termediary of the PDK and the UPK, the and PDK the of termediary in the through , Iraqi the instance, for Hence, 1991 the of War. Gulf consequences the planned nor anticipated neither had promoters whose tions, terventionism of the US and international organiza ish dissent,” quo, which consists of collectively combatting Kurd- status “the 1923, to since maintain who, seek , Turkey, and level. Iraq regional the on Iran, parties political particular, in and actors, non-state of ing has likewise been a diversification and strengthen There issues. Kurdish of expansion the for vectors 2014 of as State Islamic important the have been 2011 of of as power sion increasing the finally, and repres its and revolution Syrian the 2003, in Iraq in intervention 1990s, US the throughout sequences War (1980-1988), 1991 the con War its and Gulf Iran-Iraq the and Revolution Iranian The scale. East Middle the on question Kurdish the of gionalization re increasing an have seen decades four past The (CNRS), Paris Sorbonne andNationalCenterforScientificResearch Science (CESSP), UniversityofParis I-Panthéon- The EuropeanCentreforSociologyandPolitical Lecturer inPolitical Science Olivier Grojean Control National East: Regional and Dynamics Return to The Kurdish Question in the Middle Politics & Strategic Sectors |Security 2 1 sister organizations that have allowed it to expand to it expand have allowed that organizations sister – to create Kurdistan Iraqi in then Syria, in guard – originally from TurkeyPKK but having its rear- the led Iraq in intervention US of threats the ken, to same the By 2005. after Iraq within state mous autono afederated formed they where point the to parallel, 36th the of north zone no-fly the of ment establish the after Baghdad from autonomy gained See the list of abbreviations and acronyms and their expansions in the box in this article. Translator’s Note. Translator’s article. this in box the in expansions their and acronyms and abbreviations of list the See B ozar s lan La question kurde. États et minorités au Moyen-Orient au minorités et États kurde. question La , Hamit. 1 have been obliged to deal with the in the with to deal obliged have been 2 progressively progressively ------held that same month, the territorial defeat of the Is the of defeat territorial the month, same that held and PYD by the organized elections local first the despite Syria, In 2017 Kirkuk. of to loss the led that the referendum on self-determination in September after reaction government’s central the and support international of lack by the crushed have been ence independ for hopes Barzani’s Masoud Iraq, In coup. 2016 July failed the following repression massive 2015, after by the issue heightened Kurdish the of 2013 in tobeginning are-nationalization led –has negotiations to sham led only that but sides by both observed been had that aceasefire –after Army ish Turk the and PKK the between struggle armed the Turkey, In of into resumption question. the dynamics these have events called However, recent most the Question? Kurdish the of Regionalization the to A Halt countries. ent differ in issues Kurdish of interconnection greater to led has PKK by the embodied pole lutionary revo post-Marxist the and PDK by Barzani’s bodied betweenrivalry the conservative, liberal pole em the regionalization, this of consequence and blood life the both At once powers. global or regional with themselves by allying question Kurdish the alize region to profoundly have managed which parties, political Kurdish of power in arise have seen ades few dec past the sum, In Sinjar. of Yazidi regions Turkey in camp the and refugee Kurdish Maxmûr the in also but based, is it where Qandil Mont near Iraq, even in and territories) Arab and Kurdish numerous SDF, now control its and which PYD (via (via the PJAK), Syria the in Iran in influence its . Paris: Presses de Science Po, 1997, Po, 312. p. Science de Presses . Paris: ------

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2018 265 Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics Panorama IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2018 266 Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics Panorama State does not mean the end of History in Kurdish Kurdish in History of end the mean not does State Islamic the of defeat The connections. transnational cross-border, their and actors political of fication for manoeuvre, incapable of containing this diversi- and geographically localized, limit countries’ room socially deal), nuclear Iran the from US’s withdrawal and economic Syria, crisis in heightened Iran, by the Iraq in Turkey, underway in still gime wars civil the retour-etat-concurrence-milicienne-nord-irak/ Les notes de l’IFRI domestic unrest (protests against the Erdo fact, In control. their under considered areas all in power their legitimizing of ‘strong’, capable become have again states the that indicate would nothing dynamics, party regional in ebb an witnessing are we though But level. international the on mobilize could they support the on and region the in states the of collapse the on banking in too optimistic were parties Kurdish the that East; Middle the in ground regaining are entities government that seems thus It regional or global powers question by allying themselves with profoundly regionalize the Kurdish which haveparties, managed to rise in power of Kurdish political few past The have decades seen a issue. Kurdish the of dynamics regional the from ing) be time the for (at least Kurdistan have Iranian kept to seems Hezbollah) Lebanese and militias Shiite (via the Syria and Iraq in government Iranian the of influence diplomatic the PJAK) and the and Komala the PDKI, the (between rivalries political Kurdish intra- as well as uprising, Syrian the of onset the with PJAK the of (2004-2011) struggle armed coinciding the of end the Iran, in Finally, regionalization. of dynamics these contain and powers major the pose to or op to rally means the had still region the in tors ac state that 2018,States) March in demonstrating United the and Russia of consent the having Syria, in enclaves Kurdish (one three the of Afrin of gion Turkey re the of allowed State control tolamic take 3

Q ue s nay , Arthur, “Retour de l’État et concurrence milicienne dans le nord de l’Irak,” Noria l’Irak,” de nord le dans milicienne concurrence et l’État de “Retour , Arthur, , July 2017,, July www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/al-rachid_irak_apres_etat_islamique_2017.pdf URL: . See also also . See A ğ l - an re an R achid - - - - - ?,” tout change qui victoire Une islamique. l’État après “L’Irak , Loulouwa. resistance.” armed organized an of return the “foster also could which and populations, and State the between relations to ease unlikely amodel words, other in parties, Shiite national large by the co-opted elites militia to local thanks out carried however, been has characterized by ethnic and confessional diversity, incountry, the ‘disputed particularly areas,’ usually the of region northern the in government central the independence referendum. This redeployment of 2017 September the after Baghdad from blockade by a short cut perspectives its had has Kirkuk, 2014, in of areas’ city the ‘disputed as tain such cer of control taken had and constitution 2005 the in established than autonomy greater itself granted had which government, Kurdish regional The areas. Sunni particular in territories, vast in ground regain to government central the allowed effectively has State Islamic the against victory Mosul the Iraq, In Countries Respective in Their Kurds The new mobilizations. for vectors are tensions local growing and regions Kirkuk or other ‘disputed areas’. ‘disputed other or Kirkuk in place take clashes intercommunity if all above survival, political and economic their for struggle to parties of outside organize also could population The institutions. political Iraqi the of erlessness pow chronic the and to KRG the allocated budget national the of share the of matter tirely-resolved not-en the with challenges, political these on ily and disputed, and the economic crisis weighs heav ever, than divided more are parties the But islature. leg preceding the in than less four only May, is, that in (out 320) of Parliament MPs 58 send to Iraqi the 2017, to managed still Kurdistan of population the December in parties political ‘traditional’ the against protests of anumber After Kurds. the with relations of down acooling allow it will nor dynamics, these to improve much do not probably Badr) will tion, organiza militia national the of (head al-Ameri Hadi Shiite pro-Iranian the with alliance of plans his and ite nationalist) in the May 2018 legislative elections, 3 The victory of Moqtada al-Sadr (a Shi al-Sadr Moqtada of victory The , 10 May 2018, URL: www.noria-research.com/ , 10 2018, URL: May . ------rity theme and by repressing the HDP, the Erdo by repressing and theme rity secu the of coattails the Riding PKK. the with war Turkey) in of resumption voted party the was most second the became HDP the and majority absolute its lost (the AKP strategy this of failure the of quence conse HDP. direct party, The pro-Kurdish legal the votes for traditionally which country the of area south-east the votes from Kurdish by obtaining ity 2017. December in reopened to be 2005, since running Qam Hasakê- the even allowed has conditions, difficult extremely under done being is it because slow very is which Reconstruction, Cantons. (Jazira) Cizîrê contributing to institutionalizing the Kobanî and territory, Syrian 25% the of to control continue SDF the and 2018. YPG/YPJ the PYD, the Moreover, Yezidis, have been regularly reportedsince March against the against the population, in particular abuses that given term, long the in Afrin to hold able be pro-Turkish will the forces whether seen be to Turkey. remains and it States United case, any In the Russia, between negotiations after Manbij of city Arab majority the from withdraw and Afrin in es 2017,ber Turkish forc the before down to back had the first local elections in September and Decem organized calmly had and enthusiasm international unprecedented enjoying were who Kurds, the part, their On 2015, over 60%. September controlled it of end by the territory, the of 20% than less trolled con probably government Syrian the whereas er: pow its to consolidate Regime al-Assad Bashar the have allowed (through Hezbollah) support Iranian all above and Russian Syria, in token, same the By 4 President Erdo rilla emerged. In the June 2015 legislative elections, since 1984, particularly issue, guer when the PKK Kurdish by the affected Turkey, equally In are politics crucial actors in the Syrian conflict. still are States), Kurds United the the for region gic astrate not (which was Afrin of Turkish invasion the following protest international little the despite fact, In area. Syria’s north-east stabilizing in States ed Unit by the held interest the of and Rojava, of zation autonomi real the of signs revealing also are forces, al-Assad to Bashar the PYD the –links operation even co- –or non-aggression of pact tactical tacit, Bulletin de Bulletin et liaison d’information de kurde l’Institut de Paris iş 4 Growing tension with the regime, while a while regime, the with tension Growing lo-al-Yaarubiyah rail line, which had not been been not had which lo-al-Yaarubiyah line, rail ğ an wished to consolidate his major his to consolidate wished an ğ an’s an’s , No. 393, December 2017, 3. December p. 393, , No. ------ruption economic and risky very management. Twitter), –on –‘enough’ cor ‘tamam’ hashtag the of pression, his ‘dictatorial’ inclinations (cf. spread of whom denouncing are increasingly Erdo satisfying to all Turkish citizens, a significant number 2013, from in far is movement Park model this Gezi by the However, demonstrated as to years. ten five Teheran. Victims of an unprecedented economic cri economic unprecedented an of Teheran. Victims with 2017 relations May Kurdish changed not has in re-election Rohani’s Hassan Iran, in finally, And action. new to undertake guerrilla the have incited PKK the against Iraq in intervention of threats since especially temporary, but be could question Kurdish Kurds... Turkey’s In short, ‘renationalization’ of the the against fight the than other vision a strategic to have seems longer no Turkish government the al-Assad, Bashar of departure the for aiming officially still while Russia with close increasingly becoming Syria, in Kurds the West regarding the with odds aNATO at but posture: member rupturist to its due the credit it had namely gained in the 2000s, early Turkey lost likewise scale, has international the On actorscrucial in the Syrian conflict the United States), the Kurds are still (which was not astrategic region for following the Turkish invasion of Afrin Despite the little international protest Afrin, aim to lend Erdo to lend aim Afrin, in Turkish intervention 2018, after June just in called eral elections (legislative and presidential) to be held gen one: early into apresidentialist regime mentary Turkish parlia the of transformation the completed and irregularities multiple to its thanks powers flated new, in President the granted referendum tutional 2017 April the Finally, consti sympathizers. Kurdish were union university leaders, students… or pro- the government’s massive repression, whether they of Fetullah Gülenmais and against anyone criticizing sympathizers against 2016 directed was coup failed July the of later, Afew months repression elections. 2015 November the won legislative then early party ğ an full powers for the next next the for powers full an ğ an’s re an’s ------

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2018 267 Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics Panorama IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2018 268 Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics Panorama AKP Text in the Cited Abbreviations for renewed regionalization. catalyst apowerful today as emerges State, lamic Is the of defeat the with diminishing from far Syria, Turkey, in and tension Iraq Iran, political and social growing the But manoeuvring. for margin states en giv and parties political Kurdish strengthened both has vision, long-term of devoid but conflict Syrian the in decisive Russia, or US the as such powers al internation of action The control. national under ing to be areturn and dynamics regional between tion mo pendular of to a sort subject is Kurdistan Thus, manoeuvring and given statesparties margin for strengthened Kurdish political international powers both has under national control. action The of anddynamics areturn to being pendular motion between regional Kurdistan issubject of to asort pletely suppress these solidarities. cross-border to com Teheran’s revealed inability also Kurds Afrin the of 2018, support in protests February In more. action their to coordinate trying are parties Kurdish different the since and regime the against struggle ments arise after the decision PDKI’s to heighten the repression. Especially since these protest move the Kurdish remains mobilized society despite the 2018 June and that May in demonstrate began that movement demanding the be re-opened borders 2017ber 2018 strike the as January well and as Decem in protests political and social numerous the However, dynamics. regionalization the from lined side- to have been seem Kurds Iranian the Kurdistan, Iraqi with border the of closing by the aggravated sis opment Party, a conservative Islamic party. The The party. Islamic a conservative Party, opment : Adaletve Kalk Adaletve ı nma Partisi, Justice and Devel and Justice ------UPK PYD PJAK PKK PDKI PDK YPJ HDP SDF YPG KRG Komala September 2003 in Syria. in created to PKK the organization sister Party, Iran. in 2004 April in created to PKK the organization sister Party, Life Free Ni Abdullah Öcalan until his arrest in 1999. in arrest his until Öcalan Abdullah 1978 in founded Party, Turkey in ers’ by led and 1945. 1945. in founded Kurdistan, Iranian of Party cratic erendum. 2017 September the until KRG the of ref ident Pres Barzani, Masoud then by Mustafa first led 1946 in Iraq in and founded Party, Democratic Kurdistan. 1969 in founded Iranian in matkeshani Kurdistani Iran PKK). (pro- YPG the of counterpart female the Syria, in PYD the of branch armed female the Units, (pro-PKK). Syria in PYD the of branch armed the Units, constitution, dominated by Barzani’s PDK. by Barzani’s dominated constitution, Iraqi 2005 by the established government mous Iranian Kurdistan ( 2014. since level key, national the on active Tur of party pro-Kurdish legal the Party, ocratic lin in 2017). in lin to 2014 2005 from Ber in died President who Talabani Iraqi (the by former Jalal founded 1975 in splitting and PDK Barzani’s from Recep Tayyip Erdo Turkey, of Republic the of President the of party PKK). Kurdish, Arab and Assyrian groups (pro-PYD/ 2015, late of since and, consisting YPG the Demokratîk : : ( : : : : : Patriotic Union of Kurdistan ( Kurdistan of Union : Patriotic : : Kurdistan Regional Government, an autono an Government, Regional : Kurdistan Yekîneyên Parastina Jin : : Partiya YekîtiyaPartiya , Democratic Demokrat Union Yekîneyên Parastina Gel ş Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan Halklar Partiya Jiyana a Azad Kurdistanê timanîya Kurdistan Partîya Demokrata Kurdistanê Demokrata Partîya Partîya Demokrata Kurdistanê Iran Demokrata Partîya : Revolutionary Workers’ Organization of of Workers’ Organization : Revolutionary ı n Demokratik Partisi n Demokratik , HSD), a military coalition led by led coalition , HSD), amilitary ğ Komalay Shoreshgeri Zah an. , YNK), a splinter party party asplinter , YNK), , Women’s Protection , Women’s Protection , People’s Protection , People’s Protection ), an organization organization ), an , Kurdistan Work , Kurdistan , Peoples’ Dem Hêzên Sûriya Sûriya Hêzên , Kurdistan , Kurdistan , Kurdistan , Kurdistan , Demo Yekîtîya Yekîtîya ------