IRAQ: Humanitarian Operational Presence (3W) for HRP and Non-HRP Activities May to July 2020

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IRAQ: Humanitarian Operational Presence (3W) for HRP and Non-HRP Activities May to July 2020 IRAQ: Humanitarian Operational Presence (3W) for HRP and Non-HRP Activities May to July 2020 TURKEY Zakho 23 Number of partners by cluster DUHOK Al-Amadiya 9 3 Sumail Duhok 17 10 25 33 Rawanduz Al-Shikhan Aqra Telafar Tilkaef 17 2 ERBIL 23 Shaqlawa 26 3 Pshdar Al-Hamdaniya 4 Rania 2 Al-Mosul 48 Erbil NINEWA Koysinjaq 28 59 Dokan 2 CCCM Education E. Livelihoods Food Security Health Protection, HLP, MA Protection: Child P. Protection: GBV SNFI WASH MPCA Total partners* Makhmour 1 Sharbazher Al-Baaj Dibis 26 11 6 AL-SULAYMANIYAH Al-Hatra Al-Shirqat Kirkuk Al-Sulaymaniyah Governorate Column12 6 6 SYRIA 9 Chamchamal 5 Al-Hawiga KIRKUK 20 Halabcha Al-Anbar 34427674532 26 20 6 2 18 Daquq Al-Basrah 1 1 1 4 1 1 7 20 Beygee 9 Tooz Kalar Al-Muthanna 1 1 2 Tikrit Khurmato 10 9 10 Al-Najaf 1 3 4 2 1 8 SALAH AL-DIN Kifri 2 2 20 Al-Qadissiya 1 1 2 4 Ana 5 8 Samarra Al-Kaim Haditha Al-Sulaymaniyah 1 1 5 2 5 2 3 3 1 1 23 Al-Khalis DIYALA IRAN Babil 1 1 1 2 4 9 12 7 Balad Al-Muqdadiya Heet 10 5 Baghdad 3 2 1 1 2 6 4 1 13 6 Baquba 2 Diyala 5 3 3 6 6 4 2 2 1 23 Al-Kadhmiyah Duhok 2 7 7 1 13107 12 3 6 3 49 5 6 Al-Mada'in Al-Ramadi Al-Falluja 2 Erbil 11647485111 30 14 Al-Mahmoudiya AL-ANBAR 21 2 5 Kerbala 1 1 3 3 1 1 7 Al-Mussyab 1 Kirkuk 34428795473 35 Al-Rutba Ain KERBALA WASSIT 2 Kerbela BABIL Al-Kut Maysan 1 1 1 2 5 Al-Tamur 1 5 Al-Hashimiya 1 1 Ninewa 7 11 19 8 23 25 22 22 9 21 10 89 JORDAN 2 3 Al-Hai Al-Kufa 4 Salah Al-Din 6 3 5 1106 8 4 2113 37 1 Al-Diwaniya MAYSAN Thi Qar 1 1 1 1 4 AL-QADISSIYA Wassit 1 2 2 Al-Hamza Qalat AL-NAJAF 1 Saleh Total partners* 12 18 27 14 30 33 45 35 18 31 12 138 * Total number of unique partners reported under the HRP 2019, HRP 2020 and other non-HRP plans. Al-Najaf Al-Samawa THI QAR 2 2 2 1 Suq 2 8 Al-Chibayish Shat 138 Partners Al-Shoyokh 6 Al-Arab Providing humanitarian assistance from May to July 2020 for Al-Basrah humanitarian activities under the HRP 2020, HRP 2019 and 1 1 AL-BASRAH Abu other non-HRP programmes. AL-MUTHANNA Al-Khaseeb Al-Zubair Legend SAUDI ARABIA Number of Reporting Partners KUWAIT 1 - 5 6 - 15 16 - 25 26 - 35 36 - 59 The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the UnitedCCCMTheNations.byboundariesacceptance endorsementthe namesand or implyCamp mapdesignations shown not thisofficial do- used onthe and Coordination Campand Management;Emergency Livelihoods- E. Protection Livelihoods; General Protection, Housing, Land and Property; Protection: Child P. – Child Protection; GBV - Gender Based Violence; SNFI - Shelter and Non-Food Items; WASHSanitationHygiene;andNon-Food and Water, Items; MPCA CashShelter - Multi-PurposeAssistanceGBV Gender SNFI Based- - Violence; - –Protection; Child P. Child Protection: Housing,Property; Landand Protection, General Creation date: 1 September 2020 Sources:OCHA Feedback: [email protected] www.unocha.org/iraq www.reliefweb.int IRAQ: Humanitarian Operational Presence (3W) for HRP and Non-HRP Activities May to July 2020 CCCM Education E. Livelihood 1 1 2 1 3 2 7 2 3 3 1 1 2 3 2 1 1 3 1 4 9 1 2 5 3 4 13 8 1 8 1 13 6 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 4 1 1 2 2 2 5 3 1 3 3 1 2 2 4 1 3 4 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 4 1 4 1 4 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Partners Partners Partners 12 18 27 Food Security Health Protection, HLP, MA 1 8 2 5 2 8 4 8 7 7 4 3 1 1 1 2 9 4 9 3 3 7 8 1 2 1 13 10 1 1 4 3 1 13 5 17 4 1 1 4 5 3 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 1 5 6 3 8 2 1 1 4 1 5 2 1 2 1 1 1 4 1 4 2 5 2 1 6 1 6 1 3 1 1 2 1 3 2 5 3 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 5 5 4 7 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 Partners 1 Partners Partners 14 30 33 The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Creation date: 1 September 2020 Sources:OCHA Feedback: [email protected] www.unocha.org/iraq www.reliefweb.int IRAQ: Humanitarian Operational Presence (3W) for HRP and Non-HRP Activities May to July 2020 Protection: Child Protection: GBV SNFI 4 5 1 3 2 5 9 11 3 1 2 3 2 1 1 10 3 7 3 2 1 1 5 1 7 1 20 7 7 1 3 7 2 16 4 1 2 1 1 1 3 2 1 3 6 2 1 2 5 3 4 1 7 1 2 1 1 1 4 3 1 3 1 3 3 1 1 1 2 2 6 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 5 6 3 2 3 3 1 2 4 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 4 2 1 5 1 1 Partners Partners Partners 45 35 18 WASH MCPA 2 1 4 3 4 1 7 2 1 1 10 2 5 2 13 1 8 1 1 1 2 4 5 1 1 6 3 1 2 1 2 2 4 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 Partners Partners 31 12 The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Creation date: 1 September 2020 Sources:OCHA Feedback: [email protected] www.unocha.org/iraq www.reliefweb.int IRAQ: Humanitarian Operational Presence (3W) for HRP and Non-HRP Activities May to July 2020 Protection, HLP, Governorate District Plan CCCM Education E. Livelihoods Food Security Health Protection: Child Protection: GBV SNFI WASH MPCA MA Al-Anbar Al-Falluja HRP 2019 UNICEF DRC, IRC IRC, Tajdid SSORD DRC, Mercy Caritas-Iraq, Caritas-Iraq, DRC, DARY, IOM, UIMS, Caritas-Iraq, IRC, Caritas-Iraq, Hands, Al-Anbar Al-Falluja HRP 2020 DRC, IOM UNICEF IOM, IRC ZOA IMC NRC, HALO SSORD UNHCR UNHABITAT, ZOA Mercy Corps NRC SHO, SSORD, TDH- Al-Anbar Al-Falluja Non HRP DRC, IOM UNICEF IOM, IRC PUI SHO Italy, WC-UK Al-Anbar Al-Kaim HRP 2019 TDH-Lausanne Al-Anbar Al-Kaim HRP 2020 DARY, UIMS IRC, NRC SSORD PUI Mercy Corps, NRC Al-Anbar Al-Kaim Non HRP UNICEF PUI Al-Anbar Al-Ramadi HRP 2019 UNICEF, NRC IRC Cordaid, DARY, Cordaid, IRC, Al-Anbar Al-Ramadi HRP 2020 NRC UNICEF NRC IHA IRC, NRC IRC, JGO, SSORD UNHCR Mercy Corps NRC Al-Anbar Al-Ramadi Non HRP UNICEF IOM PUI, UIMS NRC TDH-Italy, SSORD Al-Anbar Al-Rutba HRP 2020 DARY Al-Anbar Al-Rutba Non HRP UIMS Al-Anbar Ana HRP 2019 UNICEF, NRC IRC Al-Anbar Ana HRP 2020 HA NRC DARY IRC, NRC IRC, SSORD Mercy Corps Al-Anbar Ana Non HRP UNICEF UIMS SHO Al-Anbar Haditha HRP 2020 IRC Al-Anbar Haditha Non HRP UNICEF Al-Anbar Heet HRP 2020 DARY, IMC IRC, NRC SSORD Al-Anbar Heet Non HRP PUI, UIMS Al-Basrah Abu Al-Khaseeb HRP 2020 MHA Al-Basrah Al-Basrah HRP 2020 LCN LCN, TGH, MHA LCN IFMSA Al-Basrah Al-Basrah Non HRP IOM MHA, Al-Taqwa Al-Basrah Al-Zubair HRP 2020 NRC Al-Basrah Shat Al-Arab HRP 2020 IFMSA Al-Basrah Shat Al-Arab Non HRP IOM Al-Muthanna Al-Samawa HRP 2020 LCN UADF Al-Najaf Al-Kufa Non HRP IOM IOM IOM Al-Najaf Al-Najaf HRP 2019 DRC Al-Najaf Al-Najaf HRP 2020 LCN LCN, UADF, TGH UNHCR IFMSA Al-Najaf Al-Najaf Non HRP IOM IOM IOM BWA Al-Qadissiya Al-Diwaniya HRP 2020 LCN TGH Al-Qadissiya Al-Diwaniya Non HRP UADF Al-Qadissiya Al-Hamza HRP 2020 HRF DoLSA- Al-Sulaymaniyah Al-Sulaymaniyah HRP 2019 Sulaymaniyah Heevie, DCVAW, SWEDO, Emergency, Jiyan, DoLSA- Al-Sulaymaniyah Al-Sulaymaniyah HRP 2020 JCC-Sulaimaniyah WVI Zhian HAI STEP Sulaymaniyah UNHCR Al-Sulaymaniyah Al-Sulaymaniyah Non HRP DRC, IOM, PLC CDO, KSC Jiyan, UNICEF MAG Arche Nova DoLSA- Al-Sulaymaniyah Chamchamal HRP 2019 Sulaymaniyah Al-Sulaymaniyah Chamchamal HRP 2020 Jiyan HAI Al-Sulaymaniyah Chamchamal Non HRP Mercy Corps KSC MAG Al-Sulaymaniyah Derbendikhan HRP 2020 HAI Al-Sulaymaniyah Derbendikhan Non HRP REACH Al-Sulaymaniyah Dokan HRP 2020 HAI IRAQ: Humanitarian Operational Presence (3W) for HRP and Non-HRP Activities May to July 2020 Protection, HLP, Governorate District Plan CCCM Education E.
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