olive Branch KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party PMF Popular Mobilization Forces PYD Democratic Union Party SDF Syrian Democratic Front TSK Turkish Armed Forces YBS Shingal Resistance Units YPG People’s Protection Units Turkey and the European Union: Conflicting Policies and Opportunities for Cohesion and Cooperation In Iraq and Syria. Executive Summary The aim of this paper is to explore how key security events, issues and trends within Iraq from 2003 and Syria from 2011, have influenced and impacted Turkey-European Union (EU) relations. Through conducting interviews with experts and extensive literature review, we deconstruct the causal mechanisms that act as the primary drivers impacting bilateral relations. We then compare and contrast Ankara’s and Brussels’ current security interests, priorities and perceptions toward security threats originating in this troubled neighbourhood. Finally, we classify opportunities as culminating in three possible discrete or combined security policy scenarios: conflict, cooperation and/or convergence and make recommendations to improve Turkey-EU relations. To address how Iraq’s and Syria’s security environment evolved to its current state and predict the subsequent outcomes and impacts on EU-Turkey relations, we look back and critically analyse Ankara’s and Brussels’ views on the following key events, issues and trends: security and political dynamics following the second term of al-Maliki, the withdrawal of the US forces in 2011, the 2011 Syrian revolution, the war against the Islamic state (IS), The Global Coalition against Daesh (GCD) backing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in northern Syria, the rise of Kurdish nationalism and aspirations for statehood in Iraq and autonomy in Syria, the enhanced influence of Iran in Iraq and the growth of IS with subsequent mass displacement of person across both Iraq and Syria. Iraq is now largely free of IS reign, yet is still threatened by terrorism, mass population displacement and weak governance, among other ills. In parallel, now that the Syrian civil war enters its seventh bloody year, generating large numbers of casualties and millions of displaced persons, Brussels and Ankara are strongly incented to converge and/or cooperate on security policies which mitigate the escalating humanitarian crisis and ease the path to a durable peace agreement. However, finding durable solutions to address high value, high impact problems stemming from Iraq and Syria requires identifying and mitigating the causes vs symptoms of these countries’ instability and insecurity affecting Ankara’s and Brussels’ own security interests, priorities and threat perceptions. Central security priorities for the EU in post-IS Iraq include stabilization, the return of internally displaced people and refugees and eliminating violent jihadist organizations and ideologies. While Turkey shares these objectives in principle, Ankara’s security interests concentrate primarily on neutralizing the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and its affiliates’ presence and influence. Since 2014, Ankara and Brussels have mostly bifurcated on how they perceive security threats in Syria. Turkey-EU leaders continue to disagree on the Kurd’s role in the Syrian war and how Turkey should control its borders to cut flows of foreign fighters into Syria. As the IS invaded parts of Iraq and Syria in 2014, European states
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