DOCSLIB.ORG

1 Month of October in the City of Samarra by Themselves. They 2 Had the Most Contacts of Any Platoon in the Entire Battalion 3 and They Suffered No Casualties

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
1 Month of October in the City of Samarra by Themselves. They 2 Had the Most Contacts of Any Platoon in the Entire Battalion 3 and They Suffered No Casualties 1 month of October in the city of Samarra by themselves. They 2 had the most contacts of any platoon in the entire battalion 3 and they suffered no casualties. There is no other platoon in 4 the battalion that can say that. He set up the first police 5 station in Balad and trained and monitored the Iraqis. 6 7 Balad was the geopolitical center of that region. It was 8 very unstable at the time and one of the hottest spots in Iraq. 9 Within a month we owned the city and built great relationships. 10 Subsequently, we spent a lot of money improving the 11 infrastructure. The periphery was mostly Sunni. Trying to 12 bring them into the government was difficult, but once we 13 controlled Balad and the city outlines, we controlled the 14 entire region. 15 16 Lieutenant Saville's platoon were the key to the success for 17 Alpha Company. He was put in for two bronze stars. His 18 rehabilitative potential is very high. He's very mature. He's 19 a faith-filled man, outstanding leader, outstanding officer and 20 he's earned the faith of his men. He's combat tested and he's 21 a man of integrity. I would take him anywhere, anytime. I'd 22 go to combat with him, I'.d stand by his side and I'd put my son 23 in his outfit if we were going back to war without thought. 24 25 CROSS-EXAMINATION 26 27 Questions by the trial counsel-Captain Schiffer: 28 29 The platoons were very autonomous because of the lack of 30 leadership in 1-66 Armor. The fight in Iraq is at the company 31 and platoon level. Squad leaders, platoon sergeants and 32 platoon leaders make the decisions on a daily basis that equal 33 success, the death of insurgents or the death of their 34 soldiers. 35 36 I am aware of what the accused had pled guilty to. This 37 incident has exposed the unit to a negative information 38 operations campaign by the enemy, a very effective one. It can 39 sometimes place soldiers at risk. If not dealt with, this can 40 affect the unit mission and our forward progress of Iraq on a 41 political level. 42 43 [END OF PAGE] 44 45 23 10008 1 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 2 3 Questions by the defense counsel-Captain Drake: 4 5 The charges Lieutenant Saville has been found guilty of does 6 not change my opinion about his leadership or any of the 7 observations or opinions I've stated today. I think the charges 8 are absurd. What you have is a hero who is revered by his 9 soldiers and his leadership. I've seen what he's done and what 10 his capabilities are. Instead of pinning medals on him, we're 11 making him sit in this courtroom. I think it's a travesty to the 12 Army and to our officer corps to allow this to happen. 13 14 The witness was permanently excused and remained in the 15 courtroom. 16 17 Sergeant First Class Carl Ironeyes 18 19 SERGEANT FIRST CLASS CARL IRONEYES, U.S. Army, was called as a 20 witness for the defense, was sworn, and testified in substance 21 as follows: 22 23 DIRECT EXAMINATION 24 25 Questions by the assistant trial counsel-Captain Shaw: 26 27 I'm Sergeant First Class Carl Ironeyes. I'm currently 28 stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado, with 1-68 Infantry. 29 30 Questions by the defense counsel-Captain Drake: 31 32 I've known Lieutenant Saville for over a year and half now. 33 He was my platoon leader. The op-tempo was high and very 34 dangerous. We would get mortar attacks in the morning. We 35 would start our day doing whatever PT we could and then we 36 basically did patrols. We enforced no weapons, no illegal 37 activity and keeping the peace. We detained Iraqis and 38 controlled insurgencies. We received hostile fire and returned 39 fire. 40 41 I've been in the Army for 17 years. I've been through a lot 42 of platoon leaders and you couldn't ask for anyone better than 43 Lieutenant Saville. I have no complaints. He treated everyone 44 very well. 24 10009 1 CROSS-EXAMINATION 2 3 Questions by the assistant trial counsel-Captain Shaw: 4 5 Keeping the peace was a very important part of our mission. 6 I was not aware I was in Iraq to win the hearts and minds of 7 the people. There were active insurgents who were to be 8 engaged or detained and there were Iraqis who were to be 9 safeguarded. 10 11 Lieutenant Saville is a good leader. It is important for 12 leaders to possess certain qualities like integrity. I wasn't 13 aware that he was found guilty of obstructing justice 14 yesterday. I find it hard to believe that he furnished a false 15 statement in order to not be prosecuted for certain acts. A 16 platoon leader should ensure his soldiers do the right thing 17 and counsel and advise them to do the right thing in not 18 violating the laws of war. From what I know of the situation, 19 what he did comports with being a good leader. I believe his 20 advising soldiers to throw non-hostile Iraqis into the water 21 comports with him being a good leader. 22 23 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 24 25 Questions by the defense counsel-Captain Drake: 26 27 Lieutenant Saville never did anything to compromise my 28 opinion of his integrity, leadership or care for his soldiers. 29 30 The witness was permanently excused and remained in the 31 courtroom. 32 33 Major Gavin Gardner 34 35 MAJOR GAVIN GARDNER, U.S. Army, was called as a witness for the 36 defense, was sworn, and testified in substance as follows: 37 38 DIRECT EXAMINATION 39 40 Questions by the assistant trial counsel-Captain Shaw: 41 42 I'm Major Gavin Gardner. I'm currently the S-4 of 3d 43 Brigade Combat Team, Fort Carson, Colorado. 44 25 10010 1 Questions by the defense counsel-Captain Drake: 2 3 Jack has worked for me since July of 2004. This is after he 4 returned from Iraq. I observed him on a daily basis. He has 5 shown up everyday and provided 100 percent of the work. He 6 could have easily not done any work, with this case pending 7 against him and I would have understood that, but that hasn't 8 been the case. He's provided more effort and does more work 9 than some of the branch-qualified captains that have been to 10 the advanced course in my office. I put that in his 11 evaluations. Of the 14 officers that have worked for me thus 12 far as the Brigade S-4, I put him at number four in effort. 13 What he might not know in technical knowledge of the S-4 arena, 14 he makes up for with effort and he tries to learn. 15 16 Because of this case, I told him I didn't want to give him 17 any long-term projects. He and Sergeant First Class Perkins 18 developed and monitored projects from companies we have 19 contracts with. He developed the brigade standard SOP, which 20 is also the division standard SOP for these products. He 21 accounts for these products and issues them to the units. He 22 also developed the brigade's paint program. Jack corresponds 23 with the NCOIC down at DOL and makes that mission happen. We 24 are ahead of schedule for the brigade and that's all due to 25 Jack's hard work. 26 27 Lieutenant Saville has very high rehabilitative potential. 28 I can't think of a person with more potential. Whether he 29 decides to make the Army a career or gets out and goes into the 30 civilian world, he's going to go very far. If I go back to 31 combat, I'd like to take him with me. If we were on the 32 outside and I was working for a civilian firm, I want him 33 working with me. None of the offenses that he's been found 34 guilty of changes my opinion of him. I've always believed in 35 him. I've told him to learn from his mistakes and move on out. 36 37 The witness was permanently excused and remained in the 38 courtroom. 39 40 Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Sassaman 41 42 [END OF PAGE] 43 44 45 26 10011 1 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NATHAN SASSAMAN, U.S. Army, was called as a 2 witness for the defense, was sworn, and testified in substance 3 as follows: 4 5 DIRECT EXAMINATION 6 7 Questions by the trial counsel-Captain Schiffer: 8 9 I'm Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Sassaman, HHC 1-8 Infantry. 10 11 Questions by the civilian defense counsel-Mr. Spinner: 12 13 I began my career as a platoon leader in the 7th Infantry 14 Division at Fort Ord, California. I deployed to Honduras and 15 Panama with the 7th Infantry Division. From there, I commanded 16 a company in Fort Lewis, Washington and went on several 17 training center rotations. From there I got a Master's Degree 18 from the University of Washington. I was an admissions officer 19 at the U.S. Military Academy.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • A New Formula in the Battle for Fallujah | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds A New Formula in the Battle for Fallujah by Michael Knights May 25, 2016 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Michael Knights Michael Knights is the Boston-based Jill and Jay Bernstein Fellow of The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf states. Articles & Testimony The campaign is Iraq's latest attempt to push militia and coalition forces into a single battlespace, and lessons from past efforts have seemingly improved their tactics. n May 22, the Iraqi government announced the opening of the long-awaited battle of Fallujah, the city only O 30 miles west of Baghdad that has been fully under the control of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant group for the past 29 months. Fallujah was a critical hub for al-Qaeda in Iraq and later ISIL in the decade before ISIL's January 2014 takeover. On the one hand it may seem surprising that Fallujah has not been liberated sooner -- after all, it has been the ISIL- controlled city closest to Baghdad for more than two years. The initial reason was that there was always something more urgent to do with Iraq's security forces. In January 2014, the Iraqi security forces were focused on preventing an ISIL takeover of Ramadi next door. The effort to retake Fallujah was judged to require detailed planning, and a hasty counterattack seemed like a pointless risk. In retrospect it may have been worth an early attempt to break up ISIL's control of the city while it was still incomplete.
    [Show full text]
  • Humanitarian Overview of Five Hard-To-Reach Areas in Iraq
    Humanitarian Overview of Five Hard-to-Reach Areas in Iraq IRAQ DECEMBER 2016 Table of Contents Methodology...................................................................................... 2 Summary ........................................................................................... 3 Humanitarian Overview Factsheets Falluja City .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Ramadi City......................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Heet City ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 9 Tikrit City ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 12 Muqdadiya City and surrounding villages ...................................................................................................................................... 15 Annex Severity matrix guide 18 Methodology Since January 2015 , REACH has been regularly collecting data to inform humanitarian planning in hard-to-reach areas across Iraq. As multiple hard-to-reach areas are no longer under Armed Group (AG) control
    [Show full text]
  • Weekly Explosive Incidents Flas
    iMMAP - Humanitarian Access Response Weekly Explosive Incidents Flash News (26 MAR - 01 APR 2020) 79 24 26 13 2 INCIDENTS PEOPLE KILLED PEOPLE INJURED EXPLOSIONS AIRSTRIKES DIYALA GOVERNORATE ISIS 31/MAR/2020 An Armed Group 26/MAR/2020 Injured a Military Forces member in Al-Ba'oda village in Tuz Khurmatu district. Four farmers injured in an armed conflict on the outskirts of the Mandali subdistrict. Iraqi Military Forces 01/APR/2020 ISIS 27/MAR/2020 Launched an airstrike destroying several ISIS hideouts in the Al-Mayta area, between Injured a Popular Mobilization Forces member in a clash in the Naft-Khana area. Diyala and Salah Al-Din border. Security Forces 28/MAR/2020 Found two ISIS hideouts and an IED in the orchards of Shekhi village in the Abi Saida ANBAR GOVERNORATE subdistrict. Popular Mobilization Forces 26/MAR/2020 An Armed Group 28/MAR/2020 Found an ISIS hideout containing fuel tanks used for transportation purposes in the Four missiles hit the Al-Shakhura area in Al-Barra subdistrict, northeast of Baqubah Nasmiya area, between Anbar and Salah Al-Din. district. Security Forces 30/MAR/2020 Popular Mobilization Forces 28/MAR/2020 Found and cleared a cache of explosives inside an ISIS hideout containing 46 homemade Bombarded a group of ISIS insurgents using mortar shells in the Banamel area on the IEDs, 27 gallons of C4, and three missiles in Al-Asriya village in Ramadi district. outskirts of Khanaqin district. ISIS 30/MAR/2020 Popular Mobilization Forces 28/MAR/2020 launched an attack killing a Popular Mobilization Forces member and injured two Security Found and cleared an IED in an agricultural area in the Hamrin lake vicinity, 59km northeast Forces members in Akashat area, west of Anbar.
    [Show full text]
  • Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq
    HUMAN RIGHTS UNAMI Office of the United Nations United Nations Assistance Mission High Commissioner for for Iraq – Human Rights Office Human Rights Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 – 30 April 2015 “The United Nations has serious concerns about the thousands of civilians, including women and children, who remain captive by ISIL or remain in areas under the control of ISIL or where armed conflict is taking place. I am particularly concerned about the toll that acts of terrorism continue to take on ordinary Iraqi people. Iraq, and the international community must do more to ensure that the victims of these violations are given appropriate care and protection - and that any individual who has perpetrated crimes or violations is held accountable according to law.” − Mr. Ján Kubiš Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Iraq, 12 June 2015, Baghdad “Civilians continue to be the primary victims of the ongoing armed conflict in Iraq - and are being subjected to human rights violations and abuses on a daily basis, particularly at the hands of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Ensuring accountability for these crimes and violations will be paramount if the Government is to ensure justice for the victims and is to restore trust between communities. It is also important to send a clear message that crimes such as these will not go unpunished’’ - Mr. Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 12 June 2015, Geneva Contents Summary ...................................................................................................................................... i Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 Methodology ..............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq
    The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq Julie Ahn—Maeve Campbell—Pete Knoetgen Client: Office of Iraq Affairs, U.S. Department of State Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Advisor: Meghan O’Sullivan Policy Analysis Exercise Seminar Leader: Matthew Bunn May 7, 2018 This Policy Analysis Exercise reflects the views of the authors and should not be viewed as representing the views of the US Government, nor those of Harvard University or any of its faculty. Acknowledgements We would like to express our gratitude to the many people who helped us throughout the development, research, and drafting of this report. Our field work in Iraq would not have been possible without the help of Sherzad Khidhir. His willingness to connect us with in-country stakeholders significantly contributed to the breadth of our interviews. Those interviews were made possible by our fantastic translators, Lezan, Ehsan, and Younis, who ensured that we could capture critical information and the nuance of discussions. We also greatly appreciated the willingness of U.S. State Department officials, the soldiers of Operation Inherent Resolve, and our many other interview participants to provide us with their time and insights. Thanks to their assistance, we were able to gain a better grasp of this immensely complex topic. Throughout our research, we benefitted from consultations with numerous Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) faculty, as well as with individuals from the larger Harvard community. We would especially like to thank Harvard Business School Professor Kristin Fabbe and Razzaq al-Saiedi from the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative who both provided critical support to our project.
    [Show full text]
  • EASO Rapport D'information Sur Les Pays D'origine Iraq Individus Pris
    European Asylum Support Office EASO Rapport d’information sur les pays d’origine Iraq Individus pris pour cible Mars 2019 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO Rapport d’information sur les pays d’origine Iraq Individus pris pour cible Mars 2019 D’autres informations sur l’Union européenne sont disponibles sur l’internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN: 978-92-9485-051-5 doi: 10.2847/95098 © European Asylum Support Office 2019 Sauf indication contraire, la reproduction est autorisée, moyennant mention de la source. Pour les contenus reproduits dans la présente publication et appartenant à des tierces parties, se référer aux mentions relatives aux droits d’auteur desdites tierces parties. Photo de couverture: © Joel Carillet, un drapeau iraquien flotte sur le toit de l’église syro- orthodoxe Saint-Ephrem de Mossoul (Iraq), qui a été fortement endommagée, quelques mois après que ce quartier de Mossoul a été repris à l’EIIL. L’emblème de l’EIIL était peint sur la façade du bâtiment durant l’occupation de Mossoul par l’EIIL. EASO RAPPORT D’INFORMATION SUR LES PAYS D’ORIGINE IRAQ: INDIVIDUS PRIS POUR CIBLE — 3 Remerciements Le présent rapport a été rédigé par des experts du centre de recherche et de documentation (Cedoca) du bureau belge du Commissariat général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides. Par ailleurs, les services nationaux d’asile et de migration suivants ont procédé à une relecture du présent rapport, en concertation avec l’EASO: Pays-Bas, Bureau des informations sur les pays et de l’analyse linguistique, ministère de la justice Danemark, service danois de l’immigration La révision apportée par les départements, experts ou organisations susmentionnés contribue à la qualité globale du rapport, mais ne suppose pas nécessairement leur approbation formelle du rapport final, qui relève pleinement de la responsabilité de l’EASO.
    [Show full text]
  • IRAQ: Humanitarian Operational Presence (3W) for HRP and Non-HRP Activities May to July 2020
    IRAQ: Humanitarian Operational Presence (3W) for HRP and Non-HRP Activities May to July 2020 TURKEY Zakho 23 Number of partners by cluster DUHOK Al-Amadiya 9 3 Sumail Duhok 17 10 25 33 Rawanduz Al-Shikhan Aqra Telafar Tilkaef 17 2 ERBIL 23 Shaqlawa 26 3 Pshdar Al-Hamdaniya 4 Rania 2 Al-Mosul 48 Erbil NINEWA Koysinjaq 28 59 Dokan 2 CCCM Education E. Livelihoods Food Security Health Protection, HLP, MA Protection: Child P. Protection: GBV SNFI WASH MPCA Total partners* Makhmour 1 Sharbazher Al-Baaj Dibis 26 11 6 AL-SULAYMANIYAH Al-Hatra Al-Shirqat Kirkuk Al-Sulaymaniyah Governorate Column12 6 6 SYRIA 9 Chamchamal 5 Al-Hawiga KIRKUK 20 Halabcha Al-Anbar 34427674532 26 20 6 2 18 Daquq Al-Basrah 1 1 1 4 1 1 7 20 Beygee 9 Tooz Kalar Al-Muthanna 1 1 2 Tikrit Khurmato 10 9 10 Al-Najaf 1 3 4 2 1 8 SALAH AL-DIN Kifri 2 2 20 Al-Qadissiya 1 1 2 4 Ana 5 8 Samarra Al-Kaim Haditha Al-Sulaymaniyah 1 1 5 2 5 2 3 3 1 1 23 Al-Khalis DIYALA IRAN Babil 1 1 1 2 4 9 12 7 Balad Al-Muqdadiya Heet 10 5 Baghdad 3 2 1 1 2 6 4 1 13 6 Baquba 2 Diyala 5 3 3 6 6 4 2 2 1 23 Al-Kadhmiyah Duhok 2 7 7 1 13107 12 3 6 3 49 5 6 Al-Mada'in Al-Ramadi Al-Falluja 2 Erbil 11647485111 30 14 Al-Mahmoudiya AL-ANBAR 21 2 5 Kerbala 1 1 3 3 1 1 7 Al-Mussyab 1 Kirkuk 34428795473 35 Al-Rutba Ain KERBALA WASSIT 2 Kerbela BABIL Al-Kut Maysan 1 1 1 2 5 Al-Tamur 1 5 Al-Hashimiya 1 1 Ninewa 7 11 19 8 23 25 22 22 9 21 10 89 JORDAN 2 3 Al-Hai Al-Kufa 4 Salah Al-Din 6 3 5 1106 8 4 2113 37 1 Al-Diwaniya MAYSAN Thi Qar 1 1 1 1 4 AL-QADISSIYA Wassit 1 2 2 Al-Hamza Qalat AL-NAJAF 1 Saleh Total partners* 12 18 27 14 30 33 45 35 18 31 12 138 * Total number of unique partners reported under the HRP 2019, HRP 2020 and other non-HRP plans.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Print Version (PDF)
    K2 Team Tank: Objective Camel Armor in Support of Special Operations by Robert W. Jones, Jr. A������� Army Special North).2 A�er taking three days to arrive, Operations Forces (ARSOF) are not usu- however, the armor force was not able ally associated with armored units, they to effectively leave the airfield perimeter have been known to work together when to provide an immediate impact on the the situation has warranted heavy sup- combat situation in northern Iraq. In fact, port. During World War II, the legendary three days a�er TF 1-63’s arrival, the major Colonel William O. Darby formed the Iraqi elements in the north surrendered, Captain Celeen’s provisional “Cannon Company” of four and Kurdish Peshmerga and Task Force M1A1 Abrams tank M-3 half-tracks mounted with 75mm guns Viking (10th Special Forces Group) seized accidentally drove to give additional firepower to the Rang- Kirkuk and Mosul. TF 1-63 only entered into a large hole as it ers during the Italian campaign.1 However, operations in the north as an occupying traveled at high speed not until Operation IRAQI FREEDOM force in the cities controlled by TF Viking.3 with no illumination (OIF) did ARSOF again work with armor With such a tenuous association in the during the assault on Objective Camel. forces to any appreciable degree, and north, it again fell to the Rangers to prove Because the tank even then, the association was weak. the worth of armor in special operations. entered the deep well Early in operations, armored Task Force In a situation reminiscent of that faced from the wrong end, (TF) 1-63 was airli�ed into Bashur Airfield by Darby and the Rangers in World War it flipped over and in support of Combined Joint Special II, the 75th Ranger Regiment found itself landed with its turret Operations Task Force-North (CJSOTF- in need of armor support in Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • Weekly Explosive Incidents Flas
    iMMAP - Humanitarian Access Response Weekly Explosive Hazard Incidents Flash News (25 June - 01 July2020) 79 673 11 6 4 INCIDENTS PEOPLE KILLED PEOPLE INJURED EXPLOSIONS AIRSTRIKES Federal Police Forces 01/JUL/2020 DIYALA GOVERNORATE Found and cleared 22 IEDs in Samarra district. Security Forces 25/JUN/2020 SALAH AL-DIN GOVERNORATE Destroyed an ISIS hideout and cleared a cache of explosives containing seven mortar Security Forces 25/JUN/2020 shells, three homemade IEDs, three detonators, and ammunition. Found and cleared a cache of explosives belonging to ISIS in the Al-Dhuluiya subdistrict. An Armed Group 26/JUN/2020 Coalition Forces 26/JUN/2020 Shot and killed a Security Forces member near Abu Al-Khanazer village on the outskirts of Launched several airstrikes and destroyed many ISIS hideouts and tunnels, killing 24 Abi Said subdistrict, northeast of Baqubah district. insurgents in Khanuka mountain. Popular Mobilization Forces 26/JUN/2020 Military Intelligence 29/JUN/2020 Destroyed five ISIS hideouts and killed five insurgents in the Al-Adhim area, north of Diyala. Found and cleared 24 IEDs and artillery shells in the Mukayshafa desert of Samarra district. ISIS 27/JUN/2020 Killed four Federal Police Forces members and injured two others in an attack at Abu Coalition Forces 29/JUN/2020 Al-Khanazer village, northeast of Baqubah district. Launched several airstrikes and destroyed many ISIS hideouts, killing everyone inside in Makhoul mountain of Baiji district. Popular Mobilization Forces 27/JUN/2020 Repelled an ISIS attack in Sheikh Jawamir village, north of Muqdadiya district. An Armed Group 30/JUN/2020 A targeted IED explosion struck a Popular Mobilization Forces patrol, killing four members Popular Mobilization Forces 27/JUN/2020 and injuring another, west of Baiji district.
    [Show full text]
  • 2014-12-14 Situation Report
    Iraq Situation Report: December 19-21, 2014 1 On December 20, Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces, supported by the Syrian 5 On December 20, ISIS attacked Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) stationed Kurdish PYD People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Iraqi Yazidi ghters, in areas in Haditha in western Anbar. e clashes took place in the areas engaged the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) inside the center of Sinjar of Sin al-ib and al-Sagra. e attack was repelled and French airstrikes in western Ninewa province. By December 21, these combined forces moved supported the ISF. On December, Haditha’s mayor, Abdul Hakim inside Sinjar district and retook several neighborhoods inside the city. ese al-Jughai, called for coalition airstrikes to target ISIS in the Khasfa area operations were supported by airstrikes from the international anti-ISIS which he indicated as a staging area for the next ISIS attack into coalition. Haditha. Dahuk 2 On December 20, the governor of Salah ad-Din stated that 6 On December 20, ISIS attacked ISF forces near the Baghdadi ISIS has launched a major attack inside Baiji district in Salah Mosul Dam area in Anbar province. ISIS launched the attacks from the Joba ad-Din province. is statement comes as the Iraqi 1 3 Bridge and from northern Hit. e attack was repelled, but a Security Forces (ISF) engaged ISIS in the middle of Mosul Arbil tribal leader stated that ISIS now controls the Joba and Sayad central Baiji; Iraqi military reinforcements are reported areas in northern Baghdadi. On December 21, a local ocial to have arrived in the city.
    [Show full text]
  • Three Years of Post-Samarra Displacement in Iraq
    IOM EMERGENCY NEEDS ASSESSMENTS FEBRUARY 22, 2009: THREE YEARS OF POST-SAMARRA DISPLACEMENT IN IRAQ I. POPULATION DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN IN IRAQ Three years after a severe wave of sectarian violence began, returns are increasing and new displacement is rare. Iraqis look to rebuilding their lives facing an uncertain security future. On 22 February 2006, the bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra triggered escalating sectarian violence that drastically changed the cause and INSIDE: scale of displacement in Iraq, both to locations inside Iraq and to locations Displacement/ 1 abroad. Since February 2006, more than 1,600,000 Iraqis (270,000 Return Summary families) have been displaced - approximately 5.5% of the total Post February 2006 population. Of these 270,000 families, IOM monitoring teams have Profile with identified and assessed 209,402 (an estimated 1,256,412 individuals), or 80% Numbers, 2 of the total post-Samarra displacement population. Identities, Locations, Origins These assessments, illustrated in this report, reveal the demographic Return potentials composition and geographic journeys of the IDP populations remaining in Humanitarian displacement, as well as detail the overwhelming needs for basics such as Needs & Response adequate shelter, sufficient food, clean water, and access to employment. Even as security appears to improve and displacement slows, Iraqi IDPs face threats of eviction and live in precarious environments, with the possibility of violence still a present worry. IOM’s assessments of IDP families’ intentions reveal that many wish to return home and may do so if conditions permit, especially that of security. Others wish to begin new lives in their places of displacement or other locations.
    [Show full text]
  • MNC-I Inbrief GEN Petraeus
    UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO MNC-I Inbrief GEN Petraeus 8 February 2007 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Filling the Gap Facilitates Sustainable Victory in Iraq The battle for the population of Iraq/Baghdad The Iraqi Individual The Gap Gov of Iraq Who is going to fill it? Needs and Desires: Slowly developing capability for: •Physical Security Shia militia and parties? •Physical Security Power and historical revenge Issues of ISF actions/inaction •QOL improvements-Hope for better life Sectarian EJKs/Cleansing ISF Loyal to GoI Basic Essential Services EFPs Against MNC-I forces Internal power stuggles (BADR/JAM) Sewage and Clean Water •QOL improvements minimal, need Honorable job-employment SWET-F advancement Rule of Law--balanced Iraqi Sunni Resistance? Dignified employment Return to Power Expectation to improve home, family, Protection from Shia Revenge Loans for enterprise neighborhood, society Co-location/Support with AQI, but tiring of tactics Consistent Rule of Law •Respect for Tribe/Religion AQI and the Caliphate? •Perceived as Shia biased First step in safe-haven for Regional Caliphate •Representation in Local/Provincial Govt. Foreign Fighters and Terrorists •No representation in Local or High Profile attacks (SVIED, VBIED) Provincial Govt Syria--Safe Haven/Source of support for Sunni Insurgents External Influences Iran--Influence in Iraqi (Shia) affairs, keep US engaged This is the historical fault line betwenn the Arab Sunni majority and the Persian Shia minority--Arab Sunnis are nervous, and Persian Shias are optimistic. So what do
    [Show full text]