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Iraq Master List Report 114 January – February 2020

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Iraq Master List Report 114 January – February 2020 MASTER LIST REPORT 114 IRAQ MASTER LIST REPORT 114 JANUARY – FEBRUARY 2020 HIGHLIGHTS IDP individuals 4,660,404 Returnee individuals 4,211,982 4,596,450 3,511,602 3,343,776 3,030,006 2,536,734 2,317,698 1,744,980 1,495,962 1,399,170 557,400 1,414,632 443,124 116,850 Apr Jun Aug Oct Dec Feb Apr June Aug Oct Dec Feb Apr June Aug Oct Dec Feb Apr June Aug Oct Dec Feb Apr June Aug Oct Dec Feb Apr June Aug Oct Dec Feb 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Figure 1. Number of IDPs and returnees over time Data collection for Round 114 took place during the months of January were secondary, with 5,910 individuals moving between locations of and February 2020. As of 29 February 2020, DTM identified 4,660,404 displacement, including 228 individuals who arrived from camps and 2,046 returnees (776,734 households) across 8 governorates, 38 districts and individuals who were re-displaced after returning. 2,574 individuals were 1,956 locations. An additional 63,954 returnees were recorded during displaced from their areas of origin for the first time. Most of them fled data collection for Report 114, which is significantly lower than the from Baghdad and Diyala governorates due to ongoing demonstrations, number of new returnees in the previous round (135,642 new returnees the worsening security situation, lack of services and lack of employment in Report 113). Most returned to the governorates of Anbar (26,016), opportunities. Ninewa (19,404) and Salah al-Din (5,754). In terms of areas of origin, 59 per cent of the current caseload of IDPs During the same period, DTM also identified 1,399,170 IDPs (233,195 come from Ninewa Governorate, mainly from Mosul (287,070 individuals), households) dispersed across 18 governorates, 104 districts and 3,004 Sinjar (267,150) and Al-Ba’aj (111,474). The second largest shares of IDPs locations in Iraq (-37 locations since the previous round). come from Salah al-Din and Anbar governorates with 11 per cent each. The top districts of origin are Tooz Khurmatu (41,682 individuals), Baiji Despite the overall decrease in the number of IDPs (-15,462 since the (33,006) and Balad (31,446) in Salah al-Din and Ramadi (69,948), Falluja previous round), 10,530 individuals were displaced in the assessed loca- (50,802) and Al-Ka’im (12,648) in Anbar. tions during January and February. Most of these displacement movements Displacement Overview Return Overview As of 29 February 2020 As of 29 February 2020 1,399,170 233,195 4,660,404 776,734 IDP individuals IDP households Returnee individuals Returnee households Main Governorates of Displacement Main Governorates of Return Ninewa Dahuk Erbil Ninewa Anbar Salah al-Din 331,170 IDPs 318,786 IDPs 237,408 IDPs 1,785,738 Returnees 1,479,720 Returnees 680,946 Returnees Geographic Distribution Geographic Distribution 18 104 3,004 8 38 1,956 Governorates Districts Locations Governorates Districts Locations 1 IOM IRAQ MASTER LIST REPORT 114 DISPLACEMENT OVERVIEW The below graphs show (1) the number of IDPs in all governorates of displacement, (2) the number of IDPs per main districts as well as (3) the proportion of IDPs per governorate of origin for each governorate of displacement.
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