DOCSLIB.ORG

MNC-I Inbrief GEN Petraeus

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
MNC-I Inbrief GEN Petraeus UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO MNC-I Inbrief GEN Petraeus 8 February 2007 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Filling the Gap Facilitates Sustainable Victory in Iraq The battle for the population of Iraq/Baghdad The Iraqi Individual The Gap Gov of Iraq Who is going to fill it? Needs and Desires: Slowly developing capability for: •Physical Security Shia militia and parties? •Physical Security Power and historical revenge Issues of ISF actions/inaction •QOL improvements-Hope for better life Sectarian EJKs/Cleansing ISF Loyal to GoI Basic Essential Services EFPs Against MNC-I forces Internal power stuggles (BADR/JAM) Sewage and Clean Water •QOL improvements minimal, need Honorable job-employment SWET-F advancement Rule of Law--balanced Iraqi Sunni Resistance? Dignified employment Return to Power Expectation to improve home, family, Protection from Shia Revenge Loans for enterprise neighborhood, society Co-location/Support with AQI, but tiring of tactics Consistent Rule of Law •Respect for Tribe/Religion AQI and the Caliphate? •Perceived as Shia biased First step in safe-haven for Regional Caliphate •Representation in Local/Provincial Govt. Foreign Fighters and Terrorists •No representation in Local or High Profile attacks (SVIED, VBIED) Provincial Govt Syria--Safe Haven/Source of support for Sunni Insurgents External Influences Iran--Influence in Iraqi (Shia) affairs, keep US engaged This is the historical fault line betwenn the Arab Sunni majority and the Persian Shia minority--Arab Sunnis are nervous, and Persian Shias are optimistic. So what do we have to do? Get the GoI to fill the Gap!! Military/Security Political Economic •Iraqi led, CF support--Joint Plan •GoI & USG similar goals and endstates •Expand Oil & Electricity sectors •Control COG-Baghdad •Local and Provincial Elections •Release funds to Provinces •Protect population •Reconciliation policy •Budget expended •Reduce violence •Reasonable de-Baathification Policy •Synch with mil control of secure areas •Interdict accelerants •Consistent and balanced Rule of Law •GoI/US synch economic devel effort •Balanced targeting approach •Declared/enforced State of Emergency •Investment in SOEs & Other industries •Expand MiTT, NPTT •Expand PRTs-link to mil success •Enhance capability/legitimacy of ISF •Exploit success in MNF-W Opportunities Risks •Exploit transition to ISF in MND-N •Door for Sunnis to participate in GoI •ISF not capable of "retain" •Transition to ISSR in the South •Split between Sunni tribes and AQI •GoI unwilling to put Iraq ahead of political/sectarian impulses •Disrupt border infiltration (Iran/Syria) •Splits between Shia factions •GoI unable to provide political/economic follow-up to security •Transition to Iraqi self-reliance •Population weary of conflict UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO The Threats and Their Objectives The term AIF is not adequate to describe: 1. Shia vs. Sunni Sectarian Violence 2. AQ and AQI 3. Sunni Insurgency 4. Kurdish expansionism 5. Shia on Shia Violence 6. External influences (Iranian, Syrian and Turkish) UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO TURKEY Potential Ethnic Expansion Habur Gate Rabyah Dahuk Dahuk Kurdish Tall Afar Expansion Mosul Irbil Kirkuk Sulaymaniya Hawijah Bayji SYRIA Al Qaim Tikrit Rawah IRAN Hadithah Samarra Husaybah Balad Al Asad Baqubah Hit Diyala Fallujah Shia Ramadi Baghdad Expansion Al Walid Sunni Ar Rutbah N. Babil Hindiyah Iskandariyah Karbala Al Kut Al Hillah An Nukhayb Najaf/Kufah Diwaniyah Al Amarah Nasiriyah Qurnah Basrah Safwan Umm Qasr KUWAIT SAUDI ARABIA Kuwait City KEY CITY UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO The Operational Concept The Goal: A stable Iraq (peaceful, united, representative, secure) Key reads: – Recognize there are different threats in different areas – Realization that there is an ethnic problem – Understanding sub-agendas of multiple groups/actors – Each area requires multiple approaches based on multiple threats – The Greatest Threat to Stability is escalating Sectarian Violence – The Greatest Sectarian Violence is occurring in Baghdad, Baghdad Belts Key requirements: – Can not let Sectarian Violence continue at current rate, or increase – Stop displacement of population, particularly in Baghdad – Main effort-establish security in mixed Sunni and Shia areas-protect against Shia intimidation/displacement/violence against Sunni – Supporting efforts-maintain security in Shia areas-protect against AQ accelerants and Sunni reprisals UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO The Operational Concept Approach to different Threats: Sectarian Violence -Establish combined CF-ISF security -Ensure even-handed CF-ISF actions in the streets -Replace militias as the recognized security element -Promote political/national reconciliation -Separate factions -Broker cease fires -Counter extremists and accelerators to violence AQ and AQI -Seek out and Destroy Sunni Insurgency -Bring them into the Political process -Defeat those not reconcilable with a legitimate GoI Kurdish expansion -Persuade Kurds not to over-reach (issues with Turks and Sunni Arabs) External Influences -Cut LOCs and improve border security -Diplomatic pressure is necessary UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Different Fights, Different Areas, Different Approaches The Threat Objectives Manifestation/ Locations Approach Indicators Sectarian Shia-Expand/Consolidate Power Intimidation Baghdad and Baghdad Belts Facilitate reconciliation Violence Sunni-Regain Power Murders N. Babil Act as third party Control resources Population moves Baqubah Broker cease-fires Fear/revenge cycle Counter accelerants Peace enforcement AQ and AQI Establish safe haven in Iraq High Profile attacks Baghdad N. Babil DESTROY AQ and AQI Establish caliphate for Mid-East (VBIED, SVIED) Fallujah Ramadi Sectarian catalyst or Baqubah Samarra Classic COIN accelerants Kirkuk Mosul Sunni Weaken & subvert Attacks on CF Baghdad N. Babil Bring into Political process Insurgency the GoI Retaliatory atks on Shia Fallujah Ramadi Legislation for reconciliation; de- Samarra Baqubah Ba'ath; Economic incentives, Delegitimize GoI Kirkuk Provincial elections Defeat those not reconcilable- COIN Kurdish Physical, Political and Economic Take over Kirkuk Kirkuk Art 140 resolution expansionism Autonomy Sunni Arab DPs Mosul Even-handed exec. of resolution Peshmerga in area Hydrocarbon law Violent Arab reprisal Intl facilitation Peace enforcement Shia on Shia Consolidation of Power primarily Attacks on each other, Baghdad Low priority Violence in the South primarily in the South Najaf Monitor, broker deals Basrah Opportunity to split Shia at political level External Iran-Keep US mired down Training, Funds, Weapons and Iran-Baghdad, Baqubah, Najaf, N. Diplomatic Pressure influence Syria-Survival Technology (EFPs), Terrorists Babil, Basrah Deterrence by threat of force and Foreign Fighters Syria-Baghdad, Fallujah, Mosul, Improved POE security (Iran, Syria, Turkey-Control Kurds Ramadi IO illustrating interference Turkey) Turkey-Kirkuk, Mosul UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Different Fights, Different Areas, Different Approaches The Threat Objectives Manifestation/ Locations Approach Indicators Corruption Individual Wealth Collusion of GoI officials and In key geographic locations Internal Controls, intelligence, Individual Power insurgent leaders/militia In key governmental functions leveraged pressure Other Political/Personal Lack of trust in GoI and ISF associated with critical resources Application of Rule of Law and Agendas Lack of services/infrastructure Iraqi Security Formations transparency maintenance De facto sectarian policy Lack of Bureaucratic and Political Slow political action on Ministries MNF-I and USG support/pressure Capacity and resistance to change legislation In key geographic locations Lack of budget execution In key governmental functions inexperience Lack of confidence in GoI Violent Local Individual wealth Intimidation and Murder Major urban centers Empower/support the police Criminals Local power Extortion Enforce the rule of law Subvert the local, provincial, Kidnappings for ransom Arrest, Prosecute, Convict and national GoI Black-marketing Improve judicial process Intimidate population and ISF Collusion with GoI officials and Phased removal of price controls insurgent leaders Publicize conviction of criminals Increase GOI detention capability MNC-I Operational Framework RABIAH t TAL AFAR SINJARp MOSUL u r s i Ex D ploit and KIRKUK Trans BAYJI ition TIKRIT Al QAIM SAMARRA PROTECT HADITHA t Ex DefeBALADat up pl BAQUBAH isr D oi HIT D ef t a AR RAMADI BAGHDAD ea n FALLUJAH RUTBAH t d AQ D I DN.e fBABILeat i sAL KUT ru KARBALA p t NAJAF DIWANIHAH Tran AMARAH sition SAMAWAH NASIRIYAH BASRAH As Of: 18 JAN 07 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Considerations • Recognize that there are different fights in different areas and there are multiple fights in each area • The greatest threat to stability is Sectarian Violence • Improved security is job one • The ISF is the visible arm of the GoI, manifested in legitimacy when Rule of Law derived from GoI policy/legislation is fairly enforced by the ISF • Security not followed with visible political, economic actions by GoI can not be decisive • Sunni inclusion in the GoI through reconciliation will reduce Sunni insurgency and make AQ more vulnerable • Sustained security and united population can lead to further rejection of external influences (AQ, Iran, Syria, Turkey) UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO MNC-I Mission Statement MNC-I Mission MNC-I conducts combat, stability, and support operations in coordination with the Iraqi Security Forces to secure the population, defeat terrorists and
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Security Council Distr.: General 28 March 2000 English
    United Nations S/2000/259 Security Council Distr.: General 28 March 2000 English Original: Arabic Identical letters dated 27 March 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 23 March 2000 addressed to you by Mr. Mohammed Said Al- Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the continuing pursuit by the United States of America and the United Kingdom of a policy of hostility towards Iraq. During the period from 8 to 21 March 2000, United States and British military aircraft carried out a total of 382 hostile sorties over the cities and villages of Iraq, in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law. I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council. (Signed) Saeed H. Hasan Ambassador Permanent Representative 00-36635 (E) 290300 300300 ````````` S/2000/259 Annex Identical letters dated 23 March 2000 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council I have the honour to inform you that, between 8 and 21 March 2000, United States and British military aircraft, taking off from their bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey, continued to violate Iraqi airspace, carrying out a total of 382 aerial sorties, of which 238 were from Saudi Arabia, 68 from Kuwait and 76 from Turkey, killing one civilian and wounding 14 others.
    [Show full text]
  • Weekly Explosive Incidents Flas
    iMMAP - Humanitarian Access Response Weekly Explosive Incidents Flash News (26 MAR - 01 APR 2020) 79 24 26 13 2 INCIDENTS PEOPLE KILLED PEOPLE INJURED EXPLOSIONS AIRSTRIKES DIYALA GOVERNORATE ISIS 31/MAR/2020 An Armed Group 26/MAR/2020 Injured a Military Forces member in Al-Ba'oda village in Tuz Khurmatu district. Four farmers injured in an armed conflict on the outskirts of the Mandali subdistrict. Iraqi Military Forces 01/APR/2020 ISIS 27/MAR/2020 Launched an airstrike destroying several ISIS hideouts in the Al-Mayta area, between Injured a Popular Mobilization Forces member in a clash in the Naft-Khana area. Diyala and Salah Al-Din border. Security Forces 28/MAR/2020 Found two ISIS hideouts and an IED in the orchards of Shekhi village in the Abi Saida ANBAR GOVERNORATE subdistrict. Popular Mobilization Forces 26/MAR/2020 An Armed Group 28/MAR/2020 Found an ISIS hideout containing fuel tanks used for transportation purposes in the Four missiles hit the Al-Shakhura area in Al-Barra subdistrict, northeast of Baqubah Nasmiya area, between Anbar and Salah Al-Din. district. Security Forces 30/MAR/2020 Popular Mobilization Forces 28/MAR/2020 Found and cleared a cache of explosives inside an ISIS hideout containing 46 homemade Bombarded a group of ISIS insurgents using mortar shells in the Banamel area on the IEDs, 27 gallons of C4, and three missiles in Al-Asriya village in Ramadi district. outskirts of Khanaqin district. ISIS 30/MAR/2020 Popular Mobilization Forces 28/MAR/2020 launched an attack killing a Popular Mobilization Forces member and injured two Security Found and cleared an IED in an agricultural area in the Hamrin lake vicinity, 59km northeast Forces members in Akashat area, west of Anbar.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Month of October in the City of Samarra by Themselves. They 2 Had the Most Contacts of Any Platoon in the Entire Battalion 3 and They Suffered No Casualties
    1 month of October in the city of Samarra by themselves. They 2 had the most contacts of any platoon in the entire battalion 3 and they suffered no casualties. There is no other platoon in 4 the battalion that can say that. He set up the first police 5 station in Balad and trained and monitored the Iraqis. 6 7 Balad was the geopolitical center of that region. It was 8 very unstable at the time and one of the hottest spots in Iraq. 9 Within a month we owned the city and built great relationships. 10 Subsequently, we spent a lot of money improving the 11 infrastructure. The periphery was mostly Sunni. Trying to 12 bring them into the government was difficult, but once we 13 controlled Balad and the city outlines, we controlled the 14 entire region. 15 16 Lieutenant Saville's platoon were the key to the success for 17 Alpha Company. He was put in for two bronze stars. His 18 rehabilitative potential is very high. He's very mature. He's 19 a faith-filled man, outstanding leader, outstanding officer and 20 he's earned the faith of his men. He's combat tested and he's 21 a man of integrity. I would take him anywhere, anytime. I'd 22 go to combat with him, I'.d stand by his side and I'd put my son 23 in his outfit if we were going back to war without thought. 24 25 CROSS-EXAMINATION 26 27 Questions by the trial counsel-Captain Schiffer: 28 29 The platoons were very autonomous because of the lack of 30 leadership in 1-66 Armor.
    [Show full text]
  • The Mosul Dam: Turning a Potential
    Viewpoints No. 98 The Mosul Dam: Turning a Potential Disaster into a Win-Win Solution Azzam Alwash Founder and CEO, Nature Iraq April 2016 Water management issues in the Middle East will continue to be a source of tension in a region that suffers no lack of causes for conflicts. The current problems posed by the Mosul Dam may be an opportunity to show how a collaborative region-wide solution can become a first step on the road to new ways of imaginative thinking in the region. Middle East Program ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Iraq has seen its share of calamities in recent years, but none is as dangerous as the impending failure of the Mosul Dam. The dam, if it were to be breached, will result in a tsunami-like wave that would sweep through cities and hamlets along the Tigris River from Mosul to as far south as Amarah and even Basra. Baghdad would be submerged under five meters of water within four days of the breach of the dam. Not only do experts estimate the possible fatalities to range from 500,000 to over one million, but consider the logistics of trying to provide electricity, drinking water, food, hospitals, transportation, and diesel for millions of people. The reaction to this potential calamity ranges from the U.S. government’s caution, which has issued warnings to its expats to stay at least six kilometers away from the Tigris (noting that the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad is situated on the shores of the Tigris in the Green Zone), to the Iraqi government’s nonchalance, which has only calm pronouncements to offer that there is nothing wrong with the dam and that grouting operations designed to strengthen it are proceeding on schedule.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq SITREP 2015-5-22
    Iraq Situation Report: July 02 - 06, 2015 1 On July 3, ISIS destroyed the house of Hawija police chief Col. Fattah Yasin al-Khafaji in Barima 7 On July 4, ISIS launched two SVBIEDs against the ISF and “Popular Mobiliza- village, between Kirkuk and Hawija. On July 5, Iraqi Air Force airstrikes destroyed a VBIED factory tion” in Baiji district, north of Tikrit, killing nine Iraqi Army (IA) soldiers and containing “more than 100 vehicles” and killed a large number of ISIS members, including “explosives forcing the ISF and “Popular Mobilization” to withdraw southward from the center experts” in Riyadh sub-district, southwest of Kirkuk on the road linking Kirkuk and Hawija. Between of Baiji. ISIS then recaptured Asri and Tamim neighborhoods in Baiji. On July 6, July 3 and July 4, DoD reported two airstrikes “near Hawija.” the Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that IA Aviation strikes killed 10 ISIS ghters in the Albu Juwari area, north of Baiji, and an anonymous security source 2 On July 6, Kirkuk Peshmerga ocials stated that ISIS attacked Peshmerga positions in al-Humayra reported that ISF reinforcements are heading to Baiji from south of Tikrit. Between and al-Murra villages, al-Nawal, al-Shahid complex, the Rashad area, Maktab Khalid, and Miriam July 3 and 6, the DoD conrmed three airstrikes “near Baiji.” Beg south of Kirkuk city. According to a Kirkuk Peshmerga ocial, 600 ISIS ghters participated in the attack and used multiple SVBIEDs, three of which the Peshmerga destroyed 8 Between July 3 and July 6, DoD reported six airstrikes “near Makhmur,” with anti-tank missiles before the SVBIEDs reached their targets.
    [Show full text]
  • EASO Rapport D'information Sur Les Pays D'origine Iraq Individus Pris
    European Asylum Support Office EASO Rapport d’information sur les pays d’origine Iraq Individus pris pour cible Mars 2019 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO Rapport d’information sur les pays d’origine Iraq Individus pris pour cible Mars 2019 D’autres informations sur l’Union européenne sont disponibles sur l’internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN: 978-92-9485-051-5 doi: 10.2847/95098 © European Asylum Support Office 2019 Sauf indication contraire, la reproduction est autorisée, moyennant mention de la source. Pour les contenus reproduits dans la présente publication et appartenant à des tierces parties, se référer aux mentions relatives aux droits d’auteur desdites tierces parties. Photo de couverture: © Joel Carillet, un drapeau iraquien flotte sur le toit de l’église syro- orthodoxe Saint-Ephrem de Mossoul (Iraq), qui a été fortement endommagée, quelques mois après que ce quartier de Mossoul a été repris à l’EIIL. L’emblème de l’EIIL était peint sur la façade du bâtiment durant l’occupation de Mossoul par l’EIIL. EASO RAPPORT D’INFORMATION SUR LES PAYS D’ORIGINE IRAQ: INDIVIDUS PRIS POUR CIBLE — 3 Remerciements Le présent rapport a été rédigé par des experts du centre de recherche et de documentation (Cedoca) du bureau belge du Commissariat général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides. Par ailleurs, les services nationaux d’asile et de migration suivants ont procédé à une relecture du présent rapport, en concertation avec l’EASO: Pays-Bas, Bureau des informations sur les pays et de l’analyse linguistique, ministère de la justice Danemark, service danois de l’immigration La révision apportée par les départements, experts ou organisations susmentionnés contribue à la qualité globale du rapport, mais ne suppose pas nécessairement leur approbation formelle du rapport final, qui relève pleinement de la responsabilité de l’EASO.
    [Show full text]
  • MISSAN GOVERNORATE ASSESSMENT REPORT November
    MISSAN GOVERNORATE ASSESSMENT REPORT Missan 7 Amarah 26 Al-Kahla 34 Al-Maimouna 36 Al-Majar Al-Kabir 57 Ali Al-Gharbi 86 Qal’at Salah Inhabitants per district November 2006 This UNHCR Assessment Report is intended to provide objective information regarding the overall situation in the Governorate in question, detailing the situation faced by persons of concern and their communities. The report has been drafted by UNHCR with its partners, and many governmental and non-governmental organizations have been invited to contribute to this report which draws on international sources, reports of district authorities, UNHCR’s returnee monitoring activities and consultations with returnees and their communities. Efforts have been made to ensure that only accurate, reliable, factual material, independently confirmed information is reported. This Assessment Report is not intended to be a comprehensive human rights report, nor is the report an expression of political opinion or a statement of UNHCR policy. While the Assessment Report primarily targets displaced populations and returnees, information in Annexes I to III have been prepared in a format useful for donors and the Iraqi authorities. Therefore, the Assessment Report will be made available to a wide audience, including refugees abroad, IDPs and returnees and their communities, authorities, donors and other agencies. This report does not take into account events occurring on or after 30 November 2006, unless a later date is specified. UNHCR plans to update the report on a regular basis. Further information can be found on www.hcriraq.org 2 Table of Contents I. General Information ......................................................................................................................................6 A. Political Developments................................................................................................................................7 B.
    [Show full text]
  • IRAQ: Humanitarian Operational Presence (3W) for HRP and Non-HRP Activities May to July 2020
    IRAQ: Humanitarian Operational Presence (3W) for HRP and Non-HRP Activities May to July 2020 TURKEY Zakho 23 Number of partners by cluster DUHOK Al-Amadiya 9 3 Sumail Duhok 17 10 25 33 Rawanduz Al-Shikhan Aqra Telafar Tilkaef 17 2 ERBIL 23 Shaqlawa 26 3 Pshdar Al-Hamdaniya 4 Rania 2 Al-Mosul 48 Erbil NINEWA Koysinjaq 28 59 Dokan 2 CCCM Education E. Livelihoods Food Security Health Protection, HLP, MA Protection: Child P. Protection: GBV SNFI WASH MPCA Total partners* Makhmour 1 Sharbazher Al-Baaj Dibis 26 11 6 AL-SULAYMANIYAH Al-Hatra Al-Shirqat Kirkuk Al-Sulaymaniyah Governorate Column12 6 6 SYRIA 9 Chamchamal 5 Al-Hawiga KIRKUK 20 Halabcha Al-Anbar 34427674532 26 20 6 2 18 Daquq Al-Basrah 1 1 1 4 1 1 7 20 Beygee 9 Tooz Kalar Al-Muthanna 1 1 2 Tikrit Khurmato 10 9 10 Al-Najaf 1 3 4 2 1 8 SALAH AL-DIN Kifri 2 2 20 Al-Qadissiya 1 1 2 4 Ana 5 8 Samarra Al-Kaim Haditha Al-Sulaymaniyah 1 1 5 2 5 2 3 3 1 1 23 Al-Khalis DIYALA IRAN Babil 1 1 1 2 4 9 12 7 Balad Al-Muqdadiya Heet 10 5 Baghdad 3 2 1 1 2 6 4 1 13 6 Baquba 2 Diyala 5 3 3 6 6 4 2 2 1 23 Al-Kadhmiyah Duhok 2 7 7 1 13107 12 3 6 3 49 5 6 Al-Mada'in Al-Ramadi Al-Falluja 2 Erbil 11647485111 30 14 Al-Mahmoudiya AL-ANBAR 21 2 5 Kerbala 1 1 3 3 1 1 7 Al-Mussyab 1 Kirkuk 34428795473 35 Al-Rutba Ain KERBALA WASSIT 2 Kerbela BABIL Al-Kut Maysan 1 1 1 2 5 Al-Tamur 1 5 Al-Hashimiya 1 1 Ninewa 7 11 19 8 23 25 22 22 9 21 10 89 JORDAN 2 3 Al-Hai Al-Kufa 4 Salah Al-Din 6 3 5 1106 8 4 2113 37 1 Al-Diwaniya MAYSAN Thi Qar 1 1 1 1 4 AL-QADISSIYA Wassit 1 2 2 Al-Hamza Qalat AL-NAJAF 1 Saleh Total partners* 12 18 27 14 30 33 45 35 18 31 12 138 * Total number of unique partners reported under the HRP 2019, HRP 2020 and other non-HRP plans.
    [Show full text]
  • Weekly Explosive Incidents Flas
    iMMAP - Humanitarian Access Response Weekly Explosive Hazard Incidents Flash News (25 June - 01 July2020) 79 673 11 6 4 INCIDENTS PEOPLE KILLED PEOPLE INJURED EXPLOSIONS AIRSTRIKES Federal Police Forces 01/JUL/2020 DIYALA GOVERNORATE Found and cleared 22 IEDs in Samarra district. Security Forces 25/JUN/2020 SALAH AL-DIN GOVERNORATE Destroyed an ISIS hideout and cleared a cache of explosives containing seven mortar Security Forces 25/JUN/2020 shells, three homemade IEDs, three detonators, and ammunition. Found and cleared a cache of explosives belonging to ISIS in the Al-Dhuluiya subdistrict. An Armed Group 26/JUN/2020 Coalition Forces 26/JUN/2020 Shot and killed a Security Forces member near Abu Al-Khanazer village on the outskirts of Launched several airstrikes and destroyed many ISIS hideouts and tunnels, killing 24 Abi Said subdistrict, northeast of Baqubah district. insurgents in Khanuka mountain. Popular Mobilization Forces 26/JUN/2020 Military Intelligence 29/JUN/2020 Destroyed five ISIS hideouts and killed five insurgents in the Al-Adhim area, north of Diyala. Found and cleared 24 IEDs and artillery shells in the Mukayshafa desert of Samarra district. ISIS 27/JUN/2020 Killed four Federal Police Forces members and injured two others in an attack at Abu Coalition Forces 29/JUN/2020 Al-Khanazer village, northeast of Baqubah district. Launched several airstrikes and destroyed many ISIS hideouts, killing everyone inside in Makhoul mountain of Baiji district. Popular Mobilization Forces 27/JUN/2020 Repelled an ISIS attack in Sheikh Jawamir village, north of Muqdadiya district. An Armed Group 30/JUN/2020 A targeted IED explosion struck a Popular Mobilization Forces patrol, killing four members Popular Mobilization Forces 27/JUN/2020 and injuring another, west of Baiji district.
    [Show full text]
  • Mapaction Powerpoint Maps - Iraq
    MapAction PowerPoint Maps - Iraq Introduction The aim of this PowerPoint pack to provide you with some simple maps so that you can add your own data and information to them and use in presentations or reports. The maps are saved to the background so that your write or draw over them without touching the map itself. The PowerPoint pack provides all the tools that you would need to produce including symbols, callout boxes, legends and labels. All you need to do is copy and paste. How to guide Select the map you want to use. Add your data In the Labels and Symbology section there are ready made symbols, labels and callout boxes that can be cut and pasted onto your map. With the callout boxes, double click on them and begin typing your information. Contents Introduction and How to guide Country Map Northern Iraq Admin 1 Maps – White Admin 1 Maps – Colour Admin 1 Maps - Editable Labels and Symbology Logos Weblinks Data Collection MapAction User Guide Country Map Showing Country boundary and Department boundaries There are two types of country map: • Simple Country Reference Map – Copy and paste labels to map • Advance Country Reference Map – Admin boundaries colours can be changed. Select admin area, Right Click>>Format Shape>>Fill Contents Reference map of Iraq Reference map of Iraq This map is editable TURKEY DAHUK Dahuk Mosul Erbil ERBIL NINEWA Sulaymaniyah Kirkuk KIRKUK SULAYMANIYAH SYRIA SALAH AL-DIN Samarra DIYALA IRAN Ba`aqubah Ramadi Baghdad BAGHDAD ANBAR JORDAN Kerbala WASSIT Kut KERBALA Hilla Najaf Diwaniya MISSAN QADISSIYA Amarah
    [Show full text]
  • 2014-12-14 Situation Report
    Iraq Situation Report: December 19-21, 2014 1 On December 20, Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces, supported by the Syrian 5 On December 20, ISIS attacked Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) stationed Kurdish PYD People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Iraqi Yazidi ghters, in areas in Haditha in western Anbar. e clashes took place in the areas engaged the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) inside the center of Sinjar of Sin al-ib and al-Sagra. e attack was repelled and French airstrikes in western Ninewa province. By December 21, these combined forces moved supported the ISF. On December, Haditha’s mayor, Abdul Hakim inside Sinjar district and retook several neighborhoods inside the city. ese al-Jughai, called for coalition airstrikes to target ISIS in the Khasfa area operations were supported by airstrikes from the international anti-ISIS which he indicated as a staging area for the next ISIS attack into coalition. Haditha. Dahuk 2 On December 20, the governor of Salah ad-Din stated that 6 On December 20, ISIS attacked ISF forces near the Baghdadi ISIS has launched a major attack inside Baiji district in Salah Mosul Dam area in Anbar province. ISIS launched the attacks from the Joba ad-Din province. is statement comes as the Iraqi 1 3 Bridge and from northern Hit. e attack was repelled, but a Security Forces (ISF) engaged ISIS in the middle of Mosul Arbil tribal leader stated that ISIS now controls the Joba and Sayad central Baiji; Iraqi military reinforcements are reported areas in northern Baghdadi. On December 21, a local ocial to have arrived in the city.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq SITREP 2015-10-15
    Iraq Situation Report: October 16 - 20, 2015 1 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta visits Iraq. Gen. Dunford, Chairman of the Joint 6 ISF and “Popular Mobilization” make progress in and around Baiji. Iraqi Chiefs of Sta, traveled to Arbil and Baghdad on October 20 for meetings with PM Haider Security Forces, Iranian proxy militias, and non-proxy militias seized Siniya al-Abadi, President Fuad Masoum, and American commanders. He stated that Abadi has not and the Siniya airport, west of Baiji, on October 15. Security forces also asked Russia to conduct airstrikes. recaptured several areas north of Baiji and trapped ISIS ghters to al-Fatha, between Mount Makhul and the Hamrin Mountains. Proxy militias and a Joint Operations Command spokesperson claimed full control over Baiji, though ghting in Baiji and the Baiji Oil Renery is ongoing. Six Coalition 2 Jordan-Iraq border temporarily opens. Jordan temporarily airstrikes targeted ISIS “near” Baiji between October 16 and October 20. re-opened the Trebil border crossing on October 18 to allow Iraqi trucks and goods to return to Iraq. Dahuk Mosul Dam 7 Diyala governor escapes assassination attempt. Two IEDs Mosul Arbil targeted the convoy of the Diyala governor, a senior Badr Organi- 3 ISF launches operation to re-secure key town near zation member, in al-Tahrir area south of Baquba on October 19. al-Asad Airbase. Jazeera and Badia Operations Command e governor escaped unharmed, but two bodyguards ( JBOC) launched an operation on October 16 to clear ISIS were wounded. As Sulaymaniyah from areas around Baghdadi sub-district, west of Ramadi, and destroyed three VBIEDs.
    [Show full text]