In pursuit of , justice, dignity, and

Rojava’s social contract

Institutional development in (post) – conflict societies

“In establishing this Charter, we declare a political system and civil administration founded upon a social contract that reconciles the rich mosaic of through a transitional phase from dictatorship, civil war and destruction, to a new democratic society where civil life and are preserved”.

Wageningen University Social Sciences Group MSc Thesis Sociology of Development and Change Menno Molenveld (880211578090)

Supervisor: Dr. Ir. J.P Jongerden Co – Supervisor: Dr. Lotje de Vries

1 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

Abstract:

Societies recovering from Civil War often re-experience violent conflict within a decade. (1) This thesis provides a taxonomy of the different theories that make a claim on why this happens. (2) These theories provide policy instruments to reduce the risk of recurrence, and I asses under what circumstances they can best be implemented. (3) I zoom in on one policy instrument by doing a case study on institutional development in the north of Syria, where governance has been set – up using a social contract. After discussing social contract theory, text analysis and in depth interviews are used to understand the dynamics of (post) conflict governance in the northern parts of Syria. I describe the functioning of several institutions that have been set –up using a social contract and relate it to “the policy instruments” that can be used to mitigate the risk of conflict recurrence. I conclude that (A) different levels of analysis are needed to understand the dynamics in (the north) of Syria and (B) that the social contract provides mechanisms to prevent further conflict and (C) that in terms of assistance the “quality of life instrument” is best suitable for Rojava.

2 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

Preface

The idea of this thesis originates from a flyer that was passed on during one of the courses of the Master International Development Studies curriculum. The flyer depicted the subject of the Social Contract in Relation to Rojava. Although I was not very familiar with the name Rojava, I had read previously read about the concept of the social contract, which immediately drew my attention. Whether the areas in which governance has been set up using the social contract are called Rojava, Syria or anything else depends on who you ask, and whatever they make of it. My motivation for this thesis as such was mostly related to institutional development in relation to conflict recurrence. To quote Waltz (1959) “asking who won a given war, is like asking who won the San Francisco earthquake, in wars there is no victory but only varying degrees of defeat”. Unfortunately because of security reasons I have not been able to do my research within the areas itself, still a war zone, the risks simply couldn’t be justified.

Acknowledgements

Many people contributed to the end product, and I would like to thank all my interviewees; Sheruan Hassan, Ercan Ayboga, Sinam Mohammed, and Robert Lowe, but also Bonnie Bogaard who helped me with the planning of the first interview. Finally I would like to thank Joost Jongerden for his support and positive suggestions during the past months.

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Frequently used Terms

Conflict Trap

After violent intra state conflict, countries have an increased risk of returning to violence within the first decade or the postconflict phase. Around fifty percent of all civil wars, re –start again, within a decade.

Intra – state conflict

According to Doyle and Sambanis (2000) intra state conflict is an armed conflict when it suffices all the following conditions: (a) it caused more than one thousand deaths overall and in at least a single year; (b) it has challenged the of an internationally recognized state; (c) it occurred within the recognized boundary of that state; (d) it involved the state as a principal combatant; (e) it included rebels with the ability to mount organized armed opposition to the state; and (f) the parties were concerned with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, p.10).

Libertarian Municipalism A political described by emphasizing, decentralised , a “ ”, equality and a social .

Rojava In , Rojava translates into: the west. The west in this case refers to “the western parts of ”. Rojava consists of three cantons: Cezîre, Kobanê and Afrin also refered to as the autonomous regions.

Social contract Theoretical concept with two functions; describes the historical inception of states, or thought experiment for determining principles of justice.

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List of political actors in Rojava (Khalaf, 2016).

Assad, Bashar President of Syria (disputed) since 2000, and commander of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).

DAA Democratic Autonomous Administration A structure of local governance systems comprised of local councils and assemblies across three cantons the PYD collectively calls Rojava.

SDF Alliance of Arab and YPG/YPJ armed groups created in 2015 and of whom the majority belongs to the YPG/YPJ. It is supported by the United States fight the Islamic State of and Syria (ISIS) and other jihadist groups.

PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Dîmokratik) - Kurdish Democratic Union Party Founded in 2003, the PYD is the dominant force in Kurdish majority areas in Syria. It established the Rojava governance project, which it administers though its subsidiary organizations. The PYD is often considered the PKK’s militant sister organization in Syria, although it denies this.

PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê) A Marxist-Leninist Kurdish militant party founded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978 seeking Kurdish self-determination in . Its base is in the Qandil mountains of .

TEV-DEM Movement for a Democratic Society (Tevgera Dîmokrat) The PYD-dominated coalition leading the Rojava project.

YPG People’s Defense Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel) The armed service of the PYD, and, by extension, the Rojava project.

YPJ Women’s Defense Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Jinê) The ’s armed service of the PYD, and, by extension, the Rojava project.

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List of tables and figures

Figure 1: Phases of conflict……………………………………………….………………………. P.13 Figure 2: The conflict trap: Three levels of analysis ……...... P.15 Figure 3: The conflict trap: Security Firsters……………………………………………..P.18 Figure 4: The conflict trap: Collier…………………………………………………………….. P.19 Figure 5: The conflict trap: Fukuyama…………………………………………………….. P.20 Figure 6: The path – dependency of the post conflict ……………………………. P.22 Figure 7: Turkish, Syrian, and Iraqi – political movements………… P.44 Figure 8: Global trends in armed conflict………………………………………………….. P.73

Table 1: Postconflict conditions and policy recommendations………………… P.24 Table 2: Social contract theory: Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau……….…….. P.28 Table 3: Research Designs…………………………………………………………………………. P.36 Table 4: Answering the research questions…………………………………..…………. P.41

Table 5: The Trias Politica of Rojava………………………………………………….……… P.54

Table 6: Rights and liberties………………………………………………………………………. P.52 Table 6: The functions of the legislative Assembly………………………..………… P.53

Table 7: Democratic Confederalism…………………………………………….……………. P.53

Table 8: The Legislative Assembly…………………………………………………………….. P.56

Table 9: The Executive Council………………………………………………………………….. P.57 Table 10: The Supreme Constitutional Court………………………………..…………. P.58

Table 11: The Canton Governor………………………………………………………………… P.60

Table 12: The municipal council……………………………………………………………….. P.61 Table 13: Intrastate conflict terminations over time ………………………...... P.73

Table 14: Civil war recurrence: Risk factors…………………………………………….. P.74

Table 15: Overview of Civil wars P.76 Table 16: The higher commission of elections…………………………………………. P.77

Table 17: Procedure for determination of the constitutionality of laws…. P.78

Map 1: The military situation in Syria (01 -05 -2017). P.79

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Table of Contents

(1) Introduction: violent conflict & development ...... 8 The Syrian conflict and Rojava ...... 10 (2)Theoretical chapter – conflict trap theory ...... 11 (2.1) Conflict trap theory – empirical patterns ...... 11 (2.1.1) Conflict trap theory - units of analysis and theoretical arguments ...... 12 (2.2) Policy instruments & the strategic deficit ...... 21 (2.3) Summarizing the postconflict literature & the aim of this thesis ...... 25 (2) Theoretical chapter - Social contract theory ...... 26 (2.4) Social contract theory ...... 26 (2.4.2) Modern critiques of social contract theory ...... 29 (3) Methodology: concepts, measurement and techniques ...... 35 (3.1) From Quantitative to Qualitative research – the case study design ...... 35 (3.2) Case selection and inference ...... 37 (3.3) defining concepts: Intra- state level, Intra – state conflict & postconflict ...... 38 (3.2) Answering the research questions ...... 40 (4) Empirical chapter ...... 43 4.1 Context ...... 43 4.2 Principles of governance in Rojava ...... 45 4.3 Content of the social contract - Text Analysis ...... 49 4.3.3 The Institutions ...... 55 (5) Conclusion and discussion ...... 62 References/ Bibliography ...... 67 Appendix 1: Empirical patterns of armed conflict...... 73 Appendix 2: Factors affecting civil war recurrence ...... 74 Appendix 3: List of Civil war recurrence since 1944 (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000)...... 76 Appendix 4: Institutions of Rojava ...... 77 Appendix 5: The military (May, 01 2017) and economic situation in Syria ...... 79 Appendix 6: Interview Sheruan Hassan, The Hague ...... 80 Appendix 7: Interview Ercan Ayboga (20 April 2017 – Skype) ...... 88 Appendix 8: Interview Robert Lowe ...... 92 Appendix 9: Interview Sinam Mohammed ...... 91

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(1) Introduction: violent conflict & development

“We, the people of the Democratic Autonomous Regions of Afrin, Cezîre and Kobane”, is the beginning of a document set up in 2014 by different ethnic groups in the north of Syria after gaining de facto during the (2011 – ongoing). The three cantons Cezîre, Kobanê and Afrin, which together by some parts of the Syrian population are referred to as Rojava1 are predominantly inhabited by ethnic Kurds, but also Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Arameans, Turkmen, Armenians and Chechens (Knapp & Jongerden, 2016). The document is also revered to as the Rojava social contract and attempts to constitute the beginning of democratic self-rule, based on the ideology of libertarian municipalism (Bookchin, 1991) in the north of Syria.

Violent intra –state conflict such as in Syria has overtaken inter-state conflict in both frequency, endurance, and intensity since the Second World War (Fearon, 2004)2 estimated to be responsible for the loss of 16.2 million lives3, mostly civilians (Quinn & Gurses, 2007). Not only do vast numbers of people lose their lives, conflict leaves entire populations in poverty, vulnerable to infectious diseases, internally displaced or seeking asylum internally or abroad (Gayer et al., 2007; Frerks, 2007; Kelly-Hope, 2007). The most likely hosts of these intra - state conflicts are low income countries, developing countries, some of whom seem too get stuck in what is often referred to as “the conflict trap”. Conflict trap theory describes the tendency for societies to return to violence during the postconflict phase, after initial conflict has ended, leading to a further circle of violence, institutional breakdown and economic misery, which in turn, increases the risk of even more violent conflict (Collier & Sambanis, 2002). The failure to maintain peace during the postconflict phase in other words is development in reverse; violent conflict powerfully retards development; and equally, failures in development substantially increase proneness to violent conflict (Collier, 2004; Barbara, 2008). This surge in the number of violent conflicts has led to a parallel increase in the attention of policymakers on how to best achieve humanitarian goals during and after civil war (Balch-Lindsay, 2008). Perhaps the best remedy

1 Translates into: the west 2 See: figure 8 in appendix 1. 3 1945-1999: Compared to 3.3 million “inter-state deaths”. 8 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

is risk management; if the risk of civil war in developing countries could be brought down to the negligible level of developed countries, numerous lives would be saved, and the economic gains would be equivalent to tripling the global aid budget” (Collier, 2004, p.3). In order to bring down the risk of violent conflict, and conflict recurrence, first an answer is needed to the following questions: what structural factors underlie the propensity towards violent intra – state conflict, and what factors decrease the risk of conflict recurrence? Finding an answer to these questions can inform development agencies, governments and multilateral institutions on how to best assist countries, in the postconflict phase to mitigate these risks. Popular explanations can range from some primordial ethnic disposition to conflict, or simply cultural backwardness, and often implicitly justify a non – interventionists stand (Richards, 2004). The (quantitative) academic literature however describes several plausible policy instruments; economic development, institutional development, and (international) peacekeeping. The first line of thinking idealises economic growth through aid, investment and trade, creating jobs and a higher quality of live after conflict, reducing the incentives for further mobilisation. The second approach emphasizes state – building, elections, rule of law and the creation of (political) institutions to contain postconflict tensions and grievances, while peacekeeping is sometimes thought to be a necessary condition for the other two to develop in the first place. Intuitively from a policy perspective it seems logical to enforce (international) peacekeeping, stimulate the economy and (re) - build institutions.

This “general approach” derives its arguments from quantitative research, capable of showing overall, abstract effects, but overlooks individual cases where general interventions are out of place, fail, or even backfire. The one size fits all strategy (a) easily misinterprets specific needs of people in affected areas (b) can (therefore) be resented by local populations and (c) and can have (unintended) counterproductive affects4 and even cause more conflict (Frerks, 2007; Call & Cook, 2003). One could conclude from these statements and the high level of conflict recurrence alone that intervention strategies so far have only been marginally successful (De Zeeuw, 2001; Call & Cook, 2003; Paris, 1997). When should the emphasis be on economic growth and when does

4 These are more thoroughly discussed in the theory chapter. 9 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

institutional development work? Should governance be democratic? What type of institutions work best in what type of society? These questions can best by answered by using a conflict sensitive, contextual approach to provide better assistance for these wicked problems (Frerks, 2007; de Zeeuw, 2001). To do so, I specify four different types of postconflict situations with specific needs and give some policy recommendations on how different strategies might affect these types of postconflict setting. Second, I identify a gap in the literature: the re- establishment of governance following societal conflict or war. These processes have not received much academic attention recently (Brinkerhoff, 2005). Analysing the processes of institutional and political development in post conflict societies is both important for understanding the coping strategies of citizens trying to overcome violent conflict, but also for understanding why some conflicts recur while others do not, and why (well- intended) policies at times seem to backfire.

The Syrian conflict and Rojava

Third, I try to complement the literature by doing a case study on institutional development in the north of Syria. Within these areas there has recently been an initiative to (re) - install governance through the use of a social contract. A social contract in this case, is the product of a procedure which takes place between members of a community in which they consent to (re) - install (some form) of governance. Even though the concept of the social contract as a way to overcome conflict and install governance is often mentioned in the (political theory) literature, it has so far been widely considered as both hypothetical and a-historical (Kymlicka, 2002). This makes the social contract initiative in Rojava especially appealing for research. The main research question in this thesis therefore is: what type of institutions did the citizens of Rojava set up to regulate relations between citizens and - between citizens and the authorities? And how was this process implemented, legitimized and the outcome enforced? Understanding the content of the social contract in Rojava and the process that brought it about, can contribute to the knowledge, insights and understanding of (post) - conflict institutions, the organization of social - (political) life in conflict areas and the legitimization of political institutions during transition phases.

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(2)Theoretical chapter – conflict trap theory

The following chapter consist of two parts: conflict trap theory and social contract theory. The first part starts with an empirical and theoretical analysis (2.1, 2.1.1 & 2.1.2) of the conflict trap: the tendency to relapse into violence during the postconflict phase. From the different schools of thought I derive the main theoretical arguments about why violent conflict recurs, or not. After this I discuss (2.2) the strengths and weaknesses of these arguments and their implications for policy. Lastly I (2.3) identify a gap in the literature and will explain how this thesis can contribute to filling that gap. In the second part I will (2.4) discuss social contract theory; its main characteristics, different typologies, limitations and critiques, which will allow me to formulate questions (2.4.2) that will help me answer my research questions formulated in chapter 3.

(2.1) Conflict trap theory – empirical patterns

Theoretical question 1: What structural characteristics make societies prone to 1 violent intra – state conflict ?

Looking at their geographical contingencies these countries are most likely situated in sub-Saharan Africa or the middle-east56 (Collier & Sambanis, 2002; Quin & Gurses, 2007). Why is this so? Popular analyses can range from primordial ethnic conflict, illogical and unnatural borders or a history being colonized. A more theoretically founded set of explanations claims that these countries are likely to be low income, developing countries experiencing low economic growth (Collier, 2008; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Second, closer observations over different periods of time, consistently show that when looking at the geography of violent intra – state conflict, the number of violent conflicts outnumbers the number of states in which they occurred. For instance in the analysis of Quinn & Gurses (2007) 108 conflicts (1944 – 1997) only took place within 54 nations. The same particular pattern was found in the first twelve years of the post - era (1991-2003): fifty-seven major armed conflicts took

5 Most analyses contain data post 1945. 6 Violent intra – state conflict has plagued other regions such as Europe too, but these conflicts often don’t pass the threshold 1000 deaths in a single year (see chapter 3 for an operationalisation of intra – state conflict). 11 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

place in forty-five countries, almost all of them being intra-state conflicts or intra-state with regional complications (Brown, 2007, p.39). These analyses show two important things, first; conflicts are most likely to occur within low income, slow developing states, second; nations with a recent history of conflict are likely to experience more violent conflict (after period of relative peace). Civil war in other words typically doubles the risk of further war: about half of all postconflict societies relapse into conflict within a decade and the vast majority are the continuation of old conflicts (Collier, 2004; Walter, 2004).

Answer to question 1: Civil wars are most likely to occur in countries with:

- A low average income.

- Experiencing low economic growth or decline. - A recent history of violent conflict.

These analyses show why conflict is considered a trap; it has the tendency to repeat itself within the same societies; although at the same time, in many cases it doesn’t. Walter’s statement (2015) that for some nations, civil war appears to be a chronic condition indeed seems to hold for some, but not for others. The observations, consequently raise an important theoretical question:

Theoretical question 2: why do countries relapse into more violence after intra- state conflict has ended, while others do not?

(2.1.1) Conflict trap theory - units of analysis and theoretical arguments

In the following paragraph I provide a taxonomy of different arguments on why conflict recurs. These different arguments differ in two distinct ways. First they differ in their unit of analysis; some theories argue that characteristics on the individual level matter, some that characteristics on the intra –state level matter, and some argue that third party intervention by actors outside the intra –state level affect the postconflict setting. Second different theories on conflict recurrence focus on different phases7 such as (A) why the war began, (B) characteristics during conflict, and (C) how the war ended and (D) the postconflict phase.

7 see: Walter, 2004, effects might be direct, or indirect. 12 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

(C) how the original war ended; how policies of territorial integrity or (A) Why the original war partition affect conflict began; civil wars emerging recurrence (Kreutz, 2010; from coups, revolutions and Walter 2004) and which type anti-colonial wars are often of victory is more stable; relatively short (Fearon, rebel, government or peace 2004). treaty (Quin & Mason, 2007; Mason et al., 2011).

(B) Characteristics of the conflict such as the role of ethnic composition and competition (Fearon &. Laitin, 2003; Montalvo & Reynal-Quarol 2005; Blimes, 2006), intensity; deadly civil wars are prone to recur; very long wars are not (Fortna, 2004). Type of funding; conflicts where a group derives major funding from contraband tend to last longer (Fearon, 2004)

(D) The postconflict phase; see next section.

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The postconflict phase

Violent intra – state conflicts go through different but roughly comparable, sometimes repetitive stages: conflict emergence, conflict escalation, stalemate or victory (followed by a treaty) and then into the postconflict phase (see: figure 1). In this thesis I focus on the postconflict phase for both a theoretical and a practical reason. There seems to be at least some consensus within the literature that the conditions of the post conflict environment itself have an effect on the level of risk and probability of civil war recurrence (Quin and Gurses, 2007; Walter, 2004; Collier, 2004, 2008) making this period theoretically relevant. Second for reconstruction and development assistance, the postconflict phase is essential because development is often only feasible after the war has ended From a practical point of view during this period of “relative peace” there are factors that can be influenced by development agencies, governments and multilateral institutions (Hegre, 2004).

Theoretical question 2.1: What are the crucial factors during the postconflict phase that affect the chance of recurrence? And how can they be affected to mitigate these risk?

Units of analysis

To give an overview of the different types of theoretical arguments that make a claim on why conflict recurs in the postconflict phase, I have organised them into three distinct levels of analysis: the individual level (3), whereby mainly the motivation of rebels is the centre of attention, the national/intra – state level (2) whereby economic and institutional factors are the explanatory variables, and the (1) international level where the role of outside actors becomes central (see: figure 3). Different factors on different levels affect both each other and the post conflict settings and are somehow related to each other. For instance international structures can affect domestic regimes (Gourevitch, 1978) or a military intervention by a third party might result in human casualties, which causes grievances and people joining militias to revenge their loved ones. On the other hand, (a change in) the perceived intentions of rebels might encourage

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third parties to intervene militarily8. The interrelation between these factors is highly complex and the numbers of possible relations between the different analytical levels are too many too describe in this thesis9. In the following pages I first describe variables on the individual level (3) and the international level (1).

International level Geopolitics

Institutional development, Domestic level Economic development Peacekeeping

Individual level Greed vs. Grievance

Figure 2: Three levels of analysis

The individual level – greed vs. grievance

When taking the individual level as the unit of analysis, there is an ongoing debate whether rebels are motivated primarily by personal greed or by actual grievances induced by the regime they are trying to overthrow (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). In the grievance perspective, rebels are often depicted as “fighting an unjust government or dictatorship”, demanding a better quality of life or pursuing agendas of more religious freedom or individual . People that fight for these causes in this logic deserve sympathy or even support, since their struggles are justified on moral grounds. This type of analysis is refuted by the greed perspective10; which argues more or less the opposite. Collier (2008) for instance states that rebel movements often create a narrative of social

8 For a discussion on the relation between perceived intentions and military intervention see: Walt (1987). 9 See chapter four and five for more information on how this model applies in (the north) of Syria.

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grievances to justify looting and killing while at the same time being motivated by revenge or self-enrichment. He argues that there is no structural relation between political repression, discrimination against ethnic minorities, income inequality on the one hand and the risk of civil war on the other:

“Rebel movements are often good in public relations and use grievance as a weapon” and “ethnic minorities are just as likely to rebel with or without political discrimination” (Collier, 2008, pp.22-23).

The two discourses are rather reductionist and dichotomous and a more nuanced view comes from Kalyvas (2000) who claims that this type of abstract reasoning hugely simplifies the phenomenon of civil war. Different types of actors are present and different motivations are possible such as individual personal vengeance between locals, organised crime or political violence between groups. The major cleavage along which a conflict is fought can never be account for all the individual cases of violence. The point here is that civil wars are, in the end are fought by individuals identifying with some group that might, or might not, start another fight in the postconflict phase, either as “soldier for justice” or sadist (Collier, 2008).

The international level – third party intervention

Intra-state conflict is mostly fought between a government and one or several rebel groups. The aims of rebel groups might vary from completely overthrowing a regime (revolution) or by gaining a higher level of independence (secession/federalism). Three different outcomes are therefore possible: government victory, rebel victory or some negotiated agreement (Mason, Weingarten & Fett, 1999). Intra – state conflicts often easily get a regional or international dimension, since outside actors can have an interest in a particular outcome. Regan (1996) for instance demonstrates that out the 138 conflicts in his analysis at least 85 (62%) involved some intervention by at least one third party, with an average, of approximately ten interventions per conflict. The interest of these third parties can vary from noble humanitarian intentions such as quickly ending a conflict to being interested in draining the of

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another state or plundering resources (Balch-Lindsay, 2008). The most frequent used instruments are economic (support or sanctions) indirect military intervention (altering the balance of power on the battlefield by arming pro government or opposition groups) or direct unilateral militarily intervention. When a third party intervenes on behalf of one side of a conflict, others third parties often follow by intervention on behalf of the opposing side (Gent, 2008). In this way outside interventions can have an effect on both the (1) endurance and (2) the outcome of a particular intra – state conflict (Balch-Lindsay, 2008; Brown, 2007), but can also kick-start a new one.

The intra - state level

The described theoretical arguments on the first and the third level don’t provide much grip for policy. There are limited ways to control third party intervention and if the cause of civil war is greed than (greedy) men in general need to be transformed into something else in order to prevent further violent conflict. The arguments mentioned in the literature taking the intra – state level as the unit of analysis are more suitable for policy and can be abstracted into arguments concerning: (1) (inter) national - peacekeeping11, (2) economic growth & quality of life, and (3) the development of political institutions. As explained in the introduction, in this thesis I focus on the development of political institutions in Rojava, which I argue is happening within the (2) national level/intra-state level (see paragraph 3.3). The theoretical relations between these variables and the likelihood of postconflict recurrence will be discussed in the following pages.

Theoretical argument 1: (inter) - national peacekeeping

Whether governments stay in power or rebels take over control; the first few years of the new regime are crucial for promoting peace and stability, the longer stability can be provided the less likely conflict is to recur (Mason, et al. 2011). How important are peacekeepers in this process? Some scholars even go as far

11 Peacekeeping might equally argued to be a variable on the international level, since it is often organised by institutions above the nation – state such as NATO, The United Nations or the African Union. However in this thesis I discuss the effects of peacekeeping on the postconflict setting and therefore treat it as a phenomenon on the intra - state level. 17 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

to say that without peacekeepers, a long-term peace and stability will be impossible. These “security firsters” stress the importance of managing the (ethnic) security dilemma12 through the interposition of military forces while looking at various state – building measures in the long run. In their eyes only peacekeeping or an “authoritarian transition” can provide political order, rule of law and the pre - conditions for successful economic and social development (Crocker, Hampson et. al, 2007, p. 695; Huntington, 1968). There is to some extent, at least some consensus in the literature that peacekeeping forces significantly reduce the chance of conflict recurrence during this transition period (Mason, et al. 2011; Kreutz, 2010; Collier, 2004; Quin & Mason 2007; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2004).

(International) - Peacekeeping

Ethnic security dilemmas Conflict recurrence

Figure 3: Conflict trap according to “security firsters”

Peacekeeping could be done unilaterally by a single state or a few states, but in the fast majority of cases is done through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, NATO or the African Union. In the case of the United Nations peacekeeping has in time evolved to include preventive peacekeeping, supervising cease fires between irregular forces, assisting in the maintenance of law and order, protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, guaranteeing rights of passage and enforcing sanctions and Security Council decisions (MacKinlay and Chopra, 1997, pp. 175-197). Although peacekeepers are more likely send to the more difficult cases, they tend to be more effective in conflicts after decisive victory, after long conflicts, when invited by both governments and rebels and in economically more developed countries, and less effective after identity conflicts. The prior level of democracy or the number of fighting factions doesn’t seem to matter strongly (Fortna, 2004; Regan, 1996).

12 Security dilemma: when two or more actors feel insecure, they might try to improve their security by arming themselves, often followed by armament of the other actor, eventually making everybody less secure. See: Posen, R. (1993) the security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. 18 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

Theoretical argument 2: Economic growth & Quality of life

How can economic factors help overcome the conflict trap? Not all economic factors positively affect development, for instance having lots of natural resources (Ross, 2015; Collier, 2007, 2008; Glynn, 2009) seems to hinder (1) prospects of peace after conflict13 & (2) democratic development, by negatively affecting (3) general institutional performance or indirectly by affecting (4) the competitiveness of export products14. These negative effects are so prevalent that they are often referred to as “the curse”; counterintuitively, having lots of resources seems to hinder development. If natural resources are not helping developing countries, what is? What about income inequality? Research shows that countries with larger income inequalities don’t tend to be more violent than more egalitarian, per se; there is always some interaction with other factors and a myriad of short term events (Frerks, 2000; Collier, 2008). There is however plenty of support in the literature for the thesis that economic growth after conflict benefits stability and decreases the risk of recurrence (Quin & Mason, 2007; Collier, 2008 & 2008; Walter, 2004; Quinn & Gurses 2007). Perhaps if people have the opportunity to find a job, rebuild their lives and quality of live returns to some acceptable level, there is less reason to return to fighting or be mobilised. As Walter (2004) states: “it’s difficult to start another war unless individual farmers, shopkeepers, and workers voluntarily choose to enlist in the armies that are necessary to pursue war”.

Economic growth/reforms

Low income/Slow growth Conflict recurrence

Figure 4: the conflict trap (Collier)

Collier (2004) even argues that economic growth is the only thing that really matters; the strongest predictors of non-recurrence are level of per capita

13 Especially in low and middle-income countries. 14 Referring to any “non-resource” export product. known as the Dutch Disease, see (Collier, 2007). 19 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

income and the growth rate. The other conditions; social, historical, political or geographic seem to matter less according to him, if at all (see figure 4).

Theoretical argument 3: Institutions & democracy

According to a recent UN report: (2007) “The most important tasks facing countries in crisis or recovering from recent hostilities are restoring effective governance and building public trust in government. Governance allows for the return of personal safety, stability and reconstruction and allows the people to rebuild what was lost” (UN, 2007). The emphasis in this vision lies on the development of (political) institutions rather than economic growth, the main idea here is that the latter cannot exist without the first. Fukuyama (2015) for instance states that: strong political institutions are often necessary to get economic going in the first place, it is precisely their absence that locks failed or fragile states into a cycle of violence since poor institutions fail to control violence, which in turn further weakens the ability of the government to govern (Fukuyama, 2015, pp. 48-51). The thesis that (aside from creating jobs and opportunities through economic growth), institutions are at least as important to peacefully settle disputes and grievances and prevent further violence finds plenty of support (Walter, 2004, 2015; Hegre & Nygard, 2015; Panić, 2011; Mason, et al. 2011; Bermeo, 2003; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2002; De Zeeuw, 2001; Arnson, 1999).

Institutional development

Low institutional development Conflict recurrence

Figure 5: the conflict trap (Fukuyama)

Political institutions in (post) conflict environments serve several functions which together create sustainable civil peace and mitigate the chance of recurrence by restoring conflict to the political, rather than the military arena (Arnson, 1999;

20 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

Doyle & Sambanis, 2000): (1) the executive power is checked, governments become more likely to serve the interest of the wider public instead of some specific group, (ethnic) militias become redundant due to the fact that political elites are kept in check (2) they create options to influence government trough non – violent means, reducing the need for instrumental violence (3) incumbents become more committed to the peace settlement (Walter, 2015. p.1245). In this way institutions are argued to help address postconflict tensions15; and help to mitigate the negative effects of previous violent conflict on societies during the postconflict phase.

(2.2) Policy instruments & the strategic deficit

In the previous section I discussed three possible policy instruments given in the literature; economic development, institutional development and (international) peacekeeping16 (see appendix 2 for a full overview). From a theoretical point of view, whether societies return to fighting or overcome the conflict trap during the postconflict phase depends of several factors: from similar initial conditions, depending on the presence/absence of different factors, a (wide) range of social outcomes may be possible17 (see figure 6).

Answer question 2: The postconflict setting is affected by dozens of factors including different types of rebels, post conflict institutions, economic factors, and different types of outside actors; recurrence is often an accumulation of different factors.

Both the, peacekeeping, the economic and institutional theories find empirical support in the literature and make claims about (1) some independent effect of (a) peacekeeping (b) economic factors, and (b) institutional factors in (post) conflict societies.

Answer question 2.1: In terms of policy (keeping all factors constant), the chance of conflict recurrence can be mitigated by the presence of (international) peacekeepers, economic growth (an increase in the quality of life) and the development of (political) institutions.

16 The argument of peacekeeping is perhaps low in feasibility for development agencies, since they have to be dealt with by states within in a multilateral environment such as the United Nations. The more feasible options for development agencies and foreign states are policy option 2: stimulate economic growth and improve the quality of life and policy option 3: stimulate the development of institutions. 17 See: Pierson (2000) for an explanation of the concept of path dependency. 21 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

aaa Conditions( Non - A,B,C Recurrence Postconflict phase Conditions Recurrence X, Y, Z

Policy instruments: (1) Economic growth (2) Institutional development (3) Peacekeeping

Figure 6: The path – dependency of the postconflict situation

Can we translate this information in the literature into sound policy18? Stimulate the economy and (re) - install governance seems to be the easy answer. There are however certain pitfalls attached to this type of “one size fits all” strategy. Solutions for wicked problems such as violent intra-state conflict without contextual understanding can lead to poor strategies or can even have counterproductive effects (Frerks, 2007; Paris, 1997). The thing to keep in mind here is that post conflict societies often tend to be characterised by both poor macro - economic conditions, weak institutions and grievances between individuals and groups. Blindly stimulating economic growth (alone) can increase existing tensions; aid as such might become politicized and could be used to buy arms or resupply pro or anti-government fighters (Frerks, 2007; Ofstad, 2002; OECD, 2001), encourage coups (Collier, 2008) or create “horizontal inequalities” some parts of society benefit more from economic growth than others; reinforcing and/or perpetuating: economic inequalities between different identity groups (Langer & Steward, 2014; Muller and Seligson 1987). Second, even though institutions seem to matter, the “fast track democracy strategy” can be naïve, without security there can be no such thing as political stability; hastily negotiated constitutions and snap elections do simply not create democracy; on the contrary they might even contribute to more conflict (Crocker, Hampson et al., 2007, pp.) especially when the local power structures are not properly taken

18 For a discussion on how these instruments & policy can best be applied in Rojava see chapter five. 22 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

into account or when (subjective) political marginalisation of a specific group occurs, grievances can lead to mobilisation and (more) violence (Frerks, 2007). Looking at table 1, we see how the “one size fits all” policy can have counterproductive effects under certain circumstances.

Understanding interaction

How to prevent these counterproductive interventions from happening? First by understanding that there is always is some interaction between economic and socio - political factors, second by recognizing that external assistance to postconflict societies can be effective only if it is based on a pragmatic assessment of what needs to be done and how it affects the postconflict setting rather than by ideologically motivated dogmas19 (Panić, 2011, p.9). The effects (ceterus paribus) of economic policies in the postconflict setting depends on the level of institutional development, and the effect of institutional development depends on the levels of economic wellbeing. Understanding these interactions is therefore key when formulating policy; whether an intervention has the desired positive effect intended by the third party depends on the context of the specific conflict, which I have specified as context A, B, C and D (see table 1). Depending on the conditions of the specific context; (1) aid & uncontrolled economic growth alone can lead to more/prolonged conflict, most likely in countries with low institutional development and especially in countries with low institutional development and poor economic conditions. The “the democracy strategy“(2) is more likely to positive affect peace only in countries with a GDP above average, and tends to increase the risk of civil war recurrence in low-income countries. In context C it is probably more effective to supplement promotion of democracy with international strengthening of security (Collier, 2004; Collier & Rohner, 2010) or focus more on other forms of aid such as medicine or food security (OECD, 2001).

19 See chapter five for a discussion on my recommendations for the (north) of Syria. 23 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

Post – Institutional development Institutional development conflict – Low - – High - conditions Economic Context A Context B growth Quality of life improves, but (Unlikely) - high - for everybody? Horizontal Quality of life improves, inequalities addressed? institutions deal with unequal Relative deprivation? Personal economic growth grievances grievances? between individuals and groups. Risk level Medium risk of recurrence Low risk of recurrence Policy Institutional development recommendat Tends to decrease the risk of ion recurrence in this context. + (Peacekeeping ) Economic Context C Context D growth Quality of life doesn’t improve Grievances are dealt with - low - high chance of looting, through institutions but stealing, and no chance to deal quality of life is low. Chance with grievances trough of new rebellion still high. institutions. Outside Quality of life needs to be interventions might be improved. resented by local populations. Risk level High Risk of recurrence Medium risk of recurrence Policy Peacekeeping/ Economic recommendat Authoritarian transition development/Quality of ion Institutional development life and fast democratic strategy Risk of aid politicizing tends to increase the risk of recurrence in this context. Economic development Can lead to inequality & coups

Table 1: Postconflict conditions and policy recommendations. 24 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

(2.3) Summarizing the postconflict literature & the aim of this thesis

1. The literature prescribes three instruments to mitigate the risk of postconflict recurrence: economic growth/quality of life, institutional development and (international) peacekeeping. 2. These general intervention strategies have different effects in different settings and therefore well – intended strategies might fail or backfire. 3. Therefore, understanding the specific context of an individual postconflict setting is essential for formulating policy, but is often lacking. 4. Even though the quantitative literature concerning intra-state conflict is abundant, there seems to be a need for a more qualitative, contextual, bottom up, conflicts sensitive and evidence based approach to specific conflicts (Frerks, 2007). 5. Especially the state of knowledge regarding the establishment and/or reconstitution of effective governance in postconflict and a war-torn society is limited (Brinkerhoff, 2005). 6. Better knowledge, contextual understanding will lead to better assistance strategies.

Hence, the general aim of this thesis is to:

1) Contribute to the knowledge about - and understanding of the process of institutional development and restoring governance in (post) - conflict societies. 2) By doing a case study on how the social contract has contributed to the setting up & development of (political) institutions in Rojava. 3) Specifically looking at the (1) initiation (2) process & legitimation (3) outcome & content, and (4) enforcement of the social contract20. 4) Describe and classify the “Rojavan regime” so it can be used for further comparative research. 5) Reflect on the applicability of the “general instruments” in the case of Syria.

20 These aspects are more thoroughly explained in the coming chapter. 25 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

(2) Theoretical chapter - Social contract theory

In the previous part I concluded that there is a theoretical relation between institutional development in postconflict societies and conflict recurrence. Within Rojava a social contract has been used to set up institutions; to answer the two main research questions in the introduction, I will go through the following steps. I will first explain social contract theory and describe its two main theoretical functions (2.4). Second, (2.4.1) I will shortly discuss several philosophers who wrote about the social contract during the renaissance era; Thomas Hobbes (1588 -1671), John Locke (1632 -1704) and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712- 1778). Third, I will discuss (2.4.2) several modern critiques of the social contract tradition which, together with analysis of the charter of the social contract (paragraph 4.3), allows me to formulate questions for the semi – structured interviews in paragraph 4.4. Combining all the information from these paragraphs will allow me to better answer the research questions.

(2.4) Social contract theory

According to Cudd (2013) the theoretical function of the social contract can be seen in two different ways. The first is factual/historical; social contract theory mainly seeks to explain the formation of societies and governments, especially the voluntary consent that people give to the formation of that government, arranging the rights and responsibilities of the state, the government and its citizens (Mwita, 2011). The second purpose is hypothetical and allows us to analyse the content of political principles but can also be seen a benchmark of political legitimacy (Nussbaum, 2006). What if people had to form government, what kind of, rights, responsibilities and institutions would they create?

2. Social contract as: 1. Social contract as:

thought – experiments for institutional development, the

deciding what the principles of process of commitment, to give

justice and political obligations up to a sovereign government

are (Rousseau, Rawls; 1971) or (some or all of) one's rights to

the design of the basic social the state (Hobbes & Locke).

institutions (Rawls; 1971).

26 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

In this thesis I am focusing (mostly) on the first function; the existing social contract in Rojava as a form of institutional development. While it is the main subject of this thesis, social contract doctrine is commonly no longer taken seriously as an accurate historical account of the origins of the state, but is mostly used a theory of political obligation (Evers, 1977, p.192). The two functions cannot be seen completely as independent, but are intrinsically related and complementary since the second function allows us critically asses existing political institutions (Rojava’s social contract in this case) and our intuitive principles of justice. In (post) modern times the social contract has received plenty of criticism from writers and academics that use the second function of the social contract to criticize existing formal and informal institutions, these critiques will be discussed in paragraph (2.3.3). Discussing these critiques is not the purpose of this thesis, but the questions that arise are useful for both the analysis of the charter of the social contract and to formulate questions that will be used for the interviews in chapter 4.

(2.4.1) Hobbes, Locke & Rousseau

What would life look like without governance? Can governance ever be justified? How much governance do we need? And who gets to govern and why? How a society (re) – installs institutions & governance in postconflict areas is not only an empirical question, interesting from a policy perspective, it has been a classical question from a political theoretical perspective for centuries. During the renaissance the legitimation of state power moved away from what Max Weber called “traditional legitimacy” based on a societies culture, history and often accompanied by “some divine right” of a king to rule a society, to a more legal – rational government based on the idea that institutions have been specifically constituted to serve the collective good and civil servants should put the public good above their own (Thomson, 2010, p.54). Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau have in common that they used the procedure of the social contract as a moment in- between two conditions ”man’s natural condition” or “state of nature” without any political authority and “political society” where there is some sort of governance (Kymlicka, 2002).

27 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

Social contract theory – an overview

Philosopher Hobbes Locke Rousseau Human Power Possessor of (im)- Natural man: not nature and seeking material goods developed but good reason Fearful Partial rationality Capable of Citoyen – personal and (some) general interest are the reasoning same Natural War of all Conflict and Peaceful condition against all cooperation

Social Equal Large economic Large economic contract – bargaining inequalities – but inequalities – therefore (in) positions not considered unequal bargaining equalities problematic positions – therefore unjust social contract

Sovereignty Absolute state Popular Popular sovereignty and type of power – sovereignty – state (monarchy) Parliamentary universal suffrage Ruled by an democracy – General will outsider limited suffrage

Function of Protection of Protection of Protection of citizens and the state citizens and citizens and property, creation of property – limit property moral community and individual emancipation of the freedom population

Compliance* People Continuing consent To live in a country consented to of means to submit to its the sovereigns the majority sovereignty. power – - - tacit consent tacit tacit consent inferred consent inferred from from benefits benefits received or from received or from residency residency * From: Evers (1977) Table 2: Social contract theory: Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau (a differentiation).

Within this contractarian tradition the principles of social and political life, law and state authority where the outcomes of an agreement between rational individuals who understand that they will be better off under law, then they

28 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

would be in the state of nature (Swift, p.28). According to Peperstraten (2007) the philosophers differed in their views when it came to:

(1) Their view on human nature and reason

(2) Their depictions of the natural condition

(3) The conditions of the social contract

(4) Sovereignty and form of government

(5) The (proper) functioning of the state.

These differences account for the fact that the different philosophers come up with different ideas on what the state should look like and what its functions should be (see table 3). Where Hobbes seems to be in favour of a monarchy, Locke and Rousseau tend to favour popular sovereignty and where Locke argues for a state that only protects citizens and property, Rousseau envisions a more emancipatory role of the state that creates citizens (“citoyen”).

(2.4.2) Modern critiques of social contract theory

Social contract theory since the renaissance has received plenty of critiques; both Hobbes’s theory about monarchy and Rousseau’s theory about the general will are sometimes associated with , while Locke’s theory is often criticized for advocating a minimalist state leading to huge inequalities in terms of resources, wealth and power. More recently the tradition has received criticism from different angles, including communitarians, feminist, anarchist, libertarians, and egalitarians. Their objections evolve around issues concerning (1) the non- existence & legality of the social contract, procedural aspects such as (2) inclusion & exclusion and (3) equal bargaining positions, and issues concerning (4) compliance and enforcement, to name just a few. The following paragraph gives an overview of the different arguments made. Per subject I will derive several abstract questions, which I will make more concrete at a later stage, for the interviews in chapter four.

29 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

Non – existence & legality

The most straightforward critique of the social contract is that, one might argue that there was never such a “state of nature” or a social contract. It seems very easy to simply imagine some state of nature to justify a particular outcome which gives power to, and benefits a certain set of actors. The idea of the social contract seems both hypothetical and a-historical, and how can hypothetical contracts have binding force? They are simply not worth the paper they’re not written on (Kymlicka, year; Swift, 2007, p.2). This argument seems to hold as far as the contracts described by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, since they are a - historical, but is weak in the case of Rojava because there an actual contract exists, and was agreed upon by a different set of actors (See chapter four). A second question arises concerning legality and compliance; is it possible to simply claim control for a part of the country during violent conflict and install governance? Is the social contract not conflicting with , or Syrian national law? Crawford (2007), states that;

“Secession or rebellion is neither legal nor illegal under international law; the ultimate success of secession would be dependent on recognition by the international community. Since 1945 however no state has been created by unilateral secession against the declared wishes of the predecessor state. However there are several cases where the seceding party remained de facto independent for some time” (Crawford, 200, p.390).

It seems that in practice, secession during violent conflict happens relatively frequently, and seceded areas remain independent at least for some time, while in other cases gain (more) independence. Whether they become independent states over time depends on the recognition of other states. During conflict however, within these “fragile states”, seceded areas are often not completely chaotic, ungoverned areas, but rather spaces where governance and emerges from within, filled with non-state actors that may play a crucial role in local governance, , and security (Van der Haar, 2013; Frerks et. all). Even though the future of Syria is uncertain at the moment; the most likely outcome of the conflict is either federalism whereby Rojava becomes part of a

30 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

federal Syria, or secession whereby Syria breaks up into different independent states. Following the logic of this analysis shows that it is unlikely that Rojava will become an independent state without the consent of the Syrian state, this however does not seem to be the intention either; the charter of the social contract, states that: “the charter recognizes Syria’s territorial integrity and aspires to maintain domestic and international peace”, and the autonomous regions form an integral part of Syria; it is a model for a future decentralized system of federal governance in Syria (Article 12).

Question concerning non –existence & legality

1. Does Rojava intend to remain an integral part of Syria, or do they seek more

independence? Will Rojava push for unilateral secession if necessary? 2. Has Rojava so far been recognized by members of the international community?

Inclusion and exclusion

The main critiques concerning both inclusion and exclusion and equality revolve around two main questions: (1) by whom, and for whom are society’s basic principles designed? And (2) under what circumstances are they agreed upon21? For instance within the classical contractarian ideas only economically productive men were involved, engaging in a mutual “win - win” situation (Nussbaum, 2006). In modern times this interpretation of social contract theory are criticized for benefiting some parts of society more than others, such as males or as the more affluent, contradicting the contemporary conception of human equality. Recent debates about social justice include several critiques of groups of people that feel that the classical vision of the social contract is not doing (enough) justice to certain parts of society. For instance from within feminist comes the objection that women were not included on an equal base and therefore the contract is said to favour , excluding females certain rights such as the right to participate in politics (Pateman, 1989). Second, what

21 This will be discussed in the next section. 31 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

does justice look like for people outside of the such as foreigner or refugees, what rights do they have? Can they be excluded from citizenship and economic benefits, even if they contribute to that same economy, even if they were forced to flee? Existing theories of social justice are primarily centred on the nation – state and say little about people outside of it. Fourth, there is the question of the position of non-human animals; do they receive any moral considerations?

Equal bargaining positions & Legitimacy

Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains, is a quote by Rousseau signifying his believe that a contract agreed upon under unfair conditions cannot be justified; unequal bargaining positions do make the outcome legitimate but not just22, in his view therefore a new social contract was needed. The “state of nature” in the classical version of the social contract is not an agreement between citizens, based on a position of equality. An egalitarian critique therefore is that the usual account of “the state of nature” is unfair because some people have more bargaining power than others, more natural talents or initial resources, and since these natural advantages are undeserved, they should not privilege or disadvantage people in determining principles of justice (Kymlicka, 2002). As Nussbaum (2006) explains:

“From the fact that we are all rough equals in the state of nature follow some profound criticisms of regimes that make wealth, rank, and status sources of differential social and political power, any society whose basic principles are far from what would be chosen by free, equal, and independent persons in the state of nature is to that extent called into question” (Nussbaum, 2006, p.11).

The main point here is that during deliberation people should be free, equal and independent. In reality people however often differ strongly in terms of power, capital, discursive capabilities, eloquence and some will therefore always be more

22 Where the emphasis on popular will is replaced by a contract that emphasises the general will is needed.

32 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

prominent within the deliberation than others. Creating equality within the deliberative process is therefore a necessary condition to produce fair outcomes. What should for instance be the socio – economic position of the people that are economically unproductive such as individuals with physical and mental impairments? Some of these groups are challenged in their ability to speak (in public) and therefore egalitarians emphasize that that luck often plays too much of a role in socio- economic outcomes and the distribution of power, and people should be compensated for suffering from “brute luck” before engaging in the contract. The traditional contractarian view a lacks of theory concerning the position of the economical unproductive, since they don’t seem to be included in the traditional “economical win – win” situation. How was this issue dealt with in the charter of the social contract of Rojava? The people that where involved in the procedure, how did they come to agreement? What procedures did they use to deal with disagreement? What was the position of ethnic and religious minorities, females, and the economical unproductive? Did they have equal bargaining positions?

Questions concerning: Inclusion, exclusion and equal bargaining positions

1. Who were present during the set –up of the charter?

2. Where there any (groups of) people that deliberately chose to not be involved

in the social contract?

3. What was the position of religious and ethnic minorities, females, animals,

foreigners, and the economically unproductive? Where they represented?

4. How did the procedure deal with inequalities during the deliberative process?

5. Was consensus reached after some form of majority voting was it based on consensus

33 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

Compliance, non – compliance & enforcement

A final set of critique is on why and when to comply with the social contract. In Hobbes view citizens can only resist political obligation when the sovereign no longer can account for the security of its citizens, if the state can no longer fulfil its primary function than neither is there an obligation for its citizens. In Locke’s view people have the right to revolt against their government when they it no longer seeks to further the interest of its people but acts against the social contract by destroying their private property or tries to enslave them (Locke, 2002)? In other words, when the government acts against the agreement made. Evers (1977) refers to three more arguments; the first one is utilitarian, people obey because it is beneficial to them. Both Locke and Hobbes agree that when the state functions properly functioning state everybody will prefer to be in political society rather than in “the state of nature”; compliance is self-serving. The social contract provides them with the necessary security to live their life as they see fit. The second argument is procedural; within people have the opportunity to actively influence laws and legislation, the same laws and legislation under which they live. If the citizens of Rojava have agreed with the charter of the social contract and its consequential institutions than they should not only act in consistence with those same institutions, they should also be actively involved to maintain them. His last argument is practical: the possibility of free emigration when in disagreement with the social contract.

Questions concerning compliance non – compliance & enforcement

1. How is compliance of the charter of the social contract enforced?

2. What is the legal position of the people refusing to take part?

3. What happens in case of non – compliance with the social contract?

34 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

(3) Methodology: concepts, measurement and techniques

In this chapter I will first describe (3.1) the relation between quantitative and qualitative research and consequently justify my research design. Second (3.2) I will elaborate on my case selection and its logic of inference. Third, (3.3) I will answer my research questions and describe the techniques I will use to do so. The larger, abstract questions in this thesis where mentioned in the previous chapter: (1) why do some intra – state conflicts recur, while others do not? The quantitative literature concerning conflict recurrence is capable of showing abstract relations/effects between conflict recurrence and its individual predictors. Taking the intra state level as the unit of observation, I discussed three policy instruments; (international) peacekeeping, economic growth (quality of life) and the development of (political) institutions and described their theoretical relation with conflict recurrence. This type of research is capable of explaining variation across cases, comparing a large number of cases shows that the three independent variables have an effect on the dependent variable; conflict recurrence.

(3.1) From Quantitative to Qualitative research – the case study design

The case study in general, is useful for three different types of purposes; (1) generation and testing of hypotheses, (2) classification and typologies (3) descriptive information (Landman, 2008). Individual case study on conflict recurrence could be used to generate/test hypothesis on how the independent variables (given in quantitative research) affected the postconflict setting in a specific case (sources of individual case studies) or to better understand why certain individual cases relapsed into violence a comparative (historical) case study would be more appropriate to account for variation between case(s) over times. In depth knowledge of these cases is more helpful than knowledge about a large number of examples; because it produces better understanding of the whole by focusing on a key part (Gerring, 2007, p.1). Second the case study can provide classifications and typologies (which in turn, can be used for further comparative research), for instance the governance in Rojava could be classified among the more decentralised forms of governance vs. more centralist forms, or within the libertarian , libertarian municipalism could be described, or

35 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

within the literature the case of Rojava could be described. Third the case study can be used for better showing the context of a single case, providing descriptive information.

Cases Spatial variation Temporal variation

One No Yes

None 1. Logically impossible 2. Single case to account for (diachronic) covariation/descriptive purposes (this thesis). Within - case 3. Single – case study 4. Single – case study (synchronic) (synchronic + diachronic)

Several Cross – case & 5. Comparative 6. Comparative - within case method historical

Cross Case 7. Cross - sectional 8. Time –series cross sectional Many Cross – case & 9. Hierarchical 10. Hierarchical time - within case series

Table 3: Research designs: Gerring (2001).

Directly and indirectly this thesis serves a mix of all three purposes, although not all are equally prominent. I do no attempt to show that the social contract in Rojava was capable of mitigating the risk of conflict recurrence23. This is logically impossible since first of all because at this point in time the conflict is still ongoing, and second because it is uncertain if the conflict will reoccur, the information in this thesis however can be used for that purpose in a later stage. This study of the social contract in Rojava is a single case study where the process and legitimization of restoring governance & institutional development is the centre of attention, and as such merely provides contextual/descriptive

23 See table 3 for an overview of case study in relation to explaining covariance. 36 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

information. Descriptive case studies are not only useful to provide more in depth knowledge about single cases, but can also be used for further research: theories cannot be tested without proper classifications; and classifications cannot be made without good description (Landman, 2008). Second, on another level, the content of the social contract (in the case of Rojava) could be said to test the moral premises concerning people’s moral equality (Kymlicka, 2002)24.

(3.2) Case selection and inference

Single case studies however cannot be plucked from thin air, but are specifically chosen for the merit in contribution to larger sets of question in the field (Landman, 2008, pp.86-87). So why look specifically at Rojava? I argue that there are three main reasons to shed light on this case. The first argument is practical, i identified a gap in the literature: the state of knowledge regarding the establishment and/or reconstitution of effective governance in postconflict and a war-torn society is limited (Brinkerhoff, 2005). Second within the social contract tradition there have been few, if any empirical cases of an actual social contract; the social contract in Rojava gives me the opportunity to study both the procedure and outcome of an actual social contract used to set up institutions & governance. The question within social contract theory mostly revolves around what kind of governance people would actually set up; the existing social contract allows me to answer these questions, at least for this case. Third, in relation to conflict trap theory, I argue that since Rojava will face severe challenges when it comes to remaining politically stable. This due to its complicated geopolitical position, the unlikeliness of strong economic growth due to its economic ideology (see chapter 4), the strong internal dissent within the region (see interview one and two), the conditions of multiple sovereignty within Syria, previous mobilization mostly along ethnic/religious lines, and a reasonable probability of partition (see appendix two), and the two more obviously arguments are that the county has in economic terms lost considerably since the onset of its civil war(see appendix 8), and has been through a civil war; the two underlying factors that increase the likelihood of conflict recurrence mostly (see chapter two). If stability remains in Rojava, despite the harsh conditions, then a lot of it might be attributable to the political institutions that have been set –

24 This however will however not be extensively discussed. 37 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

up25. The case of Rojava as such will mostly produce contextual, descriptive information, but will not tell much about if the same procedure can be applied within a different context to restore institutions & governance. This case is sue generis and the ability to infer to other cases in a different context is likely to be low. This however doesn’t have to be problematic because the goal of this thesis, as explained was in the first place to get a more “contextual understanding” of the process of “restoring governance”.

(3.3) defining concepts: Intra- state level, Intra – state conflict & postconflict

When exactly conflict ends and peace begins is not a hard fact, since the demarcation between war & peace is often blurred; a period often characterised by no peace, no war (Richards, 2004). Different scholar applies different definitions of civil war or intra – state conflict sometimes using the terms interchangeably (see: Sambanis, 2004 for an operational discussion). A frequently used definition of intra – state conflict and postconflict comes from:

Intra – state conflict

Doyle and Sambanis (2000) define a civil war as: an armed conflict that:

causes more than 1,000 deaths overall and in at least a single year; challenges

the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; occurs within the

recognized boundary of that state; involves the state as a principal combatant;

includes rebels with the ability to mount organized armed opposition to the

state; and has parties concerned with the prospect of living together (Doyle

and Sambanis, 2000, p.783).

postconflict A common definition of the postconflict setting is the period after conflict termination; measured by a signature of a peace treaty or victory by one side (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000) followed by a period of six month (Regan, 1986) or one year with often, no minor conflict (25 - 999) or major conflict (1000+) related casualties, between the same fighting factions (UCDP, 2003).

25 This logically is food for further research. 38 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

Intra –state

Two questions concerning time and space arise; (1) why do you consider the social contract and its consequential institutions to be on the intra – state level? (2) Why do you call it postconflict institutional development if the contract was signed before the end of the conflict (2014)? Regarding the first argument; when looking at Syria from an integral part, the social contract in Rojava was not constituted for Syria as a whole, but for some parts specific (even tough regions can freely join the democratic self-administration), one could argue therefore that it was neither a variable on the intra – state level nor was it a phenomenon in the postconflict phase. Even though the contract wasn’t signed by representatives of all groups in Syria, it was still signed for to cover large swaths of Syria; I therefore argue that the social contract happened within the Syrian geographic boundaries, and should therefore be considered as a phenomenon on the intra – state/national level, stressing that in that way I separate the intra – state level from the psychological – motivational theories of the individual and the geopolitical factors on postconflict recurrence. Concerning the time aspect; the measurement of conflict is slightly arbitrary, even though within Syria as a whole the number of battle related deaths remains over a thousand a year, within (parts of) Rojava it could have dropped below that threshold. In any case the social contract was signed on January 24, 2014, and therefore before any peace treaty or victory. It is therefore easier to argue that the social contract was signed during the civil war rather than after, depending on where one puts the “end of the conflict”. This does not have to be problematic; the social contract and its consequential institutions can both be seen as both institutional development during conflict and institutional development after conflict. Even if, according to some definition, the conflict has not ended yet, the mentioned institution still become “postconflict”, over time, when the conflict does end.

39 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

(3.2) Answering the research questions

Question 1, 2, and 2.1 related to conflict recurrence where posed and answered in chapter two. The main research questions where mentioned in the introduction:

Research question 1:

Using the social contract, what type of institutions did the citizens of Rojava

set up to regulate relations between citizens and - between citizens and the

authorities?

------

Research question 2:

How was this process implemented & legitimized? How is the social contract

enforced?

Text Analysis & semi – structured interviews

To answer these questions I will use a mix of different research methods and techniques that I believe are complementary to the end product. In the fourth chapter of this thesis I will start with a text analysis to study the content of the social contract, specifically looking at the established political institutions. Text analysis includes several techniques for both written and spoken language. Since the social contract is mostly written content analysis will be used; content analysis is a set of methods for systematically coding and analysing qualitative data to explore explicit and covert meanings within them (Bernard, 2011). The text analysis is then complemented by semi-structured interviews to provide more information on the conditions of its inception, the legitimation and the enforcement of the social contract. The interview questions are based on the both the results of the text analysis and the questions that I derived que several modern critiques within the social contract tradition in the second part of chapter two. Semi – structured interviews are often contrasted with completely unstructured or completely structured interviewing techniques. Unstructured interviews are characterised by a lot of manoeuvrability for the interviewee to

40 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

express his or her personal experiences, but often fail to answer pre – arranged questions, since they are lacking. Structured interviews are the opposite of this and gives the interviewee only room to answer a list of questions such as a questionnaire with little room to communicate freely. A third, middle –way approach is the semi – structured approach, and is most suitable when you have a single chance of interviewing a respondent and are characterised by a written list of questions and topics that are covered in a particular order, but leave room for following new leads by the Interviewer and/or interviewee (Bernard, 2011). Since I have formulated specific research and interview questions but consequently also intent to retrieve supplementing information that I cannot retrieve from other sources, the semi –structured approach seems best suitable for my research.

Answering the research questions

Research Questions Source Technique Answer

1: What type of The charter of Text analysis ~4.2 the social ~4.3 institutions did the contract ~4.3.3 citizens of Rojava set up Discussed in the to regulate relations chapter 4 & 5. between citizens and - between citizens and the authorities? 2: How was this process The charter of Text analysis Appendix 5 -8 the social Discussed in the implemented and contract chapter 5. legitimized? What where + + the biggest challenges?

Interview 1 Semi – Interview 2 structured Interview 3 interviews Interview 4 Table 4: Answering the research questions.

41 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

I will engage in four interviews with different people to answer my research questions. The interviews will be held with the following people:

1. A diplomatic representative of the PYD in The Hague. 2. Ercan Ayboga, a political activist from , of Kurdish descent. 3. Sinem Mohammed; representative of Rojava in Europe. 4. Robert Lowe, Deputy Director of the Centre, London School of Economics (LSE).

These people are not selected as a sample to represent a specific population but are rather selected because of their knowledge and expertise concerning the topics related to the charter of the social contract, the political situation in the middle – east, practical experience in Rojava, or a mix of the three.

42 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

(4) Empirical chapter

In this chapter I will first describe the context in which the social contract was signed (4.1). Second (4.2), I will explain the principles of governance underlying the social contract based on the ideology of libertarian municipalism. Third (4.3), I will analyse the actual social contract using text analysis and content analysis. Fourth, (4.4) I will formulate my research questions for the interviews, based both on the social contract theory chapter (chapter 2) as well as the text analysis (paragraph 4.3).

4.1 Context

By the end of the First World War and the parallel collapse of the Ottoman Empire, state – lines in the middle –east were redrawn according to a covenant, known as the Sykes – Picot agreement, which divided the region into French and British spheres of influence. In the same decade the treaty of Sevres (1920) carved up the Ottoman Empire and planned to give to the Kurds, which created fierce resistance from Turkish nationalist. The treaty of Sevres was amended by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) which, for the Kurds shattered the dreams of an independent Kurdistan by redrawing the lines and including “Kurdish areas” into the "Republic of Turkey" as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurds are nowadays considered the largest without a state in the middle - east, estimated to count around 35 million, mostly inhabiting areas of Southeast Turkey (15- 20 million), Northeast Syria (3 million), Northern Iraq (5 million), and Northwest Iran (6-8 Million) (Minority Rights Group 1996).

Assad, Arabisation & the “Arab spring”

Syria gained independence from France in 1945 and after a series of coups, was ruled by the Assad dynasty since 1971, when Hafez Assad, Bashar Assad’s father installed himself as the president of the country through a coup d’état. There are no official statistics on the number Kurdish residents within Syria, but the numbers of people who consider themselves Kurdish are estimated to be around

43 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

three million. Being considered a problem, the Kurdish population within Syria has faced several challenges; according to Allsop (2014) the Syrian state has actively pursued a policy of Arabisation including restriction of landownership, redistribution of “Kurdish land” to “the Arabs”, restricting kurmanji Kurdish in the workplace, and Kurdish music and literature have been periodically banned. Out of the estimated three million Kurds a group 30,000 where considered stateless because the Syrian government considered them foreigners. This denial of Kurdish identity has for many Kurds defined their relationship with the Syrian state (Allsop, 2014, pp.27 -28). In 2011 “the Arab spring” erupted in several “Arab countries”, calling for regime change and for more democratic governance. In Syria too, the wide – scale protest against the Assad regime erupted and the government violently cracked down on any dissent. In many parts of the country different groups began to arm themselves to fight the Syrian government and or other rebel groups. In 2012 the Syrian government and military left the northern parts of Syria to fight rebels elsewhere, leaving a de facto vacuum in the north of Syria. This vacuum was filled primarily by a committee formed from most of the Syrian Kurdish political parties, which administered the areas and maintained borders and security. The biggest within this committee was the PYD (Allsop, 2014).

Figure 7: Turkish Kurds, Syrian Kurds, and Iraqi Kurds – political movements (source: quora.com)

44 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

PYD and the Syrian conflict

The PYD is seen by Turkey as a terrorist organisation partly because of its alleged ideological affiliation with the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê‎ - Kurdistan Workers Party) which has been violently trying to gain more autonomy since the nineteen -eighties, the PYD itself however has always denied these alleged affiliation26. Like all other fighting factions in the Syrian civil war, the PYD has been criticized by human rights watch for: arbitrary arrests, abuse in detention, due process violations, unsolved disappearances and killings, and the use of children in PYD security force (Human rights watch, 2014). The PKK is also considered a terrorist organisation by the European Union27, NATO and the United States (BBC, 2016), while the PYD, through its military wing YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, People’s Defense Units) has been actively armed by the United States during the Syrian Civil War (Khalaf, 2016). The changing geopolitical landscape has put strains on the bilateral relations with Turkey who fears a consequential increase in violent Kurdish separatism within their own borders if the Kurds will consolidate their military presence in northern Syria. Both this fear combined with the threat faced by Daesh (acronym for ISIS) is said to be the main motivation for the Turkish military intervention in Syria named Euphrates Shield (August 2016 - Ongoing). From a PYD perspective, operation Euphrates shield has effectively cut of the Canton Afrin, Cezîre and Kobanê, making it impossible (for the PYD) to unite the three Cantons together (see appendix 4 for an overview).

4.2 Principles of governance in Rojava

On the 29th January, 2014, the social contract of Rojava, developed by people from all socio-ethno-religious identities in Rojava, was ratified by the councils and the parliament in Amude (Knapp & Jongerden, 2016). The social contract states that Rojava does not wish to become a completely independent political entity but wants to remain a part of Syria, although with higher levels of independence. Within the foreseen democratic of Syria, Syria will be governed by a parliamentary system based on and pluralism

26 See the interview with Robert Lowe for more information. 27 Though delisted by court decision (Luxemburg Strafhof), but then again listed by the EU. 45 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

(see: article 3) and Rojava becomes an “autonomous region” governed by the principles of libertarian municipalism (see next paragraph). To govern the autonomous regions, the charter of the social contract specifically mentions seven institutions. Five of these are on the “national level”; the legislative assembly (represents all three cantons), the executive council, the supreme constitutional court, the judicial council and the higher commission of elections. The two institutions on the cantonal level are the canton governor and the provincial administration council. The functioning of the institutions on the “national level” and their interrelation is depicted in table five; a complete overview of all the institutions in Rojava is given in table four. Out of the seven institutions, I will discuss five28 in the following paragraphs. The different institutions and levels of governance cannot be properly understood without the concept of libertarian municipalism which will be explained in the next paragraph.

Libertarian municipalism

Even though not explicitly mentioned in the charter of the social contract, the ideology underpinning the social contract referred to as libertarian municipalism also known as libertarian or democratic self-rule. Based on the of Murray Bookchin (1991), who fused Marxist and anarchist ideals into a vision of a world where citizens’ assemblies replace the state, and where an active replaces (Huffintonpost, 2016). According to Bookchin (1991) libertarian municipalism seeks to create a:

“Communitarian society oriented toward meeting human needs, responding to ecological imperatives, and developing a new ethics based on sharing and cooperation. It involves a redefinition of politics, a return to the word’s original Greek meaning as the management of the community or polis by means of direct face-to-face assemblies of the people in the formulation of public policy and based on an ethics of complementarily and ” (Bookchin, 1991).

28 The functions of the judicial council are not explicitly mentioned in the charter, a small description is given in the appendix. The higher commission of elections is also discussed in the appendix since it has a minor role in the daily governance of Rojava. 46 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

The ideology attempts to redefine the concept of both “citizenship” and “politics” since (contemporary) states in this ideology are seen as oppressive rather than emancipatory. The theory’s main pillars are (1) a decentralised (anti – statist), participatory democracy, (2) a cooperative economy, (3) gender – equality and (each commune and council has a women’s committee) and (4) a social ecology29.

Decentralisation

Liberal municipalism emphasizes that politics should return to the level of the polis or the communal level where life takes place on a daily basis. Citizenship in this ideology evolves around active participation in the politics of municipalities and “communities” as contrasted with the more liberal individualist position in liberal democracies. The ideology distinguishes itself from in the sense that it calls for an active participation in politics, this is done by direct popular control of a society by its citizen’s trough democracy in municipal assemblies as opposed to representative systems with extensive state . Governance should follow the principle of subsidiarity; decisions are made as close to the people as possible, only if this is not possible decisions should be made on a higher level. Bateson, Dirkx, Frerks, Middelkoop & Tukker (2016) describe these principles of governance within Rojava as such: all decision- making processes are supposed to occur at the community level within the local councils and communes, only if decisions cannot be made at the commune level, they are relegated to a neighbourhood council. On a higher level, the three cantons of Efrînê, Cizîrê, and Kobanê govern themselves autonomously with coordination only limited to regional issues. This form of local governance can be seen as an attempt at direct democracy, whereby all members of society are supposed to be involved in decision-making processes (Bateson, et al. 2016).

29 Only the first two pillars are discussed in this thesis. For an impression of the gendered aspects of Rojava, see: Gendered alternatives: exploring women’s role in peace and security in the self- administered areas of Northern Syria (Bateson, Dirkx, Frerks, Middelkoop, Tukker, 2016).For an explanation of the concept of social ecology see: (Bookchin, 1991).

47 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

Cooperative economy

Within libertarian municipalism, the economy is not completely left to market principles, such as in more right wing versions of , neither is the economy governed by the state such as in most mainstream theories of socialism, the latter shows the anti –statist aspect of the ideology. Natural resources are considered public wealth and the economic system in this view should take place on the level of the municipality through . The idea of these cooperatives is that they create collective work, providing general welfare and guaranteeing labor rights and sustainable development (see: article 42) not based on but rather on the principles of redistribution and needs. The cooperatives are managed and owned collectively, and decisions are made collectively and democratically. The main objectives of Rojava’s economy consist of (1) providing the population with basic necessities, and (2) financing the armed forces. Concerning the basic necessities, out of the cooperatives revenue (50%) is divided between the workers according to their needs and expended efforts (30%) goes to production and future projects and (20%) is spent on the immediate needs of the cooperatives such as: health insurance, education, electricity, water, and infrastructure” (Munzur, 2017).

48 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

4.3 Content of the social contract - Text Analysis

The social contract in Rojava consists of a preamble, which states that:

“We, the people of the Democratic Autonomous Regions of Afrin, Jazira and Kobane, a confederation of Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Arameans, Turkmen, Armenians and Chechens, freely and solemnly declare and establish this Charter, which has been drafted according to the principles of Democratic Autonomy”.

Then, a few phrases down the line, the goal of the social contract is described as;

“Building a society free from , militarism, centralism and the intervention of religious authority in public affairs”.

Stressing the secular character of the charter, and freedom or (Article 92a, b), going on to say that:

“In establishing this Charter, we declare a political system and civil administration founded upon a social contract that reconciles the rich mosaic of Syria through a transitional phase from dictatorship, civil war and destruction, to a new democratic society where civic life and social justice are preserved

Aside from the preamble, the rest of the charter consists of nine subsections:

1. The general principles (1-12) 2. Basic principles (13 – 20) 3. Right and liberties (21 – 44) 4. Legislative assembly (45 – 53) 5. Executive council (54 – 62) 6. The judicial council (63 -75) 7. The higher commission of elections (76) 8. The supreme constitutional council (77 – 80) 9. General rules (81 -96)

49 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

In the following paragraphs I will discuss the nine subsections of the charter of the social contract, although not in the exact same order as the table of content shown above. I divide the social contract into three different parts. My analysis starts with the general rules and principles (subsection 1, 2, 9) these subsections explain the goal of the charter, a general explanation and vision on the separation of powers, the different layers of government, rules & regulations such as gender quota. In the second part of my analysis I give a short overview of (individual & group) rights and liberties, such as freedom of expression, religion and association (subsection 3). Third and finally, I analyse I analyse the functions of the different institutions the social contract mentions: the legislative assembly, the executive council, the judicial council, the higher commission of elections and the supreme constitutional council (subsections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8).

4.3.1 General rules and general & basic principles (1, 2 & 9)

The first three articles of the charter explain the scope (Afrin, Jazira and Kobane) and the purpose of the social contract for the “autonomous regions”. The charter emphasizes that the contract is signed between the people of the autonomous regions and not between citizens and the state; furthermore is stresses popular sovereignty; the people are considered the sole source of legitimacy. The autonomous regions wish to remain part of an integral Syria, governed by a parliamentary system based on principles of decentralization and pluralism.

Democratic self - administration

The charter states that governance in the autonomous regions shall be done through democratic self – administration with a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, all governing bodies, institutions and committees shall be made up of at least forty percent (40%) of either sex. The charter can be only be amended by a qualified majority of two-thirds of the legislative assembly. The charter holds only human rights as prior to the charter; in all other cases there is no legitimacy for authority which contradicts the charter (93b). Syrian civil legislations is applicable in the autonomous regions except where it contradicts provisions of this charter. One of the most interesting

50 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

points is that the charter states that in case of conflict between laws passed by the Legislative Assembly and legislation of the central government, the Supreme Constitutional Court will rule upon the applicable law, based on the best interest of the Autonomous Regions, which possible contradicts the idea of federalism. Dual is not allowed for a position the offices; canton governor, the provincial council and the supreme constitutional court. The charter emphasizes its role in transitional justice, and states that only the People’s protection Units (YPG) is the sole military force of the three cantons, led by the body (ministry) of defence and the police task is handed over to the (police force). The education system, public service channels and academic institutions will promote Human rights and democracy. The Charter further guarantees the protection of the environment and regards the sustainable development of natural ecosystems as a moral and a sacred national duty. The promotion of cultural, social and economic advancement by administrative institutions ensures enhanced stability and public welfare within the Autonomous Regions (article 93).

4.3.2 Rights and liberties (3)

The charter explicitly mentions the universal declaration of human rights and international human rights treaties, conventions and declarations which it holds as inviolable. The list of rights and liberties (article 22 -44; see table three for a full overview) shows an extensive list of

Civil rights and individual liberties: The right to express ethnic, cultural and linguistic identity, freedom of expression, the right to life, freedom of religion, (emphasizing the freedom of the Yazidi religion).

Political rights: freedom of the press, no gender discrimination, freedom to associate politically, in a trade union or civil assembly, the right to demonstrate, the right to vote and the right to private property.

Social rights: the right to live in an healthy environment, free and compulsory primary and secondary education, the right to work, receive social security, health, and adequate housing etc.

51 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

Rights and liberties in the charter of the social contract 1. Freedom to express ethnic, cultural and linguistic identity. 2. Freedom of expression 3. Free media, Freedom of the press 4. The right to live in a healthy environment 5. The right to life is guaranteed: the death penalty is abolished 6. Men and women are considered equal in the eyes of the law and there should be no gender discrimination; women are allowed to participate in political, social, economic and cultural life. 7. Children are protected against child labour, torture and child marriage is forbidden. 8. Everybody has the right to free and compulsory primary and secondary education, the right to work, receive social security, health, and adequate housing. 9. Social care is arranged for the disabled, the elderly and those with special needs. 10. The citizens of Rojava will enjoy freedom of religion; the protection of the Yazidi religion is especially protected. 11. Freedom to associate politically, in a trade union or civil assembly 12. The right to demonstrate and strike 13. Passive and active voting rights 14. The right to political asylum 15. Equality of opportunity for all 16. Natural resources shall be considered public wealth 17. All buildings and land are owned by the transitional administration and are public property 18. The right to private property 19. The economy serves to provide general welfare; monopoly is prohibited by law

Table 6: Rights and Liberties

52 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

Syrian Federal /decentralised state

Democratic Self - Administration: Cezîre, Kobanê and Afrin

The The Judicial legislative The assembly Executive

Executive council: The Supreme Judicial constitution Council al court:. 3 Canton Executive bodies governors 1. Foreign relations 2. Defense 3. Internal affairs 4. Justice 5. Cantonal and Provincial Provincial Provincial municipal councils administration administration administration council: 6. Finance council: Afrin council: Cezîre 7. Social affairs Kobanê 8. Education 9. Agriculture 10. Energy 11. Health Neighbourhood/ Neighbourhood/ Neighbourhood/ 12. Trade & village council: village council: village council: Economics 7 -30 communes 7 -30 communes 7 -30 communes 13. Martyrs / Veterans 14. Culture 15. Transport 16. Youth and sports 17. Environment 18. Religious affairs 19. Family /Gender equality 20. Human Rights 21. Communications 21. Food security Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune 30 -400+ 30 -400+ 30 -400+ 30 -400+ 30 -400+ 30 -400+ households households households households households households

Table 7: Democratic confederalism, an overview 53 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

Human rights

1. Implementation of laws, resolutions and Popular sovereinty The charter of the social contract decrees as issued by the (Tacit consent) Legislative Assembly and judicial institutions.

The people directly The higher commision elect the of elections

legislative The executive council

Regulate It shall coordinate elections: 3. The canton 1. Set date the institutionsgovernors appointof the 2. Prevent illegal the Autonomouspresident of the interference, etc. Regions.executive council

3 The legislative assembly Canton governor

1. Elect the governor of the canton 1. Implements laws 2. Controls the executive passed by the 3. Nominates judges Legislative Assembly 4. Enact legislation for 2. Appoints one or the Local Councils more deputies, 5. Forms the executive approved by the council with the legislative assembly approval of a simple majority (51%) 6. Appoints members of the higher commission of elections. The supreme constitutional court

1. The court checks the constitutionality of the laws enacted by the legislative assembly. 2. The court approves the election of the canton governor and checks the constitutionality of its actions 3. Persecute canton governors, members of the legislative assembly and executive council when alleged to have acted in breach of the Charter. 4. Table 54 | “5:In Checkspursuit ofand freedom, balances justice, of governance dignity, and indemocracy Rojava ” – Rojava’s social contract

4.3.3 The Institutions

The Legislative assembly (4: 45 -53)

Description: The legislative assembly of the autonomous region represents all three cantons (Afrin, Cezîre and Kobane) and is directly elected by the electorate through direct, secret ballot for a term of 4 years; no member of the legislative assembly may run for more than two consecutive terms. The oldest member of the legislative assembly will fulfil the function of chairman. The number of seats in the legislature is not explicitly mentioned in the charter but it states that per 15000 registered voters, one member of the legislature assembly is elected, other sources mentions 101 incumbents in the legislative assembly (source). There is a gender quota of forty percent for either sex. Tasks: the tasks appointed to the legislative assembly are extensive, first it is involved in electing the Co – President, the executive council, the canton governor, the nomination of judges and it appoints members of the higher commission of elections. Second, the most important functions of the legislative assembly are to (1) exercise control over administrative and executive bodies (2) ratify international treaties and agreements (3) delegate its powers to the executive council & (4) declare a state of war and peace.

The executive (1): executive council (55 -62)

Description: The Executive Council is the highest executive and administrative body in the Autonomous Regions. The party or bloc winning a majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly shall form the Executive Council with the approval of the simple majority (51%) of the members of the Legislative Assembly. The Executive Council is composed of a Chairman, representatives and committees. The Head of the Executive Council shall not serve more than two consecutive terms, of four (4) years. Tasks: the executive council is responsible for the implementation of laws, resolutions and decrees as issued by the Legislative Assembly and judicial institutions; second the head of the councils appoints advisors (ministers) to lead the executive bodies, third it coordinates the institutions of the autonomous regions.

55 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

The functions of the Legislative assembly

Composition Chairman (oldest member + Incumbents (1 member per 15,000 voters) President? Elected by Directly elected by the electorate through direct, secret ballot Term 4 year, maximum two terms per incumbent Elects Co-President Executive Council (simple majority voting) The Canton governor Nominates judges Appoints members of the higher commission of elections Primary 1. Exercise control over administrative and executive functions bodies. 2. Ratification of international treaties and agreements 3. Delegate its powers to the Executive Council. 4. Declare a State of war and peace 5. Adopt decrees promulgated by the Executive Council 6. Adopt laws for the Provincial Councils 7. Establish rules and procedures governing the work of the Legislative Assembly. Secondary 8. Adopt the general budget functions 9. Establish general policy and development plans 10. Approve and grant amnesty Requirements 1. The minimum age for active/passing is 18/22 years. 2. Incumbents are not permitted to have another profession aside his/her job as a parliamentarian. 3. No member of the legislative assembly may run for more than two consecutive terms. 4. Gender quota of 40 for either sex

Table 8: The legislative assembly

56 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

The functions of the executive council Composition President, Chairman, representatives and committees Elected by The winning party or block of the elections, with simple majority voting. President is appointed by the canton governors. Term 4 year, maximum two terms? Elects 1. Elects advisors, adviser shall be responsible for one of the bodies within the Executive Council 2. Appoints one or more deputies (approved by the legislative assembly) Primary 1. It is responsible for the implementation of laws, functions resolutions and decrees as issued by the Legislative Assembly and judicial institutions. 2. It shall coordinate the institutions of the Autonomous Regions. 3. The Head of the Executive Council may choose advisers amongst the newly elected members of the Legislative Council. Each adviser shall be responsible for one of the bodies within the Executive Council. 4. After the formation and approval of the Executive Council, it shall issue its prospective programme for Government. Following its passage through the Legislative Assembly, the Executive Council is obliged to implement the programme of Government during that legislative term. Secondary Senior civil servants and Department representatives functions shall be nominated by the Executive Council and approved by the Legislative Council. Not mentioned Requirements Table 9: The executive council

57 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

The supreme constitutional court (77 – 80)

Description: The Supreme Constitutional Court is composed of seven members, all of whom are nominated by the Legislative Assembly, they are elected for four years and cannot serve more than two terms. Aside from their position as a judge in the Supreme Constitutional Court, no member of court is eligible to serve on the Executive Council or in the Legislative Assembly or to hold any other office or position.

The functions of the Supreme Constitutional Court

Composition Composed of seven members

Elected by The legislative assembly, after simple majority voting

Term 4 year, maximum two terms Elects

Primary 1. To interpret the articles and underlying principles of the functions charter 2. To assess the constitutionality of the laws enacted by the legislative assembly and decisions taken by the executive council 3. Persecute canton governors, members of the legislative assembly and executive council when alleged to have acted in breach of the Charter. Requirements 1. Its members are drawn from Judges, legal experts and lawyers, all of whom must have no less than fifteen (15) years of professional experience.

Table 10: The Supreme Constitutional Court

Tasks: The supreme constitutional court serves several functions, the main ones are; interpretation of the articles and underlying principles of the charter, it asses the constitutionality of the laws enacted by the legislative assembly and the executive council, and it can persecute public figures. The decisions of the

58 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

Supreme Court are reached through simple majority voting.

The executive (2): the canton governor (54)

Description: Within the charter of the social contract, Rojava consists of three cantons: Afrin, Cezîre and Kobane. The administrative centres of each Canton are: Afrin city, Canton of Afrin; city, Canton of Jazira; Kobane city, Canton of Kobane. The main executive on the cantonal level is the canton governor. After elections for the legislative have taken place, the president of the assembly must call for the elections of the (three) canton governors. Potential candidates are examined by the supreme constitutional court before being accepted or rejected. The canton governor is then elected by the legislative assembly by simple majority voting, for a term of four years. In case of no result a second electoral round is initiated with the candidate receiving the highest number of votes being elected.

Tasks: The main task of the canton governor is to implement laws passed by the Legislative Assembly, and issue decisions, orders and decrees in accordance with those laws. After the elections, the (three) canton governors together appoint the president of the executive council. Second they appoint one or more deputies, after approval by the legislative assembly. The Canton Governor is responsible to the people through his representatives in the Legislative Assembly; the Legislative Assembly has the right to bring him before the Supreme Constitutional Court for charges of treason and other forms of sedition or can simply replace him/her after new elections.

59 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

The functions of the Canton governor

Composition One Canton governor per canton, with deputies Elected by The legislative assembly, simple majority voting after approval of the constitutional court Term 4 year, maximum two terms Elects Appoints the president of the executive council Appoints one or more deputies, approved by the legislative assembly Primary 1. The Canton Governor shall implement laws passed by the functions Legislative Assembly, and issue decisions, orders and decrees in accordance with those laws. 2. The Canton Governor must invite the newly elected Legislative Assembly to convene within fifteen (15) days from the announcement of the election. 3. Cantons supervise the Provincial Administrative Councils [Municipal Councils’] authority, including its budget and finance, public services and mayoral elections. Secondary 3. The Canton Governor may grant medals. functions 4. The Canton Governor may issue amnesties as recommended by the President of the Executive Council. Requireme Over 35, be a Syrian citizen and a resident of the canton nts and is forbidden to have any criminal convictions.

Table 11: The functions of the Canton governor

The executive (3): The Provincial Administrative Councils (Municipal Councils):

Description: Even tough liberal municipalism assigns a large role to the municipal councils and calls for extensive subsidiarity; they are only briefly described in the social contract. The Cantons of the Autonomous Regions are composed of Provincial Administrative Councils (Municipal Councils) which are directly elected by the public (local administration units), trough secret ballot. The charter of the social contract does not refer explicitly to functions of the executive but states that it will be managed by “the relevant executive” without

60 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

any further descriptions of prescriptions. It further states that there should be a policy of decentralization. Functions of the Municipal Council

Composition Representatives of local assemblies, managed by the relevant executive. Elected by Directly elected by the electorate through direct, secret ballot Term 4 year, maximum two terms? Elects

Primary 1. The municipal functions 2. Provincial Administrative Councils [Municipal Councils] are managed by the relevant Executive Council The powers and duties of the Provincial Administrative Councils [Municipal Councils] are founded upon an adherence to a policy of decentralization. Requireme nts

Table 12: The functions of the Municipal Council

Description/Tasks: Even though libertarian municipalism prescribes politics to take place mostly within the local council, the description of the municipal council in the charter of the social contract is very limited. It simply states that it is elected directly and that it is managed by a relevant executive.

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(5) Discussion and conclusion

In this thesis I performed a literature study on conflict recurrence in relation to postconflict institutions. Concerning chapter two, I started with the observation that violent conflict tends to occur mostly in “developing countries” and often tends to reoccur after a period of relative peace. I then gave an overview of the different theoretical arguments in the literature that make a claim made about why this pattern exists. I argued that violent conflict cannot be understood by only psychological theories about the motivation of rebels, or by only arguments about economic factors; the postconflict phase is influenced by many factors on both the individual, national and international level that are somehow related. The conflict in Syria cannot be seen as simply an “intra –state” conflict since it’s involves regional actors and global actor alike. Intervention tends to prolong conflict and whatever the future holds for Rojava, cannot be explained simply by the motivations of the YPG or other fighting factions, nor can it be simply explained only the social contract or economic conditions. Turkey, the KRG, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq Russia, The United States and Russia and several other actors all have a stake in the outcome of the conflict and their role cannot be neglected. I further described the theoretical relation between three different variables that are claimed to affect the chance of conflict recurrence on the national level; economic development, institutional development and peacekeeping since these variables as opposed to some others (see appendix 2) can be influenced by actors engaged in postconflict assistance. I attempted to specify how they could be useful for policy and under what circumstance they could best be implemented. Consequently, what the literature lacked mostly was recent case studies on the set – up of governance after violent conflict. I argued that the social contract in Rojava was an interesting case due to the fact that they used the existing concept of the social contract to install governance after violent conflict and especially this made it especially appealing for research. The charter of the social contract in Rojava described the set –up of several institutions due to regulate governance in the north of Syria, I gave an overview of the existing institution and described the functioning of these institutions as mentioned in the charter. The text analysis of the charter was further complemented by four interviews with experts.

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The charter of the social contract

The charter of the social contract shows at least four interesting things: first, if we look at the social contract as a device for teasing out the implications of the moral premises concerning people’s moral equality (Kymlicka, 2002) the charter reflects a rather liberal interpretation of social justice in the sense that it leaves a lot of room for individuals to live their lives as they see fit, which expresses itself in an extensive set of individual rights and liberties; gender – equality, , secularism and religious freedom seem to be entrenched within the charter. Especially compared to the more patriarchal conservative societies in the middle – east, the charter of the social contract seems to express a rather progressive set of morals and values. It seems that efforts were made to include as many segments of society as possible to increase the legitimacy of the charter and that women where represented on an equal base, and in terms of social economic justice, the economy seems to be aimed at an inclusive production process. Even though not all segments of society agreed with the charter, all citizens in Rojava are subject to the rules and legislation which find their roots in the social contract, which gives food for thought, perhaps future research could shed more light on this issue. Second, on an institutional level, the legislative, executive and judicial powers are separated and these separations are enforced by an extensive set of checks and balances (see table 5), reflecting (at least in theory) the liberal democratic model of governance. The “Rojavan” model however deviates from in a few ways; the concept of citizenship distinguishes itself from the liberal individualist approach which claims that a set of checks and balances, and voting are enough to make democracy work, while the communitarian approach stresses that their concept of conceptions of citizenship is richer than the passive theories of citizenship within mainstream liberalism, and government policies should inculcate civic virtues and practices, and citizenship education to stimulate active participation in the political process30 (Kymlicka, 2002). In the case of Rojava this means that “(all/most) politics should be local” in the form of active engagements of citizens in the local municipalities; engagement, deliberation and decision-making. In

30 Active citizenship means in this case: aside from simply voting, active deliberation, taking hold in political functions etc. 63 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

other words “the management of the community or polis by means of direct face- to-face assemblies of the people in the formulation of public policy and based on an ethics of complementarily and solidarity” (Bookchin, 1991). This form of politics is contrasted with “bureaucratic party politics” on the national level. Third, in terms of social contract theory, the contract in Rojava reflects aspects of both Locke and Rousseau’s theory. The economy in Rojava seems to be closer to the socialist typology (Rousseau) than to the principles of a market economy (Locke). While stressing the right to private property the charter limits it at the same time; natural resources and economic benefits are considered public/common goods, The Libertarian search for a minimalist definition of the state however better fits the classical liberal model of governance (Locke). The discourse of or “democracy without the state”, in my opinion seems at least to be partly contradicted by the fact that there are many governmental institutions present in Rojava. Whether the principles of liberal municipalism will maintain themselves or governance will move away from the local to the national will be interesting to see in the (near) future. Recent developments show that many people move away from the municipal level to other institutions such as the police where they are paid more. Fourth, one remark however in this case is that after the text analysis and during the interviews, it became clear that even though liberal municipalism prescribes governance as close to citizens as possible, the charter of the social contract fails to give a complete overview of the communal and municipal level. Also the legislative assemblies on the cantonal level, mentioned in the interview, where not mentioned in the charter of the social contract. During the first interview (appendix 6) this was explained away by the fact that the charter of the social contract was set –up in a short amount of time (see interview 1). I agree with Dr Lowe who remarked (appendix 8) that: “The social contract and other documents contain encouraging and progressive ideas but there are many flaws in the structure of Rojava’s institutions and in the implementation of these ideas”. This was corroborated by Ercan Ayboga (appendix 7). Reality is of course much more complex than social contract theory prescribes; logically time is needed for institutional development, just like Rome was not built in one day.

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Postconflict assistance

I believe that depicting Syria as a failed state in the sense that it is an empty vessel that needs rebuilding from the ground up is misguided. The charter of the social contract supports the thesis that during violent conflict seceded areas are often not completely chaotic, ungoverned areas, but rather spaces where governance emerges from within, filled with non-state actors that may play a crucial role in local governance, social services, and security (Van der Haar, 2013; Frerks et. all). Although still under construction, there is extensive governance in Rojava and several institutions have been set – up to regulate daily live, it seems that most citizens in the region from different political, cultural and ethnic backgrounds feel represented by the charter of the social contract, which could help provide the necessary stability and legitimacy by overcoming the security dilemma (see chapter two). In terms of reconstruction, looking at table 1, I believe that Rojava doesn’t fit absolutely in one the specific contexts, but is probably located between context C and context D. Whether peacekeeping is an option is too hard to tell at the moment. Although perhaps in an early phase of development and in need of strengthening (see interview Robert Lowe) there are existing political institutions which can simply not be neglected. These might fit in the category “quality of life” but also show that abstract instruments should at least be modified for the local context. In terms of development, the existing institutions do not constrain postconflict assistance, but they enable it. Within the interviews it became clear that the necessities on the ground where mostly identified as medicine, health care improvement, food security and infrastructure (see interview 1, 2, 4). The existing committees (see table seven) could facilitate external assistance. The strong ideological commitment to how the economy should operate shows that economic interventions such as stimulating trade might be considered out of place, in the context of cooperatives that produce on the principle of needs. In line with the initial observations of Frerks (2007) I have to conclude that in abstract terms the quantitative literature on providing stability is perhaps helpful to show some abstract generalisations, and even though it gives some tools for the reconstruction toolbox, but especially when they reflect particular ideological biases, risk oversimplification and tend to discount the impact of situational and

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historical factors (Brinkerhoff, 2005). I believe this thesis is the exemplification of that observation. I agree with (Brinkerhoff, 2005) that “rebuilding governance systems ultimately is the responsibility of citizens and leaders in postconflict societies; external interventions by members of the international community cannot, by themselves, ‘fix’ a country’s governance structure, though they can support reconstruction and reform” (Brinkerhoff, 2005, p.28). Whether the charter of the social contract and its political institutions will bring stability in the areas that it governs; for the long haul, only time can tell. As depicted in chapter two, the postconflict situation is affected by many factors on different levels of which the institutions set –up by the social contract are just one, whether violence returns, also depends on the actions of the “external actors” involved in the conflict and also on at least some of the factors shown in appendix two. It seems at least for now that the charter of the social contract does provide some stability for the near future. Further research is needed to understand if and how it exactly affected the postconflict setting in the long run.

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Appendix 1: Empirical patterns of armed conflict.

1946–89

Type Absolute Percentage % numbers Peace 12 8.5 agreement Ceasefire 2 1.4 Victory 82 58.2 Other 45 31.9 Total 141 141 100 1990–2005 Peace 27 18.4 agreement Ceasefire 29 19.7 Victory 20 13.6 Other 71 48.3 Total 147 100

Table 13: Intrastate conflict terminations over time, (Kreutz, 2010).

Figure 8: Global trends in armed conflict (Centre for Systematic Peace).

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Appendix 2: Factors affecting civil war recurrence

Civil war recurrence; risk factors – (A) per type of argument

In this table, negative effects (decreasing the likelihood of civil war recurrence) Are shown as: (-) while factors with positive effects (increasing the likelihood of civil war recurrence are shown as: (+).

Author(s) Factors Comment s Victory - Rebel victories (-) - Government victories (-) - Rebel victories (-) only when they survive the first years. - Government victory creates fragile peace (+) unless they commit to reform, economic growth (-) and address grievances (-) - If rebels aim for total control (+) Previous mobilization along ethnic lines (+) - No difference between negotiated settlements and decisive military victories Peacekeeping - Peace agreements supported by peacekeeping forces (-) - Deployment of peacekeepers (-) - Peacekeeping (-) Economics - The level of per capita income (-) - Growth rate (-) - Dependence on natural resources as export products (+) - Post-war economic development (-) Quality of life - Higher quality of life (-) - Higher infant mortality rates (+) Regime type - Greater access to political participation/open political systems (-) - Full democracy (-) (+) autocracy (-) Time aspects - Long wars (-) - More time (-) creates more durable peace - The longer the peace can be sustained, the less likely civil war is to recur (-) other - Conditions of multiple sovereignty(+) - Partition (+) - Large diaspora’s (+)

Table 14: Civil war recurrence; risk factors; per writer (left) and per argument (right).

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(B) Per writer

In this table, negative effects (decreasing the likelihood of civil war recurrence) Are shown as: (-) while factors with positive effects (increasing the likelihood of civil war recurrence are shown as: (+).

Author(s) Factors comments

Quin & - Rebel victories (-) These effects hold - Mason Peace agreements supported by regardless of whether peacekeeping forces (-) the previous war was (2007) - Post-war economic development (-) ethnically based or - The longer the peace can be not, and whether it was sustained, the less likely civil war is to recur (-) secessionist or revolutionary. Collier - The level of per capita income (-) - Growth rate (-) - Dependence on natural resources as export products (+) - Peacekeeping (-) Walter - Higher quality of life (-) Holds regardless of - what happened in a (2004) Higher infant mortality rates (+) - Greater access to political previous conflict participation/open political systems (-) There seems to be a U - Long wars (-) shaped relation - Partition (+) between regime type - Full democracy (-) Anocracy (+) and conflict recurrence autocracy (-) Kreutz - Government victories (-) - (2010) Deployment of peacekeepers (-) - If rebels aim for total control (+) - Previous mobilization along ethnic lines (+) Mason, et - Conditions of multiple Multiple sovereignty: sovereignty(+) When one or more al. (2011). - No difference between negotiated organized armed settlements and decisive military challengers emerge victories and command a - More time (-) creates more durable significant degree of peace popular support. - Rebel victories (-) only when they survive the first years. protracted conflicts are - Government victory creates fragile not likely to end in a peace (+) unless they commit to decisive victory reform, economic growth (-) and address grievances (-). - Peacekeeping (-)

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Appendix 3: Civil war recurrence since 1944 (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000).

Table 15: List of civil war recurrence since 1994.

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Appendix 4: Institutions of Rojava

The higher commission of elections (76)

The Higher Commission of Elections is an independent body competent to oversee and run the electoral process. It is composed of 18 members, representing all cantons, who are appointed by the Legislative Assembly.

The functions of the higher commission of elections

Composition 18 members, representing all cantons Elected by Member are appointed by the Legislative Assembly

Term ? Elects Decisions in the Commission require a qualified majority of eleven (11) votes Responsible to The Higher Commission of Elections is monitored by the Supreme Court and may be monitored by observers from the United Nations and organizations. Primary 1. Determines the date on which elections are held, the functions announcement of the results. 2. The Higher Commission of Elections, together with the Judicial Council announces the names of eligible candidates. 3. Can receive allegations of electoral fraud, voter intimidation or illegal interference with the process of an election. Requirements 1. Member of the Higher Commission of Elections may not stand for office in the Legislative Assembly.

Functions of the Judicial council Composition Unknown Elected by Directly elected by the electorate through direct, secret ballot Term 4 year, maximum two terms?

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Elects

Primary 1. Create an independent judiciary functions 2. Removal of a judge from office 3. The Judicial Council together with the higher Commission of Elections, announces the names of eligible candidates for elections 1. 40 % gender quotas Requirements

Table 16: The higher commission of elections

Procedure for determination of the constitutionality of laws as follow: a)- Where, prior to a lawʼs enactment, more than twenty per cent (20%) of the Legislative Assembly objects to its constitutionality, the Supreme Constitutional Court is seized of the matter and shall render its decision within fifteen (15) days; if the law is to be urgently enacted, a decision shall be b)- rendered within seven (7) days. Where, following the rendering of the Judgment of the Supreme Constitutional Court, more than twenty per cent (20%) of the c)- Legislative Assembly still objects to its constitutionality, an appeal may be lodged. If, on appeal, the Supreme Constitutional Court rules the law to be enacted as unconstitutional, the law shall be considered null and void. 2. If an argument is raised in a court concerning the constitutionality of a law as follow: d) - If parties to a case raise a challenge to the constitutionality of a law and the court so holds, the matter is stayed while it is referred to the Supreme Constitutional Court e)- The Supreme Constitutional Court must deliver its judgment within thirty (30) days. Table 17: Procedure for determination of the constitutionality of laws

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Appendix 5: The military (May, 01 2017) in Syria.

Afrin Kobane Cezîre

Map 1: The military situation in Syria (southfront.org)

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Appendix 6: Interview Sheruan Hassan, The Hague

The first interview was planned to be held with Sheruan Hassan, representative of the PYD, and Rojava in general within in the Netherlands, in The Hague on April 4, 2017. Unfortunately Mr. Sheruan was not able to engage in the interview himself and was replaced by Mr. Bengin who presented himself as the representative of Rojava in Belgium; Mr Bengin was able to answer most of the questions, the ones left were answered by an affiliate of Mr. Hassan; Aviva Stein.

4.3.1 Interview Questions (social contract chapter)

Initiation

1. For the PYD, where did the idea of the social contract as a form to install governance come from,

was there any ideological foundation? Or specific literature that laid the foundation for the social

contract in Rojava?

Stein: The ideology of liberal municipalism comes from Murray Bookchin, an American philosopher, his books where read by Abdullah Ocalan who has been in a Turkish Prison for a long time. Ocalan, who is considered to be the founding father of the PKK, moved away from over time and was inspired by the books of Murray Bookchin.

2. Why is it called a social contract instead of a constitution?

Stein: The idea of the social contract is entails a relation between citizens rather than between citizens and the state, constitution signifies the beginning of a state, in the case of Rojava we prefer to talk about a social contract between people.

2a. Does this also have anything to do with the fact that creating a Kurdish state might trigger a fierce military reaction from Turkey?

Stein: No, I don’t believe so; it really has to do more with the philosophy of democratic confederalism where citizens engage in direct democracy rather than anything else.

3. Who initiated the set – up of the social contract?

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Bengin: The social contract was initiated by several political parties that existed long before the revolution (see question 9).

4. Was it signed by all the parties involved, if so, when and where?

Bengin: No, absolutely not. There was a lot of disagreement coming from several factions; they desired a new social contract with a different distribution of powerful positions (see question 13).

5. Why there and why at that place?

The different meetings took place within Al- Jazeera, Amuda and Qamishli, this because they were the first areas liberated from Isis.

Process: In, and exclusion

6. Who were involved during the set – up of the charter of the social contract?

Bengin: The procedure was attended by representatives of at least 10 different already existing political parties, including TEV – Dem, who supervises the “Rojava project.

7. Was everybody included or only representatives of political parties? If so, why only these people,

and how and why where they chosen?

Bengin: There was a huge attendance, maybe a 1000 people (rough estimation,. mostly representatives of existing political parties. These people represented their respective electorates, logically it is impossible to invite everybody.

8. What was the intention of the people involved to take part?

After the beginning of the conflict in Syria, the Syrian government left a vacuum in the north of Syria, of course like any society we needed governance. A new form of governance was needed, and to create a

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peaceful society, this is where the idea of the social contract came from.

9. Where there any (groups) of people who were not involved?

There was a lot of disagreement on some aspects of the social contract, and still a lot of political parties disagree with the current form. These people were mostly members of the following parties: Party democratic, Yekiti and Azadi.

10. What was the intention of the people not involved?

Bengin: The major disagreement was concerning the distribution of political positions within ministries etc. In my eyes this had to do with two things; the first one being simply personal status, people that seek powerful positons etc. second it has to do with the fact that some (regional) actors have different plans for Rojava than we have. For instance the Iraqi Kurds and the KRG have different plans for Rojava than us, the same goes for Turkey. Some of those who were present might have interest more along these lines.

11. The charter explicitly mentions gender – equality, where women involved in setting up the

charter, if so to what extend?

Bengin: Yes, we assured gender – equality by making sure that both men and women where represented on an equal base, meaning that 50 % of the attendees where males and 50 % where females.

12. Modern critiques of the social contract often claim that the position of people with physical and

mental impairments addressed, what is the position of these people within (the economy of) the

autonomous regions?

13. People outside of the autonomous regions are only briefly mentioned in the social contract,

article 37 claims that anybody has the right to seek political asylum, but also mentions forced

deportations. Who are considered to be the inhabitants of the autonomous regions and who are

not? / Does anybody have to right to come and live in the autonomous regions and let’s say,

participate in the economy, or buy a house?

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At the moment the charter entails the three Cantons; Afrin, Jazirah and Kobane.

Bengin, well, we have a lot of refugees. Both from Iraq and within Syria, in theory yes everybody can come and live in Rojava, in practice at the moment I don’t think that for instance refugees from Africa are interested in applying for asylum here, the situation here is probably worse than there.

14. What about people that have supported opposing forces during the war?

Bengin: In Qamishli there are still a few streets that support Assad; I would estimate that there are about 500 supporters left; they sometimes conflict with the PYD, but not on a regular base. In all other cases, logically if people use violence than they have to be trialled by the courts that are present in

Rojava.

15. The charter mentions freedom of religion, and specifically refers to the rights of Yazidis, are all

religious and ethnic groups included on an equal basis.

Bengin: Yes, the charter guarantees that there is religious freedom for all, Christians, Yazidi’s, Muslims, atheist etc. We believe that all people should be included in the social contract and that any attempt by one group to dominate the other should be suppressed.

16. Can you tell me something about the position of the environment? /

What is for instance the position of animals in the social contract?

Bengin: living in balance with nature is a strong part of our culture, we consider it our duty to protect nature and animals do have rights too. We are however still in the process of including the philosophy of green in our curriculum, we are not there yet, and there is plenty to be done.

Process: equal bargaining positions & legitimacy

17. During the process of the social contract was there any pre –arranged procedure present?

Bengin: I’m not sure if I can answer that question.

18. One critique on social contract theory is that people differ in terms of

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power; discursive, economic, status etc. and that the procedure is unfair unless they are

compensated in any way. How did the set – up of the charter of the social contract deal with

inequalities? Where all participants included on an equal basis? How was this assured?

Bengin: I cannot tell you the social economic position of all the attendees, what I can tell you is that we tried to include as many different parts of society as possible, different religious and different ethnic groups and everybody had their chance to have their say during the procedure.

19. Was there any disagreement on particular or general parts of the text?

See question 13.

20. If so, how did the procedure deal with disagreement? Was agreement reached after some form of majority voting was it based on consensus?

Bengin: The conflict is still ongoing, and we are trying to include everybody in the existing structures and institutions, however we have failed to do so until now, in other words there was not concensus, but

Agreement was reached after majority voting, we estimate that around 75% of the attendants in the end with the charter, this means that 25% also disagreed.

21. If so, how did this disagreement develop? Is there still disagreement?

What were the most important gains? What were the biggest mistakes?

See question 13.

Outcome: compliance, non – compliance & enforcement

22. What is the (legal) position of the people that refused to take part?

Bengin: Well, even though under construction, the social contract is being actively reinforced. The parties that opposed the social contract are subject to the same laws as everybody else. At the moment the argument with the parties that didn’t agree with the social contract is still ongoing and we hope to resolve them soon.

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23. Is it possible to change any parts of the social contract or make amendments?

Bengin: Some amendments have been made after the initial set –up of the charter of the social contract

(mentions 8, does not refer to the procedures mention in the charter). Basically the whole structure of governance is still under construction.

24. Who enforces the agreements made in the charter of the social contract?

Bening: The laws in Rojava are enforced by the Asayish (police force) and by the courts that are present within the region. They work based on the charter of the social contract.

4.3.2 Interview Questions (concerning the actual social contract)

25. How does the PYD see the relation between the autonomous regions and the Syrian state? / Do

you intend to remain an integral part of Syria, or do they seek more independence?

Bengin: As a representative of Rojava I can tell you that we seek federalism within Syria, with high levels of autonomy; we want to live together with all on an equal base. We believe that all people are equal, and there should be equality before the law. The Syrian state keeps offering us future -solutions in which they are somehow benefiting only certain parts of society, and many opposition parties call for a strong too much religion in the public sphere. For us everybody should have the freedom to believe what he or she wants.

26. Will Rojava push for unilateral secession if necessary?

Bengin/Stein: As mentioned before, we seek federalism within Syria, not unilateral secession.But if the

Assad governments and the Islamist opposition keep suggesting conditions that are contradicting the charter of the social contract, and human equality in general than a federation will be very difficult to achieve. In other words: it depends on what the other parties have to offer to us.

27. Has Rojava so far been recognized by members of the international community?

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Bengin/Stein: We started the process of getting official recognition, but so far it is still only a process; however we do have good relations with the U.S and recently there has been some Russian military presence in the canton of Afrin too. Concerning the Dutch government, we have a permit to be here as the representatives of Rojava, but have no official recognition as a political entity yet.

28. The charter states that the Supreme Constitutional Court will rule upon the applicable law, based

on the best interest of the Autonomous Regions. What in your vision will happen if the principles

of the social contract contradict (Syrian) national law or human rights?

Bengin: Human rights come prior to the social contract, they cannot be violated, some parts of the

Syrian Law still apply, but they cannot contradict the charter of the social contract, in other words the charter comes prior to Syrian national law.

28a: Don’t you think that, that contradicts the whole idea of federalism? Should the national law in the

end be binding?

Bengin: We’ll, anything that contradicts the charter is not acceptable by us, and we cannot accept a government that wants to implement laws that only benefit one religious or ethnic group of society.

29. The function of the judicial council is not explicitly mentioned, can you tell me something about

the role of the judicial council?

Bengin: I cannot answer that question.

Questions concerning liberal municipalism & Participatory democracy

30. Within liberal municipalism, representative democracy is depicted as less democratic than

participatory democracy; can you explain a little more about this idea?

Stein: Democratic confederalism basically endorses the idea of participatory democracy, people that are actively involved in their livelihoods rather than electing a representative every 4 years. Politics should be conducted on the lowest level possible. Only if affairs cannot be managed within the commune they should be taken on the municipal level then on the cantonal level and then on the national level.

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31. If I’m correct, decisions in this ideology should be taken as close to the people as possible (on the

lowest possible level) in this case the commune. In theory I think this is a nice principle, but do you

think this is feasible in the long run? How will government deal with policy issues that cross

municipal/cantonal issues such as pollution, infrastructure, the army etc.? In other words is liberal

municipalism manageable in the long run?

Stein: Well, I think that concerning issues such as pollution, infrastructure there is of course the possibility that decisions will be taken more and more on higher levels, just like in any society I guess, but in principle the approach of liberal municipalism is bottom up, and not top –down.

Questions concerning postconflict reconstruction

1. In terms of foreign assistance what is the biggest necessity in Rojava?

Bengin: I think the biggest necessities in Rojava at the moment are food security and medicine, since we are still at war with Isis we need medicine to take care of our fighters.

2. In terms of foreign assistance who are the biggest donors and what do they provide you with?

Aside from the military aspect, there are a plenty of NGO’s present in Rojava, they take care mostly of education for the young people but al universities are being build.

3. Would you say that economic assistance is needed in Rojava? If so in what specific forms?

Stein: The economy is primarily more socialist than capitalist. The idea is self-. Within the region there are many cooperatives, where people come together to produce goods. In terms of economic assistance, I don’t know if they would want to have traditional economic aid, when it is contradicting the principles of the existing economy.

4. What about institutional development, if so, in what form would it best be suitable?

Bengin: education is very important for us, and of course we will need assistance in many ways, however, we do not want any other form of governance than the charter of the social contract.

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5. Do you think that peacekeeping is an option in Syria, after a ceasefire or agreement?

Appendix 7: Interview Ercan Ayboga (20 April 2017 – Skype)

1. Can you introduce yourself?

My name is Ercan Ayboga. I live in Germany but I am of Kurdish descent, I am an engineer by profession, but I have also been a political activist since I was 18. Recently I have travelled to Rojava since I am writing on the Kurdish question.

2. Can you explain me, the function of the Judicial counsel?

Failed to answer this question.

3. A previous interview indicated that several groups within society refused to take part in the social contract, can you explain who they were and what their objections where?

There is a political party called INKS that so far has refused to take part in any deliberation, they don’t want to take part in the social contract. They have several objections. First of all, in very general terms, ideologically they are more right wing compared to for instance the YPG which in general is centred on the left. I personally also believe that they are affiliated with the KRG, the Iraqi political party of Masood Barzani. The KRG since he seeks more influence within Rojava and detests the PKK, and in general dislikes the more left wing ideologies.

3a. what is the legal position of these people? They didn’t consent to the social contract in the first place, are they subject to the laws in the autonomous regions?

Yes, even though they haven’t consented they are subject to legislation, and can be arrested if they break the law, just like any other resident of the autonomous regions. We are still trying to involve these groups, but for now they don’t want to negotiate.

Retrospectively, reflecting on the process, what went wrong (in this case) and how would you say it should be done differently in a hypothetical next case?

Well, I would say that at least three factors made a difference. First, time was of the essence; The social contract of 2014 was basically set –up in a short period of time, let say three months and was not discussed within all layers of society as much as it should have been, it was rushed into existence. Second it should have been introduced into broader society, meaning we should have gone to the communes and communities directly to discuss the social contract more properly and extensively this would have increased its legitimacy.The existing structure where not used, communes and neighbourhoods where not included. Next time more people have to be

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included including all big political parties; this mechanism will work better in the end.

4. The charter of the social contract only shortly refers to the institutions on the lower level, and the legislative council is only mentioned on the national level, can you explain me something about daily live governance on the lower levels?

Yes I can, there is a legislative branch of governance on all levels, including the municipality. These are not discussed in the social contract edition of 2014 which is a little short.

5. What is the position of people with physical and mental impairments in the economy?

At the moment there is a lot of discussion going on about the socio – economic positions this segment of society, what I can say to you is that these people are included as much as possible in the cooperatives and in the economy in general as possible. For the people that cannot possibly contribute to the economy because of their physical and/or mental impairments we are trying to set up institutions and nursing houses.

6. The specific reason for this interview is that you recently went to Rojava to write about recent amendments that have been made, can you tell me more about this?

The social contract used in your thesis was set – up in 2014, since then there several amendments have been made. This has to do with both the ongoing war, and some developments on the domestic level. In 2014 governance within Rojava was revered to as Democratic self- administration of which the social contract was the foundation. Recently the name has changes to the Democratic federation of north Syria. The city of has been included in the system of governance and in the new system there are seven levels of governance.

1. Northern federation of Syria, 2. Cantons/Regions 3. Districts 4. Municipalities 5. Cities 6. Neighbourhoods 7. Communes

A legislative and an executive within the new system will be present on all government levels. This time a lot of communes, communities, neighbourhood where approached and the amendments have been discussed more extensively then the initial contract.

7. Is Rojava being recognized by members of the international community at the moment?

Well, we are currently engaging in the process, we are talking to different members of the international community on different levels, including countries in the EU, Russia and the United 89 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

States. In some countries we have opened offices. We have let’s say not been, fully recognised by any countries, but we are half way, so to say.

8. Do you think that peacekeeping is an option for Syria, after a peace agreement?

Perhaps in some areas, where there has been intense fighting between different groups of society and trust has been damaged, it will definitely take a long time to heal all the wounds that where created. In those areas perhaps peacekeeping would be an option. But on the national level I don’t see it happening.

9. Concerning postconflict reconstruction, what is the biggest necessity in Rojava?

I would say that the most important thing is that the embargo that was imposed against us by Barzani should be lifted. Second, maybe even more important, there are a lot of refugees in Rojava. The quality of life for these people is really low, support is needed for them, I would say mostly in the form of medicine, tests. Third, I believe that the Turkish army has to stop bombing Rojava.

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Appendix 8: Interview Robert Lowe (May 08th – via email)

1. In public discourse, the PYD denies any ideological, political or military affiliation with the PKK, do you believe this is a reliable statement or is it more a matter of political marketing?

The PYD acknowledges strong fraternal ties to the PKK and is very open about sharing the ideology of the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan.It also acknowledges that individual PKK members have supported the Kurdish struggle in Syria. The PYD does deny that it is subservient to the PKK. Whether this is correct is open to debate but it is clear that the PYD makes this claim so as to increase international support for Rojava.

2. Has Rojava (so far) received any full diplomatic recognition by any members of the international community? Or would you expect this to happen in the near future?

Full diplomatic recognition is not relevant because Rojava does not claim to be independent. To my knowledge no state supports Rojava’s claim to autonomy, indeed most oppose it because they favour the indivisibility of Syria’s territory and have to consider their relations with Turkey.

3. In case the PYD consolidates its military capabilities within Rojava, would you expect a military confrontation with the Turkish army? (considering the fact that Russia has recently moved some personnel to Afrin, and the U.S military presence in other parts of Rojava. What would Turkey’s response likely be?

There is currently a sporadic military confrontation between the Turkish army and the YPG with fairly regular incidents of shelling. It is possible this will escalate but I think Turkey will be cautious about embarking on all-out war for fear of angering its allies who see the Kurds value in fighting IS.

4. The charter of the social contract states that Rojava wants to remain a part of an integral Syria, and does not seek independence. Do you believe this is a likely scenario?

I don’t believe that Rojava seeks independence from Syria as this is simply not a viable state. I think Kurds seek an autonomous settlement within Syria which guarantees their linguistic, cultural, political and economic rights at the same level as other Syrian citizens.

5. Civil wars often have the tendency to repeat themselves within a decade (conflict trap theory), the major factors underlying these dynamics are said to be low economic growth and a previous violent conflict. Syria has suffered immensely economically and clearly has seen plenty of violence in the past 6 years. Do you believe that after a foreseeable peace treaty in the near future, Syria will remain stable for a long time?

It is hard to be optimistic about future stability in Syria given the scale and trauma of the war and there are few signs that the various parties are ready to make the concessions required for peace.

6. In other words, will we see a peace Kurdistan on the world’s political map let’s say, in the next 20 years?

I’m not certain of the question’s meaning, but if an independent Kurdistan appears in the next 20 years, it would be the Kurdish region of Iraq. I don’t think the state would be any larger than this.

7. My thesis mostly evolves around the charter of the social contract (2014), previous interviews have shown that several parts of society have not consented with the social contract so far. This according to the interviewees is mostly attributable to an alleged affiliated with the KRG in Iraq, who allegedly seeks a different economic model in Rojava/seeks more influence. Would you say this is a plausible statement?

Yes, there is a clear divide in the Syrian Kurdish movement between the PYD and the other older Kurdish nationalist parties who are generally aligned with the Kurdish parties in Iraq and do not support the ideas and practices of Abdullah Ocalan. 91 | “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy” – Rojava’s social contract

8. The charter of the social contract clearly describes a separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. Would you say that governance in Rojava roughly fits the (minimal) definition of being democratic?

I think it is too early to make this assessment. The social contract and other documents contain encouraging and progressive ideas but there are many flaws in the structure of Rojava’s institutions and in the implementation of these ideas.

9. In terms of postconflict assistance, what do you believe are the biggest necessities in Rojava? (Economic aid, medicine, institutions, etc.).

Health care, food, improved supplies of electricity and water, infrastructure, education, local government.

Appendix 8: Interview Sinam Mohammed

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