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Artical Name : The Challenge of Return Artical Subject : Features of Demographic Shifts in Mosul after ISIS Defeat Publish Date: 20/07/2017 Auther Name: Dr. Muthana Al-Obeidi Subject : 9/29/2021 4:06:18 PM 1 / 2 The liberation of Mosul from the grip of "ISIS" poses several essential challenges related to dealing with the demographic shifts in Mosul, capital of Nineveh. Deportation and forced displacement, since ISIS seized control of the city on June 10, 2014, increase the importance of restoring social, political and security equilibrium in the region. Most importantly, settling all matters related to the return of displaced persons and facilitating community reconciliation in areas freed from ISIS.Complex Demographic Map Mosul, Iraq's second largest city in terms of population, the center of Nineveh province, has more demographic diversity than any other Iraqi city or province. Ethnicities in Mosul include Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmens, and Shabak. Mosul has Muslims, Christians, and Yazidis. There are no specific statistics on the size of each component, but discretionary estimates based on recent provincial elections. These components can be defined as follows: 1. Ethnic distribution, the main features of the ethnic map in Nineveh: a. Arabs constitute the majority population in the province of Nineveh, distributed in Mosul city center and various areas of Nineveh. b. Kurds live mostly on the East side of the city, or what is called the left coast. c. Turkmens come third in terms of population after Arabs and Kurds, and are ideologically divided between Shiites and Sunnis, and most of them live in the city of Tal Afar and many villages in Nineveh.d. Shabaks are one of the national minorities in Nineveh, ideologically divided between Shiites and Sunnis. They speak Shabakyah dialect close to the Gorani dialect, and are concentrated in towns and villages in Nineveh. They have representation in the provincial Council and the Iraqi Parliament, like other minorities in Mosul. 2. Religious distribution: Muslims comes first in terms of population, followed by Christians who are distributed between several Christian doctrines, as Catholics, Orthodox and Protestants, most of them live in Nineveh, especially Qada Hamdaniyah,Taqlif, and Shaykhan. There are also the Yazidis, who are ethnic-religious group about which historians disagree on its origin. Some of them speak Kurdish, others speak Arabic. They are concentrated in Sinjar and Shaykhan and Qada Taqlif and Bashiqa villages.Features of the societal transformations Mosul has undergone unprecedented demographic change after ISIS control. This change occurred due to forced relocation, displacement and genocide that had targeted various ethnic groups including Yazidis, Christians, Shabaks and Shiite Turkmens, and all Arabs who oppose ISIS. These attacks led to a change in the population, which characterized Mosul through long decades from other cities. The displaced people split into two groups, some choose to flee to other provinces inside Iraq, while others opted to migrate outside Iraq, particularly Christians, whose number in Iraq has diminished dramatically. The Kurdish forces took control of some areas, in what came to be known as "disputed areas" between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Federal Government after its liberation from Daesh¶s grip.The "disputed areas" issue emerged after 2003 as an intractable problem that defied solution during the previous phase. These areas are located on the borders of the Kurdistan region with its neighboring provinces (such as Nineveh, Salahuddin and Diyala). There are various positions, claims and accounts around these areas among Arabs and Kurds, as well as the demographic diversity, which consists of various religions and ethnicities. Arguably, the most important "disputed areas" in Nineveh are Qada Aqrah, Hamdaniyah, Makhmour, Tall Afar, Tqlif, Shaykhan, Sinjar, among others. Kurdish leaders claim that these areas are "Kurdish" even though the majority of its inhabitants are not Kurds, while the Arabs insist that these are Arab areas not Kurdish.Under these circumstances, the Peshmerga troops took over these areas with the support of the international coalition after an agreement with the Iraqi Government that they will withdraw after its liberation. However, the reality and most Kurdish leaders¶remarks indicate that they reject withdrawal from these areas, because they consider it part of Kurdistan. They further said that the borders of this territories "have been drawn with blood", signaling that they are not going to relinquish control. Amnesty International estimates that the number of Arabs who are banned from returning to their homes in all disputed areas amounts to tens of thousands. This is linked to demographic groups barred from returning to their homes by unknown armed groups that worked to create areas with one societal make-up.Internal Partition Plans There are several plans to divide Nineveh in post- Mosul liberation, all of which reflect the interests of those who adopt them. For example, a plan was announced in June 2017 to annex areas in Western Mosul to Kurdistan after the meeting between Massoud Barzani (President of the Kurdistan Regional Government) and some tribal elders in Mosul. In addition, members of the Republicans and Democrats in the US Congress, in September 2016, have previously called for the establishment of a region or province in Nineveh for Christians, Yazidis and Shabaks, to ensure their protection. Moreover, local politicians in Mosul, Iraqi Parliament deputies and the former US administration's envoy to Iraq, discussed a plan to turn Mosul and its affiliated areas to a region that consists of six to eight provinces, mainly: Sinjar, Tal Afar, Nineveh, South of Mosul, Makhmour, where the center of Mosul will be a separate province.Conceivably, the implementation of these various plans and projects will be accompanied by relocations of people from one region to another and demographic change because certain communities will dominate certain provinces or that under the new divisions. However, these plans and projects had been preceded by a decision from the Iraqi Council of Representatives in September 2016. This decision requires maintaining the borders of Mosul and Nineveh with administrative subdivisions according to pre-2003 boundaries, add to that the local and national rejection of practices that would lead to a change in the demographic make- up of the city of Mosul and Nineveh in general.Post-liberation Priorities Preserving the demographic diversity that characterized Nineveh is a priority after freeing Mosul because the population structure in this province is a model of accepting the other and the ethnic and national diversity. Another priority is to address the negative impacts and repercussions caused by ISIS¶cruel control over the city. Achieving these requires a focus on several priorities, including: 1. Reconstruction: reconstruction of Mosul must be immediately initiated in all cities, towns and villages that have been destroyed, as well as providing services and the requirements to restore normal life, besides ensuring safe return of all displaced persons to their homes.2. Community reconciliation: law enforcement is a key entry point to achieve community reconciliation. It is necessary as a first step, to compensate the affected persons, disallowing people to resort to retaliatory acts, and devise mechanisms to engage different components of the community in running the province and power-sharing. Besides, there is a need to solve the issue of the disputed areas through constitutional and legal means that guarantee the return of the indigenous peoples, and compensate the affected persons and those whose houses were destroyed or burned or had their properties confiscated. This should be done in parallel with the implementation of programs that alleviate the effects and notions, under which the community has lived during ISIS¶rule that lasted for nearly 3 years.3. National identity: maintaining diversity and pluralism, especially in the demographically mixed areas, necessitates fostering inclusive national identity, particularly in the homogeneous areas that were exposed to demographic changes at the expense of national identity. 4. Social peace: It requires the state to lay hands on weapons, empower the local security forces, federal police and the counterterrorism agency to handle the security issue, and address the problem of multiple armed militias belonging to different minorities, especially those formed during ISIS¶control over Mosul. These things would bring about peace and coexistence among various components of the community. 9/29/2021 4:06:18 PM 2 / 2.
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