Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics The Kurdish Question in the Middle Panorama East: Regional Dynamics and Return to National Control Olivier Grojean its influence in Iran (via the PJAK), in Syria (via the Lecturer in Political Science PYD and its SDF, which now control numerous The European Centre for Sociology and Political Kurdish and Arab territories) and even in Iraq, near Science (CESSP), University of Paris I-Panthéon- Mont Qandil where it is based, but also in the Sorbonne and National Center for Scientific Research Maxmûr Kurdish refugee camp in Turkey and the (CNRS), Paris Yazidi regions of Sinjar. In sum, the past few dec- Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics ades have seen a rise in power of Kurdish political parties, which have managed to profoundly region- The past four decades have seen an increasing re- alize the Kurdish question by allying themselves with gionalization of the Kurdish question on the Middle regional or global powers. At once both the life- East scale. The Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq blood and consequence of this regionalization, the War (1980-1988), the 1991 Gulf War and its con- rivalry between the conservative, liberal pole em- sequences throughout the 1990s, US intervention bodied by Barzani’s PDK and the post-Marxist revo- in Iraq in 2003, the Syrian revolution and its repres- lutionary pole embodied by the PKK has led to sion as of 2011 and finally, the increasing power of greater interconnection of Kurdish issues in differ- 265 the Islamic State as of 2014 have been important ent countries. vectors for the expansion of Kurdish issues. There has likewise been a diversification and strengthen- ing of non-state actors, and in particular, political A Halt to the Regionalization of the Kurdish parties on the regional level. Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Question? Syria, who, since 1923, seek to maintain “the status quo, which consists of collectively combatting Kurd- However, the most recent events have called these ish dissent,”1 have been obliged to deal with the in- dynamics into question. In Turkey, the resumption of terventionism of the US and international organiza- the armed struggle between the PKK and the Turk- tions, whose promoters had neither anticipated nor ish Army – after a ceasefire that had been observed planned the consequences of the 1991 Gulf War. by both sides but that only led to sham negotiations Hence, for instance, the Iraqi Kurds, through the in- beginning in 2013 – has led to a re-nationalization of termediary of the PDK and the UPK,2 progressively the Kurdish issue after 2015, heightened by the gained autonomy from Baghdad after the establish- massive repression following the failed July 2016 ment of the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel, to coup. In Iraq, Masoud Barzani’s hopes for independ- 2018 the point where they formed a federated autono- ence have been crushed by the lack of international mous state within Iraq after 2005. By the same to- support and the central government’s reaction after ken, the threats of US intervention in Iraq led the the referendum on self-determination in September PKK – originally from Turkey but having its rear- 2017 that led to the loss of Kirkuk. In Syria, despite guard in Syria, then in Iraqi Kurdistan – to create the first local elections organized by the PYD and sister organizations that have allowed it to expand held that same month, the territorial defeat of the Is- Mediterranean Yearbook 1 BOZARSLAN, Hamit. La question kurde. États et minorités au Moyen-Orient. Paris: Presses de Science Po, 1997, p. 312. Med. Med. 2 See the list of abbreviations and acronyms and their expansions in the box in this article. Translator’s Note. IE lamic State allowed Turkey to take control of the re- regions and growing local tensions are vectors for gion of Afrin (one of the three Kurdish enclaves in new mobilizations. Panorama Syria, having the consent of Russia and the United States) in March 2018, demonstrating that state ac- tors in the region still had the means to rally or to op- The Kurds in Their Respective Countries pose the major powers and contain these dynamics of regionalization. Finally, in Iran, the end of the In Iraq, the Mosul victory against the Islamic State armed struggle of the PJAK (2004-2011) coinciding has effectively allowed the central government to with the onset of the Syrian uprising, as well as intra- regain ground in vast territories, in particular Sunni Kurdish political rivalries (between the PDKI, the areas. The regional Kurdish government, which had Komala and the PJAK) and the diplomatic influence granted itself greater autonomy than established in of the Iranian government in Iraq and Syria (via the the 2005 constitution and had taken control of cer- Shiite militias and Lebanese Hezbollah) seems to tain ‘disputed areas’ in 2014, such as the city of have kept Iranian Kurdistan (at least for the time be- Kirkuk, has had its perspectives cut short by a ing) from the regional dynamics of the Kurdish issue. blockade from Baghdad after the September 2017 Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics independence referendum. This redeployment of the central government in the northern region of the The past few decades have seen a country, particularly in the ‘disputed areas,’ usually characterized by ethnic and confessional diversity, rise in power of Kurdish political however, has been carried out thanks to local militia parties, which have managed to elites co-opted by the large national Shiite parties, profoundly regionalize the Kurdish in other words, a model unlikely to ease relations question by allying themselves with between the State and populations, and which could also “foster the return of an organized armed regional or global powers 3 266 resistance.” The victory of Moqtada al-Sadr (a Shi- ite nationalist) in the May 2018 legislative elections, and his plans of alliance with the pro-Iranian Shiite It thus seems that government entities are regaining Hadi al-Ameri (head of the national militia organiza- ground in the Middle East; that the Kurdish parties tion, Badr) will probably not do much to improve were too optimistic in banking on the collapse of the these dynamics, nor will it allow a cooling down of states in the region and on the support they could relations with the Kurds. After a number of protests mobilize on the international level. But though we against the ‘traditional’ political parties in December are witnessing an ebb in regional party dynamics, 2017, the population of Kurdistan still managed to nothing would indicate that the states have again send 58 MPs (out of 320) to the Iraqi Parliament in become ‘strong’, capable of legitimizing their power May, that is, only four less than in the preceding leg- in all areas considered under their control. In fact, islature. But the parties are more divided than ever, domestic unrest (protests against the Erdoğan re- and disputed, and the economic crisis weighs heav- gime in Turkey, the civil wars still underway in Iraq ily on these political challenges, with the not-en- and Syria, economic crisis in Iran, heightened by the tirely-resolved matter of the share of the national US’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal), socially budget allocated to the KRG and the chronic pow- 2018 and geographically localized, limit countries’ room erlessness of the Iraqi political institutions. The for manoeuvre, incapable of containing this diversi- population could also organize outside of parties to fication of political actors and their cross-border, struggle for their economic and political survival, transnational connections. The defeat of the Islamic above all if intercommunity clashes take place in State does not mean the end of History in Kurdish Kirkuk or other ‘disputed areas’. Mediterranean Yearbook 3 QUESNAY, Arthur, “Retour de l’État et concurrence milicienne dans le nord de l’Irak,” Noria, 10 May 2018, URL: www.noria-research.com/ retour-etat-concurrence-milicienne-nord-irak/. See also AL-RACHID, Loulouwa. “L’Irak après l’État islamique. Une victoire qui change tout ?,” Med. Med. IE Les notes de l’IFRI, July 2017, URL: www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/al-rachid_irak_apres_etat_islamique_2017.pdf. By the same token, in Syria, Russian and above all party then won the November 2015 early legislative Iranian support (through Hezbollah) have allowed elections. A few months later, repression of the July the Bashar al-Assad Regime to consolidate its pow- 2016 failed coup was directed against sympathizers Panorama er: whereas the Syrian government probably con- of Fetullah Gülenmais and against anyone criticizing trolled less than 20% of the territory, by the end of the government’s massive repression, whether they September 2015, it controlled over 60%. On their were union leaders, university students… or pro- part, the Kurds, who were enjoying unprecedented Kurdish sympathizers. Finally, the April 2017 consti- international enthusiasm and had calmly organized tutional referendum granted the President new, in- the first local elections in September and Decem- flated powers thanks to its multiple irregularities and ber 2017, had to back down before the Turkish forc- completed the transformation of the Turkish parlia- es in Afrin and withdraw from the majority Arab city mentary regime into a presidentialist one: early gen- of Manbij after negotiations between Russia, the eral elections (legislative and presidential) to be held United States and Turkey. In any case, it remains to in June 2018, called just after Turkish intervention in be seen whether the pro-Turkish forces will be able Afrin, aim to lend Erdoğan full powers for the next to hold Afrin in the long term, given that abuses five to ten years. However, as demonstrated by the against the population, in particular against the Gezi Park movement in 2013, this model is far from Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics Yezidis, have been regularly reported since March satisfying to all Turkish citizens, a significant number 2018.