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Country Reference Map For Humanitarian Purposes Only IRAQ Production date : 5 May 2015 Country Reference Map T U R K E Y Ibrahim Al-Khalil (Habour) Zakho Zakho Amedi Dahuk Amedi Mergasur Dahuk Sumel Dahuk Rabia Mergasur Soran Sumel Shikhan Akre Haji Omaran Shikhan Akre Soran Telafar Choman Tilkaif Tilkaif Choman Shaqlawa Telafar Shaqlawa Sinjar Mosul Hamdaniya Rania Pshdar Sinjar Hamdaniya Erbil Ranya Qalat Erbil Dizah SYRIA Ba'aj Koisnjaq Mosul Erbil Ninewa Koisnjaq Dokan Baneh Dokan Makhmur Sharbazher Ba'aj Chwarta Penjwin Dabes Makhmur Penjwin Hatra Dabes Kirkuk Sulaymaniyah Chamchamal Shirqat Kirkuk IRAN Sulaymaniyah Hatra Shirqat Hawiga Daquq Sulaymaniyah Kirkuk Halabja Hawiga Chamchamal Darbandihkan Daquq Halabja Halabja Darbandikhan Baiji Tooz Khourmato Kalar Tikrit Baiji Tooz Ru'ua Kifri Kalar Tikrit Ru'ua Ka'im Salah Daur Kifri Ka'im Ana Haditha Munthiriya al-Din Daur Khanaqin Samarra Samarra Ka'im Haditha Khanaqin Balad Khalis Diyala Thethar Muqdadiya Balad Ana Al-Dujayl Khalis Muqdadiya Ba`aqubah Mandali Fares Heet Heet Ba'quba Baladrooz Ramadi Falluja Baghdad J Ramadi Rutba Baghdad Badra O Baramadad Falluja Badra Anbar Suwaira Azezia Turaybil Azezia R Musayab Suwaira Musayab D Ain Mahawil Al-Tamur Kerbala Mahawil Wassit Rutba Hindiya Na'miya Kut Ali Kerbala Kut Al-Gharbi A Ain BabylonHilla Al-Tamur Hindiya Ali Hashimiya Na'maniya Al-Gharbi Hashimiya N Kerbala Hilla Diwaniya Hai Hai Kufa Afaq Kufa Diwaniya Amara Najaf Shamiya Afaq Manathera Amara Manathera Qadissiya Hamza Rifa'i Missan Shamiya Rifa'i Maimouna Kahla Mejar Kahla Al-Kabi Qal'at Hamza Rumaitha Saleh Rumaitha Maimouna Shatra Mejar Qal'at TARMIA Tarmia Ar'ar Shatra Al-Kabi Saleh Samawa Samawa Khidhir Thi-Qar Khidhir Najaf Nassriyah Nassriya Midaina Qurnah ADHAMIA Chibayish Baghdad Suq Midaina Najaf Suq Al-Shoyokh Qurna Al-Shoyokh Shatt Governorate Chibayish Al-Arab KADHIMIA THAWRA2 Basrah Basrah Shalamcheh THAWRA1 Salman Adhamiyah Shatt Al-Arab Thawra Kadhimiyah Basrah Zubair Abu City Al-Khaseeb Resafa Abu Abu 7 Nissan Al-Khaseeb Karkh Ghraib Mansour RESAFA ABU KARKH Karadah Muthanna Zubair Fao GHRAIB Salman Fao Rasheed MADA'IN Mada'in MAHMOUDIYA Mahmoudiya K SAUDI U Persian W Gulf ARABIA A I T Scale:1:2,000,000 Km 0 40 80 160 240 ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN Legend Data sources: TURKEY International Boundary : GADM Country Boundary Railway Administrationtive Boundary : OCHA -COD 17/07/2014 Lakes and Reservoirs: OCHA-COD CYPRUS SYRIA Governorate Boundary Primary Road Cities: OCHA-COD,OSM,Google Earth,Wikipedia. Roads: OCHA-COD LEBANON IRAN District Boundary Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 38N WEST River Contact : [email protected] BANK File: IRQ_MAP_Iraq_Reference_5May2015 ISRAELJORDAN Country Capital Lake / Reservoir EGYPT KUWAIT Note: Data, designations and boundaries contained on this map are not Governorate Capital warranted to be error-free and do not imply acceptance by the REACH partners, associated, donors mentioned on this map. SAUDI ARABIA Major Cities Urban Area (Baghdad) BAHRAIN QATAR Border Crossing.
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