EASO Rapport D'information Sur Les Pays D'origine Iraq Individus Pris

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EASO Rapport D'information Sur Les Pays D'origine Iraq Individus Pris European Asylum Support Office EASO Rapport d’information sur les pays d’origine Iraq Individus pris pour cible Mars 2019 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO Rapport d’information sur les pays d’origine Iraq Individus pris pour cible Mars 2019 D’autres informations sur l’Union européenne sont disponibles sur l’internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN: 978-92-9485-051-5 doi: 10.2847/95098 © European Asylum Support Office 2019 Sauf indication contraire, la reproduction est autorisée, moyennant mention de la source. Pour les contenus reproduits dans la présente publication et appartenant à des tierces parties, se référer aux mentions relatives aux droits d’auteur desdites tierces parties. Photo de couverture: © Joel Carillet, un drapeau iraquien flotte sur le toit de l’église syro- orthodoxe Saint-Ephrem de Mossoul (Iraq), qui a été fortement endommagée, quelques mois après que ce quartier de Mossoul a été repris à l’EIIL. L’emblème de l’EIIL était peint sur la façade du bâtiment durant l’occupation de Mossoul par l’EIIL. EASO RAPPORT D’INFORMATION SUR LES PAYS D’ORIGINE IRAQ: INDIVIDUS PRIS POUR CIBLE — 3 Remerciements Le présent rapport a été rédigé par des experts du centre de recherche et de documentation (Cedoca) du bureau belge du Commissariat général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides. Par ailleurs, les services nationaux d’asile et de migration suivants ont procédé à une relecture du présent rapport, en concertation avec l’EASO: Pays-Bas, Bureau des informations sur les pays et de l’analyse linguistique, ministère de la justice Danemark, service danois de l’immigration La révision apportée par les départements, experts ou organisations susmentionnés contribue à la qualité globale du rapport, mais ne suppose pas nécessairement leur approbation formelle du rapport final, qui relève pleinement de la responsabilité de l’EASO. La traduction (en français) du présent rapport a été relue par: Belgique, Cedoca (service de recherche et de documentation), Commissariat général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides, 4 — EASO RAPPORT D’INFORMATION SUR LES PAYS D’ORIGINE IRAQ: INDIVIDUS PRIS POUR CIBLES Table des matières Remerciements...........................................................................................................................3 Table des matières .....................................................................................................................4 Avertissement.............................................................................................................................8 Glossaire et abréviations ............................................................................................................9 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 12 Méthodologie ...................................................................................................................... 12 Structure et utilisation du présent rapport ......................................................................... 13 Carte ........................................................................................................................................ 14 Contexte .................................................................................................................................. 15 1 Ciblage par les acteurs étatiques et les groupes armés affiliés............................................ 17 1.1 Acteurs étatiques et groupes armés affiliés .................................................................. 17 1.1.1 Forces de sécurité iraquiennes .............................................................................. 17 1.1.2 Unités de mobilisation populaire .......................................................................... 18 1.1.3 Forces du gouvernement régional du Kurdistan ................................................... 24 1.2 Sunnites soupçonnés d’être des collaborateurs ou des sympathisants de l’EIIL .......... 25 1.2.1 Poursuite des membres présumés de l’EIIL ........................................................... 25 1.2.2 Représailles ............................................................................................................ 28 1.2.3 Ciblage par les forces du GRK ................................................................................ 37 1.3 Personnes déplacées à l’intérieur de leur propre pays (PDI) ........................................ 42 1.3.1 Refus de retour ...................................................................................................... 42 1.3.2 Expulsion et retour forcé ....................................................................................... 44 1.3.3 Représailles violentes ............................................................................................ 47 1.3.4 Ciblage par les forces du GRK ................................................................................ 51 1.3.5 Kurdes vivant à Kirkouk après la reprise de contrôle par les FSI en octobre 2017 57 1.4 Membres de la famille des membres, affiliés et partisans effectifs ou présumés de l’EIIL ..................................................................................................................................... 58 1.5 Membres des tribus appartenant ou soupçonnées d’appartenir à l’EIIL ...................... 63 1.6 Recrutement par les UMP et les groupes armés affiliés ............................................... 66 1.6.1 Recrutement forcé ................................................................................................. 68 1.7 Anciens membres du parti Baas .................................................................................... 69 1.7.1 Liens entre l’EIIL et les anciens membres du parti Baas ........................................ 70 1.7.2 Débaasification ...................................................................................................... 72 EASO RAPPORT D’INFORMATION SUR LES PAYS D’ORIGINE IRAQ: INDIVIDUS PRIS POUR CIBLE — 5 1.8 Désertion ....................................................................................................................... 73 1.8.1 Désertion de l’armée ............................................................................................. 73 1.8.2 Absentéisme au sein des forces de sécurité intérieure ......................................... 77 1.8.3 Désertion des peshmergas .................................................................................... 79 1.9 Collaborateurs (présumés) des organisations/forces armées occidentales ................. 80 1.10 Manifestants et militants de l’opposition politique .................................................... 81 1.10.1 Iraq ....................................................................................................................... 81 1.10.2 Région du Kurdistan iraquien .............................................................................. 84 1.11 Militants des droits de l’homme ................................................................................. 86 1.11.1 Iraq ....................................................................................................................... 86 1.11.2 Région du Kurdistan iraquien .............................................................................. 87 1.12 Journalistes .................................................................................................................. 88 1.12.1 Iraq ....................................................................................................................... 88 1.12.2 Région du Kurdistan iraquien .............................................................................. 91 1.13 Chrétiens ..................................................................................................................... 92 1.14 Vendeurs d’alcool ........................................................................................................ 94 1.15 Personnes portant des noms sunnites ........................................................................ 96 1.16 Personnel humanitaire/médical .................................................................................. 97 1.17 Peine de mort .............................................................................................................. 98 1.17.1 Iraq ....................................................................................................................... 98 1.17.2 Région du Kurdistan iraquien ............................................................................ 100 1.18 Traitement des détenus ............................................................................................ 101 1.18.1 Iraq ..................................................................................................................... 101 1.18.2 Région du Kurdistan iraquien ............................................................................ 102 2 Ciblage par l’EIIL ................................................................................................................. 105 2.1 Contexte, structure et mode opératoire ..................................................................... 105 2.2 Groupes identitaires ethnoreligieux pris pour cible ................................................... 110 2.2.1 Musulmans chiites pris pour cible ....................................................................... 111 2.2.2 Musulmans sunnites
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