Assessing the Post–July 15 Turkish Military

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ 2019 ■ PN59

Assessing the Post–July 15 Turkish Military

Operations Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch METIN GURCAN

Since the July 15, 2016, military uprising in Turkey, many have speculated on how this event, and the purges and reforms that followed, has reshaped the operational effectiveness of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). Yet so far, no analytical piece relying on primary sources and on-the-ground insights has emerged assessing the TAF’s effectiveness. This study aims to fill this gap, drawing comparisons and contrasts between the post–July 15 TAF’s two critical cross-border operations into northern Syria: Operation Euphrates Shield (OES; August 2016–March 2017), against the Islamic State, which occurred in the Jarabulus–al-Rai–al-Bab triangle; and Operation Olive Branch (OOB; January–April 2018), against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)–affiliated People’s Defense Units (YPG) in the Afrin region.

© 2019 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. METIN GURCAN

The design, planning, and execution of both oper- such as the National Intelligence Organiza- ations, as well as their similarities and differences, tell tion (MIT) and TAF; political actors such as the much about how and to what extent the institutional presidency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and shock caused by the July 15 uprising, subsequent bureaucratic actors such as the Disaster and military reforms, and mass purges have affected the Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), TAF’s operational efficiency and effectiveness. Fur- Turkish Red Crescent, and local municipalities ther, OES, providing a snapshot of the TAF just after „„ type and extent of military technologies used the July 15 uprising, and OOB, providing a similar and material losses they caused snapshot eighteen months after the uprising, reveal insights regarding the characteristics of Turkey’s „„ influence on foreign policy, including strategic potential future cross-border operations. Such opera- choices by global actors such as the United tions are likely in 2019 considering Ankara’s strong States and Russia, regional actors such as the desire to diminish, if not eliminate, YPG control of Assad regime and Iran, and nonstate actors terrain along the border in northeastern Syria at all such as the PYD, Free Syrian Army (FSA), and IS costs and by all means. Given that Turkey’s potential future operations will have the same genetic markers as both OES and Background on the Campaigns OOB, both warrant a closer look, as does a com- parative study of the Turkish military’s performance in The first of the cross-border operations following the two campaigns. Moreover, OES was initiated just the July 15 uprising—Operation Euphrates Shield— one month after the failed July 15 military uprising, lasted 216 days, from August 24, 2016, to March and OOB was begun almost eighteen months after it. 29, 2017. The second—Operation Olive Branch— These two operations were conducted amid military lasted 58 days, from January 20 to March 18, 2018.1 reforms directly affecting the nature of civil-military The TAF’s primary objectives during these respective relations and mass purges degrading the Turkish mili- operations were to seize and hold critical terrain for tary’s operational effectiveness. border security and create buffer zones inside Syria This study defines operational effectiveness as the so as to deterritorialize the Islamic State (IS) northwest military’s ability to accomplish its missions. Strategic of the Euphrates River, and to disrupt if not eliminate effectiveness or success, meanwhile, refers to the contiguity for the YPG-linked Democratic Union Party ability to translate operational accomplishments into (PYD) and, in doing so, influence the strategic prefer- political outcomes. That is why this paper assesses ences of actors with stakes in the operational theater, the operational and strategic effectiveness of the TAF notably the U.S. calculus vis-à-vis the YPG. separately, although the two certainly are connected. At first glance, these two campaigns may appear For instance, the accuracy and timeliness of precision to be conventional ground force sweeps using special firepower by either ground or air elements, the com- forces (SF) to seize and hold terrain, more or less simi- bat performance of medium-range air-defense and lar to Turkey’s earlier cross-border operations such as ballistic-missile-defense systems, or the orchestration Hammer I and II in 1997–98 and Sun in 2008, both of conventional and unconventional efforts would be conducted against PKK targets in northern Iraq. Yet directly related to operational effectiveness. Enter- in examining an array of discrete factors, OES and ing Syria as a “strong” veto player that could create OOB emerge as distinct from those previous opera- de facto realities dictating Ankara’s preferences in tions. These factors include: northern Syria would relate to strategic effectiveness. In this sense, this paper suggests that OES did not „„ triggers behind the two operations yield successful outcomes at the political-diplomatic „„ execution at the tactical, operational, and strategic- level. This is because it could neither disrupt the ter- political levels ritorial control held by YPG forces to the west of the Euphrates nor dissolve either the U.S. or Russian pro- „„ command and control (C2) PYD stance in the north, meaning that the operation’s „„ decisionmakers—including security-sector actors strategic effectiveness was low. In the same vein, OES

2 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ASSESSING THE POST–JULY 15 TURKISH MILITARY did not generate desired operational outcomes, such the desired political outcomes, implying a problem as the swift elimination of the Islamic State’s pres- with strategic effectiveness in both operations. ence in the Jarabulus–al-Rai–al-Bab triangle. This This study commences with an analysis of the vari- was because OES’s campaign design could not keep ous phases and outcomes of OES and OOB, followed pace with the changing situation, a pitfall directly by a comparative assessment elucidating similarities related to operational effectiveness. In contrast, this and differences between these two operations. A operation did produce some positive effects, such as comprehensive discussion follows of the study’s find- increasing the Turkish military’s familiarity with the ings and lessons learned. The paper concludes with Islamic State’s way of warfighting, improving its ability recommendations for future TAF operations. to blend unconventional and conventional capabili- ties in urban settings, and facilitating a swifter, more accurate delivery of indirect fires—outcomes likewise Operation Euphrates Shield directly related to operational effectiveness. The TAF was undoubtedly more effective opera- At the initial phase of OES, Ankara emphasized that tionally in OOB than in OES. The TAF not only exam- the operation would be limited both in time and space ined lessons learned in OES and updated its standard to maintain border security and confront the Islamic operational procedures accordingly, it also employed State as an act of self-defense against terrorism, codi- 2 newly gained technological capabilities in the the- fied under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. ater. Nonetheless, OOB did not deliver the desired The objectives of OES, however, gradually expanded, political-diplomatic outcomes. In OOB, for instance, and Turkish commandos and SF-supported FSA Ankara designated Afrin, the sole YPG-controlled forces ended up capturing al-Bab, the strategic town Kurdish canton west of the Euphrates, as the objec- south of the PYD-controlled Afrin canton and north of tive instead of the Kobane and Jazira cantons, east of Assad-controlled Aleppo. Following is a detailed dis- the Euphrates and the center of gravity for the YPG’s cussion of the key components and phases of OES. military buildup. The related discussion helps illus- trate the difference between operational and strate- Origins of the Military Concept gic effectiveness. Since 2011, the year fighting began In April 2017, a senior officer then employed at the in Syria, the Afrin canton was always of relatively Operational Planning Department in the J3 Com- secondary importance to all actors in the conflict. In mand of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) noted that the this sense, even though the TAF achieved relatively first serious discussions about Turkey’s possible mili- higher operational effectiveness in OOB, the cam- tary intervention in Syria had started almost five years paign yielded disappointing strategic results because earlier, in June 2012. This was the pre–Islamic State Turkey could not influence other actors, particularly period, just after Syrian air-defense units shot down a the United States and Russia, to cut their ties with the Turkish F-4E.3 The officer emphasized that two serious YPG. With OOB, Ankara successfully disrupted an military options were being discussed at the time, both almost six-hundred-mile-long PKK/YPG-controlled employing corps-size units: the first involved creating belt stretching from the Qandil region in northern a safe zone protecting the Tomb of Suleyman Shah, Iraq to Syria via the Sinjar region and from the Jazira which was then located inside Syria’s Aleppo gover- and Kobane cantons in the east to Afrin canton west norate, only twenty-five kilometers from the Turkish of the Euphrates, an outcome related to operational border; the second entailed gaining control of the ter- effectiveness. Yet Ankara could not make key stake- ritory north of Aleppo for use as a safe zone to control holders in northern Syria, particularly Washington refugee flows. Notably, both prospective plans were and Moscow, understand that Turkey could change made and presented by MIT during the National Secu- the strategic picture if and when it sensed an existen- rity Council meetings in late 2012 and early 2013. tial threat to its security, an example of strategic inef- fectiveness. Thus, overall, this study suggests that the Refinement of the Military Concept TAF’s operational effectiveness in OOB was higher Having decided to conduct a military operation long than in OES yet that neither could ultimately deliver before the Islamic State announced itself by seizing

POLICY NOTE 59 3 METIN GURCAN

Mosul, Iraq, in May 2014, Ankara now planned to „„ Fourth was the replacement in early August 2015 create a buffer zone in northern Syria. A key turning of the noninterventionist army chief of staff Gen. point leading to this decision, according to a senior Necdet Ozel with Gen. Hulusi Akar, who was officer involved in operational planning, was the May known for his interventionist posture on Syria 11, 2013, car bomb attacks in Reyhanli, although the and his hawkish stance against the PKK. culprits remain unconfirmed even today.4 This event „„ Fifth was Russia’s late-October 2015 military further stoked the government’s desire to intervene intervention in Syria and its increasing profile in northern Syria, despite reluctance from then army both on the ground and in the air in the country’s chief of staff Necdet Ozel. As for the military’s ini- north, drastically reducing prospects for Turkish tial reluctance, predominant reasons for it despite cross-border operations in the area. After the pressure from political elites and MIT included downing near the Syrian border of the Russian the following: Sukhoi Su-24 by Turkish F-16s on November 24, „„ lack of a clearly defined political directive elu- 2015—the first shooting of a Russian aircraft by cidating the political ends, strategic objectives, a NATO member state since the Korean War— timeframe, rules of engagement, and limitations Russia sought to punish Turkey with sanctions and of the operation de facto exclusion from the strategic game in northern Syria. Almost a year passed before Tur- „„ need for international legal legitimacy—with key attempted to initiate normalization with Rus- the TGS believing Turkey had to lobby for this sia. On June 27, 2016, Turkish president Recep operation at the UN Security Council in order to Tayyip Erdogan sent a letter to Russian president be granted a resolution Vladimir Putin expressing “his deep regret for what „„ inability to gain NATO support5 happened” and indicating that “a judicial investi- gation is underway against the Turkish citizen said Sociopolitical Context of the Operation to be involved in the Russian pilot’s death.”6 Over the next few years, through 2016, six incidents „„ Sixth was an IS-linked suicide attack at a wed- directly influenced Ankara’s strategic calculus regard- ding in Gaziantep, Turkey, on August 20, 2016, ing a possible operation in northern Syria: that killed fifty-seven. According to a retired diplomat, during the National Security Council „„ The first occurred in late 2013, with the emer- meeting a week earlier, on August 12, Erdogan gence of the YPG as the PYD’s armed wing; it himself had stressed that it was time for a cross- became the primary security actor on the ground, border operation into northern Syria and issued dominating northern Syria by early 2015. his executive decree to prepare for it.7 The wed- „„ The second was Turkey’s brigade-size military oper- ding attack merely provided the “official cause” ation to transfer the actual tomb of Suleyman Shah to initiate OES (see Table 1 for OES objectives, on February 21–22, 2015. The site was located based on author interviews). thirty-seven kilometers from Turkey, near the Thus, the failed uprising and subsequent military Euphrates River, and Syria had recognized it as Tur- reforms aimed at subjecting the military to strict key’s sovereign territory. For many pro-intervention civilian control—spurred by the state of emergency military and civilian officials in Ankara, the with- declared immediately after the attempt—made drawal was described as a “missed opportunity” for President Erdogan the sole authority on his country’s Ankara. After the operation was completed, Tur- security-related issues and correspondingly weak- key legally renounced its sovereign right to militar- ened the Turkish General Staff. ily intervene in northern Syria to protect the tomb against the Islamic State threat. The Conduct of OES „„ The third was the reinitiation of clashes between The operation was divided into five phases. In the Turkey and the PKK in late July 2015 and their first, lasting three days, the TAF captured Jarabulus. expansion in early 2016. In the second, over two months, the TAF cleared the

4 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ASSESSING THE POST–JULY 15 TURKISH MILITARY

TABLE 1. Turkey’s objectives and outcomes for Operation Euphrates Shield

OBJECTIVE OUTCOME

Remove/eliminate IS presence from Jarabulus and al-Rai, the 60-km border with Turkey Official objective 1 and the group’s only access to the outside world, as an act of self-defense authorized Fully achieved by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Control the territory linking the Kurdish Kobane and Jazira cantons east of the Implied objective 2 Euphrates River with the Afrin canton west of the river, which would have formed a Partially achieved continuous stretch of Kurdish territory. Restore/elevate morale and motivation within the post–July 15 TAF and insulate the Implied objective 3 military from Ankara politics. Partially achieved Rebuild the nation’s confidence in the army with strong public support for the military Implied objective 4 operation in the post–July 15 setting. Partially achieved nearly sixty-kilometer border stretching from Jarabu- FSA commander, the capture of Jarabulus was to be lus to al-Rai. These first two phases were conducted enacted in early September 2016, but a “preemptive only after receiving green lights from both Russia and move” was needed the previous month, because YPG the United States.8 Essentially, these two phases sat at groups had been preparing an offensive to capture the “converging” interests of all actors with stakes in the town.9 But this move did not go off cleanly. Instead, northern Syria. In the third phase, the TAF encroached it caused confusion regarding the mission among not southward, while in the fourth it captured al-Bab. In only those loosely trained, ill-equipped, and undisci- all phases, according to military planning, the Russian plined FSA groups, but also among Turkish SF teams air force was tasked with carrying out aerial bom- and MIT elements in northern Syria. According to the bardment of critical targets and providing as-needed same FSA commander, after the capture of Jarabulus close air support (CAS). But these latter two phases, in late August, OES command had initially ordered as will be explained further, were situated between the FSA units at the Kilis-based Hawar Operations the “diverging” interests of Turkey, on the one side, Center to continue on to Manbij, to prevent the YPG and the United States and Russia, on the other. This units from moving west of the Euphrates. “Yet,” as divergence led to significant problems for the Turkish he explained, “we still do not know why, but we were military. The fifth phase involved operations around ordered to advance to the west, to al-Rai—not south- Afrin and Manbij. (See map 1 for the phases of OES.) west. I think the Americans intervened and forced the Turkish military not to advance to Manbij.” As these OES PHASE 1: Capturing Jarabulus (3 days) remarks suggest, Ankara’s primary objective in OES had not in fact been to fight the Islamic State—the This phase, designed and planned as a special U.S. target—but to degrade, if not defeat, the PYD forces operation in which Turkish units would oper- in northern Syria, particularly west of the Euphrates. ate as “liaison teams” with FSA groups, was meant Notably, Turkish Special Forces Command is to be the main ground operation. Maj. Gen. Zekai directly subordinate to the TGS—and accountable Aksakalli, then SF commander, had been named to to the deputy chief of staff—with no command-and- lead OES. His reputation had swelled following the control responsibilities. Land Forces Command, par- July 15 uprising because he had been considered ticularly its 2nd Army Command/Malatya, coordinates among the few generals to actively resist the coup counterterrorism operations in eastern and southeast- plotters. Jarabulus, meanwhile, had already been ern Turkey. By designating the initial phase of OES cleared of IS militants, so capturing this border town as a purely special forces campaign, the TGS stirred was a cakewalk for FSA groups, backed by Turkish SF friction between SF Command (led by Aksakalli) and units and with Turkish Air Force CAS missions, indirect 2nd Army Command (led by Gen. Metin Temel), with fire support, and armor protection. According to an a personal rivalry also stewing between the generals.

POLICY NOTE 59 5 METIN GURCAN

PHASE 1 (3 days)

SDF-controlled territory

YPG- controlled Afrin PHASE 3 Nov‒Dec 2016 (30 days) SDF-controlled Manbij

PHASE 4 Advance routes Jan‒Mar 2017 Forward lines of troops (100 days)

PHASE 5 March 2017 (20 days)

MAP 1. Phases of Operation Euphrates Shield

This was particularly evident in the third and fourth equally smooth, an assumption based on low situ- phases, when OES required a new type of counterter- ational awareness that, in turn, led to mission creep. rorism force involving conventional capabilities such Thus, the inability of TAF units to adapt their cam- as armored and mechanized units and indirect fire paign planning to the changing situation, combined support, as well as unconventional tactics. with increased IS resistance, would pose significant challenges with regard to operational effectiveness. OES PHASE 2: Clearing the Jarabulus–Al-Rai border area (~60 days) OES PHASE 3: Mission creep toward the south (~30 days) As Turkish forces crossed the Syrian border, the Islamic State put up only weak resistance initially. The third phase presented a stiff challenge to OES Meanwhile, Russia’s heavy air bombardments forces: the more they advanced to the south, the more around al-Bab and Manbij, coordinated with Tur- they were exposed to improvised explosive devices key, disrupted IS supply lines, preventing the jihad- (IEDs) and antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) from ist group from establishing a robust defensive line at the Islamic State. Satellite maps available from open the border. This allowed Turkey-backed FSA forces to sources revealed Islamic State militants’ efforts to dig advance rapidly to al-Rai, even though they lacked ditches and tunnels and to construct defensive posi- sufficient armored units, close-air support, and indi- tions, and IS managed to resist fiercely Turkey’s inter- rect fire support. At this phase, OES had cleared vention with suicide attacks using armored vehicles, 1,100 square kilometers of terrain from Jarabulus along with the earlier-mentioned IEDs and ATGMs. to al-Rai. But achievement of these initial goals cre- OES forces should have been provided with more ated the false impression that the advance to al-Bab armor protection and CAS; however, this requirement (phase 3) and capture of al-Bab (phase 4) would be could not have been accurately ascertained at the

6 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ASSESSING THE POST–JULY 15 TURKISH MILITARY operations center in Kilis, run by General Aksakalli. tunnel warfare, and antitank missiles. In this phase, The gradual evolution of OES from an SF operation IS aptly used suicide VBIED attacks to disrupt OES to a new type of counterterrorism operation requir- planning assumptions, task organization, and the ing a blend of conventional armored units—including morale of participating units. With tunnels, the jihad- indirect heavy fire support with 155-millimeter “storm” ist group maintained high mobility despite air attacks. howitzers and 122-millimeter multiple rocket launch- With effective antitank missile attacks, the Islamic ers and commando battalions—and unconventional State curtailed the TAF’s movement of armor and lim- capabilities would surely require new personnel at ited its coordination with infantry units. This combat the operations center. Yet this requirement was not strategy enabled IS to maintain the upper hand in the fulfilled. After three Turkish soldiers were killed in field despite being on the defensive. Clearly, Turkish an IED attack in northern al-Bab in late November military planners at the Kilis operations center did not 2016, shortly before the offensive, some FSA groups anticipate the Islamic State’s level of determination in deserted due to internecine rivalries and plain lack of al-Bab, and thus did not bolster their planning exper- discipline, breaking up the main OES ground force. tise accordingly in conventional armored tactics. Spe- After concluding that the al-Bab offensive could cifically, the TAF gave insufficient thought to providing not be conducted with FSA groups, the Turkish mili- armored and mechanized, close air, and indirect fire tary deployed one battalion from the 57th Com- support to FSA foot soldiers, assuming the Russian mando Regiment/Sarikamis, another battalion from military would provide these functions. the 4th Commando Brigade/Tunceli, and two bat- In the first stage of the al-Bab offensive, conducted talions from the 1st Commando Brigade/Kayseri. in late January 2017, the key to breaking Islamic State Additionally, all battalions from the 2nd Armored Bri- resistance on the town’s western outskirts was Aqil gade/Istanbul, involving Leopard 2A4 tanks, and the Hill. Seizing this strategic high ground was therefore 20th Armored Brigade/Sanliurfa, with M60T tanks, marked as a priority. Yet because of operational-level were deployed to the theater of operation. With these confusion between the SF planners and conventional deployments just before the al-Bab offensive, the planners at the operations center, this first attempt total number of Turkish soldiers operating at a given turned into a fiasco, with the military planners defin- time reached three thousand—pulled from among ing the very nature of the operation as SF despite it two armored brigades, one mechanized infantry bri- actually being conventional. After this experience, two gade, five commando battalions, and around fifteen brigadiers general from the 2nd Army Command who SF teams. In the course of OES, the increasing con- had commanded the anti-PKK operation in Nusaybin ventional capabilities boosted the influence of 2nd in March–April 2016—one with an armored-branch Army commander General Temel, which frustrated background; one with a mechanized infantry back- General Aksakalli, given that the “conventionaliza- ground—were granted full responsibility at the Kilis tion of OES” could crimp his rising status in Ankara. operations center. This enabled Turkish military plan- At the end of this stage, OES, despite the chal- ners to adapt during the al-Bab offensive. The TAF lenges it faced, had secured an area encompassing could then increase the number of armored or mech- nearly 2,500 square kilometers in the Jarabulus–al- anized units on the ground, further involve the Turk- Rai–al-Bab triangle. ish commando units at critical locations—in place of Turkish-SF-backed FSA units—extend the effective OES PHASE 4: Siege and capture of al-Bab provision of CAS, and, more important, provide more (~30 days) intricate coordination between the Turkish-SF-backed The al-Bab offensive required a new type of coun- FSA forces and conventional Turkish military units in terterrorism planning for the Turkish military, involv- and around al-Bab. ing conventional armored units, indirect-fire-support OES PHASE 5: Operations in the direction of components, CAS, and SF units. This was mainly due Manbij and Afrin (20 days) to the Islamic State’s success in establishing resil- ient defensive perimeters in urban settlements using After OES forces won full control of al-Bab on Febru- vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), ary 17, 2017, President Erdogan stated that Turkey’s

POLICY NOTE 59 7 METIN GURCAN next moves would be in Raqqa and Manbij.10 He was blocs that withdrew from Aleppo in summer of 2016. signaling that Turkey could go even deeper south Friction over ideology and organization still hindered and east. Although OES had ended, future opera- coordination between these two groups, as assessed tions were already surfacing.11 By such measures, the by the FSA commander. In the weeks to come, this true end of OES might be marked by the hoisting of flaw manifested itself on the battlefield in inadequate the U.S. flag in Manbij and the Russian flag in Afrin, discipline and cohesion. Moreover, as explained by a both in early March 2017. At the same time, forces Turkish officer, Turkish military units eventually had to under Syrian president Bashar al-Assad were nearing recapture most of the critical terrain initially seized by al-Bab from the south, effectively trapping Turkey- the FSA groups. In the third and fourth phases of the backed FSA elements. Even though OES yielded operation, centering on al-Bab, an FSA figure noted, some successful outcomes at the tactical level, the desertion rates from the Syrian bloc were especially operation did not resolve existing diplomatic prob- high.13 The broader take-home message from this lems involving other actors—namely, the United experience is that partnering with local proxies in an States and Russia. Steadier communication of Turk- offensive operation can come at the cost of low oper- ish goals would have gone some way toward resolv- ational effectiveness. ing this. Instead, Turkish pro-government media attempted to supplant this narrative with a flood of Unclear Political and Diplomatic Efforts (mis)information, focusing on the heroic acts of Turk- On the political end, directives were not articulated ish units on the ground. to identify the policy aims, strategic objectives, time- frame, rules of engagement, and limitations of the FSA Ineffectiveness operation. Hence, military efficiency was hamstrung As gleaned from interviews with Turkish officers who from the planning phase until the capture of al- participated in the operation, along with two Free Bab. The problem of transforming ambiguity about Syrian Army commanders,12 FSA forces joining the desired end states into clarity, and providing the operation lacked a fixed structure under a single forces best suited to achieve those end states, led to command. Moreover, roles and missions assigned “open-endedness.” Related were time- and space- to the FSA were not clearly defined, with confusion linked limitations and rules of engagement for mili- prevailing among the various FSA groups as to the tary planners seeking to create executable campaign mission, as well as their responsibilities and those of orders. Particularly during the third phase and the others involved in the campaign. Nevertheless, the advance southward, this open-endedness emerged FSA groups were assigned to be the primary ground as operational cacophony over whether or not cap- force to advance west for phase two, after control turing al-Bab was an ultimate objective. That is why, of Jarabulus was established. For this, each group for instance, an FSA commander interestingly empha- was given specific advance routes for capturing and sized that some FSA groups then advancing south- holding a particular bloc of critical terrain. A senior ward stopped and then left the battlefield, assuming military officer noted that the biggest problem the the operation had already succeeded when Turkish Kilis operations center faced during the second and military units took control of northern al-Bab.14 Fur- third phases involved a failure to synchronize the thermore, diplomatic efforts to engage other actors ground movements of advancing TAF and FSA units, with a military presence in the area could not be resulting in opaque command-and-control contours adapted in real time, coordinated with battlefield between the Turkish military’s operations center and developments. This shortcoming resulted in tragic FSA’s Kilis-based Hawar Operations Center. breaches of force protection, such as on February 9, A central reason for the larger confusion, accord- 2017, when an evidently accidental Russian airstrike ing to an FSA commander, was that when the killed three Turkish soldiers due to lack of coordina- operation began in August 2016, integration had tion with the TAF.15 Earlier, on November 25, 2016, not been fully achieved between the FSA and other fire from an Assad-regime L-38 Albatros-type aircraft Sunni groups falling within the short-lived Conquest around al-Bab killed four Turkish soldiers, according of Aleppo Front, which encompassed Sunni fighting to Moscow, due to a “lack of agreement of coordi-

8 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ASSESSING THE POST–JULY 15 TURKISH MILITARY nates during strikes by the Russian airforce.”16 Yet this was undoubtedly a clear message for Ankara.17 After Operation Olive Branch the February 2017 incident, Russia and Turkey did On January 20, 2018, Ankara launched OOB into boost military coordination.18 the YPG-controlled Afrin region in northwestern Syria.22 Following the launch, the TGS revealed in a Losses in OES press release the operation’s scope, targets, and legal Sixty-nine Turkish soldiers were killed in OES: nearly framework, but remained mum on its prospective 40 percent by VBIED attacks, 30 percent by mor- duration.23 The purpose of the operation, according tar and rocketfire, and 20 percent by roadside IEDs to the release, was “to neutralize the terrorists belong- and 10 percent by accidents. In addition, 220 Turk- ing to the PKK-affiliated YPG and the Islamic State in ish soldiers were wounded. Yet notably, not a single the region of Afrin in northwestern Syria, in order to Turkish soldier lost his life during armed man-to- provide security and stability along Turkey’s borders man engagements with the Islamic State, given that as well as in the Afrin region.”24 Implied in this state- FSA units were the primary ground force engaging ment was that Ankara did not differentiate between IS in such combat. Because they did the heavy lifting, and the YPG in pursuing border security and regional FSA groups suffered 380 killed and 800 wounded, stability. Furthermore, with OOB, Ankara aimed to the majority from the Ahrar al-Sham, Failaq al-Sham, reposition international actors vis-à-vis the YPG, cast- and Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki brigades. The Turk- ing the group as a serious threat to Turkey’s secu- ish military announced that about 3,000 IS militants rity. In seeking legitimacy for the operation, Turkey and 500 YPG fighters were “neutralized” during OES. focused on its counterterrorism component, drawing Material losses were also in play. According to the on UN Security Council Resolutions 1624 (2005), Turkish military’s list of damaged, hit, or lost armored 2170 (2014), and 2178 (2014) and, in the UN Char- vehicles leaked to open sources—and not denied by ter, Article 51, on the right of self-defense (see Table official sources—these included ten Leopard 2A4 2 for Turkey’s objectives in the operation). tanks that were hastily deployed to the high-ATGM- risk operational theater without proper armored pro- Terrain and Weather Conditions tection and camouflage,19 one M60-A3 tank, three During the Operation improved armored personnel carriers (GZPT), and The terrain in northwestern Syria is hilly, with an aver- three Cobra armored vehicles, immobilized mainly in age elevation of 800–1,100 meters along the Turkish combat around Aqil Hill, where intensive clashes took border, allowing YPG fighters to optimize their defen- place starting December 20, 2016.20 According to sive positions. Likewise, in the northern parts of the a retired general, these material losses amounted to Afrin region, YPG fighters were sometimes located some $600 million.21 Yet the total cost of the whole at altitudes 300–400 meters higher than TAF troops operation, including all aircraft flights, indirect fire and up to 1,500 meters away from them due to the support, weapons systems, and equipment delivered harsh terrain. For TAF troops, this could correspond to the FSA, exceeded $1 billion. to a 30 percent slope, hampering armor mobility. The fronts were largely grown with olive trees and thick Measuring the Success of OES evergreen foliage, allowing ample opportunity to Even though Ankara defined OES as a “successful” hide and complicating the advance of armored col- operation in its March 29, 2017, National Secu- umns. Also providing cover for YPG fire were wadis rity Council announcement marking its end, the (dry riverbeds), agricultural terraces, and peaks and measures by which Ankara defined “success” are hillsides. Afrin’s eastern and southern sections are unclear. How indeed was success in OES measured? less harsh, consisting of gentler hills. In the east, the Through the number of neutralized “terrorists,” the line between Menagh Air Base and Tal Rifaat is well size of cleared or held territory, the extent of effect- suited for human-made obstacles, and this chal- ing political-diplomatic outcomes in northern Syria? lenged the TAF’s possible advance; but otherwise, this Unfortunately, no information on how Ankara defined route was the shortest and easiest to Afrin city center. OES success in strategic terms has so far appeared. Moreover, both Tal Rifaat and the small surrounding

POLICY NOTE 59 9 METIN GURCAN

TABLE 2. Turkey’s objectives and outcomes for Operation Olive Branch

OBJECTIVE OUTCOME

Official objective 1 Dislodge, if not eliminate, YPG elements. Fully achieved Weaken the U.S.-YPG political/military relationship so as to move Turkey-U.S. Unstated objective 2 relations from conflict to cooperation. Not achieved Create a safe zone for the local population to reestablish the Afrin region’s social Stated objective 3 cohesion and rebuild societal and political stability. Ongoing Unstated objective 4 Restore/elevate morale and motivation within the TAF. Partly achieved Rebuild confidence in and strong public support for the army in the Unstated objective 5 post–July 15 setting. Fully achieved settlements carried strategic importance due to their down Turkish planes the Russian military contingent access to Syrian-regime-controlled Nubl and Zahra, controlled the country’s northwestern airspace. Thus, in southeastern Afrin. In the east and south, oppor- the Kremlin’s approval before OOB was essential for tunities for cover and concealment are less abundant Ankara to be able to sideline Assad’s air-defense units. than in the north and west. According to Ankara, around 8,000–10,000 YPG The winter timing of the operation, under harsh fighters were situated across Afrin before the opera- conditions, decisively complicated matters even fur- tion.27 And sources interviewed in Ankara say these ther for the TAF.25 Control and coordination of oper- were joined by an unknown number of IS militants ational forces suffered, and sometimes the advance who had surrendered to the organization during the was forced to slow down or even stop. Raqqa and Deir al-Zour conflicts and were promised For their part, YPG forces strengthened their in return that they could fight against Turkey. Without defensive perimeters against a potential TAF assault a doubt, the estimated number of YPG fighters con- by using a dense network of fortifications, tunnels, centrated in and around Afrin city center would pose underground shelters, ATGM strongholds, heavy gun extreme danger even in relatively more flat and popu- emplacements, and obstacle systems (e.g., pits, bar- lated terrain elsewhere in the region, especially in a ricades, IEDs, landmines). Furthermore, YPG forces complex operational environment favoring defensive developed defensive perimeters involving fixed and operations. For the TAF, the most effective tactic in well-fortified strongholds and mobile units patrolling response was surprise, achieved by traveling less- the strongholds. This hybrid defense strategy—inte- passable terrain along multiple axes, with the goal grating defensive perimeters, ATGM nests, tunnels, of keeping YPG forces dispersed and encouraging and IEDs, as well as using the civilian population as desertions. Turkish military planners, in turn, sought “human shields” in and around critical towns like Jin- to maintain a high operational tempo on the air and dires and Rajo—was the first indicator of the ferocity ground, aimed at weakening the YPG’s hold on hilly with which the YPG would defend Afrin. terrain in the north and west. Defense expert Can Kasapoglu and researcher Sinan Ulgen emphasize Phases of OOB that Russia’s opening of its airspace over Afrin allowed OOB was launched immediately after a series of high- the TAF to commence OOB with overwhelming air- profile military meetings between Turkish and Russian power, joined by a land incursion into the mountains officials. Ultimately, Ankara received the green light north and west of Afrin city.28 According to official both to launch the operation and to use airspace reports, the operation’s first forty-eight hours saw over Afrin for critical airstrikes and close air support Turkey dispatch seventy-two combat aircraft, which tasks.26 Despite threats from Assad’s forces to shoot struck 108 targets in seven sectors. This robust force

10 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ASSESSING THE POST–JULY 15 TURKISH MILITARY

PHASE 1 Jan–Mar 2018 (48 days) PHASE 1 Part 1

BULBUL PHASE 1 Part 2

PHASE 1 Part 3

MOUNT PHASE 2 26 KM BURSAYA

CLASHES

ADVANCE ROUTES

14 KM

PHASE 2 Mar 2018 (10 days)

24 KM

REYHANLI

MAP 2. Phases of Operation Olive Branch generation drew on one-quarter of the Turkish Air leading to an additional 680 deaths—with the sum Force’s principal fighter arsenal, composed of F-16 total YPG forces killed using drones amounting variants and F-4 2020s, running an impressive three to 1,129. 32 to four sorties per aircraft per day.29 In operational Judging from statements by military officials terms, these airstrikes marked a notable achievement, and political decisionmakers, the operation was conducted amid debates about fighter pilot shortages to be divided into two phases in line with opera- and the combat readiness of the Turkish Air Force.30 tional objectives: Aside from the decisive role played by manned „„ first, the clearing of YPG elements from the hilly aircraft throughout the operation, armed drones and mostly rural areas stretching to the north, emerged as operational game changers. Of the northwest, and west of Afrin city center total around 3,400 YPG fighters killed by the TAF and other indigenous components, 449 fell to „„ second, the cleaning out of YPG groups from these tactical armed drones.31 Bayraktar TB2s were Afrin city center and capture of the larger Afrin employed in target acquisition for other platforms, region33

POLICY NOTE 59 11 METIN GURCAN

OOB PHASE 1: Clearing terrain north of Afrin Despite these problems, the advance of armored (~55 days) columns was well coordinated with CAS and artillery fire, even as these columns struggled to expand their Contrary to the general expectations of Turkish secure positions. This prevented YPG elements from military analysts, OOB was not launched from the infiltrating secure positions and carrying out hit-and- relatively flat terrain of Azaz–Tal Rifaat–Afrin, which run attacks. Further, airstrikes and artillery fire forced would have enabled a fast armored advance using YPG forces to leave their defensive positions and the shortest route to Afrin city center. Rather, the withdraw to nearby villages. The fighters who stayed operation was launched from the opposite direction, behind became targets for airstrikes, armed drone crossing hilly terrain in the north and northwest. The attacks, and indirect fire. And those fighters who TAF preferred to first control these highlands before withdrew to villages such as Rajo and Jindires were laying siege to Afrin city, home to about 300,000 not able to mass sufficient forces to mount effective residents, most of them Kurdish. Operationally, the counterattacks. They could only conduct hit-and-run TAF appeared to want to open multiple fronts in dif- attacks with small units garbed in civilian clothing. ferent areas so as to disperse the 8,000–10,000 In this context, from January 21 to March 13, 2018, YPG fighters and weaken their defense perimeters. a series of small clashes occurred in rural northern On January 20, 2018, at 5 p.m., OOB began and northwestern areas of Afrin. In their study, Nec- with airstrikes and CAS missions against predeter- det Ozcelik and Can Acun split this first phase into mined YPG targets throughout Afrin. Starting the several parts, during which the TAF first lost its oper- next day, January 21, at 10:30 a.m., TAF and FSA ational tempo, then regained momentum through a groups launched a ground operation from seven dif- series of tactical and operational maneuvers.36 This ferent points toward Afrin.34 This time, as opposed recovery was attributable to extraordinary efforts at to in OES, the advance routes taken by the Turkish the tactical level and capable command and control commando units were supported by mechanized/ at the operational level, and can be broken down armored units as the primary ground force, with as follows: FSA elements mostly in place for follow-and-support tasks. At North Bulbul town’s Merseva village line „„ MULTI-FRONT LAUNCH OF GROUND OPER- and Dikmetas-Bursaya line, the West Seyh Muham- ATIONS. The approach wherein FSA-backed madli–Adamanli–Bilal village line, the Memelan- TAF units first opened and then sought to expand Atman-Sediya village line (Rajo subdistrict), the Omar seven axes of advance from the northern and Usagi–Mamal Usagi–Halikan village lines, and in western sectors surprised YPG forces, thereafter the Seyh Hadid and Halikan regions, YPG fighters overwhelming them. Moreover, the YPG failed were forming well-prepared defense lines and strong- to shape the area of operation for the eventual holds around other critical terrain.35 In order to stop armed conflicts in and around Afrin city center. the FSA-backed TAF forces, the YPG evidently dug „„ CAPTURE OF PRIORITIZED TACTICAL TAR- ditches measuring two to five meters deep and five GETS. On January 24, 2018 (the fifth day), the meters wide, with the hope of causing delays or attri- TAF had seized some critical terrain in the Afrin tion. With its campaign plan, the TAF preferred to rely countryside: to the northeast, mountainous Bur- on standoff firepower rather than combat maneuver. saya; to the north, Hay Uglu, Seyh Obasi, Mer- By the end of the fifth day, January 24, the TAF seva, Seyh Horoz, Mahmoud Usagi, and Shenkal ground elements and FSA groups, along with Turk- villages; and to the west, Adamanli, Harmanlik, ish CAS, attack helicopters, and armed drones, had and Halikan—while securing positions for further reached almost eight kilometers into Syria from their operations. In putting up resistance, YPG fight- initial seven routes, capturing at least eleven vil- ers used antitank systems, mortars, rockets, and lages. But when weather conditions worsened, this other heavy weapons.37 multi-axis approach endured setbacks. Heavy rains reduced visibility and muddied the ground, slowing „„ CAPTURE OF JINDIRES TOWN. On March 8, progress and disrupting synchronization of efforts. 2018, FSA/TAF forces captured the critical town Equipment breakdowns led to increased attrition. of Jindires, where Ankara claimed YPG forces

12 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ASSESSING THE POST–JULY 15 TURKISH MILITARY

had launched rocket attacks on Hatay’s Reyhanli A specific weakness of the YPG during this phase and Kirikhan districts.38 was its inability to send adequate reinforcements to Afrin, especially ATGMs. This helped tip the scales „„ ENCIRCLING OF AFRIN CITY CENTER. Afrin in OOB. According to a local Kurdish journalist who was surrounded by operations on its northern, covered OOB, the YPG command east of the Euphra- eastern, and southern sides that continued after tes instructed the YPG forces to hand over Afrin.43 At the capture of the Bafilyon hills and Jindires. first, some YPG units did not heed the call and kept up OOB troops started to prepare for the next oper- their resistance, but these holdouts were compelled to ation in an inhabited area, namely Afrin city cen- give up after three days.44 YPG forces in Afrin had two ter.39 In this context, joint operations with AFAD choices: remain until the end despite the risk of total and the Turkish Red Crescent were begun in the destruction and high civilian casualties, or evacuate operational area in order to evacuate civilians the city to allow for diplomatic negotiations to cede and provide aid.40 control of the city to Syrian president Assad’s forces. For YPG elements, ATGM attacks—specifically, from The YPG knew that launching an urban fight—one it the 9M133 Kornet, AT-5 Konkurs, and AT-4 Fagot— was bound to lose—could erode whatever support it were the stiffest resistance generated on the ground. still had from locals in Afrin. Particularly in the first phase, these ATGM attacks and This study suggests that the TAF’s operational ambushes were the most effective tactics in delay- effectiveness (matching capabilities to missions com- ing the advance of the TAF’s armored columns. The bined with the ability to plan, integrate, and execute ATGM attack in Seyh Horoz in early February 2018, operations) led to the YPG’s decision to withdraw which killed five Turkish soldiers, marked the deadli- from Afrin city. Simply put, the YPG’s withdrawal can est YPG attack throughout OOB.41 be defined as a negotiated outcome reached by the According to a Turkish security official, the YPG YPG command and Russia-backed Assad fighters conducted fifty-two ATGM attacks in OOB, mostly who were forced out by the on-the-ground opera- targeting pickup trucks mounted with heavy machine tional impact generated by the TAF. Yet whatever the guns.42 These types of attacks were heavily concen- cause, this withdrawal seriously affected the image trated in the Rajo area (around fifteen) and Bulbul area of YPG military prowess and the political respect it (around ten). The security official added that the ATGM had garnered in the fight against the Islamic State, attacks increased in number after early March 2018, particularly, according to one U.S. diplomat, “in the and that this increase caused great concern in OOB’s eyes of the U.S. decisionmakers.”45 command center in Kilis, especially as regarded future Another fact worth mentioning is that the YPG anticipated urban clashes in Afrin city center (see map withdrew its forces from Afrin via a military air base 3 for the locations of ATGM attacks). near Tal Rifaat under Assad’s control, an exit route intentionally left by TAF units even though the Turk- OOB PHASE 2: Clashes around Afrin city cen- ish forces had the capacity to encircle Afrin and turn ter (5 days) the operation into a siege. The coordination during In the second phase of the operation, beginning March the withdrawal and the TAF’s tacit endorsement of 13, 2018, Turkish forces surrounded Afrin city center it indicate that the Assad regime and Russian forces from the northeast, west, and southwest. In just five had advance knowledge of the YPG’s decision to days, the YPG had withdrawn, allowing TAF and FSA withdraw. Yet it is not yet clear what price Russia and forces to wrest control of the city center. The mission the Syrian regime might have imposed for allowing was achieved by 8:30 a.m. on March 18. Evidence YPG forces to withdraw to Tal Rifaat. A question that the YPG had not prepared for this withdrawal lay in that warrants serious consideration is whether some the large numbers of cars, weapons, ammunition, and YPG members stayed behind to launch guerrilla- equipment left behind. No clashes actually occurred in type attacks against the Turkish and FSA forces; the city, but Turkish forces had to work street by street, but with the exception of two or three high-profile building by building, to clear areas booby-trapped by attacks in the Afrin city center, such strikes have YPG fighters with IEDs and landmines. not occurred.46

POLICY NOTE 59 13 METIN GURCAN

Yapılan ATGM Atışlarının Harita Üzerinde Gösterimi ANALİZ

8 suriyegundemi.com

MAP 3. ATGMs shot by the PKK/YPG throughout the OOB, Suriye Gundemi, March 5, 2018, accessed May 12, 2018, at http://bit.ly/2GJUhva.

14 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ASSESSING THE POST–JULY 15 TURKISH MILITARY

Losses in OOB Compared to OES, planning for OOB was far better, as evidenced particularly by the follow- According to official figures released by the TGS, 54 ing developments: Turkish soldiers and 16 civilians were killed and 233 Turkish soldiers were injured during Operation Olive „„ preserved unity of command for the whole Branch. On February 10, 2018, a T129 ATAK heli- operation copter was downed in Rajo, marking the first combat „„ use of TAF commando units as the primary loss of a Turkish helicopter during the operation.47 ground forces rather than poorly disciplined The TGS also revealed that around 230 villages in and trained FSA elements, to boost tactical the Afrin region were taken by the Turkish army, with effectiveness around 3,400 YPG fighters killed in all.48 A retired „„ close coordination between the air and ground Turkish general estimated that the total cost of OOB elements, increased command, control, commu- was around $1 billion.49 nications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities, preci- Comparative Analysis of OES sion strike capability, and enabling of CAS mis- sions during the advance and OOB „„ more-fluid provision of CAS tasks OES led to successful outcomes at the tactical level, „„ effective and efficient use of new military sys- such as familiarity acquired by the Turkish military tems and technologies such as TB2 armed tac- with the Islamic State’s way of fighting. Yet OES was tical drones, T129 ATAK helicopters, Roketsan- poorly managed at the operational level; the initial produced MAM-L high-precision smart munitions operational design and campaign plan could not be (thermobaric, antiarmor, and airburst variants), adapted to keep pace with changes on the ground. and the TOSUN unmanned engineering system Initially conceived as a special forces operation and planned accordingly, OES led to successful out- „„ heavy emphasis on armor defense and other comes during the first phase (capture of Jarabulus) counter-ATGM efforts and second phase (control of the sixty-kilometer „„ successful integration of newly introduced C4ISR border stretching between Jarabulus and al-Rai). systems, which improved synchronization of But in the third phase (encroachment to the south) commando and armored units on the ground and fourth phase (siege of al-Bab), OES gradually and provided real-time situational awareness for evolved into a new type of cross-border counter- ground forces terrorism operation, requiring a blend of conven- „„ empowerment of the TAF as the sole logistics tional and unconventional military capabilities. The manager, whereas OES suffered from faulty coor- TAF did not fully absorb this gradual evolution, and dination between military and civilian elements the ensuing mission creep created problems. Fur- thermore, in the third and, particularly, the fourth OOB likely could not have been conducted so flaw- phase, Ankara did not think adequately through its lessly had Ankara not used robust military technol- diplomatic efforts, and paid the price for this short- ogies such as smart munitions for high-precision coming. Namely, when advancing southward to strike capability, armed drones, unmanned combat al-Rai, Ankara failed to coordinate its operational and engineering systems, and systems designed to efforts on the ground with diplomatic ones so as to increase situational awareness, armor survivability, influence strategic choices by Moscow and Wash- air-land coordination, and so forth. In the absence of ington. The failure specifically to communicate both intensive unmanned systems such as TB2 drones effectively with Russia cost the operation crucial and TOSUN unmanned military engineering systems CAS as fighters worked to achieve their last goal, the and continuous provision of CAS tasks, the Turkish capture of al-Bab. This held severe consequences casualties in OOB would have been much higher. for Turkish soldiers during the hundred-day siege Furthermore, the massive enlistment of precision of the city. airstrikes in OOB, a change from OES, was signifi-

POLICY NOTE 59 15 METIN GURCAN

TABLE 3: Critical factors shaping OES and OOB outcomes.

FACTOR EUPHRATES SHIELD OLIVE BRANCH ASSESSMENT

TERRITORIAL AND Whereas in OES the TAF was much more interested in static TERRITORIAL ENEMY-CENTRIC territorial control just across the Turkey-Syria border, the TAF’s Primary primary objective in OOB was to clean the targeted area through Establishing a buffer Deterritorializing YPG objective high-tempo maneuvers conducted by armored units and sup- zone just across the units and forcing their ported by indirect fire and CAS missions. These aimed to deter- Turkish border expulsion, generating ritorialize the YPG in terms of U.S. support for the PYD/YPG. political effects

Not fully achieved; Although the rivalry between then SOF commander Lt. Gen. Z. rivalry between then Aksakalli and 2nd Army Commander Lt. Gen. M. Temel over the na- Unity of SOF commander Fully achieved ture of the operation spoiled the unity of command in OES, Temel command Gen. Z. Aksakalli and became the commander in charge throughout OOB, which was 2nd Army command- primarily designed as a conventional military operation. er Gen. M. Temel

Mostly rugged terrain In OOB, the terrain and weather conditions were more challeng- Mostly soft ground consisting of moun- ing than in OES. During the critical periods January 22–26 and Geography/ with large flat area tains and hills, except February 1–­5, 2018, OOB stopped due to heavy rain and fog. weather and moderate for a few small plains; Mud became a factor in limiting and sometimes halting the- ar weather conditions harsh weather condi- mored units’ advance. tions

Achieved by simul- In OES, the Islamic State’s quick withdrawal without resistance taneously opening in Jarabulus and then on the Jarabulus–al-Rai line surprised the seven different axes Surprise Not achieved TAF, which led to mission creep. Unlike in OES, the TAF achieved of advance in the surprise in OOB by initiating the operation from unexpected northern and north- directions. western sectors

In OES, the TAF did not depend on new military technology; in OOB, however, military technologies were game changers. Military Limited use Extensive use Systems like TB2 tactical armed drones, T129 ATAK helicopters, technology and TOSUN engineering vehicles were used for the first time in a cross-border CT operation.

OES was a more complex operation in planning and execution due to the involvement of special forces and conventional units Simplicity More complex Less complex employing diverse tactics, techniques, and procedures. Further- more, synchronization problems among FSA units and between FSA and TAF elements increased OES complexity.

Rates of In terms of rate of advance, the operational tempo in OOB was advance/ Slow Rapid higher than in OES. OPTEMPO

In OES, the FSA constituted the primary ground element. In OOB, Ground forces Two FSA fighters per Three Turkish soldiers however, TAF commando units and the Gendarmerie Special Op- composition Turkish soldier per FSA fighter eration battalions filled this role.

Close air sup- Limited and intermit- Focused and During OOB, T129 attack helicopters and TB2 armed drones— port (CAS) tent sustained which were not used in OES—provided support for CAS missions.

In OES, logistics support was not planned and executed under Logistics Average Better the full control of the TAF. In OOB, the TAF was in charge of logis- support tics management, which ensured success.

16 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ASSESSING THE POST–JULY 15 TURKISH MILITARY

FACTOR EUPHRATES SHIELD OLIVE BRANCH ASSESSMENT

Medium-range Outmoded MIM-23B HAWKS and I-HAWKS systems were used in (5–40 km) air- both operations to provide medium-range air defense. ASELSAN Insufficient Insufficient defense and Roketsan’s attempts to develop indigenous Hisar-A missile capability systems are ongoing and aim to fill these capability gaps.

Officers and NCOs interviewed by the author on several occa- Morale Moderate High sions stated that the morale of the TAF elements was higher in OOB than in OES.

Cooperation between the TAF and other government agencies Civil-military such as MIT, AFAD, Turkish Red Crescent, and local authorities, Moderate Improved cooperation as well as coordination between government institutions and NGOs, was better in OOB than in OES.

Diplomatic- In both operations, the military efforts and achievements on the military Low Low ground were not fully coordinated at the strategic and diplo- synchronization matic level.

According to opinion polls conducted in November 2016, public support for OES was around 70%. Although a reliable public Public support High Higher survey on popular support for OOB has not yet been published, media coverage and analysis suggest that support for OOB was higher.

cant in increasing operational effectiveness through Kasapoglu and Ulgen note: the destruction of enemy assets. Can Kasapoglu and Especially in counterinsurgency and counterter- Sinan Ulgen emphasize that the operational differ- rorism missions, an advanced air force’s ability to ence between OES and OOB with regard to airpower “operate beyond the insurgent’s visual and acous- can be largely broken down into three reasons: First, tic range,” and to deliver mass destruction leads to having absorbed lessons from OES, Turkish military panic and motivational collapse among the enemy planners paid utmost attention to eliminating the ranks. Simply put, non-state armed groups are adversary’s subterranean/tunnel warfare capabili- unable to respond to the effects of kinetic airpower ties with high-precision smart munitions at the very with force on force application especially above beginning of OOB.50 (See Table 3 for a compari- the effective altitudes of MANPADS [man-portable son of OES and OOB outcomes.) In this respect, on air-defense systems]. This clear superiority natu- January 20, 2018, the TAF disseminated the visuals rally brings about secondary, non-kinetic advan- tages to the state actor.51 of an air-ground standoff missile (probably an AGM- 142/Popeye) destroying an underground muni- Also in contrast to OES, combat engineering efforts tions depot belonging to the YPG. Second, the TAF in OOB were delivered not by civilian elements but sought to soften YPG defenses decisively to ensure by military ones within the TAF.52 Throughout the maximum armor survivability and force protection for operation, for example, the TAF employed TOSUN ground units. In this area, a more detailed assess- engineering unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs).53 ment between the two operations may provide useful The TOSUN UGV has an operational range of insights. Third, to dominate the psychological war- five kilometers, and it is used primarily for clearing fare domain, Ankara employed intensive airpower in roadblocks and trenches. The need for such systems the first seventy-two hours of OOB, another change emerged particularly after 2015, during counterter- from OES. Apart from the kinetic effect, this use of rorism operations against the PKK’s urban warfare airpower struck fear into the adversary’s formations. campaign from September 2015 to March 2016

POLICY NOTE 59 17 METIN GURCAN inside Turkey, as well as in OES. Facing increas- to orchestrate military efforts at the operational level ingly urban and hybrid threats, fast integration of with political-diplomatic goals. Moreover, Turkey the TOSUN UGV into Turkey’s military operations should look to modernize its traditional cognitive and has highlighted the strong willingness of the TAF operational counterterrorism templates by including to draw on the advantages of modern unmanned- innovative doctrinal approaches in both rural and systems technology.54 urban hybrid settings, blending asymmetric with con- Similarly, both OES and OOB helped the TAF ventional approaches. All operations should be built understand the significance of armor survivability upon clear-cut political directives rooted in explicit mis- in counterterrorism operations in hybrid settings, sion objectives, and forces should be delimited spa- focused mainly on defending against intensive tially/temporally to allow for sound military planning. ATGM attacks. Currently, Turkish defense firms are This military planning, more finely, should be based involved in several programs to develop active pro- on a hybrid approach mixing conventional mecha- tection systems for ground vehicles. In time for OOB, nized maneuvers with counterterrorism operations. As the PULAT system (later named AKKOR Pulat, based the two operations also show, in fighting a new gen- on the Zaslon-L) was announced ready to fit Turkish eration of violent nonstate organizations seeking ter- armored platforms.55 The system can simultaneously ritorial control, special forces can serve as an enabler detect, track, and engage multiple projectiles, and it to conventional capabilities—but not as the primary is designed to eliminate its targets at short distances. force on the ground. Specifically, success against The Turkish defense electronics company ASELSAN these new adversaries depends on more mobility is also developing the AKKOR active protection sys- under armored protection in urban settings and more tem, a more sophisticated product with both hard- agility with CAS-supported small-unit actions in rural and soft-kill capabilities, to engage multiple targets settings, active armor-protection systems, fast and at a hundred-meter range. Considering the speed precise indirect ground fire support with mobile how- element, active protection systems require a greater itzers and multiple launch rocket systems, provision level of autonomy than remotely controlled systems. of CAS around the clock, more autonomous drone They can detect, classify, track, and engage their capabilities, and unmanned and armored engineer- targets with a speed that often exceeds human limi- ing systems. Counterterrorism operations for Turkey tations. Therefore, the development and active use should be essentially designed as tactical maneuvers of indigenous protection systems such as AKKOR with combined arms characteristics—blending con- Pulat would be a major milestone for the Turkish ventional military capabilities such as armored war- defense industry. Highlighting this fact, in March fare, CAS, drone warfare, and tunnel warfare with 2018 Turkey’s former defense minister Nurettin unconventional capabilities such as small-unit actions Canikli identified the PULAT rollout as a major turn- containing SF elements and counter-IED efforts, and ing point for the Turkish defense sector.56 The fact providing support for proxies. that not a single tank in OOB was destroyed by the Both OES and OOB also prove that the TAF should YPG despite fierce ATGM attacks shows that the TAF concentrate more on what is known as operational internalized the lessons learned during OES about design—conceiving the framework of a campaign or armor survivability. major operation. And this design must account for the inevitable evolution of a given military situation. But a major reason this project faces challenges is Lessons Learned for Ankara de-Gulenification. Many officers purged over the purported role of Fethullah Gulen in the July 2016 As this analysis shows, the TAF is capable of learn- uprising were bright individuals educated in Western ing from past mistakes and applying the lessons with institutions.57 The continuing purges of officers with relative quickness. Furthermore, the OES and OOB master’s and doctoral degrees indicates that the TAF cases show that when fighting abroad, Turkey must has been prioritizing de-Gulenification over preserv- first develop a comprehensive counterterrorism plan. ing intellectual capital, a factor negatively affecting To increase overall effectiveness, this plan should aim the TAF’s operational effectiveness.

18 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ASSESSING THE POST–JULY 15 TURKISH MILITARY

An already-highlighted weak point during OES ies, including terrorist organizations, insidiously use was the FSA—specifically, its fighters’ lack of discipline information warfare. Thus, protecting soldiers from and reluctance to work under a single command-and- captivity in high-risk operational environments has control structure, despite efforts to keep them in line. become more crucial than ever to sustain the pub- 59 Lower-profile problems, suggested earlier, included lic support to military campaigns. disruptions in logistical supply and how weather For the TAF, one vulnerability faced in both OES and events such as fog interfered with drone reconnais- OOB was the lack of medium-range air-defense and sance and CAS. Furthermore, during OES, Turkey’s ballistic-missile-defense systems. Even though Turkish inability to work with the Russian and U.S. militar- forces did not encounter a direct threat from the air— ies, which were then controlling the airspace over either warplanes or ballistic/cruise missiles—they had northwestern Syria—along with the high-level threat a technology gap in this area, potentially affecting of MANPADs—entirely blocked emergency medi- operations. Ankara needs to address this vulnerability cal evacuations with helicopters and critical logistics as soon as possible. support. This significantly harmed soldier morale and To be sure, the absence in OES of clear political hindered air evacuation and logistics support during direction hindered effective military deployment. In critical moments, particularly the al-Bab offensive. OOB, by comparison, a less opaque political direc- Turkey has a large number of tanks in its arsenal; tive provided by the civilian decisionmakers to the yet its main battle tanks need significant moderniza- TAF—cutting through the fog of war in the operational tion to fulfill operational demands in battles such as theater—enabled military planners to more simply OES and OOB, especially when faced with urban translate political objectives into operational mis- warfare conditions and specifically ATGM challenges. sions. Also deficient in OES was interorganizational A breakthrough in Turkey’s armored capability is coordination among the military (army, air force, and expected with the future delivery, slated for 2020, of gendarmerie command), government agencies (e.g., 58 250 Altay main battle tanks. The absence of such MIT, AFAD), and territorial, local, and tribal proxies, tanks during OES contributed to huge material losses. creating confusion on the ground. This shortcoming The lack of effective coalition support for OES did not occur to the same extent in OOB. also betrayed operational deficiencies, particularly in Both OES and OOB also exemplify the need for CAS and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, basic principles when fighting to take and hold for- and reconnaissance (ISTAR). These two military mis- eign territory: first, for a well-developed, appropri- sions are central in guarding against quickly planned ate strategic-communication strategy; and second, suicide attacks with VBIEDs, a challenge new to the for diplomatic language aimed at setting forth clear Turkish military although not to others from the anti- intentions to other actors operating in the same envi- IS coalition. Proficiency in these missions also helps ronment, and at avoiding the impression of being an enhance situational awareness for better armor sur- occupier. Hardline statements by Turkish politicians vivability. Thus, the TAF was forced to mitigate VBIED meant for domestic consumption before and dur- and antiarmor attacks using its own insufficient means. ing the two operations showcased the exact oppo- As Can Kasapoglu and Baris Kirdemir note: site of what to say. The January 13, 2018, statement Having digested the lessons learned from Opera- by President Erdogan himself on the forthcoming tion Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch, operation was particularly blunt: “Don’t ever doubt Turkish political-military decision-makers saw the it. One night we may arrive suddenly. If terrorists in very reality that hybrid battle-spaces bring about Afrin don’t surrender, then we will raze the place on extremely dangerous situations for military person- their heads. They will see what we can do before the nel. Advancing anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) week is over.”60 In the same vein, Erdogan’s remarks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) pose men- acing threats to armor survivability, while man- during OOB raised concerns about the possibility of portable air defense systems (MANPADS) make demographic change: “The whole issue is this: 55 altitudes below 10,000–15,000 feet risky for aer- percent of Afrin is Arab, 35 percent are the Kurds ial platforms, especially for rotary-wing assets and who were later relocated, and about 7 percent are low-flying attack aircraft. Besides, hybrid adversar- Turkmen. [We aim] to give Afrin back to its righ-

POLICY NOTE 59 19 METIN GURCAN tful owners.”61 On these and other occasions, such not only prevented OES from influencing the strategic statements effectively weakened Ankara’s hand in preferences of the United States and Russia in northern talks with the United States and Russia on manag- Syria, they also encouraged YPG forces to consolidate ing the situation in northern Syria. Furthermore, both their control in northern Syria. OES and OBB clearly show that on-the-ground mili- Operationally, OOB marked a vast improvement tary efforts should be synchronized with diplomatic over OES. The TAF’s success in drawing lessons efforts. In high-sensitivity counterterrorism operations learned from the previous engagement and its inte- abroad like the two in question, maintenance of stra- gration of newly acquired military technologies into tegic communication with other actors in the opera- planning were important factors behind this improve- tional theater carries the utmost significance. In addi- ment. Yet in the end, OOB may not have changed tion, any rhetoric seen as “ethnicizing” the operation, dynamics enough to influence the strategic prefer- either implying the need for demographic change or ences of other actors with stakes in northern Syria. presenting the Turkish military as an occupying force, According to a retired U.S. colonel whose private should be avoided. company provides logistical services in northeastern Syria, OOB’s success not only assuaged U.S. skep- Conclusion ticism about the TAF’s operational effectiveness in Syria—skepticism that had surged during the months- Both Operation Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive long al-Bab siege—it also convinced U.S. officials of Branch show that while modern conventional militar- Turkey’s seriousness in seeking to deterritorialize, if not ies can be operationally effective in hybrid settings eliminate, the YPG in northern Syria at all costs and abroad where the enemy astutely and asymmetrically by all means.62 It is therefore no coincidence that after blends conventional capabilities with unconventional OOB, with Turkey having gained full control over Afrin ones, these operations may still fall short strategically. city center, Washington grew more willing to cooperate That is why this study emphasizes the significance of with Ankara to initiate a joint-patrolling deconfliction separate analysis of the operational versus strategic program in YPG-controlled Manbij. Both the resilience effectiveness of modern militaries, even as the two demonstrated by Ankara and the impact of OOB in realms are no doubt connected. Operational effec- the Afrin theater are likely now figuring in the strate- tiveness can indeed occur alongside strategic failure gic preferences of U.S. decisionmakers seeking ways (e.g., the U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq), to cooperate with Turkey in the Manbij region. This is and the inverse can occur as well (e.g., the Israeli not least because Ankara holds the power to foil the experience vs. Hezbollah in 2006). U.S. victory over the Islamic State in northern Syria, as Overall, then, what do OES and OOB say about well as upset the balance through accidental friendly the TAF’s operational effectiveness? In both campaigns, clashes with U.S. troops. But the question remains as one can suggest that tactical effectiveness was high to whether OOB could tip U.S. cooperation away from enough to achieve the desired outcomes. But at the operational level in OES, shortfalls abounded. These the YPG east of the Euphrates, and as to Turkey’s and included lack of discipline from the FSA elements, which the TAF’s broader strategic effectiveness. were designated as the operation’s primary ground Last but not least, OES, in providing a snapshot force; the failure of CAS, particularly in the capture of of the TAF just after the July 15, 2016, uprising, and al-Bab; poor military-civilian coordination; inability to OOB, in providing one of the TAF eighteen months adapt executive directives to match the evolving nature after the uprising, reveal insights on Turkey’s potential of the armed conflict; ignorance regarding armor sur- future cross-border operations into neighboring Syria vivability; and insufficient C4ISR capabilities. This all aimed at deterritorializing the YPG. Such operations makes it difficult to call OES a success story. These are likely in the coming months in light of Ankara’s operational-level problems, combined with the lack of firm stance against YPG forces controlling territory in clear political directives and uncoordinated diplomacy, northeastern Syria along the border with Turkey.

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18. “Turkey, Russia Try to Avoid Crisis,” Hurriyet Daily News, Notes Feb. 10, 2018, http://bit.ly/2EadkNz. 1. The author is inclined to consider the events of the night 19. Gareth Davies, “The £4 Million German Tank Dubbed of July 15, 2016, as an “attempted military uprising” ‘One of the Best in the World’ Is Shown Up in Syria,” rather than a coup. For the full explanation, see foot- Daily Mail, Jan. 31, 2018, https://dailym.ai/2DFHjeZ. note 1 in Metin Gurcan, Tentative Transition: Civil-Mili- 20. Christiaan Triebert, “The Battle for al-Bab: Verifying tary Relations in Turkey since the July 15 Uprising, Policy Euphrates Shield Vehicle Losses,” Bellingcat, Feb. 12, Note 48 (Washington DC: Washington Institute, 2018), 2017, http://bit.ly/2tj55bU. p. 16, https://washin.st/2GpaW80. 21. Retired Turkish general, interview by author, May 2018. 2. Tim Arango, “With Operation in Syria, Erdogan Shows 22. “TSK Harekatin Adini Acikladi: Zeytin Dali” [TAF an- His New Power over Turkey’s Military,” New York Times, nounced the name of the operation: Olive Branch], Aug. 25, 2016, https://nyti.ms/2DCdhsp. Hurriyet, Jan. 20, 2018, http://bit.ly/2N83bni. 3. Senior TGS officer, interview by author, Ankara, Apr. 2, 23. “TSK Basin Aciklamasi” [TAF press release], Turk- 2017. ish Armed Forces, Jan. 20, 2018, accessed Mar. 23, 4. Ibid.; Kareem Fahim and Sebnem Arsu, “Car Bombings 2018, from http://www.TAF.tr/BasinFaaliyetleri/BA_47 Kill Dozens in Center of Turkish Town near the Syrian [link no longer live]. Border,” New York Times, May 11, 2013, https://nyti. 24. See the full version of the release: “TSK: Zeytin Dali ms/2E8HTmH. Harekati Basladi” [TAF: Operation Olive Branch initiat- 5. Senior TGS officer, interview by author, Ankara, Apr. 2, ed], Jan. 20, 2018, http://bit.ly/2GsmYh0; “Basbakan- 2017. lik Acikladi, İste Zeytin Dali Harekati’nin 12 Nedeni” 6. Alec Luhn and Ian Black, “Erdogan Has Apologised for [Prime Ministry announced: Here are 12 reasons for Downing of Russian Jet, Kremlin Says,” Guardian, June Operation Olive Branch], CNN Turk, Jan. 22, 2018. 27, 2016, http://bit.ly/2TVh6A5. 25. In January 2018, the average temperature in Afrin was 7. Retired Turkish diplomat, interview by author, Ankara, between –2 and –4 degrees Celsius at night, between late Apr. 2018. 12 and 20 degrees in the daytime, with sunrise at 6 a.m. and sunset at 4:45 p.m. During this month, rains 8. U.S. diplomat, interview by the author, Istanbul, Apr. occur irregularly, but heavy rainfalls loosen the soil and 20, 2017. sometimes cause flooding in dry riverbeds. In addition, 9. FSA commander, interview by the author, Istanbul, early depending on the temperature difference between day Apr. 2017. and night, weather events such as intense and sustained fog can harm visibility. 10. “Erdogan’dan Rakka Aciklamasi: El Bab’dan Sonra Durmak Yok” [Raqqa statement by Erdogan: “No need 26. Can Kasapoglu and Sinan Ulgen, Operation Olive to stop after al-Bab”], BBC Turkish, Feb. 12, 2017, Branch: A Political-Military Assessment (Istanbul: EDAM, http://www.bbc.com/turkce/38948547. Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, 2018), http://bit.ly/2tkzK8N. 11. “Erdogan’in ‘Sürprizleri Var’: ‘Firat Kalkani’ Bitti, Yeni Harekatlara Yeni Isimler Verecegiz” [Euphrates Shield 27. “Turkey Launches ‘Olive Branch Operation’ Against is over: Time to initiate new operations], Diken, Apr. 3, PKK Threat in Syria,” Hurriyet Daily News, Jan. 20, 2017, http://bit.ly/2EcLssb. 2018, http://bit.ly/2tnl5d2. 12. These interviews were conducted by the author in Istan- 28. Ibid. bul in Apr.–May 2018. 29. According to official reports—and allowing for slight 13. FSA commander, interview by author, Istanbul, Apr. differences in open-source data and disregarding the 2018. combat-readiness of each platform—the full TAF inven- tory includes 289 F-16 variants and F-4 2020s. Thus, 14. Ibid. on the very first day of OOB, Turkey flew nearly one- 15. “Russian Warplane Accidentally Kills 3 Turkish Soldiers quarter of its entire fighter aircraft. in Syria’s al-Bab,” Hurriyet Daily News, Feb. 9, 2017, 30. Metin Gurcan, “Turkish Military Purges Decimate Ca- http://bit.ly/2SSivKj. reer Officers, Pilot Ranks,” Al-Monitor, May 29, 2018, 16. “Russian Airstrikes Accidentally Kill Three Turkish Sol- http://bit.ly/2DCnzJ4. diers,” Guardian, Feb. 9, 2017, http://bit.ly/2T1SclK. 31. Murat Yesiltas “How Turkey Changed Its Counter-Ter- 17. “Russian Confirms Syria Regime Conducted Airstrike on rorism Policy,” The New Turkey, June 15, 2018, https:// Turkish Soldiers,” Middle East Monitor, Nov. 26, 2016, thenewturkey.org/how-turkey-has-changed-its-counter- http://bit.ly/2SQBu80. terrorism-policy-against-the-pkk

POLICY NOTE 59 21 METIN GURCAN

32. Anadolu Agency, “Bayraktar TB2 Zeytin Dali 47. Fergus Kelly, “Turkish T129 ATAK Helicopter Shot Down Harekati’nda 4 bin Saat Uctu” [Bayraktar TB2 flew near Efrin-Turkey Border,” The Defense Post, http://bit. 4,000 hours in OOB], May 23, 2018, http://bit. ly/2V5KEuO. ly/2UXKghR. 48. “TSK Zeytin Dali’nin Bilancosunu Acikladi” [TAF an- 33. “Basbakan Yildirim: Afrin Harekati 4 Safhada Yapi- nounced OOB outcomes], TRT Haber, Mar. 18, 2018, lacak” [Prime Minister Yildirim: OOB to be conduct- http://bit.ly/2Sb0fqW. ed in 4 phases], Milliyet, Jan. 21, 2018, http://bit. 49. Retired Turkish general, interview by author. ly/2DGLtTS. 50. Kasapoglu and Ulgen, Operation Olive Branch, http:// 34. “TAF Basin Açiklamasi” [TAF press release], http://www. bit.ly/2Sb0fqW. TAF.tr/BasinFaaliyetleri/BA_50 [link no longer live]. 51. Ibid. 35. Of the villages and regions mentioned here, only Dik- metas is in Turkey; the rest are located in Syria. Still, this 52. Anadolu Agency, “Milli Savunma Bakani Canikli: text generally uses Turkish place-names given the Turk- Afrin’de Insansiz is Makinelerini Daha Fazla Kullana- ish military context. The Arabic “Sheikh,” for example, cagiz” [Defense Minister Canikli: We’ll use unmanned is expressed with the Turkish “Seyh.” military engineering vehicles more], Feb. 27, 2018, http://bit.ly/2NgThQE. 36. Necdet Ozcelik and Can Acun, Terorle Mucadelede Yeni Safha: Zeytin Dali Harekati [A new phase in coun- 53. “Insaniz Kara Araclari Göreve Hazir” [Unmanned land terterrorism: Operation Olive Branch] (Ankara: SETA, systems ready to serve], TRT Haber, Feb. 26, 2018, Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Re- http://bit.ly/2IvcqQa. search, 2018), http://bit.ly/2S363mn. 54. Anadolu Agency, “Milli Savunma Bakani Canikli,” Feb. 37. “Köyler Tek Düşüyor” [Villages fall, one by one], Sabah, 27, 2018, http://bit.ly/2NgThQE. Jan. 24, 2018, http://bit.ly/2S2Y88E. 55. “Afrin Merkeze Önce TOSUN Girecek” [First, TOSUN 38. Anadolu Agency, “Son Dakika: TAF ve ÖSO, Afrin’in will enter Afrin city center], Aksam, accessed May 1, Cenderes Belde Merkezini Ele Geçirdi” [TAF and FSA 2018, from http://bit.ly/2DRZQ7M. captured Afrin’s Jindires], Mar. 8, 2018, http://bit. 56. Anadolu Agency, “Bakan Canikli’den PULAT Açiklam- ly/2tmz1Uv. asi” [Minister Canikli talked about PULAT], Mar. 7, 39. “Zeytin Dali Harekati” [Operation Olive Branch], Turk- 2018, http://bit.ly/2TSx1Pm. ish Armed Forces, Mar. 13, 2018, accessed Mar. 23, 57. Metin Gurcan, “Turkish Military Purges Decimate Ca- 2018, http://www.TAF.tr/ZeytinDaliHarekati/ZDH_28 reer Officer, Pilot Ranks,” Al-Monitor, May 29, 2018, [link no longer live]. http://bit.ly/2DCnzJ4. 40. Ozcelik and Acun, Terorle Mucadelede Yeni Safha, 58. Metin Gurcan, “Turkey Still Working to Get Altay http://bit.ly/2S363mn. Tank Rolling,” Al-Monitor, Apr. 30, 2018, http://bit. 41. “Syria War: Turkey Suffers Deadliest Day in Afrin Of- ly/2VrwG6N. fensive,” BBC, Feb. 4, 2018, https://bbc.in/2DFbLG8. 59. Can Kasapoglu and Baris Kirdemir, The Rising Drone 42. Turkish security official, interview by author, Ankara, Power: Turkey on the Eve of Its Military Breakthrough May 2018. (Istanbul: EDAM, Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, 2018), http://bit.ly/2GA8dsu. 43. Local Kurdish journalist, interview by author, May 2018. 60. Metin Gurcan, “Ankara Might Be Awaiting Russian OK 44. Metin Gurcan, “Turkey Rolls into Afrin, Apparently on for Afrin Operation,” Al-Monitor, Jan 9, 2018, http:// Way to Manbij,” Al-Monitor, Mar. 20, 2018, http://bit. bit.ly/2Svp3dz. ly/2X2zNnb. 61. Dorian Jones, “Turkey Eyes Refugees Turning to Afrin, 45. U.S. diplomat, interview by author, Istanbul, Mar. 20, Syria,” Voice of America, Mar. 8, 2018, http://bit. 2018. ly/2H08d55. 46. Sputnik, “Double Car Bomb Blast in Syria’s Afrin 62. Retired U.S. colonel, interview by author, Istanbul, June Leaves 11 People Dead,” June 26, 2018, http://bit. 2018. ly/2Gx3RCv.

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POLICY NOTE 59 23 THE AUTHOR

METIN GURCAN, a Turkish security analyst and columnist for Al-Monitor, has been pub- lished extensively in Turkish and foreign academic journals on the changing nature of warfare, terrorism, Turkish civil-military relations, military history, and and later as an analyst officer in Turkish foreign policy. He is the the Turkish General Staff. co-editor of The Gallipoli Cam- Gurcan obtained an MA in paign: The Turkish Perspective security studies from the U.S. (Routledge, 2016) and author Naval Postgraduate School in of What Went Wrong in Afghani- Monterey with a thesis analyzing stan? Understanding Counter- the center-periphery relationship Insurgency in Tribalized Rural between Baghdad and Iraqi Kurds, Muslim Environments (Helion & focusing on Kirkuk, and a doctor- Company, 2016). ate from Bilkent University with a A 1998 honors graduate of the dissertation titled “Opening the Turkish War Academy, he joined Blackbox: The Transformation of the Turkish Special Forces, serv- the Turkish Military.” He is a former ing in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, visiting research fellow in Oxford Kyrgyzstan, Kosovo, and Iraq as University’s Changing Character a military adviser/liaison officer, of War (CCW) program.

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