Religion and Conflict Case Study Series Iraq: Buttressing Peace with the Iraqi Inter-Religious Congress August 2013 © Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/resources/classroom 4 Abstract 5 This case study shines a light on the sectarian violence that overtook Iraq after the 2003 US-led invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein, and how religious 9 leaders gradually gained recognition as resources for the promotion of peace. This overview of the conflict addresses five main questions: What religious 11 factors contributed to insecurity in post-2003 Iraq? How did Coalition forces approach religious actors prior to 2006? How did governments interface with faith-based NGOs in pursuit of peace? What role did socioeconomic factors 14 play in exacerbating conflict? How did religious engagement intersect with the Sunni Awakening and the surge of Coalition troops in 2007? The case study includes a core text, a timeline of key events, a guide to relevant religious orga- nizations, and a list of further readings. 15 About this Case Study 17 This case study was crafted under the editorial direction of Eric Patterson, visiting assistant professor in the Department of Government and associate di- rector of the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at George- town University. This case study was made possible through the support of the Henry Luce Foundation and the Luce/SFS Program on Religion and International Affairs. 2 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — IRAQ Contents Introduction 4 Historical Background 5 Domestic Factors 9 International Factors 11 Religion and Socioeconomic Factors 12 Conclusion 14 Resources Key Events 15 Religious Organizations 17 Further Reading 19 Discussion Questions 21 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — IRAQ 3 Introduction While the US invasion of Iraq—and the insurgency that a shaky relationship with the United States. An analy- followed—touches on many aspects of religion’s role in sis of US and Coalition actions following the invasion conflict, one of the most significant but poorly under- of Iraq indicates the significance of both domestic and stood is how outreach to religious leaders contributed international religious factors, ranging from concerns to constraining sectarian violence. Following the 2003 over Iranian influence and Al-Qaeda’s attempted mobi- invasion, the United States initially relied on secular lization of Sunnis to American myopia regarding local Iraqi exiles like Ahmed Chalabi for political leadership, inter- and intrasectarian competition and violence. This who were marginalized and undermined by indigenous case study looks at the violent context of Iraq in 2007 religious forces and violent transnational networks. The and the important role that religious authorities, includ- Iraqi leadership that emerged over time did not include ing a faith-based NGO, and senior Iraqi clerics in the Sunni representation and was unable to contain Shi’a Iraqi Inter-Religious Congress, played in diminishing militias carrying out sectarian violence. Moreover, it had religiously inspired conflict. American soldiers guard a check point in Maxmur 4 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — IRAQ Historical Background While Iraq has been a center of Islamic civilization since me- formation to the United States in the run-up to the war. One dieval times, its existence as an independent political entity of its leaders, Ahmad Chalabi, was particularly involved in began in the early twentieth century. The area now known as talks with US policymakers, and some US politicians hoped Iraq included three primary groups, the majority Shi’a Arabs, to place Chalabi in a leadership role in Iraq after the inva- Kurds (who make up about a third of the country) and mi- sion. Chalabi helped to start the INC in 1992, and subse- nority Sunni Arabs. The area contains many important Shi’a quently established close ties with several US political figures, religious sites, but Baghdad was also the seat of the Abbasid especially Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense under Caliphate and thus has a degree of salience to both Sunnis George W. Bush. Chalabi was often touted as a key pro-de- and Shi’as. Tensions between Sunnis and Shi’as date back to mocracy force in a post-Hussein Iraq. The United States was the early days of Islam, but the two communities lived in also working with the two key Kurdish parties—the Kurdish relative peace through much of modern history, albeit with Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdis- some Sunni discrimination against the Shi’as. tan (PUK)—continuing a relationship that had been formed during US support for the no-fly zone over the Kurdish ter- The tenure of President Saddam Hussein (1979-2003) and ritory in the 1990s. his Ba’ath Party was characterized by the emergence of a re- pressive police state consciously modeled on that of Joseph There was some outreach to exile Shi’a leaders as well, in- Stalin. Following failed invasions of his neighbors Iran (Iran- cluding both secular figures like Iyad Allawi and religious Iraq War, 1980-1988) and Kuwait (Gulf War, 1990-1991), ones like Abdul Majid al-Khoei. Allawi was a member of the Hussein stepped up his repressive domestic activities in the Ba’ath Party who knew Saddam Hussein in the 1960s and 1990s, especially against the majority Shi’as and non-Arab 1970s, but broke with the party in the late 1970s and fled Kurds, which led the international community to institute the country. He formed the Iraqi National Accord, an exile no-fly zones in Iraq to limit the reach of Hussein’s military. group, which provided intelligence to Great Britain before In this context, Hussein began to explicitly appeal to reli- the 2003 invasion. Al-Khoei, also an exile, son of Ayatol- gious legitimacy in the 1990s, tying his rule to the legacy of lah Sayyid Abul Qasim Khoel—the supreme leader of Iraqi the Crusade-era hero Saladin. This included greater permis- Shi’a in the 1990s—lived in London since the Gulf War. He siveness regarding Shi’a religious activities. His rule ended in spent his time in exile focused on his charitable foundation 2003, with a US-led invasion that led to sectarian violence but maintained contacts with the United States. He was con- and a persistent insurgency in addition to the formal estab- vinced to return to Iraq after the invasion, and established a lishment of a parliamentary democracy by 2005. base in the Shi’a holy city of Najaf, but was killed shortly af- ter returning. Many believe that followers of rival Shi’a cleric In the lead-up to the US-led invasion in 2003, the United Muqtada al-Sadr—the son of a famous Shi’a leader assassi- States worked closely with Iraqi exiles in the hopes of devel- nated by Saddam Hussein—were responsible. oping a secular political force able to catalyze democratiza- tion in the country. The Iraqi National Congress (INC), an The provisional and interim Iraqi governments reflected this exile group with ties to the White House, provided some in- exile-oriented, generally secularist outreach. The US-run BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — IRAQ 5 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) set up a Governing leadership over the Iraqi Shi’a community among various Council made up of Iraqis. The council contained Shi’a, groups. One was the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revo- Sunni, and Kurdish representatives, but the United States lution in Iraq (SCIRI, now known as the Islamic Supreme chose the members, many of whom were exiles during the Council in Iraq), an Islamist group tied to Iran that is headed reign of Saddam Hussein. Under pressure from Grand Aya- by Abdelaziz al-Hakim; another is the Islamic Dawa Party, tollah Ali al-Sistani—the top scholar in the Najaf hawza, or which was supported by Iran and moved to that country Shi’a religious seminary—the CPA transferred power to an after earlier repression under Hussein. Despite their Iranian interim Iraqi government in 2004, which was set up un- ties, it attempted to distance itself from Iranian-style religious der the auspices of the United Nations. This interim gov- governance after the US invasion. Followers of al-Sistani also ernment, which restored Iraqi sovereignty, was intended to organized as a political grouping, as did those of Muqtada establish political institutions until parliamentary elections al-Sadr. Although he was not a high-ranking religious fig- could be held. Although this was semi-direct rule by Iraqis, ure, he leveraged his father’s legacy to lead a populist revolt its leadership again reflected the importance of Iraqi exiles in against both the established Shi’a groups and the Coalition- this period, with Allawi serving as prime minister. supported government. Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi Army, con- ducted many acts of violence against Coalition forces and These initial attempts at instituting political order in Iraq, Sunni communities. however, failed to gain widespread support, and correspond- ed with the rise of several insurgent groups among both the In sum, the Coalition’s approach to a post-invasion Iraq Sunnis and Shi’as, many of which used expressly religious was to demolish the structures of the Hussein era (military, themes and symbols, or aligned (in the Sunni case) with for- Ba’ath Party), reach out to primarily secular exile groups, and eign fighters of the Al-Qaeda network. While many of the create a secular, democratic government. The Coalition and Sunnis opposed to the government only refused to partici- the United States did not expect the complicated, violent, pate in the political process or accept its legitimacy, a good religiously-inspired conflicts that were to erupt across the number of them joined the various Sunni insurgent groups country.