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The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq

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The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq Julie Ahn—Maeve Campbell—Pete Knoetgen Client: Office of Iraq Affairs, U.S. Department of State Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Advisor: Meghan O’Sullivan Policy Analysis Exercise Seminar Leader: Matthew Bunn May 7, 2018 This Policy Analysis Exercise reflects the views of the authors and should not be viewed as representing the views of the US Government, nor those of Harvard University or any of its faculty. Acknowledgements We would like to express our gratitude to the many people who helped us throughout the development, research, and drafting of this report. Our field work in Iraq would not have been possible without the help of Sherzad Khidhir. His willingness to connect us with in-country stakeholders significantly contributed to the breadth of our interviews. Those interviews were made possible by our fantastic translators, Lezan, Ehsan, and Younis, who ensured that we could capture critical information and the nuance of discussions. We also greatly appreciated the willingness of U.S. State Department officials, the soldiers of Operation Inherent Resolve, and our many other interview participants to provide us with their time and insights. Thanks to their assistance, we were able to gain a better grasp of this immensely complex topic. Throughout our research, we benefitted from consultations with numerous Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) faculty, as well as with individuals from the larger Harvard community. We would especially like to thank Harvard Business School Professor Kristin Fabbe and Razzaq al-Saiedi from the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative who both provided critical support to our project. Additionally, HKS Professor Matthew Bunn’s guidance during the research process was immensely helpful. Professor Bunn’s detailed and thoughtful feedback on all stages of this project—from our earliest proposal to our final product—helped us to clarify our arguments and hone our assessments. We are also immensely grateful to our primary project advisor, Professor Meghan O’Sullivan. Her insights and suggestions based on her extensive experience working in Iraq were invaluable as we developed a research question, completed our literature review, conducted field interviews, and drafted our report. By asking difficult questions and probing our conclusions, Professor O’Sullivan strengthened our analysis and helped us develop different ways of thinking about some of the security sector challenges within Iraq. Finally, we would like to acknowledge and thank Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, which agreed to publish our report. The Belfer Center also provided us with the funding required to conduct our field research in Iraq and present our findings during an HKS delegation to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Cover Photo: Soldiers from the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS) raise the Iraqi flag in Bartella, Ninewa in October 2016 (AP Photo/Khalid Mohammed) via News 1130. Acronym Reference Guide A/A/A: Accompany, Advise, and Assist ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria AAAB: al-Assad Airbase ISOF: Iraqi Special Operations Forces AAH: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (League of the People of JOC: Joint Operations Command Righteousness) KDP: Kurdistan Democratic Party AQI: al-Qaeda in Iraq KH: Kata’ib Hezbollah (Battalions of the Party of ATA: Anti-Terrorism Assistance God) BPC: Build Partner Capacity KRG: Kurdistan Regional Government CIO: Contributions to International Organizations KRI: Kurdish Region of Iraq CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority MoD: Ministry of Defense CTS: Counterterrorism Service MoI: Ministry of Interior CTEF: Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund MRA: Migration and Refugee Assistance D-ISIS: Defeat-ISIS (Coalition) NADR: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Demining, and Related Programs Reintegration NOC: Ninewa Operations Command EOF: Escalation of Force NPGF: Ninewa Plains Guard Force ERD: Emergency Response Division NPF: Ninewa Plains Forces* ERW: Explosive Remnants of War NPU: Ninewa Plains Protection Units ESF: Economic Support Fund NSS: National Security Service ESDF: Economic Support Development Fund OIR: Operation Inherent Resolve ERU: Emergency Response Unit OFDA (USAID): Office of Foreign Disaster FAO: Foreign Area Officer Assistance FEDPOL: Federal Police OSC-I: Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq FFS: Funding Facility for Stabilization PKK: Kurdistan Workers’ Party FFES: Funding Facility for Expanded Stabilization PMC: Popular Mobilization Committee FFIS: Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization PMF: Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al- FMF: Foreign Military Financing Sha’abi) FMS: Foreign Military Sales PRM (DOS): Department of State, Populations, GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council Refugees, and Migration GoI: Government of Iraq PUK: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan HPE: Ezidkhan Defense Force QRF: Quick Reaction Force IA: Iraqi Army Q-West: Qayyara West Airfield IDA: International Disaster Assistance SDF: Syrian Democratic Forces IED: improvised explosive device SoI: Sons of Iraq IHL: international humanitarian law T&E: Train and Equip INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law TMF: Tribal Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al- Enforcement Asha’ari) IMET: International Military Education and TSK: Turkish Armed Forces Training UNAMI: UN Assistance Mission Iraq IP: Iraqi Police (formally named the Iraqi Police UNDP: United Nations Development Program Service) USG: U.S. Government IRGC: Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps UXO: Unexploded Ordinance ISF: Iraqi Security Forces WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction ISI: Islamic State of Iraq YBS: Sinjar Protection Units YPG: People’s Protection Units * There are two groups named the “Ninewa Plains Forces.” One is a Shia-Shabak PMF group, the other is a KRG-supported Christian group Area of Interest: Ninewa Province Maps Source: Blanchard, Christopher M. “Iraq: In Brief,” Congressional Research Service. March 5, 2018. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R45096.pdf, p. 3 and 6. Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................i-iv PART I: WHY NINEWA? ................................................................................................................. 1-11 Introduction: The Resilience of ISIS ...................................................................................................... 1 Provincial Overview ................................................................................................................................. 5 U.S. Objectives in Ninewa ..................................................................................................................... 10 PART II: NINEWA’S SECURITY SECTOR..............................................................................12-26 Formal Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)........................................................................................................ 14 Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) ..................................................................................................... 18 Kurdish Security Forces ......................................................................................................................... 21 KRG-Aligned Militias ............................................................................................................................ 22 Non-Aligned Militias .............................................................................................................................. 23 Foreign Security Services ....................................................................................................................... 24 Civilian Governance ............................................................................................................................... 25 PART III: ISIS 2.0 PATHWAYS .................................................................................................... 27-53 The Battle for Local Control ................................................................................................................. 29 Caught in the Middle: Erbil vs Baghdad............................................................................................... 37 Command and Control .......................................................................................................................... 42 The Militia Question: Future of the Popular and Tribal Mobilization Forces .................................. 46 Outsider Influence: The Role of Foreign Actors................................................................................. 50 PART IV: ASSESSING THE CURRENT APPROACH ......................................................... 54-79 The Defeat-ISIS Strategy in Ninewa..................................................................................................... 56 Assessing the ISIS 2.0 Pathways ........................................................................................................... 62 Identifying the Strategy’s Failures ......................................................................................................... 76 PART V: THE PATH FORWARD ............................................................................................... 80-90 Recommendation Overview .................................................................................................................. 81 Funding the Ninewa Provincial Police ................................................................................................
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