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Kirkuk, Ninewa & Salah Al-Din

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KIRKUK, NINEWA & SALAH AL-DIN GOVERNORATE PROFILES POST-2006 IDP NEEDS ASSESSMENTS JUNE 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section: Page: I. IOM Assessment Background 1 II. Overview 2 1. Area Background Dahuk il rb 2. Restrictions on IDP Entry or Registration E S 3. Ethnicity and Religion u la a y w m e 4. Places of Origin in a N n iy 5. Reasons for Displacement a Kirkuk h 6. Pre-2006 IDP Population 7. IDP Relations w/ Host Community S al ah 8. IDP Intentions a l- Di D n iy III. Emergency Assessment and Needs 6 a l 1. Security 6 a Security, Vulnerabilities, Women and Children Baghdad W 2. Shelter and Basic Services 7 Kerbala assit Babylon Q ad Shelter (living arrangements), Evictions, Anbar is si Food/PDS, Water and Sanitation, Fuel and ya Missan Electricity, Health Care, Education, Employment Thi-Qar Najaf 3. Legal 12 Basrah Property Issues and Documentation Muthanna IV. Humanitarian Assistance Received 13 V. Priority Needs 14 Top Priority Needs, JOC Project Recommendations VI. Conclusion 15 VII. Maps 16 I. POST-FEBRUARY 2006 IDP ASSESSMENTS: BACKGROUND Iraq has a long history of displacement; over 5 million Iraqis have been forced to flee their homes to seek refuge internally or abroad. Policies carried out by Saddam’s regime, including the draining of the marshes in the south, the “Arabization” and “Anfal” campaigns, in addition to infighting and wars, caused the internal displacement of over one million people by 2003. Military operations were the primary cause of internal displacement between 2003 and 2005, and around 200,000 people still remain displaced from this period. However, the most alarming rate of displacement occurred after the February 2006 bombing of the Samarra Al-Askari Mosque. Due primarily to sectarian violence, 1.6 million people were internally displaced in the past two years alone, according to government figures. 1 It is estimated that 2.3 – 2.5 million Iraqis have fled abroad. IOM is conducting on-going, in-depth assessments of recently displaced persons throughout Iraq. Monitors use Rapid Assessment questionnaires to gather information from IDP families, the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM), IDP tribal and community leaders, local NGOs, and local government bodies. Based on a database of this information, IOM disseminates bi-weekly, bi-annual, and annual reports containing updates, statistics, and analysis on displacement.2 This information assists IOM and other organizations in prioritizing areas of operation, planning emergency responses and designing long-term programs. This is one of six Iraq Governorate Profile reports released by IOM biyearly, which analyze the displacement situation in each Iraqi governorate. 1 Based on information provided by MoDM and the Kurdistan Regional Government. See latest IDP Working Group Update on IDPs, June 2007. 2 IOM reports are available at http://www.iom-iraq.net/idp.html . INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION II. OVERVIEW Kirkuk Ninewa Sa lah Al -Din Capital Kirkuk Mosul Tikrit Al-Ba`aj, Hatra, Shekhan, Sinjar, Al-Daur, Al-Shirqat, Baiji, Balad, Districts Al-Hawiga, Daquq, Kirkuk Telafar, Tilkaif, Al-Hamdaniya, Tikrit, Tooz, Samarra Mosul, Al-Shikhan Population 3 902,019 individuals 2,811,091 individuals 1,191,403 individuals 4 6,594 families (est. 36,202 19,126 families (est. 106,750 7,817 families (est. 45,762 Total post-Feb 2006 IDPs individuals) individuals) individuals) 5 1,252 families (est. 7,512 6,572 families (est. 39,432 3,366 families (est. 20,196 Total pre-Feb 2006 IDPs individuals) individuals) individuals) Number of post-Feb 2006 7,958 families (est. 47,748 11,391 families (est. 68,346 10,693 families (est. 64,158 IDPs assessed by IOM 6 individuals) individuals) individuals) 1. Area Background Kirkuk, an area with rich oil reserves, lies outside the 'Kurdistan Autonomous Region' delineated in 1975 and is a potential flashpoint for ethnic disputes over territory and resources. In 1972, the former regime changed the historic name of the governorate from “Kirkuk” to “Al-Tameem.” Ninewa Governorate also remains the centre of some of Iraq's most important oilfields. Mosul, the capital of the governorate, is Iraq’s third largest city after Baghdad and Basrah. The city hosts a diverse mix of ethnicities and religions, including Arabs, Kurds, Shabaks, Assyrians, Turkmens and Armenians. It is also currently one of the most unstable areas in Ninewa, along with Telafar. The capital of Salah al-Din is Tikrit, located 140 kilometers northwest of Baghdad on the Tigris River. This is Saddam Hussein’s birthplace and the former regime’s tribal base. Salah al-Din has seen major fighting between Multi-National Forces in Iraq/Iraqi Forces (MNF-I/IF) and the Iraqi insurgency, and the governorate forms the northern angle of the “Sunni Triangle.” The majority of Salah al-Din’s population is Arabic, with Turkmen and Kurdish minorities. 2. Restrictions on IDP Entry or Registration Registration is highly restricted in Kirkuk ; IDP families must present a strong reason for displacement along with their original papers from place of origin. The situation is complicated by the tense relations among different ethnoreligious groups – sometimes members of one ethnoreligious group can be given priority over another. To register in Ninewa , IDPs need their Iraqi national ID along with PDS card and residential card from the place of origin. These documents must be accompanied by certifications from the local city council and local city police. In Salah al-Din , the governor has ordered that IDPs from Samarra district and Anbar and Diyala governorates be evicted from the governorate due to concern that they are linked with security issues. To stay, IDPs coming from these areas must have a sponsor from Salah al-Din. Approximately 100 IDPs have already been evicted due to these measures, mostly from Hay al- Zohoor and Hay al-Qadissiya in Tikrit district. Those IDPs who do register must have documentation signed by MoDM, the local Mukhtar, the local council, and the local police. 3 As per the Iraq Living Conditions Survey, UNDP and Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, 2004. 4 As per Ministry of Displacement and Migration. See latest IDP Working Group Update on IDPs, June 2007. 5 As per IOM Phase II Monitoring, December 2005. 6 Please note that this is the number of post-February 2006 IDPs assessed by IOM, not the total number of IDPs in the governorate. 2 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION 3. Ethnicity and Religion These three governorates host a wide variety of ethnicities and religions. The majority of post- February 2006 IDPs in Salah al-Din and Kirkuk are Sunni Arab, while in Ninewa they are Christian Assyrians: Religion & Ethnicity Ninewa Salah al-Din Kirkuk Area All Iraq Sunni Arab 27.6% 95.0% 51.8% 58.0% 27.9% Christian Assyrian 40.1% 0.0% 2.0% 15.7% 3.3% Shia Turkmen 1.7% 1.2% 18.8% 6.0% 1.2% Christian Armenian 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% Sunni Turkmen 12.0% 0.1% 3.2% 5.4% 1.0% Sunni Kurd 2.7% 0.6% 18.2% 6.1% 3.4% Shia Arab 0.8% 3.1% 2.8% 2.1% 60.0% Shia Kurd 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.2% 0.7% Christian Chaldean 12.2% 0.0% 0.7% 4.8% 2.0% Yazidi Arab, Kurd, Other 0.3% 0.0% 0.5% 0.2% 0.1% Dahuk !. il 4. Places of Origin rb E !. S 0.34% u la !. y a m ew 14.58% in a N n Dahuk !. Kirkuk i!.y il a !. h rb E 14.75% 0.04% !. S u !. 35.34% la !. y S 17.81% a m al ew ah in a a !. N n l-D D i!. i 29.58% y n iy Kirkuk a a !. h l 0.94% a !. 19.48% Baghdad 0.79% !. !. S !. !. a 2.31% Wa la 1.20% !. 0.23% ssit h al !. Kerbala Babylon Q -Di D ad n i i y Anbar ss !. a !. iy la a !. Thi-Qar Missan 53.60% !. Baghdad 0.05% 0.59% !. 0.04% 0.20% !. Najaf !. !. 0.04% Wa Basrah !. 0.48% ssit Kerbala Babylon !. Q 0.28% !. ad Anbar is !. Muthanna si !. ya 0.11% Thi-Qar Missan !. 0.04% !. Najaf Basrah !. 6.64% !. Dahuk !. Muthanna il rb E !. S u la a !. y ew 0.48% m in a N n i!.y Kirkuk a !. h 2.67% Most IDPs in Iraq are from Baghdad, but 5.43%!. S al Kirkuk is the destination for more people ah 9.37% a !. l-Di D n iy fleeing Diyala (30%) than Baghdad (19%). a la !. Many also come from neighbouring Salah al- 61.85% Baghdad Din, Ninewa, and within Kirkuk. Most IDPs 2.45% 1.01% !. !. !. 0.07% 0.89% Wass in Ninewa come from Baghdad (54%) or !. it Kerbala Babylon Q ad Anbar is !. within Ninewa (35%). In Salah al-Din, 62% si 0.15% !. ya come from Baghdad and 15% come from Thi-Qar Missan !. Basrah. !. 0.80% Najaf Basrah !. 14.75% !. Muthanna 3 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION 5. Reasons for Displacement Direct threats to life and generalized violence account for most IDPs in these governorates for fleeing. Many in Kirkuk also said they left out of fear: REASONS FOR DISPLACEMENT Kirkuk Ninewa Salah al-Din Area All Iraq Armed conflict 4.2% 1.7% 14.6% 6.1% 16.2% Direct threats to life 45.3% 62.9% 75.9% 59.7% 55.2% Forced displacement from property 1.6% 17.8% 19.2% 12.0% 27.1% Generalized violence 84.6% 42.5% 21.5% 52.9% 47.1% Left out of fear 68.4% 28.8% 10.7% 39.1% 38.2% Other 2.6% 1.0% 2.0% 1.8% 1.1% When asked whether they felt specifically targeted and if so, why, the majority of IDPs assessed said that they were targeted for religious/sectarian identity.
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    IRAQ, YEAR 2020: Update on Incidents According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Compiled by ACCORD, 25 March 2021

    IRAQ, YEAR 2020: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) compiled by ACCORD, 25 March 2021 Number of reported incidents with at least one fatality Number of reported fatalities National borders: GADM, 6 May 2018b; administrative divisions: GADM, 6 May 2018a; incid- ent data: ACLED, 12 March 2021; coastlines and inland waters: Smith and Wessel, 1 May 2015 IRAQ, YEAR 2020: UPDATE ON INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO THE ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT (ACLED) COMPILED BY ACCORD, 25 MARCH 2021 Contents Conflict incidents by category Number of Number of reported fatalities 1 Number of Number of Category incidents with at incidents fatalities Number of reported incidents with at least one fatality 1 least one fatality Protests 1795 13 36 Conflict incidents by category 2 Explosions / Remote 1761 308 824 Development of conflict incidents from 2016 to 2020 2 violence Battles 869 502 1461 Methodology 3 Strategic developments 580 7 11 Conflict incidents per province 4 Riots 441 40 68 Violence against civilians 408 239 315 Localization of conflict incidents 4 Total 5854 1109 2715 Disclaimer 7 This table is based on data from ACLED (datasets used: ACLED, 12 March 2021). Development of conflict incidents from 2016 to 2020 This graph is based on data from ACLED (datasets used: ACLED, 12 March 2021). 2 IRAQ, YEAR 2020: UPDATE ON INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO THE ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT (ACLED) COMPILED BY ACCORD, 25 MARCH 2021 Methodology on what level of detail is reported. Thus, towns may represent the wider region in which an incident occured, or the provincial capital may be used if only the province The data used in this report was collected by the Armed Conflict Location & Event is known.