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R A  Containing Shiite : The Battle for Stability in

Ranj Alaaldin The is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars.

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III

Containing Shiite Militias: The Battle for Stability in Iraq Ranj Alaaldin1

The liberation of is complete. The so- the Badr ), and his deputy, Abu Mahdi called Islamic State (ISIS) is unlikely to govern al-Muhandis (the head of Kataib ). and control large swaths of territory any time They have functioned with autonomy over soon. However, while there are reasons to the past decade with considerable resources celebrate, the end of the so-called and patronage from their sponsors in , does not mean the end of ISIS and militancy in and they have also capitalized on Sistani’s call Iraq. To make the liberation of Mosul count, the to arms to sustain, legitimize, and consolidate Iraqi government and its allies will now have to their presence. take on the more difficult long-term challenge of reconstructing the country and reconciling International organizations have accused its communities and political factions. One Iraq’s Shiite militias of committing sectarian particular challenge that could complicate atrocities and human rights abuses.2 Many such efforts is the ascendancy of Shiite have fought both Western forces groups, which could soon use their popular and the in the past. Along with support to radically alter the political map of their sectarian discourse, and the substantial the country. support they receive from , these militias have exacerbated sectarian tensions between Many of Iraq’s Shiite militias mobilized in Iraq’s Arab Sunnis and Shiites, which response to Grand Ali al-Sistani’s groups like ISIS have exploited to swell their fatwa that called on all able-bodied ranks. Shiite militias have also concerned to defend their country when the Iraqi army other sections of Iraqi society. This includes collapsed and Mosul fell to ISIS in June 2014. the , who have been engaged with the An umbrella militia organization known as the militias in a series of skirmishes in key disputed “Hashd al-Shaabi,” or Popular Mobilization territories, as well as those components of the Forces (PMF), was established in response. Shiite community that do not want Iraq to be On the surface, the PMF constitutes a state- dominated by unaccountable armed groups. sanctioned organization that reports to the federal government, but in practice, it is Reformist politicians, including Prime Minister dominated by Iran-aligned, pre-existing militia Haidar al-Abadi, have criticized militias that groups such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib operate independently of the state and have Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and called on them to disarm. However, these the Badr Brigade. These actors constitute the calls have been met with fierce resistance from spearhead of the organization and report to the militia factions, which have threatened its de facto leader, Hadi al-Amiri (the head of to reorganize independently if the institution

1 Ranj Alaaldin is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center (BDC). His research focuses on militia groups in Iraq and , govern- ance, state-building, and post-conflict reconstruction in the MENA region. The author would like to thank Adel Abdel Ghafar, Nader Kabbani, and Firas Masri at the BDC for their support and feedback. The author would also like to gratefully acknowledge the support he has received from the BDC communications team, in particular Bahaa Omran, Sumaya Attia, and Francoise Freifer. 2 See for example , “Iraq: Ban Abusive Militias from Mosul Operation,” July 31, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/ news/2016/07/31/iraq-ban-abusive-militias-mosul-operation; Jeffrey Gettleman, “Bound, Blindfolded and Dead: The Face of Revenge in ,” New York Times, March 26, 2006; , “Absolute Impunity, Militia Rule in Iraq,” October 2014, https://www. amnesty.org.uk/files/absolute_impunity_iraq_report.pdf.

1 of the PMF is disbanded.3 Disarming and elections in 2009 and 2010. Therefore, the demobilizing Shiite militia groups is challenging ascendancy of Shiite militia groups (and their and complicated, not only because of their vast Iranian patrons) is not irresistible. Reversing numbers, autonomy, financial resources and their prominence once again requires a holistic arms, but also because of their support bases— approach and a greater appreciation of the due to their significant overlap and interactions complex web of interpersonal and inter- with the Iraqi state and society. organizational links that shape Iraq’s Shiite community. This policy briefing calls for a What compounds the challenge even further three-pronged strategy focused on helping is that Iran-aligned Shiite militias have already Iraqis reduce the space in which Shiite militias established themselves as quasi versions of operate by establishing an environment and ’s Hezbollah, having enjoyed the space culture of accountability. to do so as a result of the fragility of the Iraqi state and society over the past decade. In other First, the should shift its resources words, they have established themselves as away from the Iraqi state—specifically its socio-cultural movements that have political class—and recalibrate its policies and social welfare wings and that operate toward the grassroots communal dynamics of independently of the state. Conversely, they the Shiite community. Moreover, the United have not yet amassed the same power and States should empower the array of state-aligned authority as their Lebanese counterparts. militias, tribes, and clerical figures whose Moreover, the PMF was institutionalized into political and ideological alignments, as well the Iraqi state only recently and now functions as their day-to-day interactions and discourse, parallel to a much weaker Iraqi military. This are characterized by pluralistic values and could result in Iraq elevating the PMF into hostility to Iranian interference. These actors its own version of the Iranian Revolutionary have been misunderstood and unappreciated Guards Council (IRGC). Therefore, it is by policymakers, but they display far-reaching not too late to either resolve the problem of influence and moral authority within the Shiite autonomous Shiite militias or, at least, contain community, which should be utilized. them in the coming years. Second, the United States should use its Iraq’s Shiite militias were once pushed to influence to ensure international resources are the margins after the Iraqi state and its directed toward Iraqi NGOs, humanitarian institutions—particularly its armed forces— organizations, and civil-society actors, which became more effective. With substantial U.S. generally have greater reach and credibility military support, the country was stabilized than international organizations. These local between 2008-2011, rendering Shiite militias actors are better positioned to nudge armed an unnecessary force. The militias were groups into respecting human rights and thereafter derided for their general lawlessness adopting basic international norms, but they and for committing human rights abuses. have received insufficient investment and The entities that aligned themselves with Iran remain vulnerable to becoming political fronts were punished at the provincial and national for corrupt elites.4

3 United States Institute of Peace, “Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi on U.S. Ties, with ISIS,” March 20, 2017, https://www.usip.org/events/ iraqi-prime-minister-abadi-us-ties-war-isis; “Iraqi PM Haider al-Abadi Compares Shiite Militias to ISIS: We Did Not Fight the Baath Re- gime Only to be Ruled by Gangs,” MEMRI TV, May 20, 2017, https://www.memri.org/tv/iraqi-pm-abadi-slams-shiite-militias; Hayder al-Khoei, Post, July 8, 2017, https://twitter.com/Hayder_alKhoei/status/883461859717894145. 4 For studies on this, see Oliver Kaplan, “Nudging Armed Groups: How Civilians Transmit Norms of Protection,” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development (December 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.cw.

2 Containing Shiite militias: The Battle for Stability in Iraq Finally, Shiite militias may have battlefield From this environment emerged Mohammed experience, but they are ill-equipped to engage Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, the founder of in governance and administration. In the the that , under the event that Shiite militia factions fail to deliver leadership of his son Muqtada, constitutes security and services to local communities, Iraq’s most powerful socio-political movement. their popular support would diminish— Sadeq al-Sadr galvanized the Shiite underclass as it did in the past—at which point other and provided them with an outlet for their institutions must seize the opportunity and political and economic grievances. Many of the provide an alternative to their constituents. fighters that comprise the Shiite militia groups This requires helping the federal government today were teenagers or young men during establish pluralistic, non-sectarian institutions this period. Sadeq al-Sadr mobilized these and investing more in outward looking, communities on the basis of his fierce Iraqi conciliatory politicians like Prime Minister al- nationalist sentiments, as well as anti-Western, Abadi. Through empowering security forces and even anti-Iran discourse.6 such as Iraq’s elite, U.S.-trained special forces (known as the Golden ), the United When the Iraqi state collapsed after 2003, the States can also ensure that Iraq’s conventional vast Sadrist network filled the vacuum. Sadeq armed forces do not become an ancillary force, al-Sadr had already established a powerful which will limit the space for Iran-aligned communal element to Shiite mobilization that militias to operate. combined religious zeal with a militant, Shiite- centric form of . In addition to Yesterday’s Shiite Activists Become Today’s providing advice and counseling to the destitute, Militias Sadeq al-Sadr sent emissaries to all Shiite areas of Iraq. To complement this existing socio- In contrast to the intellectual, ecumenical, cultural and religious network, after 2003 the and Islamic revivalist outlook that inspired Sadrist movement, led by Muqtada, formally Iraq’s older generation of Shiite activists, it is established “Jaysh al-Mahdi,” the Mahdi the 1990s period of violence and destitution Army, later renamed the Peace Brigade. When that shapes the collective memory and political communities needed protection, services, and consciousness of today’s militia groups. As the leadership, the Sadrist movement stepped in. Baath regime became more brutal during the The organization established offices and local course of its rule, the mold of the typical Iraqi patrols, and provided social and religious

Shiite activist became increasingly 49radical. The services to its constituents in Baghdad, most 47 47 Baath regime’s brutal suppression of the 1991 notably in the slums of . 32 Shiite uprising the systematic killing of tens of thousands of Shiites. Shiite shrines, centers The Rise of the Militias of learning, or “hawzat,” and communities were decimated. According to witnesses, In the immediate aftermath of the 2003 war, were painted with the slogan, “No Shiites after two militia organizations dominated Iraq: the today,” people were hung from electric poles, Badr Brigade and the Mahdi Army. The former and tanks towed bodies in the streets.5 Extreme was established during the Iran-, during poverty and repression followed the uprising. which it mobilized Iraqi prisoners of war and

5 John Kifner, “After the War; Iraqi Refugees Tell U.S. Soldiers of Brutal Repression of Rebellion,” New York Times, March 28, 1991, http:// www.nytimes.com/1991/03/28/world/after-the-war-iraqi-refugees-tell-us-soldiers-of-brutal-repression-of-rebellion.html. 6 Nicholas Krohley, The Death of the Mehdi Army: The Rise, Fall, and Revival of Iraq’s Most Powerful Militia (London: C Hurst & Co, 2015).

3 drew support from Iraqi refugees who had to the Sadrist leadership.8 After clashes with the fled to Iran. Initially led by officers from the coalition, as well as , came IRGC, it later came under Iraqi leadership. As the opportunity for these factions to acquire the former armed wing of the Islamic Supreme their own support bases at the local level, their Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Badr Brigade has own resources, and a willing patron in Iran. also benefited from integration into the post- This ultimately led to these groups acquiring 2003 political order, even cooperating with sufficient confidence and resources to splinter coalition forces. The organization continues to from the Sadrist organization. Nowhere else control Iraq’s largest institution, the Interior has this had a more far-reaching impact than Ministry, and the 37,000-strong Federal in Baghdad, the Sadrists’ most powerful Police. Therefore, it has demonstrated greater constituency, where Shiite militias fought a experience and discipline than the Mahdi bloody, full-scale sectarian civil war after the Army.7 February 2006 bombing of the al-Askariya Mosque, a sacred Shiite shrine.9 Previously, In contrast, the Sadrist movement and its the movement was bound to Sadeq al-Sadr. militia wing, the Mahdi Army, spawned a series However, the breakdown of the state and of ill-disciplined and unaccountable militia sectarian conflict altered the lines of authority groups into Iraqi society. The organization among the Shiite underclass, unleashing, was unprepared for its growing responsibility. by 2007, multiple armed, battle-hardened, While the Mahdi Army swelled its ranks with and autonomous militia groups into Iraqi more supporters and fighters during the course society that no longer answered to the Sadrist of the U.S. occupation, especially after sectarian leadership. conflict intensified and frustrations grew, its discipline and organizational capacity were Multiple Identities tested and burdened by local administration and its confrontations with competing forces. Various Shiite militias have emerged in different The socio-economic background of the Sadrist circumstances. The Badr Brigade is arguably base also meant that the organization’s members Iraq’s most powerful militia since it commands were less inclined (or qualified) to engage in more active frontline fighters than any other governance. militia. It demonstrates the complexities that define Iraq’s Shiite militia groups. The Badr The Sadrist movement was mobilized around Brigade is integrated into the Iraqi state but Muqtada al-Sadr’s leadership, but it was still it can also operate autonomously. It engages heavily decentralized in the way it operated. It with the international community, cooperating was a vast, grass-roots organization that, over militarily with the United States, while also the course of the U.S. occupation, became maintaining strong ties to Iran. shaped by autonomous and battle-hardened Shiite militia factions within the organization Conversely, militias such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, who became increasingly assertive and disloyal Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada and others may be

7 PMF official, interview with the author, Baghdad, January 22, 2017; President Fuad Masum, interview with the author, Baghdad, January 22, 2017. 8 Krohley, The Death of the Mehdi Army; Marisa Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/fragmentation-sadrist-movement. 9 The conflict claimed the lives of 34,452. Estimates put the number of Arab Sunnis killed by Shiite militias at 1,000 per month. See Sabrina Tavernise, “U.N. Puts ’06 Death Toll in Iraq Above 34,000,” New York Times, January 16, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/16/ world/middleeast/16cnd-iraq.html; Toby Dodge, “UK Written Evidence,” November 10, 2009, http://www.iraqinquiry.org. uk/media/95834/2009-11-10-Submission-Dodge.pdf.

4 Containing Shiite militias: The Battle for Stability in Iraq described as opportunistic actors that have Since Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa in June 2014, exploited the chaos and vacuum left by the fall of three categories of militias have amalgamated the former regime. With Iranian support, these under the banner of the PMF: Iran-aligned groups have vehemently resisted the Iraqi state, militias, state-aligned militias, and “rebellious” as well as the United States and its coalition militias, which is how Iraqis describe the Sadrist allies. Their ideological outlook is founded on movement’s Peace , because of their Shiite supremacism and combatting Western refusal to submit to the federal government, imperialism. The aforementioned organizations the religious establishment, and Iran.12 The splintered from pre-exiting militias groups; state-aligned militias were only established for example, both Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada after Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa in 2014. and Sayyid al-Shuhada are led by former Known as the religious establishment or members of the Badr Brigade, while Asaib Ahl “Sistani militias,” they are managed by the holy al-Haq constitutes an offshoot of the Sadrist shrines—controlled by Sistani—and include movement. These groups were established, the Imam Ali Brigade, Ali al-Akbar Brigade, empowered, and entrenched by Iran after 2003 and the Abbas Division. Sistani enjoys a large to exploit state fragility and sectarian conflict. following within the PMF and commands Unlike the Badr Brigade, these actors are all respect across the ethnic and religious uncompromisingly averse to working and spectrum. Like Sistani, the fighters of these engaging with the United States. groups oppose Iranian encroachment into Iraqi affairs.13 Their commanders refuse to Unsurprisingly, the plethora of groups has meet with Iranian officials and advisors, unless resulted in multiple clashes and rivalries among other Iraqi officials are present, concurrently the militias. Muqtada al-Sadr, who orientated refusing direct Iranian military support.14 Both his organization around Iraqi nationalistic the Ashura Brigades and the Peace Brigades sentiments, has derided the Iran-aligned interact daily and coordinate closely with the militias. He has attacked Asaib Ahl al-Haq religious establishment militias.15 for being beholden to Iranian interests, and dismisses their claim that they are part of the Almost every militia group in Iraq asserts its Sadr legacy because of their loyalty to Iran. In legitimacy and popular base, and describes itself line with the true political outlook of his father as a socio-cultural or socio-political movement, and his followers, Muqtada’s supporters chanted challenging any suggestion that they are militias. anti-Iran slogans and stormed the offices of the Indeed, Iraqi officials expressed concern that Dawa Party, ISCI, and the Badr Brigade when militias will eventually transform themselves they protested against the government in May into socio-cultural actors and integrated 2016.10 The Sadrists joined forces with long- components of the political system that will time rival ISCI—which commands the Ashura continue to weaken the Iraqi state from within. Brigades—to attack “brazen militias,” who were For example, despite its violent history, over not under the command of the Iraqi army.11 the past decade Asaib Ahl al-Haq has projected

10 Saif Hameed and Aref Mohammed, “Iraqi Cleric Sadr Asks Followers to Stop Attacks on Rivals’ Offices,” , June 11, 2016, http:// www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-sadr-idUSKCN0YX0DX. For the Badr-Sadr rivalry, see Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge,” February 7, 2008, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/iraq- s-civil-war-sadrists-and-surge. 11 Loveday Morris and Mustafa Salim, “Iraqi Shiite Cleric Recalls Militiamen from Fight Against Islamic State,” Washington Post, Feb- ruary 17, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqi-shiite-cleric-recalls-militiamen-from-fight-against-islamic- state/2015/02/17/9e85321a-b6bb-11e4-bc30-a4e75503948a_story.html?utm_term=.3ebd6de31397. 12 Representative of the Ashura Brigades, interview with author, Baghdad, January 2017. 13 PMF official, interview with author, Baghdad, January 2017. 14 Member of the religious establishment, interview with the author, Baghdad, January 2017. 15 ISCI official, interview with the author, Baghdad, January 2017. 5 itself as a socio-cultural movement engaged community, their propaganda regularly incites in the practice of state building.16 Its leader, violence.19 Such narratives remain central to Qais al-Khazali, led attacks on Western targets. their identity, making it unlikely that they can Renowned as a protégé of Sadeq al-Sadr, he build the pluralistic, non-sectarian ties with led the Sadrist movement while in hiding after different sections of the Iraqi society which al-Sadr’s assassination by the Baath regime in are necessary to reduce the space that enables 1999.17 Since its inception in 2006, Asaib Ahl groups like ISIS. al-Haq has evolved into a nascent movement with its own social and religious activities. It Recommendations has offices in Baghdad and throughout the Shiite south. It produces publications and is Containing, rather than eliminating the aligned with members of the , as part of militas its intellectual outreach to different sections of the Shiite population.18 The group has adopted Shiite militias in Iraq cannot be militarily epistemological leanings in an effort to broaden defeated. In fact, international intervention its intellectual appeal to different strata of the could lead to more costs for the fragile Iraqi Shiite community. state. Iraqis confess that there is little choice other than to accept and work with the militias Many militias assert that they champion Sadeq even though they function autonomously al-Sadr’s legacy in an attempt to historicize of, and challenge, the state. They have faith their claims to legitimacy, but they will actually in the capacity of existing institutions and struggle to develop beyond criminal gangs. socio-cultural dynamics to contain malevolent In any event, the challenge for Iraqis and for militia groups. The recently passed PMF law international policymakers is in reducing the is seen—by both officials and state-aligned space that eventually allows both militia gangs militia groups—as a means of regulating their and Iranian proxies to make the transition into presence.20 integrated components of the Iraqi political system. In addition to their lawlessness, those Moreover, alliances among different groups’ vision for the future of Iraq and components of the Shiite community and ideological outlook are problematic. Iran- the different Shiite militias can shift. The aligned militias within the PMF such as Asaib problem is, therefore, a dynamic one. To forge Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, and Kataib a strategy that confronts Iraq’s Shiite militias, Sayyid al-Shuhada are able to historicize it is first important to reframe the challenge and legitimize their existence, and may not as one of dealing with Iranian proxies or even plausibly argue they are socio-cultural criminal gangs, but as one of engaging Shiite movements. Regardless, in addition to their communal grassroots dynamics. Containing human rights abuses and record of violence, the destructive behavior of Shiite militia their populist and violent sectarian discourse groups, including their human rights abuses, enables the space for militant groups like refusal to submit to government or civilian ISIS. Away from the glare of the international oversight, sectarian discourse, and challenges

16 Advisor to Prime Minister al-Abadi, interview with the author, Baghdad, January 2017; advisor to the Iraqi president, interview with the author, Baghdad, January 2017; Ranj Alaaldin, “Iran’s Interference is Nothing New,” , December 31, 2009, https://www. theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/dec/31/iran-iraq-hostages-moore. 17 Asaib Ahl al-Haq representative, interview with the author, London, December 2016. PMF official, interview. 18 Ibid. See also Asaib ahl al-Haq’s social media presence. 19 “Shia Militia Leader Vows ‘Revenge for Hussein’ in Mosul Battle,” Middle East Eye, October 14, 2016, http://www.middleeasteye.net/ news/shia-militia-leader-describes-campaign-liberate-mosul-revenge-hussein-1867945098. 20 ISCI official, interview with author, Baghdad.

6 Containing Shiite militias: The Battle for Stability in Iraq to the Iraqi state, requires interaction with, and the substantial differences and divisions within investment in, the socio-cultural environment the organization by working more closely of these militias. with and emboldening actors whose political and ideological alignments, interactions, and Any strategy for dealing with Iraq’s Shiite discourse, are grounded in pluralistic, non- militias must also consider Iran’s role. Iran has sectarian values. Even if these actors do not enjoyed a largely uncontested space in Iraq become integrated into the armed forces in since the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Its Shiite their entirety, they provide an opportunity to militia proxies act as a button and a buffer: a create leverage that remains noticeably absent. button that Iran can press to indirectly confront and intimidate those actors that threaten State-aligned militias constitute the majority of its interests, and a buffer that allows Iran to the fighters within the PMF. To ensure that these distance itself from these proxies when they fighters do not shift toward the Iran-aligned commit human rights abuses and engage in groups, the United States and the international criminal activities, lest it becomes accountable community can provide political and financial for their actions. Despite this, Iran’s influence support to the religious establishment and is reversible.21 state-aligned militia groups. Appropriate training and support will allow them to match It is an irony that large numbers of the the discipline of their rivals. These groups must traditionally Sadrist base now fight for Iran- be equipped with the capacity to match the aligned militia groups. These are people that more sophisticated propaganda output of their were once mobilized on the basis of the fierce Iran-aligned counterparts. Enhancing their Iraqi nationalist values espoused by Sadeq al- capacity to engage more effectively with the Sadr, who challenged Iran during his sermons, Iraqi population will enhance their capacity to while at the same time, provided the Baath project their conciliatory and Iraqi nationalist regime with a unifying that could discourse and to leverage the powerful, far- mobilize the Arab consciousness of Iraq’s reaching symbolism of Ayatollah Sistani. Shiite community against what it framed Their Iran-aligned rivals have a strategy that as alien Persian Shiism. When the rank and appropriates cultural space, as much as it does file of these groups become more hostile to Iraq’s institutions.23 Left unchallenged, Iran- Iranian interference, as they were historically, aligned factions will harness the political and militia leaders will also become less inclined to symbolic power of the PMF in their efforts to associate themselves with Iran. mold the fabric of Iraqi society.

Focus on communal, intra-Shiite dynamics Similarly, the Sadrist movement has a violent history with the United States; however, Since 2003, Iraq’s Shiite militias have been Muqtada al-Sadr is receptive to engaging with fierce rivals.22 While the PMF may refer to all the international community. He maintains Shiite militia groups, the concept means very strong ties to key U.S. allies in the , little in reality. It is not too late to capitalize on who see his movement as a bulwark against

21 Ranj Alaaldin, “Iran’s Weak Grip: How Much Control Does Tehran Have Over Shia Militias in Iraq?” Foreign Affairs, February 11, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2016-02-11/irans-weak-grip. 22 John F. Burns, “Precarious Cease-Fire in Amara Holds,” New York Times, October 22, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/world/ middleeast/22iraq.html; “Hizb- al-Iraqi yaqtahim mqraan lil-majlis al’aelaa fi al-” [Iraqi Hizbollah Breaks into Supreme Council .حزب-الله-العراقي-يقتحم-مقراً-للمجلس-األعىل-يف-البرصة/in Basra], al-Arabiya, May 11, 2015, http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/iraq/2015/05/11 html. 23 Hassan al-Shanoun, “Shiite Militias Prepare for Education ‘Revolution’ in Iraq,” al-Monitor, April 17, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/ pulse/originals/2017/04/university-iraq-cultural-revolution-pmu.html#ixzz4empnYkOg. 7 rising Iranian influence in Iraq. The Sadrists Empower Civil Society currently constitute a counter-weight to Iran- aligned groups, but fear losing support to Iraq has a civil society that could hold politicians organizations such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq. Yet, the and militias accountable and engineer the space Sadrists lack strategic nous good governance that enables change. As it stands, civil society capabilities and the ability to muster alliances in Iraq has been effective in mobilizing large with reformist actors that could, collectively, swaths of the population for against help translate recent protests in Iraq into public the government, but it can also be disorganized policy reforms.24 Helping the Sadrists through and ineffective when it comes to influencing capacity-building initiatives will remedy public policy and accountability. Civil-society these shortcomings and could be leveraged to actors, except those that are co-opted by counter malevolent actors, while also nudging political parties or form part of religious and the movement into accepting international family networks face political interference, norms and basic human rights. intimidation, and have weak fund-raising capabilities. Identify and empower agents of change Iraq’s NGOs, humanitarian organizations, and Empowering community leaders and investing other civil-society actors can sway armed groups in Iraq’s bottom-up politics challenges the into respecting human rights and adopting ability of corrupt elites and militant groups to basic international norms.25 The United States use civil society as patronage networks. Rather can use its international influence to help ensure than simply directing its resources and energy international resources empower local NGOs, toward the political class and the country’s charities, and other civil-society groups. Iraqi weak institutions, the international community organizations do not enjoy the same financial must appreciate that the battle for Iraq remains support that international organizations do rooted within Shiite communal networks. and complain about symbolic, rather than These communal networks are collectively effective assistance.26 comprised of economies worth hundreds of millions of dollars, which manage projects Nevertheless, international organizations have that are autonomous of the state. This includes legitimate grievances, such as government a vast network of charitable institutions that interference and ineffective implementation, receive funds through religious donations but conditionality and benchmarks can help from around the world. Since the emergence manage future assistance to the Baghdad of ISIS and the ensuing humanitarian crisis, government. However, this will not allay these institutions have used their status and concerns around security. The international wealth to provide sanctuary to internally community should consider establishing displaced persons, including people from Iraq’s special arrangements that see international different ethnic and religious minorities. These organizations protected by a combination of communal, grassroots actors are overlooked by international and local security forces, akin to policymakers as potential drivers of stability; the arrangements afforded to international oil yet they enjoy autonomy from the corrupt companies. This will also help strengthen the political class and command a loyal following, coordination between local and international which could help combat militancy. organizations.

24 Ranj Alaaldin, “Could Muqtada al-Sadr be the Best Hope for Iraq and the Region?” Markaz (blog), Brookings Institution, August 21, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/08/21/could-muqtada-al-sadr-be-the-best-hope-for-iraq-and-the-region/. 25 Kaplan, “Nudging Armed Groups.” 26 IRIN, “Local NGOs Appeal for More Financial Support,” July 24, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/news/2008/07/24/local-ngos-appeal- more-financial-support.

8 Containing Shiite militias: The Battle for Stability in Iraq Religious mobilization decentralization requires a capable government able to ensure it takes place in a regulated A fundamental aspect of Shiite political and meaningful manner.28 The local actors mobilization is the role of religion. Shiite conducting the business of governance must also activism in Iraq has historically been wedded to have the necessary legitimacy and administrative the Shiite clerical establishment. Shiite militias capacity. depend on the clerics for legitimacy, and have strived to align their discourse and intellectual The recommendations and analysis above do output with those of the seminaries. Religious not disregard the influence of Iraq’s institutions. sermons facilitate the dissemination of political The Iraqi government remains the only actor and social goals. The contestation that takes capable of shaping the country’s constitutional place within the seminaries of and and legal system. All Shiite militia groups believe is not too dissimilar from that unfolding within their political future lies within the Iraqi state. If the politics of Baghdad or on the battlefield. anything, Shiite militias seek to utilize the state and the benefits that come with sovereignty and The options available to outsiders are limited international recognition. It is not inevitable when it comes to attempting to shape the that these actors will shape the Iraqi state sensitive aspects of Shiite religious mobilization according to their own political and ideological and doctrinal thought. Despite this, the values and, therefore, establish a new political United States must still engage with the order. As it stands, the federal government lacks clerical community in coordination with its the credibility and capacity to stabilize Iraq. international allies. The United States must look at Shiite religious organization through While Shiite militia groups have one eye toward the prism of civic development. The Europeans, the coming local and national elections, their particularly the British, have greater reach political ascendancy will be short-lived if they within these communities and are regarded fail to deliver on security and governance or if as less hostile outside actors.27 The moderate Iraqis become inclined to back Prime Minister tribal, religious, and militia actors would al-Abadi, whose support increased off the back benefit if the international community added a of the . Where the Shiite religious component to its policies in Iraq, so militias fail, the Iraqi state must supplant them that political, military, and economic support with an organized and effective security force, appreciates the overlap and interaction between the capacity to deliver basic services and the politics and religion. ability to revive the country’s economy.

Revitalizing Iraq’s Institutions Resist Maliki’s Return

The above discussion may suggest that this Iraq will suffer if Prime Minister al-Abadi is policy briefing calls for decentralization and the replaced by the Maliki-led faction within his devolution of power away from Baghdad. The party, the . Aligned closely notion that the answer to Iraq’s problems lies with Iran, this faction has sought to undermine in decentralization is a common misperception al-Abadi since 2014. The collapse of the military harbored by Iraqi, as well as Western officials in 2014 and its mismanagement is attributed to and commentators. As others have noted, Maliki’s tenure in power. The former premier

27 President Masum, interview; member of the Shiite religious establishment, interview with the author, Baghdad, January 22, 2017. 28 Kenneth M. Pollack, “Iraq and a Policy Proposal for the Next Administration,” Brookings Institution, September 29, 2016, https://www. brookings.edu/research/iraq-a-policy-proposal-for-the-next-administration/.

9 is closely aligned with Asaib Ahl-Alhaq Division. These forces have won widespread and partnered with the group in the 2014 acclaim across Iraq’s ethnic and religious parliamentary elections. When the military spectrum. Its 10,000 fighters derived from collapsed in the immediate aftermath of the Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite Arab communites in 2014, Maliki empowered Asaib communities emerged as symbols of national Ahl-Alhaq and direct Iranian proxies such unity. Greater investment in this force could as Kataib Hezbollah and tasked them with breed national unity and alleviate ethnic and securing Baghdad. That led to an escalation in sectarian tensions in the long-run, as it would sectarian attacks and further raised sectarian embolden state-aligned forces while weakening tensions at a critical moment for the country.29 their Iran-aligned rivals.31 Combined with Maliki’s tarnished reputation, stemming from technical, military, and financial support, his authoritarian, polarizing, and sectarian an enhanced U.S. military presence will approach to governance means that his return challenge Iran’s projection of power in Iraq as prime minister, or that of someone from and its exploitation of Shiite fears of an ISIS his faction of the Dawa Party or his allies resurgence. among the Iran-aligned militia factions, must be strongly resisted by the Shiite political and Conclusion religious class. This policy briefing has identified policies that Presence equals power aim to help Iraqis help themselves. By shifting the focus to bottom-up, grassroots governance, Iran-aligned Shiite militias have concerned and capacity building, it has examined the Iraqis because of their ambitions to emulate avenues through which Shiite militias can be Iranian security apparatuses.30 While it may contained, and how the influence of armed have limited military leverage on the ground, groups can be reduced. Policymakers in the the United States can still create leverage. At United States and internationally must look to the very least, Iraq’s Iran-aligned militias and the actors who envisage and aim for pluralistic, their Iranian patrons must consider America’s non-sect institutions. This includes state- position in their calculations as they move aligned Shiite militias, even if they continue forward in Iraq. The political and symbolic to retain some autonomy from the state in the importance of America’s presence in Iraq near future. With international support, they and the region must not be understated. It can reduce the space in which their hostile reassures U.S. allies and Iraq’s Western-aligned counterparts operate. Simply isolating or factions—and those that are hostile to Iranian marginalizing these militias will bring more interference. In addition to maintaining problems than solutions. the current deployment of Western military personnel, there should be greater investment The Iraqi state and the conciliatory, composed in Iraq’s Counter- Service, the Golden rule of Prime Minister al-Abadi, along with

29 Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: Pro-Government Militias’ Trail of Death,” July 31, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/31/iraq-pro- government-militias-trail-death. 30 Hamza Hendawi and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, “Fears in Iraqi Government Army over Shiite Militias’ Power,” Military Times, March 21, 2016, http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2016/03/21/fears-iraqi-government-army-over-shiite-militias-power/82101226/. 31 David Witty, “The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service,” Brookings Institution, , 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ uploads/2016/06/David-Witty-Paper_Final_Web.pdf.

10 Containing Shiite militias: The Battle for Stability in Iraq other reformist and moderate actors within the political class, warrant greater support. It would be a grave mistake for the United States to reduce its support for Iraq, as some in Washington have suggested.32

Iraq will be presented with the twin threat of ISIS and Iran-aligned Shiite militias for the foreseeable future. While there are disgruntled voices in Washington and legitimate arguments based around Iraq’s inability to capitalize on international blood and treasure, it does not have to be business as usual. The United States has friends both at the bottom and the top that wish to establish a culture of accountability in Iraq, which includes respect for human rights and international norms.

32 , “America Needs a Post-ISIS Strategy,” Journal, , 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-needs-a-post- isis-strategy-1498688109.

11 About the Brookings Doha Center

stablished in 2008, the Brookings Doha Center (BDC) is an overseas center of the Brookings Institution Ein Washington, D.C. As a hub for Brookings scholarship in the region, the BDC advances high-quality, independent research and policy analysis on the Middle East and North Africa.

In pursuing its mission, the BDC undertakes field-oriented research and programming that addresses and informs regional and international policy discussions, engaging key elements of governments, businesses, civil society, the media, and academia on four key areas:

(i) The of the Middle East, emphasizing ties within the region as well as regional ties between the Middle East, the United States, and . (ii) Conflict and post-conflict transitions, including security, peace processes and reconstruction. (iii) Economic and fiscal strategies of Middle Eastern states, including the geopolitics and economics of energy. (iv) Governance and institutional reform, including democratization and state-citizen relations.

Open to a broad range of views, the BDC encourages a rich exchange of ideas between the Middle East and the global community. Since its founding, the BDC has hosted a number of leading scholars from a dozen different countries; put on a variety of events, including high-level roundtables, timely policy discussions, and the annual Doha Energy Forum; and published a series of influential Policy Briefings and Analysis Papers. Brookings Doha Center Publications

2017

Containing Shiite Militias: The Battle for Stability in Iraq Policy Briefing, Ranj Alaaldin

Supporting Indian Workers in the Gulf: What Delhi can do Policy Briefing, Kadira Pethiyagoda

Transitional Justice Policy in Authoritarian Contexts: The Case of Policy Briefing, Noha Aboueldahab

Grappling with : Assessing ’s Evolving Approach Analysis Paper, Beverley Milton-Edwards

Still in Ruins: Reviving the Stalled Reconstruction of Gaza Policy Briefing, Sultan Barakat and Firas Masri

Toward a Recalibration of EU-North Africa Relations Policy Briefing, Adel Abdel Ghafar

De-securitizing Counterterrorism in the Policy Briefing, Sahar Abdel Aziz

Entrepreneurship: An Engine for Job Creation and Inclusive Growth in the Arab World Policy Briefing, Bessma Momani

India-GCC Relations: Delhi’s Strategic Opportunity Analysis Paper, Kadira Pethiyagoda 2016

Equality and the Economy: Why the Arab World Should Employ More Women Policy Briefing, Bessma Momani

Educated but Unemployed: The Challenge Facing Egypt’s Youth Policy Briefing, Adel Abdel Ghafar

Risky Routes: Energy Transit in the Middle East Analysis Paper, Robin Mills

Jihadi Rivalry: The Islamic State Challenges al-Qaida Analysis Paper, Charles Lister