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News & Analysis ISIS Remains a Challenge in Iraq Post-Mosul

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News & Analysis ISIS Remains a Challenge in Iraq Post-Mosul March 26, 2017 5 News & Analysis Iraq US and allies talk of post-ISIS future, but have no plan Thomas Seibert the conference statement, jihadists have lost 60% of the Iraqi territory they conquered when their fighters Washington stormed through eastern Syria and western Iraq in 2014. he United States and its Iraq, a crucial US partner in the allies say military victory fight against ISIS, is calling for over the Islamic State more economic help to ensure ar- (ISIS) is close, but have eas where ISIS has been defeated not come up with a con- can be stabilised. Prime Minister Tcrete plan to deal with the after- Haider al-Abadi, who met US Presi- math. dent Donald Trump before the ISIS This week, US Secretary of State conference, said the new US ad- Rex Tillerson hosted a meeting ministration was ready to step up with the 68 member states of the support for Baghdad’s fight against global coalition against ISIS. After the militants, but warned that long- the meeting, he made a statement term economic and financial assis- praising military advances against tance to rebuild shattered Iraqi cit- the jihadists in Iraq and Syria and ies was key to a stable future. underlining the need to prepare for the day after the group has been de- Iraq is calling for feated on the battlefield. more economic help “Soon, our efforts in Iraq and Syr- to ensure areas ia will enter a new phase defined by where ISIS has been transition from major military op- erations to stabilisation,” Tillerson defeated can be said at the gathering in Washington, stabilised. his first major international confer- ence since taking office last month. “We will pursue regional diplo- “I think they’re prepared to do matic solutions for the underlying more to fight terrorism and be more political and sectarian disputes that engaged,” Abadi said after meeting helped ISIS to flourish,” he said. Trump in the White House. The But there were no details of how meeting was the first the Iraqi lead- such solutions might be achieved. er had with the new US president, Three major players — Syria, Rus- who promised to swiftly defeat ISIS sia and Iran — were not represented during the election campaign last at the conference in Washington. year. Tillerson called for “interim zones Abadi made it clear that he did of stability” to shelter civilians but not think there was a quick fix to New phase. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson (L) passes behind Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi did not spell out where those pro- the problem. “Committing troops is as he walks to the podium to address the Meeting of the Ministers of the Global Coalition on the Defeat (AP) tection areas could be set up. Both one thing,” the prime minister said of ISIS, on March 22nd. the Syrian and the Russian govern- in a speech after his meeting with ments have said they are against Trump at the United States Insti- troops on the ground are not neces- about short-term tactical moves”. ple in areas where ISIS has been the creation of safe zones on Syrian tute of Peace, a non-partisan Wash- sary,” Hamasaeed said. The diplomat added that a com- defeated. territory. ington think-tank created by the US Economic help was also on Aba- prehensive strategy would have to But in Syria, the ongoing fighting, Congress. “Fighting terrorism is an- di’s mind in Washington. Given that also take into account Iran, which the widespread international rejec- Abadi thinks other thing. You don’t defeat terror- Iraq’s economy is almost entirely is seen as a major threat by Sunni tion of the government in Damas- ism by fighting it militarily. There dependent on oil exports and is suf- Arab countries. cus and a lack of consensus among American troops are better ways,” Abadi said. fering in an era of low oil prices, One of the difficulties in arriv- allies mean that talk of stabilisation on the ground are He said he would like “more the prime minister is hoping that ing at a major strategy is that con- is premature at best. In northern not necessary. funds” to bring services and stable the US and its Western allies will ditions in the region do not allow Syria, Turkey is competing for con- conditions to people in areas from step up their financial efforts. for a one-size-fits-all solution. trol with Syrian Kurds, another im- Sarhang Hamasaeed, director” which ISIS had been driven out. Some participants in the Wash- “There’s the need, there’s what the portant US partner. of Middle East programmes at This strategy was crucial to win- ington conference voiced disap- US and its allies are able and willing Those difficulties are becom- the Institute of Peace ning over Sunni Iraqis after ISIS was pointment about the absence of a to do, and then there’s reality,” Ha- ing more pronounced as the anti- gone, Abadi said. strategy that they had hoped would masaeed said. ISIS alliance is preparing an attack The conference came as ISIS was Sarhang Hamasaeed, director be presented by the Trump admin- In Iraq, the United States and its on Raqqa. “If you push ISIS out of on the defensive in the Iraqi city of Middle East programmes at the istration. “I was hoping for more allies can build on an internation- Raqqa, then what happens?” Ha- of Mosul and in northern Syria, Institute of Peace, said Abadi was specifics,” French Foreign Minister ally recognised government and masaeed asked. “This is a big prob- where American-backed fighters hoping for US assistance in train- Jean-Marc Ayrault said, according the UN-administered Funding Fa- lem.” have been training for an attack on ing Iraqi troops and for US military to news reports. cility for Immediate Stabilisation to Raqqa, the self-proclaimed capi- help in logistical and intelligence CNN quoted a senior Arab diplo- channel money into projects such Thomas Seibert is an Arab Weekly tal of ISIS’s caliphate. According to support. “Abadi thinks American mat as saying that “right now it’s as restoring basic services to peo- correspondent in Washington. ISIS remains a challenge in Iraq post-Mosul liberation James Snell treat not as a failure in the face of The interplay of various groups, unexpected opposition but as a de- each with different ties to the Iraqi liberate ploy by then-prime minis- state and varying loyalty to the no- London ter Nuri al-Maliki to surrender the tion of Iraq, will decide the success Sunni areas he had no intention of the country after Mosul falls. s the final assault on the of governing to ISIS, all the better The Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), stronghold of the Islam- to recapture them bloodily in the a Yazidi affiliate of the Kurdistan ic State (ISIS) in Mosul is years to come. Workers’ Party (PKK), are part of in the works, important That this idea has traction shows the People’s Mobilisation Forces — questions are going un- how fractious things have become. popular militias, some of which are answered.A Chief among them is: It is also largely unknown how notably pro-Iran. What will ISIS do in Iraq after Mosul other actors will proceed after the falls? caliphate falls. It is likely that ISIS Though ISIS itself seems new, Abdulla Hawez, who researches will retreat into the with its remarkable conquering of Turkey, Iraq and Syria and issues deserts, where it has territory in 2014 seeming to herald relating to Kurds at King’s College great strategic depth. a new terror organisation and a new London, said: “The real challenge modus operandi, the organisation is going to be post-ISIS Mosul with has deep roots. each group trying to get a bigger The YBS is, in Hawez’s words, “al- ISIS militants learnt how to fight share of the cake.” lowing Iranian movement, includ- insurgent wars following the depo- This is a result of Mosul’s diversi- ing movement of weapons, to Syria sition of Saddam Hussein in 2003. ty and the interest of external forces in return for money and weapons” What’s next? A member of the Iraqi forces holds the national flag They learnt the politics of sectari- in the fate of Iraq in general. Hawez because it controls the border be- on the outskirts of the old city in western Mosul, on March 21st. (AFP) anism from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, noted that, in addition to Mosul’s tween Iraqi Sinjar and Syria. This the former leader of ISIS’s prede- large Sunni population, “there are is a challenge to the integrity of the cessor organisation, al-Qaeda in in which the United States replaced was the unexpected use of sleeper large Turkmen, Yazidi, Christian Iraqi state. Double dealing of this Iraq (AQI). the militants as a partner Sunni cells in Kirkuk last year, which in- and Kurdish concentrations in the sort cannot continue if Iraq is to re- It is likely that ISIS will retreat tribes could trust. flicted damage and undercut the province, with each hoping to get main unified and at peace. into the deserts, where it has great Amid this, it is highly likely that newfound success of the Iraqi autonomy”. Iraq’s upcoming capture of Mosul strategic depth. The insurgents did ISIS will retain some capacity for military. ISIS will continue its pro- There is little chance, he said, should be a moment of sincere cel- this during the US troop surge after orchestrating terrorist attacks.
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