The Iraqi Opposition's Evolution: from Conflict to Unity?

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The Iraqi Opposition's Evolution: from Conflict to Unity? THE IRAQI OPPOSITION’S EVOLUTION: FROM CONFLICT TO UNITY? By Robert G. Rabil* This article uses Iraqi documents to survey the relationship between the Iraqi opposition and the regime of Saddam Hussein. Both government and opposition have gone through different phases varying on such issues as cooperation, conflict, and degrees of repression. A key question is whether the opposition has reached a higher level of unity and both the determination and ability, with U.S. help, to develop a new democratic regime in the country. This article, based largely on official autonomy was secured in the north under Iraqi documents, reviews the relationship U.S. and UN sponsorship. between the Iraqi opposition and the At the same time, the opposition camp regime of Saddam Hussein.(1) It also gradually began to solve the historical tries to place the opposition’s evolution problem of its fragmentation due to and actions in the context of regional and rivalries and ideological differences. This international factors. Generally speaking, trend was accentuated following the the opposition went through four phases September 11 terrorist attacks on the since the current government took power United States. The Bush administration in 1968. made “regime change” in Iraq a high- During the first phase, from 1968 to priority objective. Suddenly, the 1980, opposition to the regime was opposition became the focus of the U.S. mainly local. Although Iran supported a efforts. The future of the opposition, and Kurdish rebellion, the regime was able to Iraq itself, will largely depend on whether suppress the opposition and solidify its the opposition will play a significant role own rule. The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) in removing Saddam and be able to heralded a new phase marking the institute a democratic and stable opposition’s shift from a local to a government if he falls. regional phenomenon. The regional countries, particularly Iran and Syria, SUPPRESSING THE OPPOSITION tried to control the opposition parties’ The Iraqi opposition is not the product agenda by developing patron-client of either the first or second Gulf Wars. relationships given their own interest in Throughout its modern history, Iraq has undermining Saddam Hussein’s power. had an active opposition and this has been The second Gulf war (1990-1991) and the especially true during the Ba’th party’s March 1991 uprisings by Kurds and rule over the country since 1968, and Shi’is after the regime’s defeat in Kuwait particularly after Saddam Hussein ushered in a new phase. During the next became president in 1979. Yet while decade, the opposition was transformed to opposition to Ba’th rule gathered an international phenomenon, letting the momentum, opposition forces were groups free themselves from the leverage plagued by fragmentation and disarray, of regional states. The Iraqi National partly due to the regime’s ruthless Congress was born and Kurdish Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002) 1 Robert G. Rabil suppression and its ability to exploit be in full enough control to break its internal dissent and rivalry. promise by then. During this period, the opposition In March 1974, Baghdad unilaterally consisted mainly of the Kurdish decreed an autonomy statute excluding movement led by the Kurdistan the oil-rich areas of Kirkuk, Khaneqin Democratic Party (KDP), the Iraqi and Jabal Sinjar from the Kurdish Communist Party, the Arab nationalists autonomous region, which would include and the Islamic movement, led by the only the three provinces (governates) of Da’wa party. It is noteworthy that the Irbil, Sulaimaniya and Dohuk. In line distribution of the opposition conformed with the new statute, the Ba’th regime to a great extent with the ethnic and undertook an administrative reform in sectarian division of the country, with the which the country’s sixteen governates Sunni Kurds in the north, the mainly were renamed and some had their Sunni nationalists in the center, and the boundaries altered. Of special Shi’a Islamists in the south. importance, the governate of Kirkuk was The deep structural changes brought divided and the area around its capital about by the post-1973 hike in oil city Kirkuk was renamed al-Ta’mim revenues and the Algiers agreement with (nationalization) governate after its the shah of Iran in 1975 allowed the boundaries were redrawn to give an Arab regime to deal the opposition camp severe majority. blows. Immediately after the Algiers As a result of the collapse of the agreement, the Kurdish rebellion Kurdish rebellion, the KDP split into two collapsed because Iran no longer backed main factions, the KDP-Provisional it. These events followed a pattern Command led by Idris and Masoud characterizing Kurdish-Iraq relations Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of since 1958. Each Iraqi government that Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani. came to power at first pursued peace talks The Iraqi regime embarked on a with the Kurds only to fight them at a campaign to “Arabize” the areas it had later date and assert its authority excluded from the autonomous region. throughout the country. This was also the Hundreds of Kurdish families were case with the Ba’th party government uprooted and Arabs from the south were taking power after the July 1968 coup. lured to move to the north. Subsequently, The new regime was pragmatic enough to in 1977-1978 the regime began to clear a seek political accommodations with the strip of land along its northern borders Kurds at a time it had not yet with Turkey and Iran, which was consolidated its rule. expanded several times until it was The government’s Revolutionary several few miles wide. Command Council (RCC), the highest Sharing a long mountainous border authority in the land, issued a manifesto with Iran, the governate of Sulaimaniya on March 11, 1970 essentially was deeply affected. Hundreds of villages recognizing the legitimacy of Kurdish were destroyed in this border clearance nationalism and guaranteeing Kurdish campaign. Their residents were forcibly participation in government. But it relocated to mujamma’at (complexes), avoided defining the territorial extent of crude resettlement camps, known also as Kurdistan pending a new census. Since “modern cities,” built near large towns or the next census was not scheduled until main highways under the army’s 1977, the regime felt confident it would complete control.(2) By the time Saddam Hussein became president in 1979, 2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002) The Iraqi Opposition's Evolution: From Conflict to Unity? Kurdish social and political life had been initiative as it ineluctably deferred to the very much affected by these measures. decisions of its regional supporters, who Army and intelligence units stationed tried not only to control them but also to throughout Iraqi Kurdistan continued to play off one party against another. control and oppress them. On November 12, 1980, two months Simultaneously, the regime continued after the war began, Damascus hosted the its persecution of Communist party inauguration of an alliance of opposition members and supporters. Upon his forces, the Democratic Patriotic and ascendancy to the presidency, Saddam National Front (DPNF). The DPNF Hussein orchestrated a bloody purge of included nationalist and Kurdish groups the Ba’th Party. By early 1980, the and the Iraqi Communist Party. However, regime focused on the Islamist the Arab nationalist parties (Arab opposition, after a number of grenade Socialist Movement, Socialist Party and attacks in Baghdad were blamed on the the pro-Syrian Ba’th Party) objected to Da’wa Party. Tens of thousands of people the inclusion of the KDP and supported were expelled to Iran on the pretext they the PUK, whose leader Talabani had were of “Iranian origin.”(3). Equally resided for several years in exile in Syria. significant, the RCC banned the Da’wa On November 28, another opposition Party and made membership in the party front, the Democratic Patriotic Front punishable by death.(4) (DPF), was established at the instigation of the Communist Party and included the THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND ITS KDP and the Kurdistan Socialist party. IMPACT ON THE OPPOSITION Throughout the 1980s, opposition forces With the onset of the Iran-Iraq War in were plagued by personal rivalries for September 1980, Baghdad’s campaign to leadership, institutional control, and suppress Kurdish political life had ideological differences. eventually foundered after so many army At this time, it was fairly difficult to units stationed in Iraqi Kurdistan were identify and assess the real strength of the sent to the front. The resurgent Kurdish various Islamist underground forces. But fighters, known as peshmerga (those who the regime’s ruthless clamp down on the face death), were quick to fill the security Da’wa Party indicated that it was the vacuum there. In addition, rejuvenated by strongest of the forces.(5) Among other the victory of the Islamic revolution in active groups at the time was the Iran, the Islamist opposition continued its Organization of Islamic Action. In a underground attacks on the regime’s move to close Shi’i ranks, Iran supported facilities and officials. However, unlike the creation of the Supreme Council for its Kurdish counterpart, the Islamist Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) in opposition failed to transform its November 1982. However, this is not to individual attacks into an armed struggle. say that Iran supported only Islamist The eruption of the Iran-Iraq War organizations. It also backed the two main marked a new phase in the development Kurdish parties, the KDP and the PUK, of the opposition. Iraq’s neighbors, though not equally. In the beginning of mainly Iran and Syria, began to support the 1980s, Iran extended substantive the opposition on a scale hitherto unseen.
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