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R. Srinivasan Prasad Daggupati Deepa Varma

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R. Srinivasan Prasad Daggupati Deepa Varma R. Srinivasan Prasad Daggupati Deepa Varma Overview of Tigris river, tributaries and water structures feeding Hawizeh marsh Upper Zone Proposed dam until Iraq border Current dam 1 Legend tigris_dams 2 <all other values> Type Û Barrage !( Dam 3 #* Dam Under Construction $+ Planned Dam Û Regulator +$ planned dam Middle Zone until Bagdad 1 2 Legend tigris_dams <all other values> Type 3 Û Barrage !( Dam #* Dam Under Construction $+ Planned Dam Û Regulator +$ planned dam Lower Zone until Hawizeh Marsh 1 Legend tigris_dams <all other values>2 Type Û Barrage !( Dam #* Dam Under Construction $+ Planned Dam 3 Û Regulator +$ planned dam River Flow Flow into Hawizeh marsh from Karkheh Flow (cms) 1000 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 0 1/1/1982 8/1/1982 3/1/1983 10/1/1… 5/1/1984 12/1/1… Flow without Karkheh dam 7/1/1985 2/1/1986 mcm 5900 ha, 2500 9/1/1986 4/1/1987 11/1/1… 6/1/1988 1/1/1989 8/1/1989 3/1/1990 10/1/1… 5/1/1991 12/1/1… 7/1/1992 2/1/1993 Karkheh flow 9/1/1993 4/1/1994 11/1/1… 6/1/1995 Average monthly flow (mcm) 1/1/1996 8/1/1996 3/1/1997 10/1/1… 5/1/1998 12/1/1… 7/1/1999 2/1/2000 9/1/2000 4/1/2001 Exceedance% 11/1/2… 6/1/2002 1/1/2003 8/1/2003 3/1/2004 10/1/2… 5/1/2005 12/1/2… 7/1/2006 2/1/2007 9/1/2007 4/1/2008 11/1/2… 6/1/2009 1/1/2010 8/1/2010 Annual Water budgets in 80’s Kutt Barrage Tigris Tigris Tigris Average 80’s 22000 Low 80’s 7500 High 80’s 28000 Mosul Mosul Mosul 27000 9000 37000 12000Greater zab 5500 Greater zab 16000Greater zab 7000Lesser Zab 1500Lesser Zab 11000 Lesser Zab Tartar Tartar Tartar 47000 16000 64000 5000 1000 11000 Samarra barrage Samarra barrage Samarra barrage 42000 15000 53000 Bagdad Bagdad 3500 Bagdad 5000 Diyala 2000 Diyala Diyala Kutt barrage Kutt barrage Kutt barrage 40000 16000 53000 Amarah Karkheh Karkheh Betarra Betarra Betarra Al Al Al All numbers above are average annual flow volume in mcm Nature Iraq report: 5000, 4000, 2500 mcm to reflood 75, 50 and 25% with evaporative demand of 3000, 2000, 1500 mcm and with constant outflow of 2000 mcm Annual Water budgets in 90’s until Kutt Barrage Tigris Tigris Tigris Average 90’s 15000 Low 90’s 2500 High 90’s 23000 Mosul Mosul Mosul 19000 6000 29000 8000 Greater zab 3400 Greater zab 6000 Greater zab 4000Lesser Zab 800 Lesser Zab 5000 Lesser Zab Tartar Tartar Tartar 31000 9000 40000 9000 1000 14000 Samarra barrage Samarra barrage Samarra barrage 22000 8000 26000 Bagdad Bagdad 2800 Bagdad 1800 Diyala 1000 Diyala Diyala Kutt barrage Kutt barrage Kutt barrage 18000 7000 22000 Amarah Karkheh Karkheh Betarra Betarra Betarra Al Al Al All numbers above are average annual flow volume in mcm Nature Iraq report: 5000, 4000, 2500 mcm to reflood 75, 50 and 25% with evaporative demand of 3000, 2000, 1500 mcm and with constant outflow of 2000 mcm Annual Water budgets in 2000’s Kutt Barrage Tigris Tigris Tigris Average 2000’s8000 Low 2000’s 6000 High 2000’s 13000 Mosul Mosul Mosul 9000 5500 16000 4000 Greater zab 3000 Greater zab 6500 Greater zab 1000Lesser Zab 350 Lesser Zab 2000 Lesser Zab Tartar Tartar Tartar 14000 9000 24000 4000 2000 8000 Samarra barrage Samarra barrage Samarra barrage 10000 7000 16000 Bagdad Bagdad 1200 Bagdad 2000 Diyala 600 Diyala Diyala Kutt barrage Kutt barrage Kutt barrage 8000 5000 13000 Amarah Karkheh Karkheh Betarra Betarra Betarra Al Al Al Nature Iraq report: 5000, 4000, 2500 mcm to reflood 75, 50 and 25% with All numbers above are average annual flow volume in mcm evaporative demand of 3000, 2000, 1500 mcm and with constant outflow of 2000 mcm AnnualTigris Water budgetsTigris belowTigris Kutt Barrage Percentage based on channel capacities Kutt barrage Kutt barrage Kutt barrage 40000 16000 53000 High 80’s Average Low 80’s 60% 80’s 24000 9600 31800 Amarah 25% Amarah Amarah 10000 5000 Karkheh 4000 4300 Karkheh 13250 6000Karkheh Betarra Betarra Betarra Al Al Al 15% 6000 2400 7950 Kutt barrage Kutt barrage Kutt barrage 18000 22000 7000 High 90’s Average Low 90’s 90’s 10800 4200 13200 Amarah Amarah Amarah 5500 8000 Karkheh 4500 5000 Karkheh 1750 2500 Karkheh Betarra Betarra Betarra Al Al 2700 Al 1050 3300 Kutt barrage Kutt barrage Kutt barrage 8000 5000 13000 High Average Low 2000’s 2000’s 2000’s 4800 3000 7800 Amarah Amarah Amarah 2000 900 Karkheh 1250 270 Karkheh 3250 2200Karkheh Betarra Betarra Betarra Al Al Al 1200 750 1950 Nature Iraq report: 5000, 4000, 2500 mcm to reflood 75, 50 and 25% with All numbers above are average annual flow volume in mcm evaporative demand of 3000, 2000, 1500 mcm and with constant outflow of 2000 mcm Flow intensity, duration, probability below Kutt Barrage After Kutt barrage Flow diversion into Hawizeh marsh 5000 mcm (416 mcm monthly) 5000 mcm (416 mcm monthly) 4000 mcm (330 mcm monthly) 2000 mcm (208mcm monthly) 2000 mcm (208mcm monthly) Average monthly flow(mcm) monthly Average Average monthly flow(mcm) monthly Average % Exceedence % Excedence Tigris Kutt barrage Flow diversion above Flow of tigris towards Amarah barrage Basra Amarah Karkheh Betarra Al Average monthly flow(mcm) monthly Average Average monthly flow(mcm) monthly Average % Excedence % Excedence Dams Current Volume Inflow Outflow Evaporation evap/v Future Countr River Volume Dam (mcm) (mcm) (mcm) % reduction (mcm) ol Dams y Batman 1100 1105 874 21% 50 5% Taqtaq Lesser Zab Iraq 2858 Dicile 580 674 659 2% 24 4% Bekhme Greater zab Iraq 8300 Kralkize 1920 342 305 11% 54 3% BakeermanGreater zab Iraq 500 Mandava Greater zab Iraq 2000 Mosul 11110 18799 17972 4% 416 4% Hakkari Greater zab Turkey 2000 Dokan 6800 5799 4587 21% 309 5% Trib upper Garzan Dibbis 4000 4953 3932 21% 154 4% tigris Turkey 145 Hemrin 2500 3318 2670 20% 78 3% Trib upper Derbinkha Kayser 3000 tigris Turkey 1970 n 3250 2866 12% 142 5% Trib upper Dilini Karkheh 5900 1978 1086 45% 40 1% tigris Turkey 200 Trin upper Tartar 11000 9000 - - 2260 21% Silvan Total 47910 49219 35519 3529 tigris Turkey 1175 800 Cizie Upper tigris Turkey6000 200 Illisu Upper tigris Turkey 10410 700 Dam effects 27777 5000 600 4000 Flow out with reservoir 500 Flow out without 400 reservoir 3000 Volume with irrigation Flow Flow (cms) 300 Volume (mcm) 2000 200 1000 100 0 0 1/1/2… 5/1/2… 9/1/2… 1/1/2… 5/1/2… 9/1/2… 1/1/2… 5/1/2… 9/1/2… 1/1/2… 5/1/2… 9/1/2… 1/1/2… 5/1/2… 9/1/2… 1/1/2… 5/1/2… 9/1/2… 1/1/2… 5/1/2… 9/1/2… 1/1/2… 5/1/2… 9/1/2… 1/1/2… 5/1/2… 9/1/2… 1/1/2… 5/1/2… 9/1/2… 1/1/2… 5/1/2… 9/1/2… Current and Post Dams Average 2000’s - Current Average 2000’s – Post dams* Tigris Tigris 6000 *Assumptions based on current dam sizes, 8000 inflow and outflow calculations Mosul Mosul 7000 9000 2000 Greater zab 4000 Greater zab 1000Lesser Zab 1000Lesser Zab Tartar Tartar 10000 14000 3000 Samarra barrage 4000 Samarra barrage 7000 10000 Bagdad 1000 Bagdad Diyala 1200 Diyala Kutt barrage Kutt barrage 4000 50% reduction 8000 2400 4800 1000 900 Karkheh 2000 900 Karkheh Betarra 600 Al Betarra 1200 Al Conclusions Open source of knowledge about water is key to avoid conflicts Open source models and data availability publically is very important Mekong river basin is a good example The water conflicts are well known in other river basins such as Ganges, Nile, Amazonia, Danube, Colorado and other major rivers around the world. As SWAT modelers we could model these basins and publish the information in a peer review process to bring focus to the problem and contribute to the awareness to countries that have no or poor information. .
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