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The Syrian Civil War a New Stage, but Is It the Final One?

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The Syrian Civil War a New Stage, but Is It the Final One? THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR A NEW STAGE, BUT IS IT THE FINAL ONE? ROBERT S. FORD APRIL 2019 POLICY PAPER 2019-8 CONTENTS * SUMMARY * 1 INTRODUCTION * 3 BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT, 2011-14 * 4 DYNAMICS OF THE WAR, 2015-18 * 11 FAILED NEGOTIATIONS * 14 BRINGING THE CONFLICT TO A CLOSE * 18 CONCLUSION © The Middle East Institute The Middle East Institute 1319 18th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036 SUMMARY Eight years on, the Syrian civil war is finally winding down. The government of Bashar al-Assad has largely won, but the cost has been steep. The economy is shattered, there are more than 5 million Syrian refugees abroad, and the government lacks the resources to rebuild. Any chance that the Syrian opposition could compel the regime to negotiate a national unity government that limited or ended Assad’s role collapsed with the entry of the Russian military in mid- 2015 and the Obama administration’s decision not to counter-escalate. The country remains divided into three zones, each in the hands of a different group and supported by foreign forces. The first, under government control with backing from Iran and Russia, encompasses much of the country, and all of its major cities. The second, in the east, is in the hands of a Kurdish-Arab force backed by the U.S. The third, in the northwest, is under Turkish control, with a mix of opposition forces dominated by Islamic extremists. The Syrian government will not accept partition and is ultimately likely to reassert its control in the eastern and northwestern zones. INTRODUCTION from ISIS. The pending American withdrawal, initially announced by President Donald Trump at the end The Syrian civil war is winding down, and of 2018, has forced the Syrian Kurdish President Bashar al-Assad’s government leadership to negotiate with the Assad has largely won. Assad will remain government about the redeployment in power for the foreseeable future. of Syrian forces in eastern Syria after Meanwhile, the Trump administration U.S. forces depart. After the eventual has extolled the capture of the final American withdrawal, the Syrian portion of ISIS-controlled territory in government will begin to reassert southeastern Syria by American special control there as well, working in uneasy forces with their Arab-Kurdish allies, conjunction with the Syrian Kurdish in March 2019. The downfall of ISIS in and local Arab militias that helped the eastern Syria did not, however, resolve Americans fight ISIS. the broader Syrian conflict. The Syrian government and its allies will The patchwork of control that not accept partition of the country and predominated for the first part of the will continue pushing to reassert central conflict now has consolidated to three government control over the zones zones. In the first, Assad’s government, now in Turkish and American hands. bolstered by vital aid from Iran and Final resolution of the Syrian conflict Russia, controls most of the country and will require negotiations over the future its key population centers in western of those zones. These negotiations will Syria. It aims to reassert its authority over cover the terms under which the Syrian the two remaining portions of the country government reasserts its authority still controlled by opposition forces and will involve Russia, Turkey, the operating with foreign military backing. Syrian government, and Syrian armed In northwestern Syria, Turkish troops opposition groups. This process could oversee uneasy ceasefires between take years. In the meantime, there will opposition forces dominated by Islamic be intermittent fighting and violence, extremists and the Syrian government. It albeit at a far more limited scale and is likely that Syrian forces (with Russian scope than what Syria experienced help) will launch an operation to regain in the first years of the war. While the control of this opposition-held pocket of Damascus government is within reach Idlib in northwestern Syria, causing yet of recapturing all pre-uprising Syrian more refugee suffering. territories, it lacks resources to rebuild In eastern Syria, a reduced American the shattered economy. For many ground force, backed by an American no- years ahead the country will face the fly zone, enables a mixed Kurdish-Arab enormous challenge of rebuilding, group to administer territories captured aggravated by Western sanctions and 1 MAP OF SYRIA Map of Syria (Earthstar Geographics | Esri, HERE, Garmin) TIMELINE 2011 March Anti-government protests begin in Daraa and violence soon escalates July Founding of the Free Syrian Army and beginning of armed rebellion 2012 April-May Failure of the Annan peace plan, escalation into full-fledged civil war 2014 June ISIS declares caliphate in Iraq and Syria 2015 September Russia carries out first air strikes in support of the regime 2016 December Fall of rebel-held Aleppo to regime forces 2017 October ISIS loses Raqqa in battle against the Syrian Democratic Forces 2018 December Trump announces withdrawal of US troops from Syria 2019 March Destruction of ISIS’s territorial caliphate, fall of Barghouz 2 a scarcity of funding for reconstruction, as escalated with tanks, artillery, and aircraft. well as occasional extremist attacks. As a The fighting spread to encompass nearly result, most of the 5 million Syrian refugees the entirety of the country in the ensuing will have little incentive to return home, months. The nature of the conflict changed and Syria will remain a weakened state. as well, becoming a battle not only for accountability but for absolute power. The BEGINNING OF THE fight also became markedly more sectarian CONFLICT, 2011-14 with a growing presence of Sunni extremists fighting alongside the more moderate Encouraged by the success of popular elements of the opposition. After initial protest movements in Tunisia and Egypt, gains in 2012, the armed opposition, short hundreds of thousands of Syrians began of supplies and money, lost momentum demonstrating across their country in and a stalemate ensued. Shifts in control of March 2011, demanding an end to abuses territories between the armed opposition among the security forces and government and the Syrian government were marginal corruption. Apart from a few instances of between 2013 and 2015. violence, the majority of protests were Western governments, shocked at the peaceful. The Syrian government quickly scale of bloodshed and fearful of growing responded with arrests and shootings, extremist elements in the Syrian opposition, resulting in an escalation of violence. urged negotiation of a transitional national While the draconian response to the unity government. Along with Turkey and protests that started in Daraa in 2011 was a few Gulf states, they provided limited the spark that ignited the conflict, other material aid to client groups among the factors also contributed to the country’s armed opposition in order to press the Assad descent into civil war. The contagion government to come to the negotiating effects of the Arab Spring revolts in Tunisia table. Meanwhile, Iran mobilized tens of and Egypt were the proximate cause of thousands of foreign Shi’a militiamen to the Syrian civil war. Discontent about the fight on behalf of the Assad government. government’s response to the drought that In 2015, the Russian air force began flying beset Syria from 2006-10 was an underlying combat air support missions to help cause as well. This manifested in protests President Assad’s fragile forces. in shantytowns outside Damascus and The Western mantra starting in 2011 that other cities in the spring and summer of there was no military solution to the Syrian 2011. Poor economic circumstances among conflict was wrong, as it only made sense climate refugees in shantytowns around if one side’s escalation in the war was big cities made protests more likely. matched by escalation on the other side. By autumn 2011, insurgents had seized The Americans and allies opposed to Assad whole neighborhoods of several towns declined to match the Iranian and Russian and cities. The Syrian government further escalations and the military balance steadily 3 shifted in favor of the Assad government. The Syrian government depends heavily The American strategy of resolving the on help from its allies and has signaled that Syrian conflict through negotiations Russian and Iranian forces will remain in without applying some kind of persuasive Syria over the long term. Damascus retains military pressure on Damascus failed badly. some agency; it has occasionally, gingerly, Instead, the Assad government, with help resisted Russian pressure to be more from militia forces mobilized by Iranian and forthcoming on humanitarian aid deliveries Russian air support, gradually recaptured and confidence-building measures. It has all of western Syria through punishing also publicly rebuked Iran for taking too military assaults against weakened armed much credit for battlefield successes. opposition groups. Washington didn’t care; The government is strong enough on the in late 2014, American attention had shifted battlefield that the opposition cannot away from a transition government in remove it, but its manpower resources are Damascus to ISIS, which had seized control exhausted and its finances in tatters. The of all of eastern Syria and western Iraq. government’s desperate search for more fighting men empowered local warlords DYNAMICS OF THE who, while nominally loyal to Damascus, WAR, 2015-18 led commanders and fighters who were little more than irregulars exploiting THE SYRIAN neighborhoods they control for money and plunder. GOVERNMENT IN The Syrian government war machine has WESTERN SYRIA largely prevailed in western and southern Syria with Russian and Iranian help. The Syrian government has been the main Damascus, with Moscow’s backing, has protagonist since the beginning of the concluded many local “reconciliation” deals conflict. It has enjoyed a relatively unified that were, in fact, rebel surrenders. The command structure and still to this day government’s hold on the major population functions as a state, although the long fight centers of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, has weakened it substantially.
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