UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

MNC-I Inbrief GEN Petraeus

8 February 2007

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Filling the Gap Facilitates Sustainable Victory in The battle for the population of Iraq/ The Iraqi Individual The Gap Gov of Iraq Who is going to fill it? Needs and Desires: Slowly developing capability for:

•Physical Security Shia militia and parties? •Physical Security Power and historical revenge Issues of ISF actions/inaction •QOL improvements-Hope for better life Sectarian EJKs/Cleansing ISF Loyal to GoI Basic Essential Services EFPs Against MNC-I forces Internal power stuggles (BADR/JAM) Sewage and Clean Water •QOL improvements minimal, need Honorable job-employment SWET-F advancement Rule of Law--balanced Iraqi Sunni Resistance? Dignified employment Return to Power Expectation to improve home, family, Protection from Shia Revenge Loans for enterprise neighborhood, society Co-location/Support with AQI, but tiring of tactics Consistent Rule of Law •Respect for Tribe/Religion AQI and the ? •Perceived as Shia biased First step in safe-haven for Regional Caliphate •Representation in Local/Provincial Govt. Foreign Fighters and Terrorists •No representation in Local or High Profile attacks (SVIED, VBIED) Provincial Govt

Syria--Safe Haven/Source of support for Sunni Insurgents External Influences --Influence in Iraqi (Shia) affairs, keep US engaged This is the historical fault line betwenn the Arab Sunni majority and the Persian Shia minority--Arab Sunnis are nervous, and Persian Shias are optimistic. So what do we have to do? Get the GoI to fill the Gap!! Military/Security Political Economic •Iraqi led, CF support--Joint Plan •GoI & USG similar goals and endstates •Expand Oil & Electricity sectors •Control COG-Baghdad •Local and Provincial Elections •Release funds to Provinces •Protect population •Reconciliation policy •Budget expended •Reduce violence •Reasonable de-Baathification Policy •Synch with mil control of secure areas •Interdict accelerants •Consistent and balanced Rule of Law •GoI/US synch economic devel effort •Balanced targeting approach •Declared/enforced State of Emergency •Investment in SOEs & Other industries •Expand MiTT, NPTT •Expand PRTs-link to mil success •Enhance capability/legitimacy of ISF •Exploit success in MNF-W Opportunities Risks •Exploit transition to ISF in MND-N •Door for Sunnis to participate in GoI •ISF not capable of "retain" •Transition to ISSR in the South •Split between Sunni tribes and AQI •GoI unwilling to put Iraq ahead of political/sectarian impulses •Disrupt border infiltration (Iran/Syria) •Splits between Shia factions •GoI unable to provide political/economic follow-up to security •Transition to Iraqi self-reliance •Population weary of conflict UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO The Threats and Their Objectives

The term AIF is not adequate to describe:

1. Shia vs. Sunni Sectarian Violence 2. AQ and AQI 3. Sunni Insurgency 4. Kurdish expansionism 5. Shia on Shia Violence 6. External influences (Iranian, Syrian and Turkish)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO TURKEY Potential Ethnic Expansion Habur Gate Rabyah Dahuk Dahuk Kurdish Tall Afar Expansion Irbil

Kirkuk Sulaymaniya Hawijah Bayji

SYRIA Al Qaim Rawah IRAN Hadithah Husaybah Balad Al Asad Hit Diyala Shia Baghdad Expansion Al Walid Sunni Ar Rutbah N. Babil Hindiyah Iskandariyah Al Al

An Nukhayb /Kufah Diwaniyah Al

Nasiriyah Qurnah

Basrah Safwan Umm Qasr KUWAIT SAUDI ARABIA Kuwait City

KEY CITY

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO The Operational Concept

The Goal: A stable Iraq (peaceful, united, representative, secure)

Key reads: – Recognize there are different threats in different areas – Realization that there is an ethnic problem – Understanding sub-agendas of multiple groups/actors – Each area requires multiple approaches based on multiple threats – The Greatest Threat to Stability is escalating Sectarian Violence – The Greatest Sectarian Violence is occurring in Baghdad, Baghdad Belts

Key requirements: – Can not let Sectarian Violence continue at current rate, or increase – Stop displacement of population, particularly in Baghdad – Main effort-establish security in mixed Sunni and Shia areas-protect against Shia intimidation/displacement/violence against Sunni – Supporting efforts-maintain security in Shia areas-protect against AQ accelerants and Sunni reprisals

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO The Operational Concept

Approach to different Threats: Sectarian Violence -Establish combined CF-ISF security -Ensure even-handed CF-ISF actions in the streets -Replace militias as the recognized security element -Promote political/national reconciliation -Separate factions -Broker cease fires -Counter extremists and accelerators to violence

AQ and AQI -Seek out and Destroy

Sunni Insurgency -Bring them into the Political process -Defeat those not reconcilable with a legitimate GoI

Kurdish expansion -Persuade not to over-reach (issues with Turks and Sunni )

External Influences -Cut LOCs and improve border security -Diplomatic pressure is necessary

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Different Fights, Different Areas, Different Approaches

The Threat Objectives Manifestation/ Locations Approach Indicators Sectarian Shia-Expand/Consolidate Power Intimidation Baghdad and Baghdad Belts Facilitate reconciliation Violence Sunni-Regain Power Murders N. Babil Act as third party Control resources Population moves Baqubah Broker cease-fires Fear/revenge cycle Counter accelerants Peace enforcement AQ and AQI Establish safe haven in Iraq High Profile attacks Baghdad N. Babil DESTROY AQ and AQI Establish caliphate for Mid-East (VBIED, SVIED) Fallujah Ramadi Sectarian catalyst or Baqubah Samarra Classic COIN accelerants Mosul Sunni Weaken & subvert Attacks on CF Baghdad N. Babil Bring into Political process Insurgency the GoI Retaliatory atks on Shia Fallujah Ramadi Legislation for reconciliation; de- Samarra Baqubah Ba'ath; Economic incentives, Delegitimize GoI Kirkuk Provincial elections

Defeat those not reconcilable- COIN Kurdish Physical, Political and Economic Take over Kirkuk Kirkuk Art 140 resolution expansionism Autonomy Sunni Arab DPs Mosul Even-handed exec. of resolution Peshmerga in area Hydrocarbon law Violent Arab reprisal Intl facilitation Peace enforcement Shia on Shia Consolidation of Power primarily Attacks on each other, Baghdad Low priority Violence in the South primarily in the South Najaf Monitor, broker deals Basrah Opportunity to split Shia at political level External Iran-Keep US mired down Training, Funds, Weapons and Iran-Baghdad, Baqubah, Najaf, N. Diplomatic Pressure influence Syria-Survival Technology (EFPs), Terrorists Babil, Basrah Deterrence by threat of force and Foreign Fighters Syria-Baghdad, Fallujah, Mosul, Improved POE security (Iran, Syria, Turkey-Control Kurds Ramadi IO illustrating interference Turkey) Turkey-Kirkuk, Mosul

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Different Fights, Different Areas, Different Approaches

The Threat Objectives Manifestation/ Locations Approach Indicators Corruption Individual Wealth Collusion of GoI officials and In key geographic locations Internal Controls, intelligence, Individual Power insurgent leaders/militia In key governmental functions leveraged pressure Other Political/Personal Lack of trust in GoI and ISF associated with critical resources Application of Rule of Law and Agendas Lack of services/infrastructure Iraqi Security Formations transparency maintenance De facto sectarian policy Lack of Bureaucratic and Political Slow political action on Ministries MNF-I and USG support/pressure Capacity and resistance to change legislation In key geographic locations Lack of budget execution In key governmental functions inexperience Lack of confidence in GoI Violent Local Individual wealth Intimidation and Murder Major urban centers Empower/support the police Criminals Local power Extortion Enforce the rule of law Subvert the local, provincial, Kidnappings for ransom Arrest, Prosecute, Convict and national GoI Black-marketing Improve judicial process Intimidate population and ISF Collusion with GoI officials and Phased removal of price controls insurgent leaders Publicize conviction of criminals Increase GOI detention capability MNC-I Operational Framework

RABIAH

t SINJARp MOSUL u r s i Ex D ploit and KIRKUK Trans BAYJI ition

TIKRIT Al QAIM SAMARRA PROTECT t Ex DefeBALADat up pl BAQUBAH isr D oi HIT D ef t a AR RAMADI BAGHDAD ea n FALLUJAH RUTBAH t d AQ D I DN.e fBABILeat i sAL KUT ru KARBALA p t

NAJAF DIWANIHAH Tran AMARAH sition

NASIRIYAH BASRAH

As Of: 18 JAN 07 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Considerations

• Recognize that there are different fights in different areas and there are multiple fights in each area

• The greatest threat to stability is Sectarian Violence

• Improved security is job one

• The ISF is the visible arm of the GoI, manifested in legitimacy when Rule of Law derived from GoI policy/legislation is fairly enforced by the ISF

• Security not followed with visible political, economic actions by GoI can not be decisive

• Sunni inclusion in the GoI through reconciliation will reduce Sunni insurgency and make AQ more vulnerable

• Sustained security and united population can lead to further rejection of external influences (AQ, Iran, Syria, Turkey) UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO MNC-I Mission Statement

MNC-I Mission MNC-I conducts combat, stability, and support operations in coordination with the Iraqi Security Forces to secure the population, defeat terrorists and irreconcilable extremists, neutralize insurgent and militia groups, and transition responsibilities to the ISF in order to reduce violence, gain the support of the people, stabilize Iraq, and enable GoI security self-reliance. NLT December 2007, we will establish stability and create irreversible momentum with the Iraqi population, the GoI and ISF toward the ultimate goal of self-reliance.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Commander’s Intent (1 of 3) • Purpose In order to break the current cycle of sectarian violence, we must set the conditions for the ISF to emerge as the dominant security force, able to protect the population and provide security in a fair and impartial manner. This operation will be Iraqi-led with Coalition support. Much more than a military operation alone, it must include a combination of military, economic, and political actions. Militarily, we must interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence emerging from Southern Salah ad Din, Eastern Diyala, and Western Anbar, exploiting recent successes in these areas to continue the transition to Iraqi security self-reliance and enhance the prospects for reconciliation. A key will be our ability to neutralize VBIED and EFP networks. Within Baghdad, we must move deliberately and maintain a robust, combined presence in each administrative district until we have firmly established Joint Security Stations manned by CF alongside ISF that are loyal to the GOI and can provide adequate protection for the population. Our operations must be deliberate, our goals achievable and sustainable. We will only be decisive when security is sustained over time with Iraqis fully in charge. Economically, we must create a combination of near-term and long-term employment opportunities and improve basic services in order to generate economic growth in poor neighborhoods. Politically, we must set benchmarks to address the dismantling of Shia militias, deal with de-Baathification, and move towards provincial and local

elections. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Commander’s Intent (2 of 3) • Key Tasks – In conjunction with the ISF, secure the Iraqi people, with a focus on Baghdad; as a minimum: • Maintain consistent forward presence – 24/7 CF coverage in clear, control, and retain areas until CF shift to the periphery • Be deliberate – resist the urge to surge; as the operation progresses, give priority to the retention and control of cleared areas; ensure the right amount of security forces are controlling the districts • Achievable – demonstrate real and perceived success, early-on and throughout the operation • Sustainable – as ISF and CF control expands, avoid overstretch and prevent re-infiltration; carefully consider the risks of committing to new clearing operations – Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence – Neutralize VBIED networks – Neutralize Sunni and Shia extremists that conduct EJKs, IED and IDF attacks – balanced operations targeting groups on both sides of the sectarian divide – Improve security at Ports of Entry to reduce illegal cross-border activity, with a priority to stemming the flow of weapons and EFPs from Iran – Enhance the capability and legitimacy of the ISF – Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance – Support PRTs and interagency partners in the implementation of economic development initiatives UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Commander’s Intent (3 of 3) • Endstate – Baghdad secure and considered so by Sunni and Shia alike; violence in Baghdad reduced to a manageable level – ISF viewed by Iraqis as the dominant security force in Baghdad – Iraqi-led C2 structure for Baghdad in place and functioning – GOI perceived as taking the issue of sectarian violence seriously and seen as acting to reduce it – Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance initiated IAW the Bridging Strategy and making steady progress throughout Iraq – Enhanced capacity of GOI to provide essential services and infrastructure maintenance – Foundation laid for self-sustaining economic growth – CF positioned on the periphery of urban areas; enhanced transition teams and dedicated strike forces in place

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Critical Conditions Beginning the Operation 9 Concurrence from GOI on the concept of operations and the endstate – Start, stay, and finish together – GOI must publicly announce and display their support until endstate achieved 9 GOI must give the proper support and authority to its security forces without undue interference and influence 9 GOI must support a “balanced” targeting approach, allowing operations throughout the city – to include shia areas 9 GOI extension of existing state of emergency, with measures including at a minimum: – Banning vehicles from selected locations – Controlling access into, and internal to, the city as required – Random searches of vehicles, people, businesses, and homes – Full enforcement of the weapons ban • GOI must seriously consider declaring a cease fire, institute a mid-term amnesty program, and – with reconciliation in mind – determine a policy defining the endstate for all militias • GOI must release all DFI funds to Anbar, Tal Afar, and Samarra to cultivate Sunni trust and confidence • In coordination with the GOI, the Coalition must have a coordinated and synchronized reconstruction and beautification plan as it clears, controls, and retains districts in Baghdad • GOI must pass legislation and announce a timeline for local and provincial elections as soon as possible • GOI must develop, announce, and implement a reasonable de-Baathification program • USG must engage GOI and encourage GOI to endorse and fund state-owned enterprise reinvigoration initiatives proposed by the Brinkley Group

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Phasing Construct

Phase I: Setting the Conditions Overlap between phases and • GOI political conditions within certain phases • Organize forces • Disrupt VBIED and EFP networks • Develop Baghdad C2 structure Combined operations Phase II: Clear, Control, Retain with the ISF Clear • Secure Baghdad MND-B MAIN EFFORT: Control Retain SUPPORTING • Interdict accelerants to Baghdad sectarian violence EFFORTS: • Outlying MNDs exploit prior success • Neutralize VBIED and EFP networks • Deny extremist group sanctuaries Increasingly capable ISF Phase III: Retain and Renew throughout Iraq supports the Phase III tasks • Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance effort to secure Baghdad also support • Economic development initiatives the main effort • Sustain PIC; continue transition to PIC Phase IV: Exploitation Operational • Conduct strike ops against AQI and Shia extremists Overwatch

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Clear, Control and Retain

1. Designated clear forces with specific objectives: ‰ Combined IA/NP and CF Operation • Cordon and Search Clear: remove all enemy forces and eliminate • Cordon and Knock organized resistance within an assigned area. • Deliberate, precise targeting (can be Security Forces (ISF and CF) and infrastructure multiple targets) required to protect the population identified and ‰ Heavy combined presence established to protect the population resourced. ‰ “Quick start” short term employment projects identified and resourced

2. Designated control forces with specific objectives: ‰ IA/NP Brigade maintains heavy presence in District to protect the populace Control: maintain physical influence over a ‰ Coalition Battalion supports IA/NP BDE specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or operations to protect the populace (requires a to create conditions necessary for successful 24/7 presence in sector) friendly operations. Security Forces (ISF and CF) ‰ Joint Security Stations established with in place to protect the population and security IP/IA/NP and Coalition Forces ‰ Coalition Force QRF prepared to support infrastructure improvement / construction ‰ Short term employment projects on-going, ongoing. long term employment and reconstruction projects identified and funded

3. Designated retain forces with specific objectives: ‰ IPs conducting routine police actions Retain: ensure a terrain feature controlled by a ‰ IA or NP BDE in tactical overwatch friendly force remains free of enemy occupation ‰ Coalition Battalion in Operational Overwatch or use. All required Security Forces (ISF and CF) ‰ Long term employment and reconstruction are in place, fully functional, and sustainable. projects on-going or complete

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Clear, Control, Retain and Transition

1. Begin Clearing Phase 2. Begin Control Phase 1. Are ISF and CF partnerships establish and 1. Are sufficient ISF and CF on hand to clear the functional? (CF BN DS to ISF BDE) designated administrative district? 2. Is there a CF TST unit available? 2. Are sufficient ISF and CF available to transition to YES 3. Are sufficient ISF and CF available to conduct the control phase? control operations? 3. Is target development sufficient to begin clearing 4. Are the required number of Joint Security phase? Stations at initial operational capability? 4. Are sufficient adjacent forces available to conduct 5. Is sufficient barrier material available to begin interdiction, control or block tasks in support of establishing “vehicle free zones” and “gated clearing operations? communities”? 5. Have “Quick start” short term employment projects 6. Are Neighborhood and District Councils formed been identified and resourced or forming? 7. Are short term employment projects on-going and long term employment and reconstruction These criteria are to be viewed as the minimum projects identified and funded? standards to progress from one phase to the next.

However, each area and Administrative District YES will be different - Commanders must view this criteria as “commander’s intent” and be prepared to operate within it to achieve their mission. 3. Begin Retain Phase

4. Begin Transition Phase 1. Are the required number of Joint Security Stations at full operational capability? 2. Is there a dedicated CF TST available? YES 1. Are the IPs capable of conducting effective law 3. Is the ISF Brigade and Joint Security Station and order operations with IA or NP overwatch? adequately manned with ISF and CF? 2. Are local governance systems operational – local 4. Are the IA, NP an IP cooperating to provide to provincial? security to the citizens of the district? 3. Are enhanced MiTTs in place and opeational? 5. Has the GOI accepted responsibility for the 4. Are CF in postion to provide a QRF or reinforce management of ongoing reconstruction projects? the ISF if required? 6. Are NACs and DACs functional? 7. Are long term employment and reconstruction projects on-going or complete? UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Baghdad Security-The Way Ahead (1 of 2)

• MNC-I understands time is not on our side—must have visible progress soon and use time pressure to help GoI reach political accommodation now

• Visible progress can create momentum and space for economic/legislative action

• Security provides momentum and sets the conditions for GoI (Governance), ISF, economic success

• Security synchronized with Governance and Economic development can work, but it will take great internal political effort from the GoI in the short term

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Baghdad Security-The Way Ahead(2 of 2) • How we see it going: – Main effort is growing political legitimacy and capacity with supporting security, economic, information and overarching transition operations – Main security effort will be on Baghdad and Baghdad Belts (Enemy support zones/avenues of approach) – Combined effort with ISF partnered with CF – Supporting security efforts will be to interdict accelerants/POE – Security actions will be deliberate—designed to retain cleared areas – There will be no hurry to move to new areas, unless the situation dictates; and there will be no hurry to transition, unless ISF are really ready/capable of success – May have to re-clear areas if intel/situation warrants – May need to take risk in other areas away from Baghdad (MND-N and MNF-W) if required and based on opportunities for earlier transitions there – Transition to ISF will also be deliberate—designed to not regress/lose control of the population – Transition will encompass partnership and enhanced transition teams, from CF elements – Transition will also encompass a gradual reduction of CF footprint, first to tactical overwatch, then to operational overwatch once security is retained in designated areas – CF will retain strike capability for TSTs and freedom of movement • Timely and effective GoI economic actions, synchronized with and immediately behind successful clear, control, retain operations contributes to momentum of improved security—this is where ISF/GoI legitimacy has the most potential for taking root in population centers—(Baghdad first) • Legislation and effective application of policy on de-Ba’athification/ reconciliation, provincial election plans, and release of funds for economic development, simultaneously with fully established security allows GoI to gain nation-wide legitimacy in eyes of all of the Iraqis

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO IGFC & 4 IA II Proposed Division Boundaries for Surge AOR 1 505

II

2 505 II II

3 8 II II

2-82 II 6-9 1-12

II

II II 2-8 I

II I 5-73 x II II1-82 II 1 1 III 1-7 FA 1-37 1-37 FA 6 IIII II II 2-5 2-5 CAV II 3 509 II 3-61 II 1-89 II II 2-23 II 2-14 II 1-40 1-38 4-31 4/6 IA

II BCT 19 1 501

2 377 4 2 II

2-1 II

4-9 OPRES UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO MNF-I Issues for Consideration

Political: • Focus Main Effort Ö Political reconciliation and GOI capacity • Engage with Tribes and • Manage the “blame game” – Iraqis will blame us for everything that goes wrong • Create seamless relationship between MNF-I and Embassy • Put pressure on approval of critical legislation: – Hydrocarbon legislation – Provincial Powers Law and related laws for provincial elections – Amnesty Amendment – Approval of article 140/Relations with Kirkuk – De-Ba’athification legislation – Reconciliation process for militias (DDR is a GOI not a CF task) • With USM-I, Apply diplomatic pressure on Syria, Iran, and Turkey

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO MNF-I Issues for Consideration

Security: • Identify and agree on command and control relationships post 1st March • Emphasize MNC-I, MNDs, & BCTs joint planning with the Iraqis (Re-shape MNSTC-I umbilical cord) • Achieve and effectively publicize quick wins • Expand rule of law detention capacity and facilities • Redo MNF-I strategic guidance and plan for bridging strategy and transition

Economics: • Move mindset from reconstruction to economic development • Help Iraqi’s spend their money • Push for continuing US Reconstruction Budgets ($1.2 billion FY 2007 supplemental critical to partners (USAID)) • Leverage PRTs – Deployed, empowered, resourced, energized

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Things that could go wrong

• Perception of continued violence in Baghdad despite the security surge • GoI fails to put Iraq ahead of sectarian political agenda. Sectarian violence continues, possibly increases • Significant Shia on Shia fight in the South with Iranian involvement, spills into Baghdad • Death of Sistani • Significant move by Kurds causes major incursion of Turkish forces in the North

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Comments/Questions

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO